Is the ATP going to be replaced by the ITP? Indo-Pacific, or community of common destiny. Indo-Pacific, Quadro and containment of China

The author of the article is General Robert B. Brown, US Army, commander of the United States Army on pacific ocean. The article was published in the March-April issue of the Military Review. Translation into Russian was carried out by the SGS-mil team, when using a link to the site is required.

The United States military is at a crossroads, facing both institutional and operational challenges. Character modern war continues to change at a rapid pace, requiring military leaders to reassess some core beliefs. This situation has led to the testing and refinement of concepts and capabilities, as well as people, so that the US Armed Forces are ready for the conflicts of today and tomorrow.

Without a doubt, any future conflict will become increasingly complex and distributed, including simultaneously with multiple actions in many areas - on land, in the air, at sea, in space, as well as in cyberspace. The emerging concept of multi-domain combat, some elements of which are described in an upcoming official publication jointly developed by the Army (Army) and the Marine Corps, is devoted to the complexity of the battlefield and its requirement for future integration .

Still in development and experimentation, this concept is already affecting operational and resource decisions, especially in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

This article introduces three themes that illustrate how we think to implement the concept of battle in many areas in the area of responsibility of the Pacific Command. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which characterizes the need for a new operating concept to integrate the entire United States military. She goes on to describe the concept of combat in many areas, including three elements that help determine the desired effects: co-integration, technology, and human development. Finally, it presents a drawing of the definition of several areas, since the concept is already applicable at the tactical level.

Strategic context of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region

Given that international position affairs in this region is weaker than ever, the concept of battle in many areas is urgently needed. The region consists of thirty-six countries that are in sixteen time zones; these countries make up more than half of the world's population and twenty-four of the thirty-six metropolitan areas on Earth, and they also cover more than half of the planet's surface area.

The region has three major economies the world, the seven largest militaries, and five of the seven partners in mutual defense agreements with the United States. According to Admiral Harry B. Harris (" junior"), Commander, United States Pacific Command," annual global trade of approximately $5.3 trillion. The US is based on unfettered access to sea lanes [such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea] $1.2 trillion. from this maritime trade destined for or exported from the United States". Besides, " Strait of Malacca alone, handles more than 25 percent of oil tanker passes and 50 percent of all transits natural gas everyday».

In addition, this area is prone to natural disasters: typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis and other events that are " more than 60 percent of natural disasters in the world". Simply put, global prosperity depends on stability and security in this vast and complex region.

These demographic and economic dynamics interact with the increased pace of technological change, adding to the political and military complexity already present in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Dramatic technological shifts being created by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, biotechnology and big data are only intensifying the military competition between geopolitical rivals.

Many of these new technological tools depend on the use of digital communications - seven billion devices connected to the Internet in 2016 and a projected fifty billion by 2020 - only increase the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its reliance on space assets to provide communications. .

Picture 1. Multinational forces marching in formation in a single unit on February 15, 2017, after the official opening ceremony of the exerciseCobraGold ("Golden Cobra") 2017, inutapao,Thailand. TeachingsCobraGold, now in its 36th year, is the largest security cooperation event in the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. This year's focus is on strengthening regional security and effectively responding to regional crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to meet common security challenges and commitments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region..

Technological shifts are also fueling and intensifying security challenges in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, with some of the world's most intractable problems among them. Challenges include:

an increasingly militant North Korea that shares increasingly effective missile technology with Iran;

‒ a rising China that defies international rules and regulations;

- revanchist Russia (Muscovy), which is increasingly trying to act in the Pacific Ocean with a provocative military position;

‒ continued nuclear support for friction between India and Pakistan;

- revitalization of violent extremist networks operating in partner countries and allies;

‒ Political and diplomatic instability resulting from changes in the executive leadership of key regional allies and partners.

The most dangerous threat in the Asia-Pacific region comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals and intent to undermine the international order. Difficult failure options and small state-run military forces backed by large military forces with internal lines of communication pose a danger of a fait accompli .

As in international regime, the military environment is also becoming more dangerous. Rivals and enemies alike have learned from the successes and failures of the US military over the past few decades. They acknowledge that US strengths based on power projection, joint operations, and technological transition have led to unprecedented tactical success. .

Thus, rivals have developed capabilities and concepts that try to eliminate these advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield for the United States Armed Forces. This has led to participation in an increasingly contested global commons, with the loss of U.S. air and sea military superiority to technology and denial tactics. Whether adversaries take gradual or sudden action, the United States needs to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, otherwise the United States risks losing its position in military, diplomatic and economic terms. .

Because of these strategic trends, both positive and negative, US and partner forces must maintain current military advantages and regain those that have been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the stability of the current international system depends on our ability to deter key actors from aggressive and harmful actions. We must break the enemy's decision-making cycles and present the enemies with multiple dilemmas that create uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. However, if aggression leads to conflict, we must be prepared to unequivocally defeat our enemies. .

This approach is the driving force behind the concept of combat in many areas (domains), which is designed to overcome technologies of failure and jointly influence all areas (i.e., domains) to create localized areas of force. These effects will re-activate the maneuver for the entire combined force operating in any region, thereby placing the enemy at a disadvantage so that US forces can gain the initiative to act. .

Elements of the concept of battle in many areas

The concept of combat in many areas may at first sound like something new, not like a traditional joint operation. There is a deal of truth in it. However, what we are trying to achieve - effects in the intersection of areas - is not entirely new. For example, at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks used both land and naval forces to defeat the invading Persians . Much closer to our time, the United States of America owes its independence to the effective use of American and French land and naval forces against the army of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown.

Other historical example is the Vicksburg Campaign during the American Civil War. With the ability to control shipping on the Mississippi River, the Vicksburg Confederate artillery, infantry, and cavalry forces presented a formidable problem of countering access and defense denials to Allied forces. Union General Ulysses S. Grant only overcame this problem by combining the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry and infantry forces with naval ships led by his staff officer Andrew Hull Foote.

The introduction of the aircraft, submarine, and aircraft carrier during World War I, and the introduction of mobile radio communications and radar systems during World War II, greatly increased the strategic commander's ability to operate simultaneously in multiple areas.

More recently, the development of air-to-land combat in the 1980s, and then air-to-sea combat in 2013, has shown that military thinking is developing along the same general line - how to achieve decisive results. Even if they are outnumbered, including technologically, by integrating operations in multiple areas to present multiple dilemmas to enemies.

The various services regularly supported each other in all areas. So when Harris says he wants the army to provide off-terrestrial effects, he's not asking for it to be done without precedent. From 1794 to 1950, the army was responsible for the defense of the coasts and ports, and later for the air defense of their homeland. The junior officer corps of the Army arose from the need during the First World War to have the proper number of technical specialists to staff army personnel and submarine fleet. The idea or desire for combat effects of intersections in many areas is not new. .

While all services are encouraged to carry out their missions in a way that is not much different from the past, there will be differences. We in the army can no longer simply focus on the land, leaving the air and sea to other services. The Marines, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard can no longer focus solely on " their» areas. We all need to better integrate planning, operations, command and control across all areas .

Achieving integration requires a new approach, a new approach. All US forces must change their culture of service to a culture of inclusion and openness, focusing on " purple (or joint) first» mentality. The Army must further integrate a mission command image where each individual is entitled to receive initiative based on his or her role and function. And he must focus on developing Leaders who thrive in ambiguity and chaos. .

1. Joint integration

It is assumed that the concept of battle in many areas (domains) will include three key areas: organization and processes, technologies, and people . Changes in organizations and processes will be aimed at providing different and more focused military tools to the joint forces to overcome the loss of US superiority or parity in certain areas, especially in the air, at sea and in cyberspace.

Army (i.e. Ground Forces) can no longer focus exclusively on the ground component. As part of the joint forces, army troops must provide other services in their areas to overcome their operational tasks and vice versa. This means that changes need to focus on greater capability, have cross-domain effects, and be more focused and effective integration across joint forces. .

At the United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) we are trying to do this in three ways:

- Firstly, is development and experimentation with flexible management teams, adaptable and scalable modules, and flexible policies in key areas.

- Secondly, most of of these experiments will be carried out as part of a redesigned exercise program designed to make all events collaborative and multinational, in order to conduct an exercise in 2018 " Pacific Fleet».
- Thirdly, we support an increase in innovation across all services in cross-company and combat team processes.

2. Technology

Another key area is technological change. We must overcome and harness the speed of technological change instead of losing our coping capabilities with acquired slow programs . The Department of Defense and the Army have already established a framework for rapid material solutions with the Strategic Capabilities Office at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Response Office at Army Department Headquarters.

These departments are doing an admirable job of reorienting current technology towards application innovation, a key ingredient in reclaiming our tactical advantage. USARPAC is closely associated with these efforts. This binding includes all the equipment in the exercises and experiments. As it has been in this theater for many years, USARPAC uses a lot of culture" combat laboratories that this team has developed over the past decade (or more).

The technology offers key tools for decision support, mortality and protection. We must use this technology to empower our men and women and increase their effectiveness. .

3. Prepared people

The final area in which the concept of combat in many areas (domains) is considered is people . The U.S. military must use its people to overcome the challenges of being outnumbered, outclassed, and " find out» from enemies and opponents.

People are America's main strategic advantage. To use this advantage, the Armed Forces must develop flexible and adaptable Leaders through education and training. . Strict iterations of decision making, including " impossible» scripts or « black swans that Soldiers don't expect can help develop critical thinking skills. Refusal should be an option, in keeping with the principle that training exercises develop Leaders who will respond better to actual conflicts.

Leaders must also receive some degree of cultural education and training that will allow them to experience different ways of thinking. . At USARPAC, we address both critical thinking and cultural understanding through the Regional Leader Development Program, which is led by staff and at the command level of the Army.

As Army advisory and advisory teams come online, we will also be including Pacific-bound unit personnel in this educational and training resource to prepare them for operations in the region. .

Figure 2. Battlefield in many areas.

Battle in many areas (domains) in practice

The following fictitious picture illustrates the concept of combat in many areas, applied at the tactical level. This example based on a hypothetical location in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say there is a chain of islands or a coastal land mass whose location would make it a decisive landform, affecting air or sea navigation or access to a strategic port. The possession of this function by some enemy would pose a serious threat to the international order, stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Let's say an enemy seizes control of this feature and announces that it is restricting commercial air and sea traffic, denying access to any nation allied with the United States. Treaty commitments would require the United States to intervene militarily, although the enemy's arsenal of weapons and electronics is substantial.

A military option that applies the concept of combat in many areas could include the use of cyberspace and space assets to temporarily blind and destroy enemy command and control systems so that the Special Task Force can advance and gain a foothold along the chain of islands. . They will then assist the amphibious forces to provide a foothold, an airfield and other major facilities necessary to establish a secure foothold.

Immediately behind them were to be army ships loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the runway (if necessary) and build up good defensive positions. Simultaneously transport aviation Air Force C-17s and C-130s bring in a ground force battalion group, a high mobility artillery battery, and specially equipped anti-ship missile defenses. And batteries of indirect fire protection systems for short-range air defense. In addition, a battery of 155mm long-range howitzers would be unloaded, using an empty aircraft, to restore their capacity for subsequent forced entry operations if necessary.

Within ninety-six hours, the main position would have been dug out and ready for the Stryker Battalion Combat Team. With Air Force manned and unmanned systems, Navy ships and underwater drones aircraft, a complex of army radar systems (such as AN / TPQ-36, AN / TPQ-37 or AN / MPQ-64 Sentinel).

As well as the air threat detection system of the Joint Network System of Ground Protection Sensors against a possible missile attack in order to see beyond the horizon. An overlapping, multi-domain sensor network would emerge that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, and deploy lethal and electronic fire support in all areas - on land, at sea, in the air, in cyberspace and in space - simultaneously.

A tactical group may be cut off from resupply or communications for an indefinite period of time. This is why this tactical group of approximately one thousand men will be able to sustain itself for thirty days, ten times the current doctrinal requirement of 72 hours for a unit of this size. .

But with advances in mobile water treatment, solar panels, wind turbines and wave and tidal power, as well as additional printers for manufacturing spare parts, such a unit can be self-sufficient for much longer than even larger previous century. They would still need fuel for their vehicles, but with drones and other autonomous platforms boosting force defenses, they could limit the need for vehicles fossil fuels and supplement organic aids with an accurate system aerial reconnaissance Air Force.

I repeat, these units could operate in extremely harsh conditions with limited resources and without a permanent land, sea or air line of communication linking them with other friendly forces. However, these men and women would be ready, with exceptional Leaders on a mission.

Practical conclusion about the concept of battle in many areas

Again, this is just a mental exercise based on how the Army forces in the Pacific think and experiment with wrestling in many areas. The application of the concept may look different in other parts of the world or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region.

However, it is clear that regardless of geography or rivalry, army units must be well led, well trained and well armed to work in different areas in support of joint forces. .

One way to ensure this is through holistic operational testing, in which the Army command component and support units work hand in hand with the concept and doctrine developers at US Army Command. This is happening in the Pacific today. We are applying co-integration, technology and people to the concept of battle in many areas by rigorously incorporating concepts and capabilities into all of our exercises, which will culminate in a major test at the Navy Ring of the Pacific in 2018. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate a multi-domain approach to combat with our planning, equipping, and Leader development efforts. .

The army should not be shy about the resource and check these efforts. Many of the concepts and capabilities offered in the Concept of Combat in Many Areas (Domains) will be needed not only for future conflicts, but also for near conflicts, which may require us to be ready " to fight today». Make no mistake: Testing and implementing a multi-domain approach will increase our readiness today, as well as prepare our men and women to win wars if the country demands it. .

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The term Indo-Pacific and its derivatives are increasingly found in English-language scientific articles, speeches by statesmen and the media.

The Indo-Pacific region is a vast maritime space, including the Indian and Pacific Oceans, as well as the shores bordering them. According to the authors of the idea, the new geographical concept should reflect the growth and interpenetration of the spheres of influence of China and India, as well as a significant increase in maritime trade flows, especially energy supplies, between East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.

The concept of "Indo-Pacific region" in the political and strategic sense was first used in 2007 in an article by Indian author Gurpreet Khuran. It is curious that earlier it was also used, but it denoted the biogeographic region of the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean, as well as the western and central parts of the Pacific Ocean, which is characterized by the commonality of many marine species. Rapidly, literally over the past one or two years, the concept of Indo-Pacific has turned from exotic into a noticeable element of international political discourse. This suggests that the new geo-concept is being purposefully and vigorously promoted.

Who promotes ITR?

Who might be interested in the Indo-Pacific? It is noteworthy that Australia, India and the United States, as well as Japan, are promoting the most enthusiastic engineers today.

India's interest is understandable. The region of the same name, “their own”, of course, flatters the great-power vanity of the Indians and increases the prestige of the country. If Delhi's belonging to the Asia-Pacific region has often been disputed, then the ITR should no longer leave any doubts about this. The Indo-Pacific concept legitimizes India's growing strategic interests in East Asia and the Western Pacific.

The United States of America needs the ITR, first of all, in order to balance the obvious strengthening of China in East Asia. It is East Asia that is the natural axis of the Asia-Pacific region. So, to paraphrase the famous dictum of Halford Mackinder, whoever controls East Asia rules the Asia-Pacific region, and later, perhaps, the whole world. The expansion of the geopolitical picture beyond the East Asian coast and its shift towards the Indian Ocean allows the introduction of new players who will “blur” the influence of China. These hopes, of course, are pinned primarily on India. It is also noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific region almost exactly corresponds to the area of responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

As for Australia, a country located at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the new geographical formula gives Canberra a chance to be in the very center of the reformulated Asia-Pacific and get rid of some marginality and peripheralness of its regional identity. It is the Australian analysts who have shown the greatest activity in developing the idea of ITR. They also do not hide the fact that one of the goals of the new region is to justify the need to maintain the leading strategic role of Canberra's main ally, Washington, in Indo-Pacific Asia.

Apparently, the idea of the ITR is also close to Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advocates that Australia, India, Japan and the United States form a "strategic diamond" configuration to ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

Region-building, that is, the purposeful creation of political regions, is not a rare phenomenon in international relations. We can recall the "Euro-Atlantic" (aka "North Atlantic") - a concept that was designed to ensure the indestructible unity of the United States and Western Europe. The same Asia-Pacific region, which has now received a competitor in the form of an engineering and technical one, is also largely an artificial formation. As Oleg Arin, the author of the book Asia-Pacific: Myths, Illusions and Reality, rightly points out, the narrative about the Asia-Pacific region, created in the 1970s–80s, was largely caused by the need for an ideological and political justification for maintaining and strengthening the dominant position of the United States in Pacific Ocean and East Asia. By the way, Russia also does not remain aloof from such regional construction projects to ensure its geopolitical interests. A striking example– promotion of the Eurasia geoconcept and the project Eurasian Union.

How successful the attempt to construct an Indo-Pacific region will be, time will tell. Obviously, not everyone will like this geopolitical construction. First of all, of course, China does not like it.

For Russia, the idea of ITR also does not promise bright prospects. The Pacific Ocean, of course, will not disappear anywhere, and Russia will not cease to be a Pacific power, but the shift of the geopolitical focus to the west from the Strait of Malacca will most likely weaken Moscow’s influence in the region: in the Pacific Ocean, our positions have never been particularly strong, let alone in Indian they are practically non-existent.

Beijing-Delhi: a new axis of world politics?

If the Indo-Pacific region nevertheless turns from a fashionable verbal construction into a geopolitical reality, it will determine the state of world politics and economics, and relations between China and India will become its main axis.

China, with a GDP of $12.4 trillion (purchasing power parity), is now second only to the United States in terms of economic power. India's figures look more modest: its GDP is almost three times inferior to China's, amounting to "only" $ 4.7 trillion (4th place in the world). India is still lagging behind China in terms of economic growth. If China has been demonstrating growth of 8–10% per year for a long time, then the growth rate of Indian GDP since the late 1990s has been about 7%, and in 2012 it even dropped to 5.4%.

The Indian economy is still noticeably inferior to the Chinese in most parameters, but it has one very important potential advantage - demographic. The fact is that China will soon enter a phase of rapid population aging, when the number of people retiring will significantly exceed the number of new workers. According to the latest census, since 2010, the working-age population (from 16 to 60 years old) in China began to decline, which was a natural consequence of low birth rates. At the same time, the number of senior citizens is growing, increasing the burden on the country's financial system. This factor will become a fundamental constraint on the further rapid growth of the Chinese economy and will create serious challenges for it.

India, on the contrary, is entering the most favorable demographic phase, when young and middle-aged people predominate in the age structure. According to UN experts, by 2030 China's population will begin to decline, and India will become the most populous country in the world. This is likely to affect the ratio of their economic potentials: the pace of China's development will slow down, while India will begin to rush forward.

It can be predicted with certainty that the Delhi-Beijing dyad, along with the Beijing-Washington axis, will act as the most important bilateral relations in the world politics of the 21st century. What will happen between the two Asian giants will directly or indirectly affect all the others. If India and China manage to come to an agreement, forming an "Asian alliance", they will easily be able to claim world hegemony.

However, such a scenario looks unlikely. Beijing and Delhi today act more as rivals than strategic partners. And apparently, their competition will intensify. Delhi has not forgotten the humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war, when the Indian army was utterly defeated by the Chinese. The Indians categorically dislike China's alliance with Pakistan and are alarmed by the growing presence of the Chinese in the Indian Ocean. In turn, the Chinese are unhappy with the increasing penetration of India into Southeast Asia, which Beijing considers its sphere of influence. Beijing is also extremely concerned about the strengthening of cooperation between Delhi and Washington.

The main reason for the flaring rivalry between the two Asian colossi is, perhaps, that they have ceased to be self-sufficient, self-centered civilizations, which they have been for millennia, and have turned into ambitious great powers that are actively asserting themselves in the international arena. One can only hope that the competition between India and China will have a peaceful and constructive outcome.

The Initiative is an organizational vision for China's foreign policy for the foreseeable future; and the heart of what has been conceptualized even before President Xi Jinping is the "peaceful rise" of China.

The Trump administration's response to the existence and scope of the Initiative has been somewhat minimalist. On the this moment everything resulted in a terminological shift from what used to be called Asia-Pacific to "Indo-Pacific". Until the last visit to Asia by the former president in September 2016, the Obama administration always spoke of the Asia-Pacific region.

The Indo-Pacific region includes South Asia and the Indian Ocean. So, from the American point of view, India's ascension to the status of a growing global superpower capable of "containing" China is implied.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson couldn't have put it more bluntly:

“The world center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. The US and India - with our shared aspirations for peace, security, freedom of navigation, and free and open architecture - should serve as the eastern and western beacons of the Indo-Pacific region. As the left and right hallmark lights by which the region can reach its greatest and best potential."

Attempts to present this as a "one approach" may mask a clear geopolitical aberration, where Indo-Pacific sounds like a remix of the Obama-era "pivot to Asia" extended to India.

The Indo-Pacific region directly touches the length of the Maritime Silk Road in the Indian Ocean, which is one of China's main connectivity routes, with clear signs of "globalization with Chinese characteristics." Like Washington, Beijing is all for free markets and open access to the common table. But from a Chinese perspective, this does not necessarily imply a single, vast US-controlled organizational network.

"Eurasifrica"?

As far as New Delhi is concerned, the use of the Indo-Pacific concept has almost entailed walking a tightrope.

Last year, both India and Pakistan became official members of the SCO, a key element of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership.

India, China and Russia are BRICS members, the president of the BRICS New Development Bank headquartered in Shanghai is Hindu. India is also a member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. And until recently, India has taken part in the Initiative.

But then things began to turn last May when Prime Minister Narendra Modi refused to attend the Initiative summit in Beijing, as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, at the Initiative's key node, appeared to cross Gilgit-Baltistan and the sensitive region Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir. and India with Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

And right there at the meeting of the Bank African Development in Gujarat, New Delhi unveiled what could be the Initiative's rival project, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), in collaboration with Japan. Couldn't be more of an "Indo-Pacific" project, actually delineating an Indo-Pacific corridor of freedom and openness funded by Japan and drawing on India's knowledge of Africa, this corridor rivals - well, what else - the Initiative.

At the moment, this is nothing more than an announced concept document of the intentions shared by Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe to create something like an Initiative, such as developing the quality of infrastructure and digital connectivity.

Well, the addendum to the AAGC is the Quadrilateral (India, USA, Japan and Australia), a kind of trick of the Japanese Foreign Minister with a project of "a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific region." That it once again contrasts "Indo-Pacific stability" and Tokyo's perception of "China's aggressive foreign policy" and "belligerence in the South China Sea" endangering what the US has always presented as "freedom of navigation."

As much as Xi and Abe have recently touted the new beginning of Sino-Japanese relations, reality says otherwise. Japan, citing the threat from the DPRK, is actually afraid of China's rapid military modernization, and will buy more American weapons. At the same time, New Delhi and Canberra are also quite concerned about China's rapid economic/military growth.

In essence, the AAGC and the Quadrangle link the Indian East Policy Act to Japan's Indo-Pacific Freedom and Opening Strategy. When comparing both documents, it does not seem at all forced to characterize the Indo-Japanese strategy as aimed at "Eurasifika".

In practice, in addition to expanding into Africa, in cooperation with India, Tokyo is seeking to expand infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia - some of which compete with or overlap with the Initiative. Meanwhile, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is considering financing options for infrastructure projects outside of the Initiative.

As it turns out, the Quadrangle is still in the making, with its "Indo-Pacific stability" set against Beijing's acknowledged desire for a "common future community" in the Asia-Pacific region. There are reasons to worry that this new configuration may actually develop into a sharp economic and political polarization of Asia.

Split at the heart of BRICS

A staggering $1.7 trillion a year is needed for infrastructure projects in Asia, according to the Asian Development Bank. In theory, Asia as a whole would benefit from a number of the Initiative's projects, along with some others that the Asian Development Bank is funding and linked to the AAGC.

Given the extremely ambitious existence and scale of the entire strategy, the Initiative is pleased with a significant starting spurt. Beijing's vast resources are already being channeled into infrastructure investment across Asia, in tandem with the export of surplus construction capacity and improved connectivity all around.

Conversely, New Delhi has sufficient industrial capacity for the needs of India itself. In fact, India desperately needs investment in infrastructure. India needs at least $1.5 trillion over the next decade, according to an extended report. And on top of everything else, India has a persistent trade deficit with China.

A tangible possible success is Indian investment in the Iranian port of Chehbahar as part of the Afghan trade strategy (see part two of the report). But enough about that.

In addition to energy and structural projects, such as the national digital identification system for citizens and residents AADHAAR (1.18 billion users) and investments in a number of industries solar energy India still has a long way to go. In the recently released General Hunger Index (GHI), India is ranked 100th out of 119 countries where child hunger has been assessed based on the following components: poor care, child mortality, malnutrition, stunting among children. This is extremely alarming - it is seven positions below the DPRK. And only seven positions above Afghanistan, at the end of the list.

New Delhi would hardly lose anything if it consciously staked on building cooperation between India and China within the BRICS framework. And this includes recognizing that the Initiative's investments are useful and even very important for the development of India's infrastructure. Doors remain open. All eyes are on December 10-11 when India hosts a trilateral ministerial meeting of Russia, India and China - all BRICS members.

It has been almost a year since Donald Trump came to power in the United States. To what extent has US policy towards Asian countries changed, and to what extent does it retain continuity? Preliminary conclusions can already be drawn, especially given that Trump made a 12-day tour in the first half of November 2017, visiting five Asian countries. On October 18, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson delivered the keynote address at the Center for Strategic and international studies in Washington. This speech preceded his visit to India and was devoted to US-Indian relations, but actually contained a number of orientation statements about US Asian policy in general. Finally, in December, a new US National Security Strategy was made public, in which a considerable place is given to the Asia-Pacific direction.

Creation of the Indo-Pacific

One of the most striking changes is in the names. As you know, the Obama administration called its strategy in the Asia-Pacific region first a "reversal" ( pivot), and then "rebalancing" ( rebalancing).Given Trump's dislike of just about anything related to the previous administration, it's no surprise that the term rebalancing has disappeared from the lexicon of top officials in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. It has not yet been replaced by an officially approved name. Nevertheless, a term has appeared that is most often heard in the speeches of Trump, Rex Tillerson and other senior American leaders on Asian issues. This is Indo-Pacific Indo-Pacific), or the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, I would conditionally call the US line in Asia that is being formed under Trump the “Indo-Pacific strategy”.

The Indo-Pacific concept was not invented by the Trump administration and has been in circulation for about a decade. It was also used under Obama, although not as actively. One of the first uses of the term "Indo-Pacific Region" (IPR) in the political-strategic sense was recorded in 2007 in an article by Indian author Gurpreet Khuran. Since then quite quickly the concept Indo-Pacific has turned from exotic into a noticeable element of international political discourse. In Washington's interpretation, the Indo-Pacific region is a vast expanse "from the western shores of India to the western coast of the United States." Tillerson emphasizes, "The Indo-Pacific - including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific and the countries that surround them - will be the most important part of the globe in the 21st century." The United States of America needs the ITR, first of all, in order to balance the obvious strengthening of China in East Asia. It is East Asia that is the natural axis of the Asia-Pacific region. So, to paraphrase Halford Mackinder's famous saying, whoever controls East Asia controls the Asia-Pacific Region, and later, perhaps, the whole world. The expansion of the geopolitical picture beyond the East Asian coast and its shift towards the Indian Ocean allows the introduction of new players who will “blur” the influence of China. These hopes are pinned primarily on India. It is also noteworthy that the Indo-Pacific region almost exactly corresponds to the area of responsibility of the US Pacific Command.

Region-building, that is, the purposeful creation of political regions, is not a rare phenomenon in international relations. We can recall the "Euro-Atlantic" (aka "North Atlantic") - a concept that was designed to ensure the indestructible unity of the United States and Western Europe. The same Asia-Pacific region, which has now received a competitor in the form of an engineering and technical one, is also largely an artificial entity. As Oleg Arin, the author of the book Asia-Pacific: Myths, Illusions and Reality, rightly points out, the narrative about the Asia-Pacific region, created in the 1970s–80s, was largely caused by the need for an ideological and political justification for maintaining and strengthening the dominant position of the United States in Pacific Ocean and East Asia. Russia also does not remain aloof from such regional building games to ensure its geopolitical interests. A striking example is the promotion of the Eurasia geoconcept and the Eurasian Union project. How successful the attempt to construct an Indo-Pacific region will be, time will tell.

For Russia, the idea of ITR does not promise bright prospects. The Pacific Ocean, of course, will not disappear anywhere, and Russia will not cease to be a Pacific power, but the shift of the geopolitical focus to the west from the Strait of Malacca will most likely weaken Moscow’s influence in the region: in the Pacific Ocean, our positions have never been particularly strong, let alone in Indian they are practically non-existent. Therefore, one should be careful about borrowing the term ITR into the official Russian lexicon. Probably, it is worth remaining faithful to the APR, although, I repeat, it also has a Western origin. It is noteworthy that the Americans speak of a "free and open Indo-Pacific." Under this firstly, implies rejection of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, which, according to Washington, poses a threat to China's geo-economic dominance in Asia. Secondly, this is freedom for American and friendly naval and air force act ( sail, fly and operate) in all parts of the Pacific and Indian Oceans in accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation. China's attempts to establish sovereignty over the South China Sea, as well as its territorial dispute with Japan, are seen as a direct encroachment on the principle of "freedom and openness." The context of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” also fits accusations addressed to China of “undermining the sovereignty of neighboring countries”, using “predatory economic methods” and turning other countries into their “satellites”.

Despite all the hysteria surrounding Russia and Moscow's alleged interference in the US elections today, Washington sees China as the main long-term geopolitical threat, not in Russia. The identification of China as a key US rival dates back to the early 2000s, when George W. Bush proclaimed China the main "strategic competitor". Since then, regardless of the change in presidential administrations, Washington has been quite consistently pursuing a policy of limiting the growth of Beijing's strategic influence. This is also recorded in Trump's National Security Strategy. Among the main rivals of the United States, the document names China first, and only after it Russia. In the list of regional priorities for American foreign policy, the Strategy puts the Indo-Pacific in first place, where again China is the main challenge. Europe - where, of course, Russia is named as the main threat - is put in second place. And the general tone of the document, in which the challenge emanating from China is portrayed more verbosely and in brighter colors than the “Russian threat”, leaves no doubt about the priorities strategic planning USA.

As mentioned above, it is India that the United States would like to assign the role of the main counterweight to China in Asia. Objectively, only India is able to balance the Chinese giant in terms of its aggregate indicators. By 2050, the Indian economy may become the second largest in the world in terms of GDP. By 2030, India's population should surpass China's, with the Indian population, with a median age of just 25 years, much younger than China's steadily aging population, which should affect economic growth, innovation, and more. Even today, the growth rate of the Indian economy exceeds that of China.

Of course, the Americans also rely on common “democratic values”. Here is a typical quote from Tillerson's speech: “The US and India are increasingly becoming global partners with ever closer strategic interests. Indians and Americans don't just share a common commitment to democracy. We have a common vision for the future…Our nations serve as two pillars of stability – on both sides of the globe…We will never have the same relationship with China, an undemocratic society, that we can have with a large democratic country.”. Such rhetoric indicates that Washington sees as its main promising partner in Asia not a fading and insecure Japan, but a growing and increasingly ambitious India. The Trump administration has clearly indicated that it intends to strengthen strategic relations with India in every possible way, both in the political-diplomatic and military spheres, including joint exercises, the supply of weapons and military technologies. It should be noted that the Trump administration's policy towards India demonstrates complete continuity with the administrations of both Obama and Bush Jr. It was under Bush Jr. that an active rapprochement between Washington and Delhi began, which continued under Obama.

However, the question remains whether India itself is ready for such a mission as the main US strategic partner in Asia, since this role inevitably means one degree or another of opposition to China. In general, Delhi is behaving rather cautiously towards China and so far there is no reason to say that India has abandoned its traditional line of "strategic autonomy", which implies avoiding too close alliances with great powers. It is significant that Delhi is not ready to participate in the "patrol" of the South China Sea to maintain the principle of freedom of navigation, which the Americans would very much like from India.

"Networkization" of military-political alliances

Allied relations with other states are one of the most important tools for maintaining and strengthening Pax Americana in key geopolitical regions, including Asia. As you know, during the presidential campaign, candidate Trump was very critical of US alliances in Europe and Asia, questioning their benefits to America. Alliances with Japan have been criticized South Korea. On this wave, many even began to predict, if not the end, then the weakening of the US's cornerstone Asian alliances. However, this did not happen in 2017. Moreover, in the case of Japan, there is even a strengthening of allied relations, which is explained by the personal friendship between Trump and Shinzo Abe, as well as by the factor of the increased “North Korean threat”.

As for South Korea, Trump's personal relationship with President Moon Jae-in is not as close as with Abe, but the institutional military-political alliance of the United States and the Republic of Korea looks quite strong today, which is also facilitated by the North Korean factor. If the US-South Korean alliance begins to weaken, this will most likely happen not on the initiative of Washington, but on the initiative of Seoul, which increasingly feels its economic and geopolitical dependence on China and tries not to irritate its giant neighbor once again (which was evidenced by the November 2017 Seoul promised Beijing not to deploy additional THAAD systems in South Korea, not to participate in the US-created regional and global missile defense systems, and not to enter into a trilateral military-political alliance with the US and Japan).

In addition, under Trump, steps were taken to restore military-political relations with Thailand, a treaty ally of the United States, relations with which deteriorated significantly under Obama after the military junta came to power in Bangkok. Traditionally, in the San Francisco system, there were only two-way vertical links between Washington and the junior allies, while there were practically no horizontal links between the latter. Neither the US nor their Pacific clients were particularly interested in going beyond the time-honored “axle and spoke” model ( hub and spokes). However, since the 2000s, American diplomacy has taken a course towards promoting military-political cooperation between the "spokes" - junior allies and partners. It develops both in bilateral and multilateral formats. In addition to its traditional allies, the United States is actively involving new partners in these strategic alliances, primarily India and Vietnam. In a number of cases (for example, in the Japan-USA-Australia triangle), Washington is a direct participant and leader. In others (for example, India-Australia-Japan, the Philippines-Japan, South Korea-Australia), the Americans are formally absent, but even in these cases there is little doubt that the process is taking place with the blessing of Washington.

The most developed is the Australian-US-Japanese Triangle, officially launched in 2002 with the launch of the Security Dialogue at the level of senior officials. Since 2006, it has been held at the ministerial level and is called the Tripartite Strategic Dialogue. Since 2011, a US-India-Japan trilateral dialogue (at the level of deputy ministers) has been held, and in September 2015, the first trilateral ministerial meeting was held. Since 2015, Japan has joined as the third permanent participant in the large-scale US-Indian naval exercise Malabar. In June 2015, the first trilateral meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of India, Japan and Australia took place in Delhi. Thus, the “axle and spokes” system gradually transforms into a “network”, the nodes of which are connected by numerous connections, although with varying degrees of formalization and intensity. The main "hub" of the network, which manages its construction and operation, is still the United States.

Under Trump, the “networking” trend has continued and developed further. On the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila in November 2017, another trilateral summit of the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia was held, which confirmed the viability of the trilateral coalition. But the most significant event was the meeting in Manila in the Quartet format ( Quad), consisting of the US, Japan, and Australia and India. The US and Japan have been promoting the idea of the Quartet for quite some time, but have not received support from Canberra and Delhi, who did not want to provoke China once again: everyone understands that the Quartet has a distinct flavor of containing China. That is why the first meeting in a quadripartite format, which took place in 2007 at the initiative of Japan (this was during Shinzo Abe's first term as prime minister), did not continue afterwards. And now the Quartet is being revived, although so far it has not been a meeting at the level of leaders of states or ministers, but only of senior officials. Significantly, in a communiqué following the meeting, all four sides declared their commitment to a "free and open Indo-Pacific."

From “free” trade to “fair”

If the US military-political strategy in the Asia-Pacific region has remained basically the same, then the same cannot be said about the sphere of trade and economic relations, where the protectionist inclinations of the Trump administration were fully manifested. The Trump administration's emphasis is not on "free trade" ( free trade), but to "fair trade" ( fair trade). Trump famously withdrew the US from the Obama administration's multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership and signaled that the US would prioritize bilateral trade and economic agreements, as such a format gives America much more leverage in negotiations. In abandoning the Chamber of Commerce, the Trump administration has opted for the obvious and short-term trade advantages over the long-term prospect of building an economic regime in the Asia-Pacific region — and the world at large — based on the model of liberal post-industrial capitalism that until recently was the basis of US foreign economic policy. It is not yet entirely clear how exactly the withdrawal from the Chamber of Commerce, as well as the desire of the United States to change the free trade agreement with South Korea, will affect Washington's strategic position in the region, whether they will lead to a weakening of US influence and a strengthening of China's position, how quickly and to what extent.

North Korea factor

Finally, North Korea has become another fundamentally new factor influencing US policy in the Asia-Pacific region. Trump's coming to power coincided with the moment when the North Korean nuclear missile program began to pose a real threat to the United States (possible or expected soon the DPRK will have an intercontinental ballistic missile, a thermonuclear warhead, etc.). Trump, like any American president in his place, must respond to this. North Korea has become one of the main items on the American agenda in the Asia-Pacific region, which has also affected relations with China. Washington proceeds from the premise that only Beijing, which essentially controls the vast majority of North Korea's foreign economic contacts, is capable of forcing Pyongyang to back down. The Americans are counting on the Chinese to impose harsh economic sanctions on North Korea and possibly use some additional leverage they have with regard to the North Korean regime. Dependence on Beijing in the North Korean issue makes Trump seek friendship with Xi Jinping. This is one of the main reasons why Trump abruptly abandoned his campaign anti-China rhetoric.

In exchange for cooperation on North Korea, the White House is willing to make concessions to China on trade and perhaps even on Taiwan and the South China Sea. Significantly, in the early months of the Trump administration, the United States famously conducted several “freedom of navigation operations” ( FONOPs) in close proximity to Chinese-controlled islets in the South China Sea, but as the Korean Crisis escalated, these operations ceased (at least there is no public information about them). The Trump administration clearly does not want to quarrel with Beijing and is not making serious attempts to block Chinese expansion in the South China Sea. A number of American analysts believe that even under Obama, Washington has actually come to terms with Chinese expansion in the South China Sea and are calling on the Trump administration for a much more decisive rebuff, including by militarizing the South China Sea through the supply of modern American weapons to China's opponents in Southeast Asia. But Trump is unlikely to do so as long as North Korea is perceived as the main immediate threat and there is hope for China's help in eliminating it.

Not everyone in Washington believes that China is ready to help solve the North Korean problem. Thus, a prominent conservative Republican senator and Trump ally Tom Cotton, who is tipped to be the director of the CIA, is sure that China is playing a double game. In his opinion, the presence of a nuclear North Korea is beneficial to Beijing, as it diverts US attention from economic expansion and other hostile actions taken by China. It is impossible not to admit that there is a rational grain in these statements. On the one hand, North Korea is a headache for China. But, on the other hand, it can be used as a trump card in bargaining with the US on other important issues for China. Therefore, Beijing is hardly interested in a complete and final solution of the North Korean issue.

Conclusion

So, in 2017 - the first year of the Trump administration - US policy in the Asia-Pacific region was characterized by both significant elements of continuity that it perceived from previous administrations, and differences. Continuity - identifying China as the main geopolitical challenge for America, relying on India as China's most important potential balancer, as well as strengthening and expanding Washington's network of alliances and military-political partnerships, where the most notable event was the revival of the "quartet" (USA, Japan , Australia, India). This network is again aimed at the long-term strategic deterrence of China. The most significant changes took place in the area of trade policy: a turn from the ideology of “free trade” and a liberal globalization agenda based on multilateral regional blocs to protectionism, an emphasis on bilateral agreements, and the associated withdrawal from the TPP.

North Korea has become a new factor that has made noticeable adjustments to the US Asia-Pacific policy. Largely because of the need to enlist the support of Beijing in the pressure on North Korea, Trump turned his anger into mercy in relations with China. However, the big question remains how US-China relations will develop if China's actions on North Korea do not lead to the result Washington wants or if the White House begins to suspect Beijing of a double game and unwillingness to finally resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. In this case, a sharp and significant deterioration in relations between the US and China cannot be ruled out.

While new concept As the Indo-Pacific region continues to dominate the media headlines, the recent reorientation of Indian diplomacy speaks of a renewed appreciation for the importance of Eurasia, what US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski called the world's "great geopolitical chessboard". To understand the significance of this strategic space, it is useful to compare it with the dynamics of developments in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Indo-Pacific region is a union of two maritime geographic regions, formed over several decades under the influence of the US presence and its military-political strategy. The rise of China's influence is challenging the status quo, and New Delhi is seeking to forge a new alliance of like-minded countries to maintain an order that benefits India's interests.

Eurasia is the intersection of two continental and normative spaces: Europe and Asia. Russia is an archetypal Eurasian power; its foreign policy is shaped in equal measure by the ever-changing dynamics in Asia and Europe, and balanced by NATO policy. As in the Indo-Pacific region, new cooperation projects are also emerging in this region in connection with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Given this state of affairs, and its interaction with Moscow.

The whole complexity of India's foreign policy lies in maneuvering between these two regions. Delhi maintains partnerships with Washington in the Indo-Pacific region, but India's cooperation in Eurasia is falling apart due to key differences in assessing the security dynamics in the region, especially in the context of India's cooperation with Iran and Moscow. Interaction of India with Eurasia is further complicated by the partnership between Moscow and Beijing on projects for the development of communication systems and the emerging opportunity for interaction between the two states in the Indo-Pacific region.

The situation is very similar to the dilemma of Britain late XIX century, when London sought to cooperate with France to neutralize the challenge from Germany on the Continent and maintain the balance of power in Europe, but resisted French attempts to establish its supremacy at sea in Asia. All comparisons end there, for the first signs of Britain's decline were then already evident and thus London's room for maneuver was limited. India, on the other hand, is on the rise.

However, these complicated relationship within the triangle increase tension and uncertainty between India and Russia, given that the Indo-Pacific region and Eurasia are not clearly separated strategic theaters. To put it mildly, partnerships with Washington at sea and with Russia on the continent represent a delicate balance for any country. However, two facts indicate that this state of affairs will continue with regard to India in the future.

First, India is a rising economic power. It is estimated to become the world's second largest economy by PPP in the 2040s. The fact is that the $1.6 trillion Russian economy simply cannot provide New Delhi with the required investment opportunities and commercial partnerships. Washington, on the other hand, is a vibrant and global economy that can help India grow with finance and technology. The long-term presence of the navy in America and the partnership in the Indo-Pacific region also contribute to the integration of India and the strengthening of its regional leadership.

Second, Delhi cannot allow this alliance with Washington to jeopardize its security relationship with Moscow. Indeed, India is well aware that no other country will help build a defense capability the way Russia is already doing, whether it be by leasing a nuclear submarine, jointly developing Brahmos-type missile systems, or selling S-400 missile defense systems. Ultimately, India will make these deals despite the threat of US sanctions, as it must prioritize its security interests over American goodwill.

In Eurasia, these realities complicate things. Engagement with Moscow remains critical if India is to be able to respond to intractable conflicts in Afghanistan, persistent security threats in the Middle East and Central Asia, and China's constant westward expansion. Such a partnership could prevent the SCO from becoming a de facto police force under China's Belt and Road Initiative and, in return, give the forum a more legitimate and pluralistic voice in Eurasian dialogues on connectivity, finance, security and development.

Therefore, the “axis of convenience” between Russia and China is rather an axis of dependence. China is the only country capable of protecting Moscow from American pressure. India cannot do the same politically or economically, leaving Moscow few options. And while Washington has shown some flexibility in seeking to exempt India's defense purchases from sanctions, America's security priorities in Eurasia run deep - and hostility towards Russia runs deep in its foreign policy. It is not entirely clear yet where Washington is drawing a red line on India.

Increasingly, New Delhi is teetering on the edge between the political realities of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region. In the Indo-Pacific, geographic, economic and political vectors are much more favorable to India. Eurasia is a fundamentally different situation, and India's pivot will be based on the strength of its bilateral relationship with Moscow. New Delhi must evaluate its interests in the region, communicate mutually acceptable freedom of partnership, and rethink its relationship with Russia in the 21st century.