Soviet diplomacy during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War.

Introduction

World War II is the largest conflict in human history. 61 states of the world took part in the war, on whose territory 80% of the world's population lived. Military operations were conducted on all oceans, in Eurasia, Africa and Oceania. 110 million people were drafted into the armies of the warring countries. In total, the war drew 3/4 of the population into its orbit the globe. If the First World War lasted a little more than 4 years, then the Second - 6 years. It has also become the most destructive of all wars.

The Second World War differed from the First World War in the very nature of military operations. If the First was primarily a positional war, in which the defense was stronger than the attack, then during the Second - the widespread use of tanks, aviation, the motorization of the army and the strengthening of its firepower made it possible to break through the enemy's defenses and quickly go to his rear. Warfare has become more agile, combat operations more dynamic, their geographical scope wider. Moreover, during the war, the destructive power of weapons continued to increase: by the end of it, rocket and nuclear weapons appeared - the most terrible weapon of the 20th century.

The Second World War was the result of the purposeful activity of a small group of aggressor states, which the world community was unable to curb. What did these countries and their leaders bring to the peoples of the world? The elimination of democracy, racial and national oppression, the assertion of the right of the strong in international relations. Whatever the world was like in the 1920s and 30s, however far from perfection it was, their victory would mean a step back in world history. It would open the way for the social, political and cultural degradation of mankind. And therefore, all those who fought against the aggressors fought a just fight, regardless of what the motives of this struggle were for each of its participants. At the same time, it must be borne in mind that among the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition there was also a totalitarian state - the USSR. For the Soviet people, liberation anti-fascist war did not become a movement towards democracy. Rather, on the contrary, paradoxically, the war contributed to the strengthening of totalitarianism. But this does not in the least diminish the contribution of the USSR to the defeat of fascism.

The Second World War was also distinguished by a very active diplomacy, both overt and covert. The internal contradictions in both coalitions were such that initially they ensured the very possibility of Hitlerite aggression, and later left Hitler with chances for separate negotiations, chances that, fortunately, could not be realized. The relevance of this study stems from the fact that the experience of the Second World War shows that diplomacy can be more important than military force.

The purpose of the work is to study the peculiarities of the diplomacy of the aggressor countries in the Second World War. To achieve this goal, this paper examines the diplomatic steps of both the countries of the Hitlerite axis. So did the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition in prewar period and in the course of combat operations.

In this work, the author relied both on publications (primarily publications of the Soviet period, which were largely propaganda in nature) and on materials on the Internet. Which provides information obtained in the last years of the 20th century, after the disclosure of a number of secret archives, analysis of foreign sources, memoirs of German politicians and military leaders.

1.The strategy of the German high command

The Second World War of 1939-1945, a war prepared by the forces of international imperialist reaction and unleashed by the main aggressive states - fascist Germany, fascist Italy and militaristic Japan. The Second World War, like the First, arose due to the operation of the law of uneven development of the capitalist countries under imperialism and was the result of a sharp aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions, the struggle for markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence and investment of capital. The war began in conditions when capitalism was no longer an all-encompassing system, when the world's first socialist state, the USSR, existed and was growing stronger. The split of the world into two systems led to the emergence of the main contradiction of the era - between socialism and capitalism.

Inter-imperialist contradictions have ceased to be the only factor in world politics. They developed in parallel and in interaction with the contradictions between the two systems. The warring capitalist groups, fighting each other, simultaneously sought to destroy the USSR. However, World War II began as a clash between two coalitions of major capitalist powers. It was imperialist in origin, its originators were the imperialists of all countries, the system of modern capitalism. Hitlerite Germany, which led the bloc of fascist aggressors, bears special responsibility for its emergence. On the part of the states of the fascist bloc, the war bore an imperialist character throughout its entire length. On the part of the states fighting against the fascist aggressors and their allies, the nature of the war was gradually changing. Under the influence of the national liberation struggle of the peoples, the war was being transformed into a just, anti-fascist one. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the states of the fascist bloc that treacherously attacked it completed this process.

Preparation and outbreak of war. The forces that unleashed World War II, long before it began, were preparing strategic and political positions advantageous for the aggressors. In the 30s. Two main centers of military danger formed in the world: Germany - in Europe, Japan - in the Far East. Strengthened German imperialism, under the pretext of eliminating the injustices of the Versailles system, began to demand a redistribution of the world in its favor. The establishment in Germany in 1933 of a terrorist fascist dictatorship, which fulfilled the demands of the most reactionary and chauvinist circles of monopoly capital, turned that country into a strike force of imperialism directed primarily against the USSR. However, the plans of German fascism were not limited to the enslavement of the peoples of the Soviet Union. The fascist program for the conquest of world domination provided for the transformation of Germany into the center of a gigantic colonial empire, the power and influence of which would extend to the whole of Europe and the richest regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the mass extermination of the population in the conquered countries, especially in the countries of Eastern Europe. The fascist elite planned to start implementing this program from the countries of Central Europe, then spreading it to the entire continent. The defeat and capture of the Soviet Union, with the aim of primarily destroying the center of the international communist and working-class movement, as well as expanding the "living space" of German imperialism, was the most important political task of fascism and, at the same time, the main prerequisite for the further successful deployment of aggression on a world scale. The imperialists of Italy and Japan also aspired to redistribute the world and establish a "new order". Thus, the plans of the Nazis and their allies posed a serious threat not only to the USSR, but also to Great Britain, France, and the USA. However, the ruling circles of the Western powers, driven by a sense of class hatred for the Soviet state, under the guise of "non-intervention" and "neutrality", essentially pursued a policy of complicity with the fascist aggressors, hoping to avert the threat of a fascist invasion from their countries, to weaken their imperialist rivals by the forces of the Soviet Union, and then with their help to destroy the USSR. They relied on the mutual exhaustion of the USSR and Nazi Germany in a protracted and destructive war.

The French ruling elite, pushing Hitler's aggression to the East in the prewar years and waging a struggle against the communist movement inside the country, at the same time feared a new German invasion, sought a close military alliance with Great Britain, strengthened the eastern borders by building the Maginot Line and deploying armed forces against Germany. The British government sought to strengthen the British colonial empire and sent troops and naval forces to its key areas (the Middle East, Singapore, India). Pursuing a policy of complicity with aggressors in Europe, the government of N. Chamberlain, right up to the start of the war and in its first months, hoped for an agreement with Hitler at the expense of the USSR. In the event of aggression against France, it hoped that the French armed forces, repelling the aggression together with the British expeditionary forces and British aviation formations, would ensure the security of the British Isles. Before the war, the US ruling circles supported Germany economically and thus contributed to the reconstruction of the German military potential. With the outbreak of the war, they were forced to change their political course somewhat and, as fascist aggression expanded, they switched to supporting Great Britain and France.

The Soviet Union, in a situation of increasing military danger, pursued a policy aimed at curbing the aggressor and creating a reliable system for ensuring peace. On May 2, 1935, the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance was signed in Paris. On May 16, 1935, the Soviet Union concluded an agreement on mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government fought to create a system of collective security that could become an effective means of preventing war and ensuring peace. At the same time, the Soviet state carried out a set of measures aimed at strengthening the country's defense and developing its military and economic potential.

In the 30s. Hitler's government launched diplomatic, strategic and economic preparations for a world war. In October 1933, Germany left the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932-1935. and announced her withdrawal from the League of Nations. On March 16, 1935, Hitler violated the military articles of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 and introduced universal military service in the country. In March 1936, German troops occupied the demilitarized Rhineland. In November 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, which Italy joined in 1937.

Let us dwell in more detail on the reaction of France and England to the first serious act of German aggression. After 28,000 German soldiers ended up in the Rhine zone on March 9, 1936, the French showed indecision, limiting themselves only to diplomatic notes. Meanwhile, Hitler considered this action as a "touchstone". He told his translator: “... If the French had answered the same, we would have been forced to leave with our tail between our legs. After all, our military resources were insufficient.”

In Paris, the member states of the Locarno Pact could not reach an agreed decision, and French Foreign Minister Flandin flew to London for help. The position of England was stated by Lord Lothian: "In the end, the Germans came to their backyards." And Neville Chamberlain, who was being groomed to succeed Baldwin, told Flandin that public opinion was against violent sanctions, and wrote in his diary: “He thinks that if France and England keep a united front, Germany will yield without war. We cannot consider this an adequate assessment of the behavior of a crazy dictator.”

Three days later, Hitler decisively ignored the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations, which unanimously condemned Germany's disregard for international treaties.

The activation of the aggressive forces of imperialism led to a number of international political crises and local wars. As a result of the aggressive wars of Japan against China (started in 1931), Italy against Ethiopia (1935-1936), German-Italian intervention in Spain (1936-1939), the fascist states strengthened their positions in Europe, Africa, Asia .

Using the policy of "non-intervention" pursued by Great Britain and France, fascist Germany in March 1938 captured Austria and began to prepare an attack on Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had a well-trained army, based on a powerful system of border fortifications; treaties with France (1924) and with the USSR (1935) provided for military assistance from these powers to Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its readiness to fulfill its obligations and provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia, even if France does not do this. However, the government of E. Benes did not accept the help of the USSR. As a result of the Munich Agreement of 1938, the ruling circles of Great Britain and France, supported by the United States, betrayed Czechoslovakia, agreed to the seizure of the Sudetenland by Germany, hoping in this way to open the "way to the East" for Nazi Germany. The hands of the fascist leadership were untied for aggression.

At the end of 1938, the ruling circles of fascist Germany launched a diplomatic offensive against Poland, creating the so-called Danzig crisis, the meaning of which was to carry out aggression against Poland under the guise of demands to eliminate the "injustices of Versailles" against the free city of Danzig. In March 1939, Germany completely occupied Czechoslovakia, created a puppet fascist "state" - Slovakia, seized the Memel region from Lithuania and imposed an enslaving "economic" treaty on Romania. Italy occupied Albania in April 1939. In response to the expansion of fascist aggression, the governments of Great Britain and France, in order to protect their economic and political interests in Europe, provided "guarantees of independence" to Poland, Romania, Greece and Turkey. France also pledged military assistance to Poland in the event of an attack by Germany. In April - May 1939, Germany denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935, tore up the non-aggression agreement concluded in 1934 with Poland and concluded with Italy the so-called Steel Pact, according to which the Italian government pledged to help Germany if it enters into war with the Western powers.

In this situation, the British and French governments, under the influence of public opinion, out of fear of further strengthening of Germany and with the aim of putting pressure on it, entered into negotiations with the USSR, held in Moscow in the summer of 1939. However, the Western powers did not agree to the conclusion of the agreement proposed by the USSR on joint struggle against the aggressor. Offering the Soviet Union to take unilateral obligations to help any European neighbor in the event of an attack on it, the Western powers wanted to draw the USSR into a one-on-one war against Germany. Negotiations, which lasted until mid-August 1939, did not produce results due to the sabotage by Paris and London of Soviet constructive proposals. Leading the Moscow negotiations to a breakdown, the British government at the same time entered into secret contacts with the Nazis through their ambassador in London, G. Dirksen, seeking to achieve an agreement on the redistribution of the world at the expense of the USSR. The position of the Western powers predetermined the failure of the Moscow negotiations and confronted the Soviet Union with an alternative: to be isolated in the face of a direct threat of an attack by fascist Germany or, having exhausted the possibilities of concluding an alliance with Great Britain and France, to sign a non-aggression pact proposed by Germany and thereby postpone the threat of war. The situation made the second choice inevitable. The Soviet-German treaty concluded on August 23, 1939 contributed to the fact that, contrary to the calculations of Western politicians, the world war began with a clash within the capitalist world.

On the eve of World War II, German fascism, through the accelerated development of the war economy, created a powerful military potential. In 1933-1939. spending on armaments increased more than 12 times and reached 37 billion marks.

The strategy of the German High Command was based on the doctrine of "total war". Its main content was the concept of "blitzkrieg", according to which victory must be won in the shortest possible time, before the enemy fully deploys his armed forces and military-economic potential. The strategic plan of the fascist German command was to attack Poland under the guise of limited forces in the West and quickly defeat its armed forces. 61 divisions and 2 brigades were deployed against Poland. The Polish command, counting on military assistance guaranteed by Great Britain and France, intended to defend the border zone and go on the offensive after the French army and British aviation diverted German forces from the Polish front.

The French plan for the conduct of the war against Germany in accordance with the political course pursued by France and military doctrine French command provided for the defense of the "Maginot Line" and the entry of troops into Belgium and the Netherlands.

September 1939 Germany attacked Poland. On September 3, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany. With an overwhelming superiority of forces over the Polish army and by concentrating a mass of tanks and aircraft on the main sectors of the front, the Hitlerite command was able to achieve major operational results from the beginning of the war. The incomplete deployment of forces, the lack of help from the Allies, the weakness of the centralized leadership and its subsequent collapse put the Polish army in front of a catastrophe.

The courageous resistance of the Polish troops near Mokra, Mlawa, on the Bzura, the defense of Modlin, Westerplatte and the heroic 20-day defense of Warsaw (September 8-28) wrote bright pages in the history of the German-Polish war, but could not prevent the defeat of Poland. Hitler's troops surrounded a number of groupings of the Polish army west of the Vistula, transferred hostilities to the eastern regions of the country, and completed its occupation in early October.

September, by order of the Soviet government, the troops of the Red Army crossed the border of the collapsed Polish state and began a liberation campaign in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. After the liberation of the Western Belorussian and Western Ukrainian lands by the Red Army, Western Ukraine (November 1, 1939) and Western Belarus (November 2, 1939) were reunited with the Ukrainian SSR and the BSSR, respectively.

In late September - early October 1939, Soviet-Estonian, Soviet-Latvian and Soviet-Lithuanian mutual assistance treaties were signed, which prevented Nazi Germany from seizing the Baltic countries and turning them into a military foothold against the USSR. In August 1940, after the overthrow of the bourgeois governments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, these countries, in accordance with the desire of their peoples, were admitted to the USSR.

The governments of Great Britain and France, after the outbreak of the war until May 1940, continued only in a slightly modified form the pre-war foreign policy, which was based on reconciliation with Nazi Germany on the basis of anti-communism and the direction of its aggression against the USSR. Despite the declaration of war, the French armed forces and the British Expeditionary Force (began to arrive in France from mid-September) were inactive for 9 months. During this period, known as the "strange war", the Nazi army was preparing for an offensive against the countries of Western Europe. From the end of September 1939, active military operations were carried out only on sea lanes. To blockade Great Britain, the Nazi command used the forces of the fleet, especially submarines and large ships (raiders).

In April - May 1940, the German armed forces captured Norway and Denmark in order to strengthen German positions in the Atlantic and Northern Europe. The occupation of Norway was facilitated by the Nazis by the actions of the Norwegian "fifth column" headed by V. Quisling. The country turned into a Nazi base in northern Europe.

At dawn on May 10, 1940, after careful preparation, the Nazi troops invaded Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and then through their territories and into France. On May 28, Belgium capitulated. The English and part of the French troops, surrounded in the Dunkirk area, managed, having lost all military equipment, to evacuate to Great Britain.

At the 2nd stage of the summer campaign of 1940, the Nazi army, with much superior forces, broke through the front hastily created by the French along the river. Somme and En. Without exhausting the possibilities of resistance, the French armed forces laid down their arms.

The Compiègne armistice of 1940 (signed on June 22) was a milestone in the policy of national treason pursued by the Pétain government, which expressed the interests of a part of the French bourgeoisie that was oriented towards Nazi Germany. This truce was aimed at strangling the national liberation struggle of the French people. According to its terms, an occupation regime was established in the northern and central parts of France. Industrial, raw materials, food resources of France were under the control of Germany.

At the end of June 1940, the Free French Committee headed by General Charles de Gaulle was formed in London to lead the struggle for the liberation of France from the Nazi invaders and their henchmen.

June 1940, Italy entered the war against Great Britain and France, striving to establish dominance in the basin mediterranean sea. In August, Italian troops captured British Somalia, part of Kenya and Sudan, and in mid-September invaded Egypt from Libya in order to break through to Suez. However, they were soon stopped, and in December 1940 they were driven back by the British. The Italian attempt, launched in October 1940, to develop an offensive from Albania to Greece was resolutely repelled by the Greek army, which inflicted a number of strong retaliatory blows on the Italian troops.

In the fall of 1940, Hitler tried to negotiate with Franco on the performance of Spain on the side of Germany against the British. The expulsion of the British from Gibraltar would allow the aggressor to close the Mediterranean to the British fleet. And this, in turn, would mean obtaining serious advantages in Germany's military operations in North Africa.

Spanish Minister of the Interior Ramon Serrano Suner first held talks with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and was dissatisfied with the arrogance of the latter. However, the next day, Suner was very warmly received by Hitler. Hitler hinted at the desirability of Spain's active participation in the hostilities, and in response to a request for Spanish help with artillery in the Gibraltar area, the Fuhrer, in terms of numbers, argued that aviation would be more effective there, especially dive bombers, and assured Sunyer, amazed by the Fuhrer's technical knowledge, that Germany will do everything to strengthen Spain.

Upon his return to Spain, the minister advised Franco to accept Hitler's proposal for a meeting of the two heads of state on the Spanish border for more detailed negotiations. For his part, Hitler sent a personal message to Franco, in which he expressed his wish that Spain enter the war on the side of the Axis powers, and suggested that it be timed to coincide with the capture of Gibraltar. In this case, Germany will provide Spain with military and economic assistance. In his September 22 reply, Franco seemed to agree with Hitler's proposal, but Serrano Suñer's meeting with Ribbentrop two days later revealed contradictions: Spain politely but firmly rejected German claims to several strategically important islands off the coast of Africa.

However, this German diplomatic failure was compensated for a few days later. in Berlin, a tripartite pact was signed between Germany, Japan and Italy, according to which Japan recognized the leading role of Germany and Italy in Europe, and they agreed with its dominance in Asia. The three powers promised to "render each other assistance by all political, economic and military means."

The failure in negotiations with Spain and the presence of the British fleet in the Mediterranean led to a number of negative military consequences for Germany. In January - May 1941, British troops expelled the Italians from British Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Italian Somalia, Eritrea. Mussolini was forced in January 1941 to ask for help from Hitler. In the spring, German troops were sent to North Africa, forming the so-called African Corps, headed by General E. Rommel. Going on the offensive on March 31, the Italo-German troops reached the Libyan-Egyptian border in the second half of April.

And in the future, Franco sought to pursue an evasive policy, agreeing with Hitler in words, but avoiding an armed conflict with Britain. Franco argued that the British would never surrender, they would attract the United States to their side.

In July 1940, secret negotiations began between the air and naval headquarters of the United States and Great Britain, culminating in the signing on September 2 of an agreement on the transfer of the last 50 obsolete American destroyers in exchange for British military bases in the Western Hemisphere (given to the United States for a period of 99 years). Destroyers were required to fight on the Atlantic communications.

July 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the invasion of Great Britain (Operation Sea Lion). Since August 1940, the Nazis began massive bombardments of Great Britain in order to undermine its military and economic potential, demoralize the population, prepare an invasion, and ultimately force it to surrender. As a result of air raids that continued until May 1941, the Nazi leadership was unable to force Great Britain to capitulate, destroy its industry, and undermine the morale of the population.

However, the main reason for Hitler's refusal to invade Great Britain was the decision he made back in the summer of 1940 on aggression against the Soviet Union. Having begun direct preparations for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi leadership was forced to transfer forces from the West to the East, to direct huge resources for the development of ground forces, and not the fleet necessary to fight against Great Britain. In autumn, the preparations for war against the USSR removed the direct threat of a German invasion of Great Britain. The plans for preparing an attack on the USSR were closely connected with the strengthening of the aggressive alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan, which found expression in the signing of the Berlin Pact on September 27, 1940.

Preparing an attack on the USSR, fascist Germany carried out aggression in the Balkans in the spring of 1941.

March fascist German troops entered Bulgaria, which joined the Berlin Pact; On April 6, Italo-German and then Hungarian troops invaded Yugoslavia and Greece and occupied Yugoslavia by April 18 and mainland Greece by April 29. Puppet fascist "states" - Croatia and Serbia - were created on the territory of Yugoslavia. From May 20 to June 2, the fascist German command carried out the Crete airborne operation of 1941, during which Crete and other Greek islands in the Aegean were captured.

The military successes of fascist Germany in the first period of the war were largely due to the fact that its opponents, who possessed an overall higher industrial and economic potential, were unable to pool their resources, create a unified system of military leadership, and develop unified effective war plans.

The economic resources of most European states were put at the service of the war, primarily the war being prepared against the USSR. In the occupied territories, as well as in Germany itself, the Nazis established a terrorist regime, exterminating all those who were dissatisfied or suspected of discontent.

Military successes allowed Hitler's diplomacy to expand the boundaries of the fascist bloc, to consolidate the accession to it of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland (which were headed by reactionary governments closely connected with fascist Germany and dependent on it), plant their agents and strengthen their positions in the Middle East, in parts of Africa and Latin America. At the same time, the political self-exposure of the Nazi regime took place, hatred for it grew not only among the general population, but also among the ruling classes of the capitalist countries, and the Resistance Movement began. In the face of the fascist threat, the ruling circles of the Western powers, primarily Great Britain, were forced to revise their previous political course aimed at condoning fascist aggression, and gradually replace it with a course towards the fight against fascism.

Gradually, the US government began to revise its foreign policy course. It increasingly actively supported Great Britain, becoming its "non-belligerent ally". In May 1940, Congress approved an amount of 3 billion dollars for the needs of the army and navy, and in the summer - 6.5 billion, including 4 billion for the construction of a "fleet of two oceans." US troops occupied Greenland and Iceland and established bases there. The North Atlantic was declared a "patrol zone" for the US Navy, which at the same time began to be used to escort merchant ships bound for the UK.

June 1941 Nazi Germany treacherously and suddenly attacked the Soviet Union. This attack completed the long course of the anti-Soviet policy of German fascism, which sought to destroy the world's first socialist state and seize its richest resources. Against the Soviet Union, fascist Germany threw 77% of the personnel of the armed forces, the bulk of tanks and aircraft, that is, the main most combat-ready forces of the fascist Wehrmacht. Together with Germany, Hungary, Romania, Finland and Italy entered the war against the USSR. The Soviet-German front became the main front of the war. From now on, the struggle of the Soviet Union against fascism decided the outcome of the Second World War, the fate of mankind.

As a result of the surprise attack, the superior forces of the Nazi troops succeeded in the first weeks of the war in penetrating deeply into Soviet territory. By the end of the first decade of July, the enemy captured Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, a significant part of Ukraine, part of Moldova. However, moving deep into the territory of the USSR, the fascist German troops met the growing resistance of the Red Army and suffered more and more heavy losses. Soviet troops fought steadfastly and stubbornly.

Already the initial period of the war showed that the military adventure of the Nazis was doomed to failure. The Nazi armies were stopped near Leningrad and on the river. Volkhov. The heroic defense of Kyiv, Odessa and Sevastopol for a long time fettered the large forces of the Nazi troops in the south. Despite initial successes, he failed to break the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, who were inferior to the enemy in numbers and military equipment, and break through to Moscow. In tense battles, the Red Army defended the capital under extremely difficult conditions, bled the enemy's strike groups, and in early December 1941 launched a counteroffensive. After fierce fighting near Voronezh and in the Donbass, the Nazi troops managed to break into the big bend of the Don. However, the Soviet command managed to withdraw the main forces of the South-Western and Southern fronts from under attack, withdraw them beyond the Don, and thereby frustrate the enemy's plans to encircle them. In mid-July 1942, the Battle of Stalingrad 1942-1943 began.

The liberation struggle of the peoples against the aggressors created the objective prerequisites for the formation and consolidation of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Soviet government sought to mobilize all forces in the international arena to fight against fascism. On July 12, 1941, the USSR signed an agreement with Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Germany; On July 18, a similar agreement was signed with the government of Czechoslovakia, on July 30 - with the Polish government in exile. On August 9-12, 1941, talks were held on warships near Argentiya (Newfoundland) between British Prime Minister W. Churchill and US President F. D. Roosevelt. Taking a wait-and-see position, the United States intended to limit itself to providing material support (lend-lease) to countries fighting against Germany. Great Britain, urging the United States to enter the war, proposed a strategy of protracted actions by naval and air forces. The goals of the war and the principles of the post-war order of the world were formulated in the Atlantic Charter signed by Roosevelt and Churchill (dated August 14, 1941). On September 24, the Soviet Union joined the Atlantic Charter, while expressing its dissenting opinion on certain issues. In late September - early October 1941, a meeting of representatives of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain was held in Moscow, which ended with the signing of a protocol on mutual deliveries.

December 1941 Japan surprise attack on the American military base in the Pacific Ocean, Pearl Harbor unleashed a war against the United States. On December 8, 1941, the USA, Great Britain and a number of other states declared war on Japan. The war in the Pacific and Asia was a product of long-standing and deep-seated Japanese-American imperialist contradictions, which were exacerbated in the course of the struggle for dominance in China and Southeast Asia. The US entry into the war strengthened the anti-Hitler coalition. The military alliance of the states fighting against fascism was formalized in Washington on January 1 by the Declaration of 26 states in 1942. The declaration proceeded from the recognition of the need to achieve complete victory over the enemy, for which the countries waging war were charged with the duty to mobilize all military and economic resources, to cooperate with each other. with a friend, not to conclude a separate peace with the enemy. The creation of the anti-Hitler coalition meant the failure of the Nazi plans to isolate the USSR, the consolidation of all world anti-fascist forces.

In November 1941, the "Anti-Comintern Pact" of the fascist powers was extended for 5 years. December 11, 1941 Germany, Italy, Japan signed an agreement on waging war against the United States and Great Britain "to a victorious end" and refusing to sign a truce with them without mutual agreement.

Having disabled the main forces of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese armed forces then occupied Thailand, Xianggang (Hong Kong), Burma, Malaya with the fortress of Singapore, the Philippines, the most important islands of Indonesia, capturing vast reserves of strategic raw materials in the zone of the southern seas. They defeated the US Asiatic Fleet, part of the British Navy, the Air Force and the Allied ground forces and, having ensured supremacy at sea, deprived the US and Great Britain of all naval and air bases in the Western Pacific Ocean in 5 months of the war.

It should be noted that despite Hitler's victories on the Eastern Front, and Japan's in the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was no absolute coincidence in Germany's relations with Japan in 1941. All attempts by Ribbentrop to put pressure on Japan in order to involve her in the war against the Soviet Union ended in failure. The Japanese did not introduce Germany to the course of their foreign policy plans, which extremely irritated the Fuhrer. Germany had to conduct intelligence work in Japan. As a result of which disappointing information was received about Japan's plans to wage war only in the Pacific Ocean, i.e. exclusively against the US and. possibly the English colonies.

Germany and Italy, after the attack on the USSR, were unable to simultaneously conduct offensive operations in other areas. Having transferred the main aviation forces against the Soviet Union, the German command lost the opportunity to actively act against Great Britain, to deliver effective strikes against British sea lanes, fleet bases, and shipyards. This allowed Great Britain to strengthen the construction of the fleet, remove large naval forces from the waters of the mother country and transfer them to ensure communications in the Atlantic.

Nevertheless, in the spring of 1942, at negotiations with Mussolini in Salzburg, Hitler convinced his Italian interlocutors that in the near future German troops would seize all the oil sources of the Soviet Union in the south and that the defeat of the USSR in the war would be a foregone conclusion. After that, measures will be taken that will force England to capitulate. As for America, it, according to the Fuhrer, did not pose a serious danger. However, Hitler's rantings in Salzburg made much less impression on Mussolini and his companions than before.

During these negotiations, the forthcoming operations in the Mediterranean area, the issues of coordinating the policy of Germany and Italy towards Turkey, India and the Arab states were also considered. According to Hitler, "Turkey was slowly but surely moving towards the axis." Despite the wide range of issues discussed during the negotiations in Salzburg, they did not play an important role either in the political or in the strategic direction of the war on the part of the fascist bloc.

Mussolini was delighted with the news coming from Africa, and tried his best to exaggerate the role of the Italian units in this campaign.

However, the German fleet soon seized the initiative for a short time. After the US entered the war, a significant part of the German submarines began to operate in the coastal waters of the Atlantic coast of America. In the first half of 1942, the losses of Anglo-American ships in the Atlantic increased again. The transfer of the bulk of the fascist German troops to the Soviet-German front contributed to a radical improvement in the position of the British armed forces in the Mediterranean basin and in North Africa.

By February 2, 1943, the group surrounded by Stalingrad was liquidated. This ended the Battle of Stalingrad, in which from November 19, 1942 to February 2, 1943, 32 divisions and 3 brigades of the Nazi army and German satellites were completely defeated and 16 divisions were bled white.

The victories of the Red Army contributed to the expansion of the partisan movement in the USSR, became a powerful stimulus for the further development of the Resistance Movement in Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Greece, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway and other European countries.

The liberation movement that unfolded in the territories occupied by the countries of the fascist bloc fettered the Nazi troops, their main forces were bled to death by the Red Army. Already in the first half of 1942, the conditions were in place for the opening of a second front in Western Europe.

In North Africa, British troops, using the weakening of the Italo-German grouping, launched offensive operations. British aviation, which again seized air supremacy in the fall of 1942, sank in October 1942 up to 40% of the Italian and German ships heading to North Africa, disrupted the regular replenishment and supply of Rommel's troops. 8th English army General B. L. Montgomery October 23, 1942 launched a decisive offensive. Having won an important victory in the battle of El Alamein, for the next three months she pursued Rommel's African Corps along the coast, occupied the territory of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, liberated Tobruk, Benghazi and reached positions at El Agheila.

At the Casablanca Conference in 1943, the leaders of the United States and Great Britain, declaring the ultimate goal of the unconditional surrender of the Axis countries, determined further plans for the conduct of the war, which were based on the course of delaying the opening of a second front. Roosevelt and Churchill considered and approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 1943 strategic plan, which provided for the capture of Sicily in order to put pressure on Italy and create conditions for attracting Turkey as an active ally, as well as an intensified air attack on Germany and the concentration of large forces to enter the continent, "as soon as German resistance weakens to the desired level."

The implementation of this plan could not seriously undermine the forces of the fascist bloc in Europe, much less replace the second front, since active operations by the American-British troops were planned in a theater of military operations secondary to Germany. In the main questions of the strategy of the Second World War, this conference proved fruitless.

May Roosevelt and Churchill met at a new conference in Washington. The intention was confirmed not to open a second front in Western Europe during 1943 and the approximate date of its opening was set - May 1, 1944.

In April 1943, another meeting between Hitler and Mussolini took place in Salzburg. Mussolini, during the negotiations, tried to persuade Hitler to conclude a truce with the USSR, since he clearly understood that after the victory of the Red Army at Stalingrad, the scales in World War II tipped in the direction of the Soviet Union.

Later, in his memoirs, the Italian dictator will write with what persistence he advised the ally to make peace with the USSR at any cost and redistribute all forces in favor of the war in the Mediterranean. Fuhrer. However. He clearly realized that Stalin would not go to separate peace negotiations after all the losses (both military-economic and reputational) that he suffered in 1941-1942. Therefore, Hitler informed Mussolini of his intention to carry out a decisive blow on the Eastern Front. In other words, Hitler demanded from Benito Mussolini to continue persistent actions to further the conduct of the war, and the head of the Italian government asked to help the already fairly battered Italian army.

At this time, Germany was preparing a decisive summer offensive on the Soviet-German front. The Hitlerite leadership sought to defeat the main forces of the Red Army, regain the strategic initiative, and achieve a change in the course of the war. It increased its armed forces by 2 million people. through "total mobilization", forced the release of military products, transferred to Eastern front large contingents of troops from various parts of Europe. According to the Citadel plan, it was supposed to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk salient, and then expand the front of the offensive and capture the entire Donbass.

July the enemy began to withdraw. The troops of the five fronts of the Red Army, developing a counteroffensive, defeated the enemy strike groups, opened their way to the Left-Bank Ukraine and the Dnieper. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops defeated 30 Nazi divisions, including 7 tank divisions. After this major defeat, the leadership of the Wehrmacht finally lost the strategic initiative, was forced to completely abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive until the end of the war. The Red Army, using its major success, liberated the Donbass and the Left-bank Ukraine, crossed the Dnieper on the move, and began the liberation of Belarus. In total, in the summer and autumn of 1943, Soviet troops defeated 218 Nazi divisions, completing a radical turning point in the course of the Great Patriotic War. A catastrophe loomed over Nazi Germany. The total losses of the German ground forces alone from the beginning of the war to November 1943 amounted to about 5.2 million people.

Beginning in the winter of 1942 (that is, after the encirclement of Paulus' troops near Stalingrad and the defeats in North Africa), the ideas of a separate peace were worked out in Germany both on the Western Front (Himmler and Hitler himself were supporters) and on the Eastern. German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop wrote in his memoirs that he was initially against the idea of ​​war with the USSR, on the contrary, he planned the formation of an eastern union (as a development of Bismarck's ideas). The probing of possible contacts was carried out in Stockholm in 1943 through the USSR ambassador to Sweden, A. Kollontai. “Soviet emissaries who acted on behalf of Ambassador Kollontai stated that “the Soviet Union does not intend to fight for Anglo-American interests” and does not trust partners in the anti-Hitler coalition. Moscow feared that after the defeat of Germany, the weakened Soviet Union would be face to face with the Western "imperialists". According to representatives of the Soviet embassy, ​​there are no real contradictions between Germany and the USSR, and "Germany was drawn into the war against the Soviet Union thanks to the intrigues of the imperialist powers." The main subject of bargaining, the emissaries believed, could be the Soviet territories occupied by German troops.

Attempts to hold peace talks between Germany and the USSR were also made through Japanese channels. “In the summer of 1943, Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu turned to the German leadership with an official proposal to provide mediation assistance in organizing Soviet-German negotiations on a separate peace. The Japanese Foreign Ministry prepared a special plan of negotiations, according to which Germany was to return all the occupied territories to the USSR. In order to interest Moscow, the Japanese leaders were ready to make huge concessions for their part: Tokyo agreed to give the Soviet Union South Sakhalin and the Kuriles and recognize Northern China, Manzhchuria and Inner Mongolia as a “Soviet sphere of influence”. Many influential representatives of the Japanese leadership were supporters of the peace plan, including the chairman of the Privy Council, Prince Konoe, the Minister of the Imperial Court, Marquis Kido, prominent generals and admirals.

September 1943, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Sato, told the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov about the proposal of the Japanese government to send to Moscow "a high-ranking person representing directly the Japanese government" to carry out an intermediary mission in organizing Soviet-German negotiations. However, by that time the Kremlin had already abandoned the idea of ​​a separate peace with Germany. The Soviet Foreign Ministry decisively rejected the proposals of the Japanese.

However, the Fuhrer spoke out strongly and sharply against such diplomacy. In 1942, he rejected all attempts by Ribbentrop to start negotiations. After the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler was less categorical, but continued to drag out the negotiation process, while the successes of the Soviet troops allowed the secret diplomacy of the USSR to set the Germans more and more stringent conditions. The delay in negotiations ultimately led to the fact that in 1944 the USSR was no longer interested in ending the war, since, following the results of the Tehran agreements, it became the leader in all of Eastern Europe.

The Allies, after the end of the struggle in North Africa, carried out the Sicilian operation of 1943, which began on July 10. With absolute superiority of forces at sea and in the air, they captured Sicily by mid-August, and in early September they crossed to the Apennine Peninsula. In Italy, a movement was growing for the elimination of the fascist regime and a way out of the war. As a result of the blows of the Anglo-American troops and the growth of the anti-fascist movement, Mussolini's regime fell at the end of July.

In the Atlantic Ocean, by the beginning of 1943, the positions of the German fleet were weakened. The Allies ensured their superiority in surface forces and naval aviation. The large ships of the German fleet could now operate only in the Arctic Ocean against convoys.

At the Cairo Conference (November 22-26), the delegations of the United States (head of the delegation F.D. Roosevelt), Great Britain (head of the delegation W. Churchill), China (head of the delegation of Chiang Kai-shek) considered plans for waging war in Southeast Asia, which provided for limited goals: the creation of bases for the subsequent offensive against Burma and Indochina and the improvement of air supply to Chiang Kai-shek's army. Questions of military action in Europe were seen as secondary; The British leadership proposed to postpone Operation Overlord.

At the Tehran conference (November 28 - December 1, 1943) of the heads of government of the USSR (head of the delegation I. V. Stalin), the USA (head of the delegation F. D. Roosevelt) and Great Britain (head of the delegation W. Churchill) the military questions. The British delegation proposed a plan to invade Southeast Europe through the Balkans, with the participation of Turkey. The Soviet delegation proved that this plan did not meet the requirements of a speedy defeat of Germany, because operations in the Mediterranean area were "operations of secondary importance"; With its firm and consistent position, the Soviet delegation forced the Allies to once again recognize the paramount importance of the invasion of Western Europe, and "Overlord" - the main Allied operation, which should be accompanied by an auxiliary landing in southern France and distracting actions in Italy. For its part, the USSR pledged to enter the war with Japan after the defeat of Germany.

The report on the conference of the heads of government of the three powers said: "We have come to full agreement on the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south. The mutual understanding we have reached here guarantees us victory."

At the Cairo Conference held on December 3-7, 1943, the delegations of the United States and Great Britain, after a series of discussions, recognized the need to use landing craft intended for Southeast Asia in Europe and approved a program according to which the most important operations in 1944 should be "Overlord" and "Envil" (landing in the south of France); The conference participants agreed that "in no other part of the world should any action be taken that could hinder the success of these two operations." This was an important victory for Soviet foreign policy, its struggle for the unity of action of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and the military strategy based on this policy.

The Red Army, in the course of a powerful strategic offensive, expelled the Nazi troops from the territory of the USSR, liberated the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and, together with the armed forces of the Allies, completed the rout of Nazi Germany. At the same time, the offensive of the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific Ocean continued, and the people's liberation war in China intensified.

In January - February, the Red Army, after a 900-day heroic defense, liberated Leningrad from the blockade. By spring, having carried out a number of major operations, Soviet troops liberated the Right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea, reached the Carpathians and entered the territory of Romania.

In Chelm, the first Polish city liberated by the Red Army, on July 21, 1944, the Polish Committee of National Liberation was formed - a temporary executive body of people's power, subordinate to the Craiova Rada Narodova. In August 1944, the Craiova Army, following the order of the Polish exile government in London, which sought to seize power in Poland before the approach of the Red Army and restore the pre-war order, began the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. After a 63-day heroic struggle, this uprising, undertaken in an unfavorable strategic environment, was defeated.

In June, the Normandy landing operation of 1944 began. The second front in Europe was opened when the outcome of the war was already a foregone conclusion as a result of the victories won by the Soviet Union in single combat with Nazi Germany and its allies. But even after the creation of the second front, the main military forces of Germany continued to be on the Soviet-German front, and the decisive importance of the latter in winning victory over fascism did not diminish.

The Red Army, continuing a powerful offensive, in the period from July to November 1944, liberated the Baltic states, defeating 29 Nazi divisions here, and in the south in the 18 divisions and freeing Romania. As a result of the popular armed uprising that broke out on August 23 in Romania, the anti-people regime of Y. Antonescu was liquidated. Since September, an armistice agreement between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain with Romania was signed in Moscow. The entry of the Red Army troops into Bulgaria hastened the popular uprising that was imminent in the country, which took place on September 9th. During the uprising, the ruling monarcho-fascist clique was overthrown and the government of the Fatherland Front was formed. The peoples liberated with the help of the Red Army were given the opportunity to embark on the path of democratic development and social transformation and to contribute to the defeat of fascism. Romania and Bulgaria declared war on Nazi Germany. Soviet troops, together with the Romanian and Bulgarian troops, launched an offensive in the Carpathian, Belgrade and Budapest directions. Moving to help, the Soviet troops, together with the Czechoslovak units on September 20, 1944, crossed the border, initiating the liberation of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Red Army, together with units of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and the Bulgarian troops, began to liberate Yugoslavia. In October 1944, the Red Army began the liberation of Hungary. The position of Nazi Germany deteriorated sharply. Its Eastern Front, especially its southern flank, was collapsing.

By the beginning of 1945, the economic and military resources of fascist Germany were depleted. The goal of the Red Army was to finish off the Nazi Wehrmacht, complete the liberation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and, together with the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, force Germany to unconditional surrender.

In the first half of April, the Allies launched an offensive in Northern Italy. After a series of battles, with the support of Italian partisans, they occupied Bologna and crossed the river. By. At the end of April, under the blows of the allied troops and the influence of a popular uprising that engulfed all of Northern Italy, the German troops began to retreat quickly, and on May 2, the German Army Group C capitulated.

The Red Army, advancing on a broad front, completed the liberation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Having expelled the Nazis from Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, the eastern regions of Czechoslovakia, the Red Army, together with the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, liberated Yugoslavia from the invaders; Soviet troops liberated a significant part of Austria. Fulfilling its liberation mission, the Soviet Union met with warm sympathy and active support from the European peoples, all democratic and anti-fascist forces of the occupied countries and former allies Germany. The entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe contributed to their social and political transformation, fettered the reaction and favorably affected the strengthening of democratic forces.

At midnight on May 8, in the Karlshorst suburb of Berlin, occupied by Soviet troops, representatives of the German high command, headed by V. Keitel, signed an act of unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Nazi Germany; unconditional surrender was accepted on behalf of the Soviet government by Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov together with representatives of the USA, Great Britain and France.

At the Potsdam Conference of 1945 held on June 17-August 2, the heads of government of the USSR (head of the delegation I. V. Stalin), the USA (head of the delegation G. Truman) and Great Britain (head of the delegation W. Churchill, from July 28 - K. Attlee) adopted decision on the demilitarization, denazification and democratic reorganization of Germany, the destruction of German monopoly associations. The three powers confirmed their intention to completely disarm Germany, to liquidate all German industry that could be used for war production. The Soviet delegation confirmed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan. On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 was published on behalf of the heads of government of Great Britain, the United States, and China, containing the demand for the surrender of Japan. The Japanese government rejected this demand. On August 6 and 9, the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing and maiming about 1/4 million civilians. It was a barbaric atrocity, not caused by the demands of war, and served only to intimidate other peoples and states. The Japanese armed forces continued to resist. The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan on August 9, 1945, decided its outcome in favor of the Allies.

September 1945 the Japanese government signed an act of unconditional surrender. Thus ended the six-year struggle of the freedom-loving peoples against fascism.

Conclusion

The Second World War had a huge impact on the fate of mankind. It was attended by 61 states (80% of the world's population). Military operations were conducted on the territory of 40 states. 110 million people were mobilized into the armed forces. The total human losses reached 50-55 million people, of which 27 million people were killed on the fronts. Military spending and military losses totaled $4 trillion.

During the course of the war, the forces of imperialist reaction failed to achieve their main goal - to destroy the Soviet Union, to suppress the communist and working-class movement throughout the world. In this war, which marked the further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, fascism, the striking force of international imperialism, was completely defeated.

The war influenced the development of the national liberation movement of the peoples, which led to the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism. During the war, a galaxy of outstanding Soviet military leaders emerged, including Marshals of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, L.A. Govorov, G.K. Zhukov, I.S. Konev; R.Ya. Malinovsky, K.K. Rokossovsky, F.I. Tolbukhin and many others.

The armed forces of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan carried out major operations in which various types of armed forces participated.

In the land theaters, the military art of the Allies was characterized by the desire to create an absolute superiority in technology, mainly in aviation, and go on the offensive only after the complete suppression of the enemy's defenses. Significant experience was gained in operating in special conditions (in deserts, mountains, jungles), as well as experience in strategic offensive operations of the Air Force against the economic and political centers of Germany and Japan. On the whole, bourgeois military art developed significantly, but it was to a certain extent one-sided, since the main forces of fascist Germany were on the Soviet-German front and the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain fought mainly against a weakened enemy.

Thus, in a difficult period of world history, the USSR and the bourgeois-liberal countries managed, at least for a while, to overcome the mutual fundamental ideological alienation in order to protect the planet from the real threat of establishing an inhuman fascist “new order”. After the war, the USSR quickly restored the economy, significantly expanded the sphere of international influence. A long period began in the history of international relations global confrontation two world powers - the USSR and the USA, which was based on deep ideological contradictions on issues of social order.

In preparation for the war, during the period of hostilities, the countries of the axis of aggression and the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition played serious and complex diplomatic games aimed at achieving their own very complex goals and objectives. It can be seen that relations between the allies in both blocs were very difficult, the negotiations did not always lead to success, which seriously affected the course of military operations.

It should be noted that the diplomacy of the victorious countries turned out to be wiser. After a series of sensitive defeats, Germany failed to find ways not only to conclude a separate peace, but even to start secret negotiations for such a peace. Germany was late with the start of such negotiations, and the military successes of the Allies and their agreements on the post-war division of Europe predetermined the collapse of the aggressive regimes of Germany, Italy and Japan in the Second World War.

The analysis carried out shows that diplomacy plays no less, but rather a greater role in political success than a powerful army, no less than the economy. The course of the post-war existence of the world only confirms this conclusion.

diplomacy war world conflict

List of used literature

1. Berezhkov V.M. Pages of diplomatic history / V.M. Berezhkov. - M.: Progress, 2007. - 390 p.

2. Bogolyubov A.N. History of International Relations. - M., 2006.

Wallerstein I. The end of the familiar world. Sociology of the XXI century / I. Wallerstein. - M.: Nauka, 2008. - 416 p.

Meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Salzburg. April 1943

The Second World War. - M.: BMM, 2010. - 360 p.

The Second World War. Directions of the main attacks. - M.: Harvest, 2007. - 804 p.

Gareev M.A. Ambiguous pages of the war: essays on problematic issues of the Great Patriotic War / M.A. Gareev. - M.: Academy, 2005. - 355 p.

Dashichev V.I. Hitler's strategy - the road to disaster 1933-1945. Historical essays, documents and materials: In 4 volumes. T. 2. The development of the struggle for dominance in Europe 1939-1941 / V.I. Dashichev. - M., 2008. - 290 p.

Zalessky K.A. Who's Who in World War II. Germany and allies / K.A. Zalessky. - M.: Veche, 2010. - 496 p.

Ivanov R.F. Stalin and the Allies: 1941-1945 / R.F. Ivanov. - Smolensk, 2007. - 260 p.

To the 70th anniversary of the start of World War II. Studies, documents, comments. - M.: Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010. - 520 p.

Kulkov E. War 1841-1945. / E. Kulkov, M. Myagkov, O. Rzhevsky. - M.: Yurist, 2007. - 490 p.

Mernikov A.G. History of World War II / A.G. Mernikov. - M.: Harvest, 2010. - 368 p.

World Wars of the XX century. Book 4. World War II. Documents and materials. - M.: Aleteyya, 2009. - 390 p.

Moshchansky I.B. Unknown war / I.B. Moshchansky. - M.: Veche, 2011. - 272 p.

Hitler's negotiations with Franco, Petain and Mussolini (1940).

Hitler's last chance. Historical almonac "Labyrinth of times".

Sipols V.Ya. diplomatic secrets. Eve of the Great Patriotic War 1939-1941 / V.Ya. Sipols. - M.: Progress, 2007. - 210 p.

Hitler's tirade.

Toland John. Adolf Gitler. Russian electronic library.

Falin V.M. Second front. Anti-Hitler coalition: conflict of interests / V.M. Falin. - M.: Aspect - press, 2006. - 420 p.

Churchill W. World War II. In 6 volumes / W. Churchill. - M.: Alpina non-fiction, 2011. - 2128 p.

The historical and documentary department of the Russian Foreign Ministry should, in theory, be the quietest area in a skyscraper on Smolenskaya Square in Moscow. But today this is not the case - the department is overwhelmed with work on the eve of the 60th anniversary of the victory in World War II, celebrated on May 9.

The manuscript of the Minister (more precisely, People's Commissar) of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov, under glass, must be delivered to the Victory Museum, according to which he read his famous radio address on the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. For many magazines, little-known photographs of the leaders of the victorious powers - the USSR, the USA, Great Britain - should be retaken at a conference in November 1943 in Tehran, where the question of opening a second, Western front in Europe was discussed.

The Soviet military machine, as is well known, bore the brunt of the war with Germany and played a major role in the military victory that culminated in the entry of Soviet troops into Berlin. Soviet diplomacy during World War II is interesting in that it played a correspondingly key role in creating the model of the world in which we still live, although this period is coming to an end - the model formed by the victors in World War II.

The archives of the historical and documentary department show how this was done - at random, by trial and error, often in a sharp diplomatic struggle between the allies.

The most famous episodes of this story are the attempts of Moscow, which fought almost alone for almost 3 years, to speed up the opening of a second front, the efforts of Russian diplomacy to prevent a separate peace between London, Washington and Hitler. And also - the history of the creation of the UN. But these episodes of the war are well known. And there were lesser-known diplomatic plots that preceded the climax of World War II. The bottom line here is that the principles of world order, reduced by the beginning of 1945 into a single system, were first tested and played out, with varying success, in relation to many individual countries of Europe.

Initially, the task was to get them out of the war, in which they either acted as allies of Germany and Italy, or were occupied. But then, naturally, the question arose about their political system, their place in European and world politics.
Here is an episode of August 1941, when the German offensive towards Moscow unfolded, seemingly unstoppable, and in London almost no one doubted that Germany's victory over the USSR was expected by winter. In those days, Joseph Stalin did not expect any help, except verbal, from Winston Churchill. However, British diplomacy continued to fight for at least the neutrality of the countries of the Near and Middle East, expecting future wars with Germany over this region. Turkey, with its long-standing pro-German sympathies, was a key country here, as, indeed, for its immediate neighbor, the USSR.

It was this neighborhood that gave Soviet diplomacy those levers of pressure on Ankara that London did not have. The result of this situation was the agreed diplomatic representations on August 10 from London and Moscow, which expressed their readiness to respect the territorial integrity of Turkey and provide assistance to her "if she were attacked by any European power."

Ankara, for a start, used this situation in trade negotiations with Germany, achieving favorable conditions for itself. And then Turkey, having appreciated the benefits of the situation, remained completely neutral until the end of the war, broke off relations with Germany in August 1944, and did not suffer any damage after the end of hostilities.

Here is the episode with Czechoslovakia, which apparently began in a telegram from the Russian Foreign Ministry to its ambassador in Great Britain dated March 10, 1943. It put forward the concept of the unity of interests of the Slavic peoples of Europe, the idea of ​​the need for Moscow to conclude a pact with them on relations during the war and the post-war period.

The emigrant Czech government of Benes, we note, was located precisely in London. As a result, on December 12, 1943, a Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of friendship and post-war cooperation was signed with this government, which removed all questions about who would rule Czechoslovakia after it was liberated from German occupation. Moscow, in particular, did not support the attempts of the Slovak resistance forces to act autonomously from Beneš.

Benes, on the eve of the end of the war, himself proposed to introduce communists into the post-war government of the country, moreover, in order to provide them with leading positions in the military and other power ministries. Stalin, on the contrary, reproached Benes for the fact that the representatives of the Communist Party received too many ministerial posts in the coalition government of Czechoslovakia, created in March 1945, after the Soviet troops liberated most of the country.

And here is the story of Finland, which was not neutral, like Turkey, and not occupied, like Czechoslovakia. Finland was an ally of Hitler. The most famous woman of the Soviet era, Alexandra Kollontai, then ambassador to Sweden, tried to bring this country out of the war. In Stockholm, she met with Finnish Prime Minister Paasikivi, who was given Soviet conditions for his country's withdrawal from the war. Negotiations on this subject between Paasikivi and Foreign Minister Molotov took place in Moscow in March 1944. Simultaneously with the act of withdrawing the Finns from the war, the USSR renewed the agreement of 1940 with this country, settled the common border, and did it to mutual satisfaction. Finland then became for many decades (and remains today) a great friend and important economic partner of Moscow.

And the Finnish episode turned out to be historic because negotiations with this country prompted the statement of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in 1943. It determined that the Soviet government should have a "decisive voice" in any negotiations with Germany's allied states. It was one of the building blocks from which the model of the United Nations was later built.

Spain, on the other hand, suffered the most unusual fate of all the countries of Europe - the country found itself, as it were, aloof from the redistribution of borders and the reorganization of governments, which, as we see, unfolded back in 1943-1944. For Spain, according to the paradoxical assessment of the former Soviet ambassador to Madrid, Yuri Dubinin, World War II ended in 1977, when, among other foreign policy actions of the Spanish government, diplomatic relations with Moscow were established.

From the very beginning, we made a bet that the King of Spain would be the person who would help start new chapter relations with our country, says Dubinin. The king, however, saw the situation at that time better than I did, the ambassador admits, he understood much more clearly that on the path to normalization with the USSR, he was also moving towards national peace, brings Spain out of isolation, into the expanses of world politics.

Yuri Dubinin included these and other thoughts in his book of memoirs, which was published in Russia several years ago, and in Spain only a few months ago.

The king read this book and sent a letter of thanks to the ambassador.

... A person entering the high lobby of the building of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs today sees a polished granite plaque with the names of Soviet diplomats who volunteered for the front and died there. The names of those employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were engaged in their direct business in those years are not carved in granite. But largely thanks to them, we lived 60 years after the World War without new total upheavals on a global scale. –0-

The Soviet Union entered World War II two and a half weeks after it began. On September 17, 1939, the Red Army crossed the Polish border. It struck from the east against the Polish army, which was desperately defending itself from the German invasion. Poland was crushed by the combined efforts of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This was openly and loudly declared by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939.

In a rather short interval between the campaign in Poland and the German attack on the USSR, three stages of Soviet foreign policy can be conventionally outlined: the first - from September 1939 to the defeat of France in June 1940, the second - until the Soviet-German negotiations in Berlin in November 1940, the third - before the German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

At the first stage, Stalin, using two agreements with Nazi Germany, tried to quickly realize the opportunities that were opened up by secret agreements.

After the Red Army occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, that is, Eastern Poland, preparations began for a "free will" of the twelve million people living there in favor of unification with the Ukrainian and Byelorussian SSR. But even earlier, special units of the NKVD arrived in the territories just occupied by the Red Army. They began to identify "class alien" elements, arrested and deported them to the east of the country. On October 31, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted laws on the "reunification" of these regions with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSRs, respectively.

Curious documents have been preserved in the archive - the texts of the declarations of the People's Assembly of Western Belarus on the confiscation of landowners' lands, on the nationalization of banks and large-scale industry, on the nature of the power being created in Western Belarus with additions and corrections made by the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov. So to speak, an outpouring of will is an outpouring of will, but you don’t have to make a mistake ...

Stalin's plan to absorb the Baltic countries

As I already mentioned, the three Baltic republics - Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia - also went into the sphere of state interests of the USSR. In the autumn of 1939, just at the moment when Molotov and Ribbentrop were signing the friendship and border treaty in Moscow, the USSR forced the Baltic countries to sign mutual assistance pacts and allow the introduction of "limited contingents" of Soviet troops into their territory.

Stalin's Baltic plans were coordinated with Hitler through Ambassador Schulenburg and Ribbentrop himself. As in the case of Eastern Poland, the Soviet scenario was the same - in October 1939, i.e. when the Baltic republics were still independent, although they were forced to accept Soviet garrisons, the NKVD (General I. Serov) issued an order to prepare for the deportation of hostile elements. This means that the plan for the takeover of the Baltics was already worked out then.

The schedule of "free will" of Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians was prepared in Moscow. In strict accordance with the established timetable, people's governments were established in these countries; then on June 17-21, 1940, elections were held for the People's Seimas of Lithuania and Latvia, and on July 14-15 for the State Duma of Estonia. On July 21, 1940, on the same day, Soviet power was proclaimed in all the Baltic countries, and three weeks later all three were accepted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR into the Soviet Union. Practical preparations began immediately for the mass deportation of part of the indigenous population.

It was the turn of Bessarabia. On June 26, Molotov demanded from Romania the immediate return of Bessarabia, annexed to Romania in 1918. In August, Bessarabia was already united with the Moldavian ASSR, which was part of the Ukrainian SSR, and thus the Moldavian Union Republic was created. At the same time, Northern Bukovina was also "grabbed", to which there were no historical rights, since it was part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. This act was not provided for by the German-Soviet secret protocol. The Germans, of course, grimaced. Molotov explained to the German ambassador Schulenburg that Bukovina "is the last missing part of the united Ukraine."

The occupation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina was connected, of course, with the defeat of France and the occupation by Germany of the territories of several European states in the north and northwest of Europe. The victories of the German partner in the West had to be balanced.

Stalin was now afraid of the imminent conclusion of peace in the West, while the USSR had not yet implemented a program of territorial expansion.

The Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938 and the capitulation of Czechoslovakia to German demands under pressure from Britain and France gave Stalin hope that the Soviet Union should not postpone the implementation of its own geopolitical and strategic plans.

Literally a few days before the opening of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), Finland was offered to lease to the Soviet Union part of the Finnish territory, namely the islands of Sursari (Gogland) and three others, on which the USSR intended to build its military bases. The proposal was made by Litvinov two months before his own resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The freedom-loving Finns, of course, rejected this proposal, even despite the proposal to receive in return a much larger territory of Soviet Karelia. Note that Litvinov, whose name is invariably associated with the policy of collective security, did not see anything shameful in persuading an independent state to cede its territory. For Finland, however, these were not "barren islands", but part of their native land.

Preparation of the USSR for the war with Finland in 1939

In the summer of 1939, i.e. already during the ongoing negotiations with Great Britain and France on mutual assistance in the event of German aggression, the Main Military Council of the Red Army considered the plan of military operations prepared by the General Staff against Finland. He was reported by the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov. Although the possibility of direct support for Finland from Germany, Great Britain, France, and also the Scandinavian states was recognized, it was not for this reason that the plan was rejected by Stalin, but because of the overestimation of the difficulties of the war by the General Staff. The new plan was developed by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, K.A., who had just been released from prison. Meretskov. The plan was designed for the initial strike and defeat of the Finnish army within two to three weeks. It was a kind of plan for the Soviet blitzkrieg. It was based on the factor of surprise and arrogant disregard for the potential capabilities of the enemy, just as it was in the German calculations of the war against the USSR.

While the war plan against Finland was being developed (this lasted five months), the Soviet Union exerted continuous diplomatic pressure on Finland, putting forward more and more new demands, each of which meant not only the transfer to the Soviet Union in the form of an exchange of part of the Finnish territory, not only leasing another part of the territory for the construction of Soviet military bases there, but also the disarmament of the Finnish defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus ("Mannerheim Line"), which completely transferred the fate of Finland into the hands of a powerful southern neighbor. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union used these diplomatic maneuvers to cover up preparations for war, or, as the current Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army M. Moiseev, writes now, "the final military preparations were hastily carried out." The Soviet historian Viktor Kholodkovsky, without any doubt the most competent expert in the country on the history and politics of Finland and Soviet-Finnish relations, cites in one of his recent articles the words of Kekkonen, at that time a minister in the Cajander government, who rejected the Soviet demands: "We knew that the cession of the required territory would mean a fatal gap in the country's defense system. And we could imagine what such a gap would mean in the presence of such a neighbor as Russia."

In the USSR, psychological preparations began for the war against Finland. The tone was set by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, who delivered a long speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939. In it, he admitted, among other things, that Finland had been asked to disarm its fortified areas, which, according to Molotov, was in the interests of Finland. For some reason, the Finns themselves did not think so. What prompted the Soviet leadership to pursue such a stubborn policy of pressure on the small Finnish people? Confidence in the right of strength, its originality; and most importantly, it was safe, since Finland, by agreement with Nazi Germany, went into the sphere of Soviet interests, just like the Baltic states, and England and France were absorbed in their own military concerns. By this time, the three Baltic states had already been forced by the Soviet Union to sign treaties of mutual assistance with it and allow the stationing of a "limited contingent" of Soviet armed forces on their territory, which very soon turned into unlimited hostage on the territory of the still sovereign Baltic republics.

Finland, of course, did not want a war and would prefer to resolve the complications that arose through the fault of the Soviet Union peacefully, but Stalin sought to unconditionally accept his demands. The company of intimidation of the Finns went in parallel with military preparations. Pravda published articles that were unprecedentedly rude towards Finland. Their tone could only be compared with the tone of Soviet newspapers during the Moscow trials in the second half of the 1930s.

On October 5, the following Soviet demands were transferred to Finland: the exchange of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, which belongs to the Finns, for twice as large, but sparsely populated and undeveloped part of the territory of Soviet Karelia; the right to lease the Hanko Peninsula, located at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, and the ice-free port of Petsamo on the Rybachy Peninsula for the construction of Soviet naval and air bases there. For Finland, accepting Soviet conditions would have meant the loss of any opportunity to defend itself. The proposals were rejected. In the face of the impending military threat from the USSR, Finland was forced to take the necessary defensive measures. Even now, in 1990, the Soviet military department is trying to place equal responsibility for the outbreak of war on both sides.

"The Finnish side," the commentary of the USSR Ministry of Defense already quoted above says, "not only did not show readiness to reach any mutually acceptable agreements with the USSR, but..." and so on. or "Having not exhausted all the possibilities of a political settlement, the USSR and Finland practically took a course towards solving problems by military means." That is, the aggressor and his victim are put on the same board. On November 3, 1939, Pravda ominously declared in an editorial: “We will cast aside any game of political gamblers and go our own way, no matter what. We will ensure the security of the USSR, no matter what, breaking down any and all obstacles in the way to the goal".

Meanwhile, four Soviet armies were deployed on the Karelian Isthmus, in Eastern Karelia and the Arctic. Finally, on November 26, the Soviet government announced the shelling of Soviet territory in the area of ​​​​the village of Mainila, located 800 meters from the Finnish border; there were casualties among the Soviet military. The USSR accused the Finns of provocation and demanded the withdrawal of Finnish troops to a distance of 25-30 km from the border, i.e. from its line of defense on the Karelian Isthmus. Finland, for its part, proposed a mutual withdrawal of troops and an investigation at the scene in accordance with the 1928 convention. According to Khrushchev's testimony, Stalin had no doubt that the Finns would be frightened and capitulate after the USSR unilaterally broke the non-aggression pact on November 28. Finland was accused of keeping Leningrad under threat. On November 30, Soviet troops opened hostilities. The little people were not afraid. The war has begun.

The lessons of the war against Finland for the USSR

It turned out that, despite five months of preparations, the Red Army was not ready for war. The inability to act in winter conditions was revealed immediately. Neither the Komsomol volunteers, abandoned from Moscow and Leningrad, nor the mobilized skiers-athletes, many of whom died senselessly and ingloriously, did not help. Attempts to overturn the Finnish army with frontal attacks on the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line turned into bloody losses. "Our troops, - says the Commentary of the Ministry of Defense, - in none of the directions, primarily on the Karelian Isthmus, failed to fulfill the assigned task."

Everything failed: tanks bound by frost; roads clogged with traffic; there were not enough mortars and small arms, there were no winter clothes. The culprit was immediately found: Meretskov was replaced by Marshal Timoshenko, Army General Stern was called from the Far East. Only after significant forces of all types of troops were transferred to the Finnish front, on February 11, 1940, a new offensive began, the struggle went on for meters. A month later, the Finnish defensive line was broken through, and Finland was forced to accept the conditions imposed on her by the winner. The peace treaty, signed in Moscow on March 12, 1940, transferred the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet Union, including Vippuri (Vyborg) and the Vyborg Bay with islands, the western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga with the cities of Kexholm, Sortavala, Suoyarvi, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, and a number of others territories on the Sredniy and Rybachy peninsulas, as well as for renting the Khanko peninsula, with the right to maintain here, in addition to naval and air force bases, also ground garrisons.

The principle of ideological warfare, used as early as during the civil war, was applied in preparation for and during the war against Finland. A puppet government was prepared for it, headed by one of the leaders of the Comintern, the former leader of the Communist Party of Finland, O.V. Kuusinen. The plan provided for the subsequent creation of the Karelian-Finnish Union Republic by uniting the Karelian ASSR with Finland.

However, Kuusinen himself did not play any independent role in this political farce. A.A. Zhdanov - the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, he is also a member of the Military Council of the 7th Army in the field, he is also a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was a key figure here.

Archival documents brought to us curious evidence of how the Finnish Democratic Republic was created, with the government of which the USSR immediately signed an agreement on mutual assistance and friendship.

The first document - the message about the formation of the FDR government and the declaration of the "People's Government" - was written by Zhdanov's hand. Considering, apparently, the form for its publication, Zhdanov made notes: "radio interception" and "translation from Finnish" (!). The Leningrad secretary was an educated person... This six-page document announced the liberation of the Finns from the power and oppression of the "bourgeoisie, its henchmen"; in a word, the document contained a full set of derogatory epithets against the "ruling clique" and a promise to the Finns of freedom from exploitation. The second document written by Zhdanov is a draft instruction on how to begin political and organizational work in the areas of Finland "liberated from white power."

The third document (eleven pages) - an appeal to the working people of Finland - was also written personally by Zhdanov. The funniest thing of all, however, if only it is appropriate to use this word here, is the text of the oath of a soldier of the People's Army of Finland. As a basis, Zhdanov took the printed text of the military oath of the Red Army servicemen and made several purely formal amendments to it.

This inglorious war cost the Soviet people great sacrifices. According to the information contained in the reference-commentary of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the losses of the Red Army in killed alone exceeded 67 thousand people. The Finnish army lost over 23 thousand people. These data are seriously different from those given by various researchers. V.M. Kholodkovsky believes, based on sources, that Soviet losses amounted to about 74,000 killed and 17,000 missing, and only 290,000. Finnish losses were 3-4 times less. B.V. Sokolov agrees with the Finnish estimate that Soviet casualties were about 200,000 and gives his own calculations on this score.

Negative consequences of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939

The moral damage caused by the war against Finland was colossal. In December 1939, the League of Nations formally condemned the USSR as an aggressor and expelled it from the League of Nations. Only three states were branded as aggressors - Japan, Italy and Germany. Now the USSR has been added to this list. One of the reasons that prompted the USSR to quickly conclude a peace treaty with Finland and not try to completely capture this country was that there was a real danger that the center of the war would move from the Western Front to North-Eastern Europe. The Western Allies began to seriously consider sending a 50,000-strong volunteer corps to help Finland. However, the Finnish government did not want to turn the territory of their country into a power field of the great powers, as happened with Spain in 1936-1939.

Another negative result for the USSR, more important than its expulsion from the League of Nations, was Germany's increased confidence that militarily the USSR was much weaker than it seemed before. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.

"In our war against the Finns," Khrushchev said, "...we could ultimately win only after enormous difficulties and incredible losses. Victory at such a cost was in fact a moral defeat."

The borders of the USSR were moved to the west. However, there was very little time left for their strengthening. This should have become evident after the signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September 1940 by Germany, Japan and Italy.

Although the Soviet Government had been informed by Germany of the forthcoming conclusion of the Tripartite Pact even before its publication, it was not deceived as to the true nature of the pact. The leading article of the Pravda newspaper of September 30, 1940, on the subject of the Tripartite Pact, emphasized that its signing meant "further aggravation of the war and expansion of its sphere of action." At the same time, the Soviet press drew attention to the reservation that the Tripartite Pact did not affect the relations of its participants with the USSR, and explained that this reservation should be understood "as confirmation of the strength and significance of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany and the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Italy".

The fact that the USSR did not doubt the meaning of the Tripartite Pact as a pact on the preliminary division of the world was also evidenced by the more friendly tone of the Soviet press towards England. For example, on October 5, 1940, Pravda published a very detailed and sympathetic correspondence from London about a visit by a TASS correspondent to one of the London field batteries of anti-aircraft guns. From this article, the reader could easily conclude that England is fighting in earnest and her strength is growing. There were many other events that made Stalin think about the near future. It seemed very gloomy. Germany was clearly aiming at the Balkans.

In these months, only one event will truly please Stalin. On August 20, 1940, the NKVD finally completed the hunt for L.D. Trotsky. He is mortally wounded by an ice pick. "Pravda" publishes an editorial titled "The Death of an International Spy", and "Izvestia" - and even worse - an article by D. Zaslavsky "To a dog - a dog's death."

But the assassination of Trotsky cannot change anything in a formidable situation, just as her articles in the Soviet press against "the aggressor of Great Britain and the United States of America helping her military efforts" cannot change. The Soviet Union continues to maintain diplomatic relations with both states, but attempts by England to enter into closer relations with the USSR are rejected by Stalin. Although the tone of the Soviet press softens, and the stupid campaign against the US entry into the war stops altogether, Stalin continues to focus on Germany, despite the friction that arises between the USSR and the Reich (the Vienna Arbitration, the problem of Sweden's neutrality, the sending of German troops to Romania, etc.). ). Relations between the two states begin to deteriorate.

Possible agreement on the division of the world between the USSR and Germany

By the end of 1940, under the heel of Germany was a territory of 4 million square meters. km with a population of 333 million people. Since the summer of 1940, the systematic use of the European economy for the needs of the war began. Thus, a significant number of Germans were released to carry military service. The development of a plan to attack the USSR goes on as usual, but in the meantime Ribbentrop invites Molotov to come to Berlin. There Molotov met with Hitler. November 12, 1940 Molotov, accompanied by a large group of experts, arrives in Berlin. The official German record of his talks with Hitler says: “Molotov expressed his agreement with the Fuhrer’s statements about the role of America and England. The participation of the USSR in the tripartite pact seems to him completely acceptable in principle (emphasis mine. - A.N.), bearing in mind, that Russia should cooperate as a partner, and not just as an object. In this case, he sees no difficulty in the participation of the Soviet Union in the common effort." At the same time, Molotov demands clarifications, in particular about the "great Asian space", puts forward a number of demands regarding Finland and Southern Bukovina, Bulgaria and the straits. Before leaving for Moscow, Molotov was given projects on the division of the world into spheres of influence between Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR. On November 14, Molotov returned to Moscow.

In the Soviet Union, a version was established for 50 years (and it is present in all historical studies without exception, official histories, memoirs published before 1989) that the USSR rejected Hitler's proposal to participate in the division of the world. Nothing of the sort happened. On November 26, a response was sent to Hitler, in which the Soviet government agreed with the German project for dividing the world, but with some amendments: the Soviet sphere of influence was to extend to the areas south of Baku and Batum, i.e. include eastern Turkey, northern Iran and Iraq. The Soviet Union also demanded consent to the establishment of its naval base in the Straits. In addition, Soviet demands concerned the role of Turkey, the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin, the inclusion of Bulgaria in the Soviet orbit.

Later, Molotov asked the Germans several times for a response to the Soviet counterproposals, but the German government did not return to this problem again. Thus, if the agreement on the division of the world did not take place, then there was no merit of the Soviet government.

Soviet-Bulgarian relations before the Second World War

Since the end of 1939 there has been some improvement in Bulgarian-Soviet relations. Economic and cultural agreements were concluded, which contributed to the establishment of closer ties between the USSR and Bulgaria. The traditional sympathy of the Bulgarian people for the Russian people, who had helped in the past in their struggle against Turkish rule, the widespread idea of ​​Slavic solidarity, was cemented by the great interest of the Bulgarians in Russia and the socialist traditions of the Bulgarian labor movement. In addition, the significant strengthening of Germany in the Balkans as a result of her victory in the west caused considerable excitement in Bulgaria. The fear of an attack from Turkey also played a role. The Soviet Union was the only country that could really resist the German intrigues in the Balkans. During the Soviet-Bulgarian negotiations in the autumn of 1939, the Soviet government offered to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. However, the Bulgarian government rejected this proposal. In the future, under the influence of events in Western Europe and the fear of increasing Soviet influence, the Bulgarian government was increasingly inclined towards a bloc of fascist aggressors.

After the November negotiations in Berlin, on November 19, 1940, the Soviet government turned to Bulgaria with a proposal to conclude a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance. A week later, General Secretary of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs A. A. Sobolev arrived in Sofia and confirmed this proposal. The Soviet Union declared its readiness to provide Bulgaria with assistance, including military assistance, in the event of an attack on it by a third power or a group of powers. The USSR expressed its readiness to provide Bulgaria with financial and economic assistance. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared that the pact would in no way affect the existing regime, the independence and sovereignty of Bulgaria. However, it was no longer a secret that the Soviet Union was aiming south. The Soviet attack on Finland served as a warning. On the same day, November 25, the Soviet proposal was discussed at a narrow meeting of the Bulgarian Cabinet of Ministers with Tsar Boris and rejected. The German envoy in Sofia was informed of this Soviet proposal.

Although the Bulgarian government rejected the Soviet proposal, it played a certain positive role, slowing down Bulgaria's transition to the camp of the fascist aggressors. The Bulgarian envoy in Stockholm reported to his government in mid-December 1940: “Here they note with interest the recent Russian intercession in favor of Bulgaria and Sweden in order to keep these two countries not only out of the war, but also out of the combination of Germany against England ".

In January 1941, in connection with the widespread reports that German troops were being transferred to Bulgaria with the consent of the USSR, the Soviet government officially announced that if such a fact really took place, then "this happened and is happening without the knowledge and consent of the USSR."

Four days later, the Soviet government declared to the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, that it considered the territory of the eastern part of the Balkans as a security zone of the USSR and could not remain indifferent to events that threatened this security. The same was repeated on January 17, 1941 by the Soviet plenipotentiary in Berlin to the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, Weizsäcker. However, on March 1, the Bulgarian government joined the Tripartite Pact, providing its territory for the passage of German troops for military operations against Greece, and then against Yugoslavia.

The Soviet government in a special statement condemned this step of the Bulgarian government, pointing out that its position "leads not to the strengthening of peace, but to the expansion of the sphere of war and the drawing of Bulgaria into it." On March 3, the German ambassador in Moscow was told that Germany could not count on the support of the Soviet Union for her actions in Bulgaria.

The failure with Bulgaria showed that Germany had already begun hostile military-political steps against the USSR. The clash in Bulgaria was in fact a test of the strength of Soviet-German relations. Appropriate conclusions should be drawn from the results of this test.

Germany masks preparations for an attack on the USSR

Serious fears arose in the Soviet Union because of Turkey's position during the "strange war", and also due to the fact that the Turkish government continued to maneuver between the warring parties, leaning first to one, then to the other, depending on the emerging balance of forces in each this moment. However, the entry of German troops into Bulgaria frightened the Turkish government. As a result of an exchange of views between the Soviet and Turkish governments in March 1941, mutual assurances were given that in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other could "count on complete understanding and neutrality ..."

Events in the Balkans showed that relations between Germany and the USSR were developing in a menacing direction. The German-Soviet contradictions, which, as a result of the Nazis' striving for world domination, had an irreconcilable character and were only softened by the agreements of 1939, now made themselves felt with renewed vigor. Germany continued to prepare bridgeheads near the borders of the USSR. Faced with the negative position of the Soviet Union regarding German policy in the Balkans, the Nazis tried to intimidate the Soviet Union with their military might. On February 22, 1941, the responsible official of the German Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Richter, on behalf of his superiors, in a strictly secret coded telegram to Ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg, informed that the time had come to announce the data on the number of German troops stationed in Romania in order to impress Soviet circles accordingly. . The 680,000-strong German army is in full combat readiness. It is well technically equipped and includes motorized parts. This army is supported by "inexhaustible reserves". Ritter suggested that all members of the German missions, as well as through proxies, begin disseminating information about German assistance. This assistance must be presented in an impressive manner, Ritter wrote, emphasizing that it is more than sufficient to meet any eventuality in the Balkans, from whatever side it comes from. It was proposed to disseminate this information not only in government circles, but also among interested foreign missions accredited in Moscow.

Along with intimidation, the Nazis tried to disguise the ongoing military preparations along the Soviet-German border. On January 10, 1941, an agreement was signed between Germany and the Soviet Union on the Soviet-German border from the river. Igorka to the Baltic Sea. After the conclusion of the agreement, the demarcation of the border determined by the agreement was to be carried out by authorized representatives of both parties. Negotiations on the procedure for the work of the commission began on 17 February. The German side dragged them out in every possible way. At the request of the High Command of the Ground Forces, Schulenburg was instructed to delay the negotiations in every possible way in order to prevent the work of the Soviet commission on the border. The Germans feared that otherwise their military preparations would be exposed.

The Nazis stepped up aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet border areas. At the same time, for the purpose of camouflage, they began to assert that rumors of an impending German attack on the Soviet Union were being deliberately spread by "English warmongers." Just at this time, the Soviet Union received warnings through diplomatic channels about German plans to attack the USSR.

A new complication of relations between the USSR and Germany then occurred because of Yugoslavia. On March 27, 1941, the government of Cvetkovic was overthrown in Yugoslavia, which signed an agreement on accession to the Tripartite Pact. The Yugoslav people were determined to offer armed resistance to the German aggressor. “The recent events in Yugoslavia,” Pravda wrote, “showed with all clarity that the peoples of Yugoslavia are striving for peace and do not want war and the country’s involvement in the maelstrom of war. Through numerous demonstrations and rallies, broad sections of the population of Yugoslavia expressed their protest against foreign policy government of Cvetkovic, which threatened Yugoslavia by drawing it into the orbit of the war ... ". On April 5, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, according to which, in the event of an attack on one of the parties, the other undertook to observe the "policy of friendly relations towards it." This formula was vague and not binding. On the day the treaty was published, April 6, Nazi Germany attacked Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union publicly condemned this act of aggression in a report by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs dated April 13, 1941, on the attitude of the USSR government towards Hungary's attack on Yugoslavia. Although Hungary was condemned in the statement, the initiator of the aggression, Nazi Germany, was also condemned. The events connected with Yugoslavia showed that relations between Germany and the USSR were approaching a denouement.

Improvement of relations between the USSR and Japan before the Second World War

In an atmosphere of growing tension, the Soviet Union managed to achieve major success in dealing with another potential adversary - Japan.

Already from the end of 1939, the prospect of at least a temporary improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations gradually began to emerge. After Khalkhin Gol, some sobering up began in Japanese military circles. Attempts to put pressure on the Soviet Union by military means ended in failure. The war against the USSR seemed to be an extremely difficult and dangerous matter. The conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, which caused a cooling in relations between the partners of the "axis", also had a certain influence on Japanese policy. Japan's ruling circles were aware that under these conditions, Japan's chances of waging a victorious war against the USSR were significantly reduced. Despite the anti-Soviet campaign launched in Japan during the Soviet-Finnish conflict, things did not go beyond anti-Soviet statements in the press. A number of Japanese industrialists and financiers interested in developing economic relations with the USSR, and especially fishermen, put pressure on the government, demanding better relations with the USSR and the signing of a new fishing convention, since the previous one expired in 1939. Articles appeared in the Japanese press insisting signing a non-aggression pact with the USSR.

Such was the situation at the time of the collapse of France. This event significantly strengthened those Japanese circles that were in favor of expansion towards the southern seas. They also found support from Germany, which at that time considered waging war against England as its main task and therefore advocated the settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations "in order to untie the hands of Tokyo for expansion to the south. This was to draw the attention of England and the United States to Pacific Ocean weakening their position in Europe".

In early June, the issue of the border line between Manchukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic in the conflict area of ​​1939 was settled. A month later, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Togo, proposed to conclude a Soviet-Japanese treaty for a period of 5 years. The essence of such a treaty, which would be based on the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1925, was to maintain neutrality in the event that one of the parties was attacked by a third party. The Soviet Union agreed to the Japanese proposal, but made it conditional on the rejection of the 1925 treaty as "the basis of the new agreement, since the 1925 convention was largely outdated. In connection with the change of cabinet in Japan in July 1940, the negotiations were interrupted, and the ambassador of Togo was recalled to Tokyo. However, the trend towards a settlement with the USSR continued to intensify as favorable prospects emerged for intensifying Japanese aggression in Southeast Asia as a result of the weakening of England and the defeat of France and Holland. This trend was briefly formulated at the end September 1940 by the Japanese newspaper "Hopi": "If Japan wants to advance in the south, it must be free from fears in the north." new ambassador- Taketawa, who, according to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, was instructed to "open a new page in relations between Japan and the Soviet Union."

The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1940 meant, under those specific conditions, the strengthening of Japanese circles advocating aggression in southbound, i.e. against British possessions in Asia. At the same time, one had to take into account the fact that in the event of a change in the international situation, for example, in the event of a German attack on the Soviet Union, Japan could provide her support. This point was repeatedly stressed by the responsible leaders of the Japanese government in secret meetings.

In autumn 1940 and early 1941, Soviet-Japanese negotiations continued. The USSR put forward a proposal to sign a treaty of neutrality, subject to the liquidation of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin. In this case, the USSR undertook to compensate the concessionaires and supply Japan with Sakhalin oil for 5 years on normal commercial terms. The Japanese government agreed to discuss the draft treaty, but rejected the proposal to liquidate the concessions.

However, despite all the difficulties, Soviet-Japanese relations were already entering a period of temporary settlement. Its prospects improved after the signing in the second half of January 1941 of a protocol extending the fishing convention until the end of 1941. The unsuccessful start of Japanese-American negotiations also had a certain impact on Japan's position.

Shortly after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government approached the USSR government with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact. At the same time, Japan asked Germany to facilitate the conclusion of the pact.

The plan proposed by Ribbentrop was rejected in November 1940 by the Soviet government. Meanwhile, supporters of the direction of Japanese aggression to the south exerted an ever greater influence on Japanese foreign policy and demanded, for this purpose, to ensure the security of the Japanese rear in the north, i.e. in the northeastern regions of China bordering the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic. A significant role was played by the fact that the lessons of Khalkhin Gol had not yet been forgotten by the Japanese military. The prospect of a war against the USSR seemed much more dangerous than an attack on British possessions in Southeast Asia, given that England was in a very difficult situation. On February 3, 1941, at a joint meeting of the government and representatives of the military circles, the "Principles for Negotiating with Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union" were approved. On March 12, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka left for Europe. During a stop in Moscow, Matsuoka suggested that the Soviet government conclude a non-aggression pact. Recall that in the 1930s the Soviet Union repeatedly approached Japan with such a proposal, but then it was rejected by Japan. In the new situation, the Soviet Union did not consider it sufficient to conclude only a non-aggression pact. It was important to secure Japanese neutrality in case of complications with Germany. Therefore, the Soviet Union put forward a counterproposal: to conclude a treaty of neutrality. On March 26, with this proposal, Matsuoka went to Berlin.

German pressure on Japan to incline towards a pro-German position

After the issuance of the "Barbarossa" directive, Nazi Germany began to put pressure on Japan in order to force her to take a position that would favor German plans. In the second half of January 1941, at a meeting with Mussolini at the Berghof, Hitler speaks of Japan "whose freedom of action is limited by Russia, just like Germany, which must keep 80 divisions on the Soviet border in constant readiness in case of action against Russia." Assessing Japan as an important factor in the struggle against Britain and the United States, Hitler deliberately emphasized that part of the Japanese forces were pinned down by the Soviet Union.

Hitler, receiving on February 3, 1941, the Japanese ambassador Kurusu, who came to him on a farewell visit, made transparent hints to the ambassador regarding the possible development of German-Soviet relations. "Our common enemies," he said, "are two countries - England and America. Another country - Russia - is not an enemy at the moment, but poses a danger to both states (i.e., to Germany and Japan. - A. N At the moment, everything is in order with Russia. Germany believes in this country, but the 185 divisions that Germany has at its disposal ensure its security better than treaties do. Thus, Hitler concluded, "German interests and Japan are absolutely parallel in three directions."

Seek to involve Japan in the war as soon as possible - such a directive was given in the directive of the German High Command of the Armed Forces No. 24 of March 5, 1941 regarding cooperation with Japan. This document explicitly stated that the goal of German policy was to involve Japan in active operations in the Far East as soon as possible. "Operation Barbarossa," it was said later, "creates especially favorable political and military conditions for this." The directive made it clear that Japan was attacking British possessions, while Germany, attacking the Soviet Union, released the Japanese troops chained in the Far East.

During the stay of the Japanese Foreign Minister in Berlin, this attitude was the leitmotif of all the conversations with him between Hitler and Ribbentrop. Emphasizing that England had already been defeated and it was advantageous for Japan to immediately oppose her, the head of the German Reich also drew the attention of the Japanese minister to the fact that England's hope was American help and the Soviet Union. By referring to the Soviet Union in this connection, Hitler wanted to prevent Japan from signing any political agreements in Moscow. Ribbentrop also tried to impress Matsuoka with the idea of ​​the imminent defeat of England and the liquidation of the British Empire; therefore, Japan should hurry, attacking, say, Singapore. Ribbentrop in every way made it clear to his interlocutor that the war of Germany against the USSR was inevitable. Hence, Matsuoka himself had to come to the conclusion that there was no point in entering into a political agreement with the Soviet Union. After all, Japan's ally, Germany, takes over everything... Ribbentrop explained to Matsuoka: "The German armies in the east are ready at any time. If Russia one day takes a position that can be interpreted as a threat to Germany, the Fuhrer will crush Russia. Germany is convinced that the campaign against Russia will end in the absolute victory of German arms and the complete defeat of the Red Army and the Russian state.The Führer is convinced that in the event of action against the Soviet Union in a few months there will no longer be a great power of Russia ... It should also not be overlooked that the Soviet Union, despite to all denials, is still carrying out communist propaganda abroad... Further, the fact remains that Germany must secure its rear for a decisive battle with England... The German army has practically no opponents on the continent with the possible exception of Russia.

In a conversation dated March 29, 1941, Ribbentrop, in his usual provocative manner, assured Matsuoka: "If Russia ever attacks Japan, Germany will attack immediately." Consequently, the security of Japan in the north is assured.

Pressure was exerted on Matsuoka with unrelenting persistence during the entire stay of the Japanese minister in Berlin. On April 4, Matsuoka spoke again with Hitler, and on April 5 with Ribbentrop. Again and again the German ministers assured Matsuoka that England was about to collapse and that peace would be achieved at the price of her total surrender. Japan should hurry. Matsuoka sympathetically agreed, pretending to agree with everything, and asked for Japan's assistance in armaments, in particular in the equipment of submarines. Matsuoka promised his partners in Tokyo to support the plan to attack Singapore, although during his stay in Berlin he received a warning from the high command against making any military commitments, for example, an attack on Singapore. Matsuoka himself proceeded from the calculation that a war with England would not necessarily mean a war with the United States of America as well. Despite Ribbentrop's assurances that Germany would ensure the security of Japan in the north, Matsuoka, acting in the spirit of the directives received in Tokyo, decided to seek a direct Japanese-Soviet agreement. As early as February 2, the document "On Forcing the Policy of Advancement to the South" was approved in Tokyo.

Negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese pact resumed on April 8, after Matsuoka returned to Moscow. They took place in an atmosphere of ongoing disagreement over the nature of the treaty. The Japanese Foreign Minister insisted on a non-aggression pact. The Soviet side agreed to this on the condition that the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin be liquidated. After much debate, it was decided to sign a neutrality treaty, which was done on April 13, 1941. At the same time, Matsuoka gave a written commitment to resolve the issue of concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a few months. Later, in connection with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the problem of concessions was no longer returned.

The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was approved in Tokyo, since at that moment the supporters of expansion to the south had the upper hand. This was also expressed in the fact that on June 12 it was decided to intensify Japan's actions in the south, not stopping before the war with England and the United States of America. The final decision was made 10 days after the German attack on the Soviet Union, at the imperial conference on July 2, 1941.

Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany on the eve of World War II

Introduction

Chapter 1. The Versailles-Washington system of international relations on the way to the crisis

1 Formation of the Versailles-Washington system; Causes of the crisis

2 The reparations question of Germany in the context of attempts to normalize European international relations

3 Locarno Accords

4 Towards the aggravation of international relations at the turn of the decades

Chapter 2. Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany in the last pre-war decade

1 The situation in the European diplomatic arena in the early 1930s

2 Growing tensions in Europe with the arrival of the National Socialist Party in Germany

3 Apogee of international tension in 1938

Conclusion

Bibliography

Introduction

Relevance.In Russia, the questions of the origins of the Second World War and historical memory are becoming more and more common these days. Unfortunately, sometimes there is an impression that this is connected, first of all, with the political situation around the state, and only then we can talk about pure interest in the historical events of that time. This work touches on topics directly related to the political sphere of society. Its time frame refers to the interwar period, which in itself is one of the most remarkable phenomena of the 20th century, although quite short in terms of history. With its help, two, in every sense, completely different worlds are connected - the one that left with the end of the First World War, and the new one, in which the world ended up after the Second World War. The significance of these two and a half decades for historical science, and indeed for all mankind, can hardly be overestimated. This period is replete with bright and controversial events, it attracts with its dynamism and instability. This is the time of revolutions, grandiose economic and political upheavals, and at the same time, the time of the formation of new states, new public sentiments and hopes. The basic or better to say the background idea that accompanied the first half of the interwar period was the idea of ​​preserving peace, preventing new war Even when, closer to the middle of the 1930s, the contours of future conflicts and various destructive situations are becoming more and more clearly visible, this trend still persists. Nevertheless, gradually, they are replaced by one another and various interstate contradictions are growing, which inevitably reflected on international relations.

The diplomatic sphere, better than others, felt the dangerous notes of future problems, already at the time of the creation of a new system of international relations, when a time bomb was laid at its very foundation, which then, coupled with other factors, led the world to the most bloody war in its entire history. history. Frequent attempts by the diplomatic departments of different countries during the first post-war decade to smooth out sharp corners were ineffective, and with the advent in the early 30s. The global economic crisis, the contradictions began to heat up with renewed vigor. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of this phenomenon on the relations between countries, and the crisis, of course, also exerted considerable pressure on the internal affairs of states, the consequences of which sometimes, one might say, shocked the world, for example, the coming to power in Germany of the National Socialist Party, in part, associated with the economic problems of the country. In the future, this event will most directly affect the entire international situation in the European region. The relevance of the study also lies in the fact that the use of a complex of new literature and source base allows you to effectively and with a greater degree of objectivity reflect real events, opposing misconceptions and myths about this time that still exist today. In addition, it is also very important that in the modern international space there are also a number of hotbeds and points of tension, the fight against which is certainly within the scope of consideration by the UN Security Council. As in the past, there is constant debate about what line of conduct in relation to this or that aggressor the world community should follow. It is extremely rare to achieve full agreement and coordination of action, now examples of conflicts in Syria and Ukraine are in sight, so the experience of such work in the past is especially valuable.

Chronological frameworkworks cover the period from the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919 to the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR in 1939. powers of the region, determined their global political goals. And it is there that one should look for the origins of the aggravated in the 30s. contradictions. The upper bar was chosen in this way, in view of the fact that this agreement with its entire being followed from the nature of the diplomatic actions of the great powers and Germany and can be considered their natural outcome.

objectThis study is the diplomatic relations of England, France and Germany before the Second World War. Subject:A complex of documents and sources of foreign policy and Great Britain of the French Republic and Germany of the period under review.

aimThis work is the study of the specifics and the study of the results of the diplomatic struggle of Anglo-French and German diplomacy before the Second World War. In accordance with the goal, the work contains the following tasks:

1)To study the initial positions and tasks of the foreign policy of each of the countries;

2)Analyze the available sources related to the field of foreign policy.

3)Research the diplomatic moves of each country;

4)Consider internal and external political factors that influenced the formation of foreign policy;

This issue has been given great attention both in domestic and foreign historiography.Most of the works here can be differentiated into three main groups, firstly, these are monographs and articles on the history and theory of international relations, secondly, studies on the analysis of the history of foreign policy of individual countries, the subject of research of the third group is Germany's bilateral relations with other states . From a huge layer of works related to the history of international relations, we would like to single out the works of a generalizing nature, such as: Systemic History of International Relations, edited by A. D. Bogaturov.

In this work, special attention is paid to the plots of the Versailles settlement, international relations in the zone of the nearest perimeter of Soviet Russia, the eve and the first stage of the Second World War before the entry of the USSR and the USA into it, as well as the development of the situation in East Asia and the situation in the peripheral zones of the international system., "Diplomacy" by G. Kissinger, which not by chance became a national bestseller in 1994-1995. Echoing the book of the same name by G. Nicholson, the author analyzes the factors that make it possible to assess the strength and durability of a particular world order, starting from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and up to the present day. The reader is presented with a series politicians"of all times and peoples" - from Richelieu to our contemporaries. Speaking as a participant in many historical events of modern times, the author considers them as milestones in the formation of the so-called "new world order", which is taking shape at the turn of the 20th-21st centuries. "A course of lectures on the history of international relations in 1918-1939." V. N. Gorokhov, this is the result of summarizing many years of experience in lecturing at the Faculty of History of Moscow State University. The advantages of the book include the conciseness of the presentation, the availability of the presentation, the possibility of using it as a teaching aid in preparing for exams. The disadvantages of the book include the absence in the book of references to the literature and sources used, which makes it difficult to identify original ideas the author and those that he borrowed from other researchers. The book offers a rather traditional presentation of the events of international political history from the point of view of political realism and some elements of implicit Marxism-Leninism. In general, the work is a good textbook, but does not pretend to be a monograph. "History of International Relations 1918-1939" by E. di Nolfo, of course, in the framework of the study, we are primarily interested in the first volume. This book is a generalizing survey work on the history of international relations, covering the period from the end of the First World War to the 90s of the XX century. The paper reveals the leading trends in the evolution of the international system, its main nodes and turning points. The book contains not only a narrative of the political and diplomatic history of the chosen period, but also an examination of the economic, financial, military, psychological factors of its development.

The author successfully combines a vivid display of the most significant events with an analytical presentation of his own conceptual approaches to the problems of the history of international relations of the 20th century. "Introduction to the Theory of International Relations" ed.; One of the first general monographs on the history of international relations in the 20-30s, published after 1991, is a four-volume edition prepared by a team of authors edited by A. O. Chubaryan. The authors set themselves the task of presenting the events of the interwar period in a slightly different light, avoiding ideological clichés.; AS Manykina, The manual discusses the basic patterns studied by the theory of international relations. The approaches of the main scientific schools to the key problems of this branch of knowledge are shown. The mechanism of functioning of the system of international relations is analyzed, the factors (ideological, economic, military-strategic) influencing this process are revealed.

Turning to the review of works belonging to the second group, the classification adopted by us, devoted to the analysis of the foreign policy of individual countries, let us pay attention to the monograph by I. M. Lemin devoted to the Foreign Policy of Great Britain7, a number of works on related topics by Trukhanovsky V. G. England at the first stage of the general crisis of capitalism (1918 - 1939).8 This is a monograph that examines the foreign policy of one of the largest imperialist powers in the period between the two world wars. Based on official Soviet and British, German and other public cations and documents, Soviet and foreign memoirs and monographic literature, on the materials of Soviet and foreign frontier printing, the book traces the development over the course of twenty years of Anglo-Soviet relations, the relations of England with Germany, France, Italy and some other European powers, Anglo-American relations, so far called the policy of England in the Near and Far East and in the League of Nations. Or another work by the same author, in which the researcher not only shows the role and place of Eden in British political life, but also reproduces interesting pages in the history of British diplomacy, where Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and many others act alongside Eden. The subject of the author's special attention is Eden's attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Another work of Trukhanovsky, undoubtedly worthy of attention, is a work that tells about the life and work of Winston Churchill, which is shown in close connection with the domestic and foreign policy life of England, as well as with the most important events that took place on the world stage. The reader will get acquainted with a strong, talented and colorful personality, extraordinary both in politics and in private life, I would like to single out the article by I. Yakubovskaya. Extensive material is contained in the work of Z. S. Belousova on French policy, the monograph is devoted to the foreign policy and diplomacy of France in the pre-war decade . At the same time, the main attention is paid to the analysis of the positions of the ruling circles on the problems of European security. The paper shows the reasons why France suffered a major political and diplomatic defeat and found itself on the eve of a military defeat.; Of great value are the articles and dissertation on the problems of French foreign policy by K.A. Malafeev, a very informative article by E.O. Obichkina regarding the dynamics of the development of French diplomacy14. When examining questions of German foreign policy strategy, it is difficult to do without the work of V. N. Dashichev15. If we talk about works published relatively recently, then it is necessary to single out the monograph by A. I. Patrushev on the history of Germany. Let us now turn to a review of foreign historiography on foreign policy issues; In comparison with the domestic one, it is not as widely represented, but nevertheless, it is still worth noting the great importance for labor research, for example, William Shirer.17

We deduced the next group as works on bilateral relations of individual countries. Very strong and useful in this study is the monograph by Borisov Yu. M.K. Simychev analyzes the development of relations between Germany and France, reproducing them against the backdrop of the process of Western European integration. In conclusion to the historiographic review, we note that a characteristic feature of foreign historiography since the post-war period has been reflection on the causes of the war, on missed opportunities, on the criminality of the inaction of the political leaders of Western countries. To this day, both at the level of scientific and historical circles and in general, the public is still arguing about the degree of responsibility of their countries for the onset of the world war, immediately after its end they branded, despised and hung (literally and figuratively) their chamberlains, daladiers and lavals . Over time, a change of orientation took place: historians and publicists began to lean towards looking at the events of the pre-war period not from the height of the historical experience of the Second World War, but through the eyes of political figures who made decisions in the 1930s. and did not know that these decisions were "pre-war". Using new documents, they focus on the variety of different factors that led the countries of Western Europe to move towards a policy of appeasement.

Overview of sources:

The sources that formed the basis of this work are divided into the following groups: these are archival materials, diplomatic and parliamentary documents, publications of speeches by political figures, memoirs, journalism and the press. The first group includes published archival materials of Russia (Foreign Policy Archive - AVP). The second group of sources includes materials that form the basis of almost any work on foreign policy. These are collections of documents, publications of speeches by political figures, transcripts of parliamentary meetings, documents of international conferences and organizations. The main materials on the diplomatic activity of England are presented in the publications published after the war.

British Foreign Policy Documents. This source was taken as a basis by most historians specializing in the history of the interwar period, since it contains a significant number of documents that allow us to analyze not only the foreign policy of England, but also other European states. For the correct use of this publication, it is necessary to take into account a number of its features. First, you need to understand that not all documents of the Foreign Office are presented there. In this regard, the "Documents on British Foreign Policy" should be supplemented by the one implemented in the 1990s. in the United States by the publication "British Documents on Foreign Affairs"21, which presents a number of new sources, including from the Confidential Print (a group of documents sent to a strictly defined number of members of the Cabinet of Ministers and the Foreign Ministry). Secondly, it is very important that the Documents on British Foreign Policy offer a view of international relations from the point of view of the Foreign Office, while, in the early 1920s. its traditional role as the government's chief foreign policy organ was to a large extent called into question by the active intervention of Prime Minister D. Lloyd George. Although the extent of this phenomenon is debated. Thirdly, the work on the Documents on British Foreign Policy was carried out at a time when most of the document flow, especially those related to intelligence activities, remained classified. Without taking into account this component of foreign policy, it is impossible to understand with a sufficient degree of completeness many of the actions of Great Britain in the international arena in the 1920s. Diplomatic documents of the 1920s were published, of course, in the USSR, first by the People's Commissariat and then by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the “Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR”, which presents a number of materials on the relations of the USSR with Great Britain and France, it is worth highlighting the publication “Locarno Conference” (1959)22 Based on captured German documents, it allows in a number of aspects to supplement the information contained in British and French documents on the subject.

In addition to the above sources, press materials played an important role. The voice of the leading newspapers of Great Britain and France - The Times and Le Tane - was quite significant in the 1920s.

An important source for this study is also the works of contemporaries: political, military-theoretical and journalistic writings written directly in the interwar period, or memoirs compiled later. On the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 D. Lloyd George23. International events of 1922-1923. a series of articles by D. Lloyd George, who had already left the government and tried to prove on the pages of the press the fidelity of the political course pursued by him until then, is devoted. The picture of British foreign policy is perfectly complemented by the memoirs of Winston Churchill, which are distinguished by a very accurate perception of the situation in the international arena24. In many respects, Robert Vansittart was in solidarity with Churchill's position, in 1930-1938. Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of England. His memoirs and diary entries make it clear that Churchill was by no means alone in his opinion.

Finally, an important group of sources are personal papers, letters and diaries of British and French politicians. It includes the papers of the British Prime Minister S. Baldwin, O. Chamberlain's correspondence with his sisters and other letters, papers of A. Briand, published by his biographer J. Suares26. Such sources give us the opportunity to try to understand some personal experiences, considerations of officials, which could never be expressed officially by them.

The structure of this workdetermined by the subject, purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, two chapters and a conclusion. The introduction reveals the relevance of the issue, establishes the object, subject, purpose and objectives of the study, provides historiographical and source study reviews of the topic.

The first chapter examines the dynamics of the development of the Versailles Washington system of international relations.

The second chapter analyzes the diplomacy of England and France towards Germany during the last decade before the Second World War.

In conclusion, the results of the study are summed up, final conclusions on the topic under consideration are formed.

Chapter 1. The Versailles-Washington system of international relations on the way to the crisis

1.1 Formation of the Versailles-Washington system; Causes of the crisis

The Versailles-Washington system of international relations - in historiography, this term refers to a multipolar world order, the foundations of which were laid at the end of the First World War of 1914-1918 by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, agreements with Germany's allies, as well as agreements concluded at the Washington Conference of 1921- 1922. It took shape in 1919-1922 and was intended to formally consolidate the results of the First World War.

The Versailles component of this system largely depended on the political and military-strategic actions of the victorious states, the key among which, of course, were Great Britain and France. At the same time, one can state a characteristic disregard for the interests of the losing countries and states that have just emerged on the political carriage of Europe (Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia).

The formation of the post-war world order in Europe took place against the background of the revolution in Russia and chaotic events in Eastern Europe. When discussing and drafting the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the leading states pursued various goals. For France, the primary task was to weaken Germany, which would allow the final formation of French hegemony in Europe and secure its eastern borders. Great Britain and the United States, on the contrary, were more interested in maintaining the balance of power in Europe, which pushed them to the need to take German interests into account with a greater degree of sensitivity. It is necessary to note the favorable conditions for the use of defeated Germany as a pacifying deterrent and stabilizing factor for the pan-European situation: the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the revolution in Russia, the all-encompassing national revolutionary upsurge and effective Bolshevik propaganda.

The logical outcome expressed in the Versailles agreements was the achieved compromises of the extreme positions, mainly, however, at the expense of the vanquished. This, in turn, played a cruel joke on the guarantors of the Versailles-Washington system in the near future. The number of mass communist parties increased sharply, and the direction of Germany's foreign policy acquired a radically revanchist character. At the same time, England and France tried to use the new states that had arisen in Europe, both against the Bolshevik revolution and against German revanchism.

The absence of a coordinated position of Great Britain and France on the issue of the prospects for European equilibrium and the self-withdrawal of the United States from participating in the functioning of the Versailles system, the isolation of Soviet Russia (USSR) and the pronounced anti-German orientation of the Versailles system turned it into an unbalanced and non-universal one, which certainly only undermined the fragile peace and inflamed potential for global geopolitical conflict.

It must be remembered that an integral part of the Versailles Peace Treaty was the Charter of the League of Nations, an intergovernmental organization whose main goals were: the development of cooperation between peoples, the guarantee of peace and security. A noteworthy fact here is that at first the number of countries participating in this organization did not include: the USA, Germany and the USSR. The cornerstone and main idea of ​​the League of Nations was the creation of a system of collective security. In a historical retrospective, we clearly see that in practice, these ideas could not be implemented, and in fact in 1939 the League of Nations collapsed, although it officially existed until 1946.

It makes sense to dwell in more detail on what served as the foundation of the Versailles-Washington system, and first of all, here we need to recall the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 itself, in which all responsibility for the First World War was assigned to Germany. Even despite the fact that on November 11, 1918, an armistice was signed with Germany, which marked the end of hostilities, then a long six-month negotiation process followed in the format of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. Initially, 70 delegates from 27 countries took part in the talks28. After the defeat, the representatives of Germany, Austria and Hungary were excluded from the negotiations. The Russian delegation was also excluded due to the negotiations on a separate peace with Germany in 1918, during which Germany received a significant part of the territory of the former Russian Empire with rich resources. Until March 1919, a key role in the complex preparations for the almost complete secrecy of the negotiation process, as well as the development of difficult conditions for a peace treaty, was assigned to regular meetings of the so-called "Council of Ten", which included the heads of government and foreign ministers of the five main countries. -winners: Great Britain, France, USA, Italy and Japan. But later this format failed to justify itself and became formal in nature, which did not allow any effective decisions to be made. Over time, the representatives of Japan and the foreign ministers of most of the other countries participating in the conference ceased to take part in the main meetings and only representatives of the Big Four remained29. But this was not the last reduction. The final terms of the peace treaty were determined by the leaders of the Big Three: British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and American President Woodrow Wilson. But here, too, the work went very slowly and protractedly, because the goals of the participants were completely different, as noted above, in the final analysis, this predetermined the fragile nature of the system created. As a result, the process of preparing the text of the peace treaty was called the “unfortunate compromise”30. After numerous consultations, secret meetings, it was finally possible to consolidate the main theses of the peace treaty, which was signed on October 21, 1919 and entered into force on January 10, 1920, after ratification by Germany and the four main allied powers - Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan . Among the signatories of the Versailles Peace Treaty, the United States, Hejaz and Ecuador refused to ratify it. The US Senate refused ratification due to the US unwillingness to commit itself to participation in the League of Nations (where the influence of Great Britain and France prevailed), the charter of which was an integral part of the Treaty of Versailles.

Instead of this treaty, the United States signed a special treaty with Germany on July 21, 1921, almost identical to that of Versailles, but without articles on the League of Nations. An inseparable part of the Treaty of Versailles was the charter of the League of Nations. The question of establishing the League of Nations was important for two other reasons. First, as an international organization, the League could make a practical contribution to regulating international relations and reducing the danger of war. Secondly, it assumed the inclusion of the United States of America in the circle of global players (although Washington never ratified the peace treaty), thirdly, its charter was intended to give legal and moral sanction to the policy of the great powers, thereby legalizing it in the eyes of the public. opinions.31 The military control commission formed by the allies did not have the right to independent verification. She had only the right to demand from the German government information about violations. It is clear that such information was hardly amenable to official confirmation or refutation. The commission was dissolved already in 1926, and the revision of Germany's obligations fell to the intelligence services. In this connection, there is nothing surprising that the articles on disarmament were violated in the most flagrant way long before Hitler came to power and his resolute rejection of them.

If we move on to a more detailed description of the content of the imposed sanctions and restrictions on Germany, then it is probably worth starting with the obligation to return Alsace-Lorraine (within the borders of 1870) to France; the transfer to Belgium of the district of Eupen-Malmedy, as well as the so-called neutral and Prussian parts of Morena; Poland - Posen, parts of Pomerania and other territories of West Prussia; Danzig and its district was declared a "free city"; The Memel (Klaipeda) region (Memelland) was transferred to the control of the victorious powers, but only until February 1923, when it was annexed to Lithuania.

A significant part of Schleswig went to Denmark in 1920, part of Upper Silesia in 1921 to Poland, southern part East Prussia remained with Germany; Czechoslovakia ceded a small section of Silesian territory - the Gyulchin district. Saar passed for 15 years under the control of the League of Nations, and after 15 years, the fate of the Saar was to be decided by a referendum. The important thing here is that the coal mines were given into the ownership of France. The eastern borders of Poland were established along the line of the Bug River, west of Brest and Grodno, along the line of demarcation known as the Curzon Line.

Under the treaty, Germany recognized and undertook to strictly observe the independence of Austria, and also recognized the full independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The entire German part of the left bank of the Rhine and a strip of the right bank 50 km wide were declared demilitarized. As a guarantee of Germany's compliance with Part XIV of the Treaty, the condition of temporary occupation of part of the territory of the Rhine River basin by the Allied forces for 15 years was put forward. Reparations were also a heavy burden: “The Allied and Associated Governments declare, and Germany acknowledges, that Germany and her Allies are responsible for causing all the loss and damage suffered by the Allied and Associated Governments and their citizens in consequence of the war which was forced upon them by the attack of Germany and her allies<...>Germany will produce during 1919 and 1920. and the first four months of 1921 such payments and in such forms (in gold, goods, ships, securities or otherwise) as the Reparation Commission may fix, the equivalent of these payments being 20,000,000,000 (twenty billion) gold marks.”

The nature of the negotiations that took place can be judged by many testimonies. At a meeting on May 7 in Versailles, at which the Allies handed over to the Germans the text peaceful conditions Count Brockdorff-Rantzau answering Clemenceau declared, among other things, that the main task of Germany is: the restoration of the warring peoples through the international defense of life, health, and the freedom of the working classes. It is in this sense that articles 55 56 of the German draft statute for the League of Nations were drafted. The draft of the labor agreement proposed by the German delegation, in its content, was very closely in contact with the resolutions of the Berne Conference in February 1919, which we already know, and with the resolutions of the conference in Leeds.

The German draft also contained a proposal to convene a special working conference on the working question, which would meet at Versailles simultaneously with the general peace conference. This irritated Clemenceau and he categorically forbade the workers to enter Versailles, citing the fact that a conference in Washington would soon be held with their participation. He answered no less decisively on all other points of the mentioned German note criticizing the allied plan. international organization labor. All that the German delegation at Versailles managed to achieve in the field of labor regulations was to make a few editorial corrections, and even then in the French text alone, in which a number of grammatical errors were discovered.33

After we have considered one of the components of the Versailles-Washington system, we must turn to the second, but in this work we will do this in the format of a very small review, because our study is much less concerned with the Washington system of international relations in comparison with Versailles. Let us single out a characteristic, in our opinion, aspect, which, by and large, distinguishes both components of the Versailles-Washington system, namely, some inconsistency and lack of universality. As in the Versailles component, this is partly due to the neglect of the interests of significant regional states on the part of the leaders. This is mainly about not including the USSR and China among the subjects of the system, which were able to become a significant counterbalance to the same Japanese expansionism in cooperation with the United States and Great Britain. Here, several factors that shake the system came together at once: the uncertainty of China's political development, the militaristic and aggressive foreign policy of Japan, the isolationism of the United States, in other matters, it cannot be said that these are the only episodes, but undoubtedly the most significant, especially in the context of the events that brought World War II closer.

Thus, article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles contained the following financial requirements: “Regardless of the subsequent claims of the allies, compensation for damages prohibition of the seizure of public valuables that could serve as a guarantee for reimbursement of the immediate return of the Belgian National Bank in cash and any documents in securities and money related to the occupied areas of issuance by the ally of the Russian and Romanian gold"34. The Versailles Peace Treaty contained a provision that the complete disarmament of Germany was to be a prerequisite for a general limitation of armaments of all countries. This subsequently gave Berlin a reason to refer to the Allies' failure to fulfill their promises on the general limitation of the armed forces of all nations and, under this pretext, to renounce the military provisions of the treaty.

The recent Paris Peace Conference and the signed Versailles Treaty could only solve the problem of an approximate all-European vector for the development of international relations, but it is obvious that many more steps and negotiations were required to resolve the entire complex of problems of the post-war world order. The incompleteness of the process of resolving the geopolitical situation predetermined subsequent events and attempts, often futile, to find compromises. Next, we will try to analyze the following events: the Genoa Conference and the Treaty of Rapallo and the Locarno Accords. First of all, we will consider their significance for Germany and for the two flagships of the Versailles system, France and England, their direct role in these processes and the consequences.

1.2 The reparations question of Germany in the context of attempts to normalize European international relations

Despite the fact that when it comes to the problems of relations between the guarantor powers of the Versailles system of international relations (France and Great Britain) with Germany and the USSR in the 1920s, the issues of reparations and recognition or cooperation, respectively, are much more obvious, in this paragraph we we deduce from this one general problem, and reduce these issues to the problem of the full integration of the young Soviet state and Germany into the international system which was ruled by England and France at that time. In the following, an attempt will be made to trace how this process took place. It makes no sense to break the chronology of events, therefore, we will start with the Genoa Conference. The subject of this international meeting in the spring of 1922 was economic and financial matters.

When, at the end of 1921, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, GV Chicherin, noted that Russia was ready to become part of the world community on an equal footing, Lloyd George spoke out in support of this idea. During his meeting with French Prime Minister Aristide Briand in January 1922, a program was developed for the future Genoa Conference. The final decision to convene an international conference on economic issues was taken by the Entente countries at a meeting in Cannes on January 6-13, 1922.

At the talks in Cannes, British diplomacy presented a memorandum emphasizing the need to resolve the "Russian question" as a key one in the restoration of Europe. An agreement was reached between Britain and France on a common line of conduct in relation to Soviet Russia. After a detailed discussion, the Council approved the relevant resolution. The Allied Powers recognized that the relief of the suffering of all peoples is possible only through the restoration of international trade and the development of the natural wealth of all countries, and that the deliverance of Europe from economic paralysis requires the combined efforts of the most powerful countries. They invited to this conference the countries that lost during the First World War, including Germany, as well as Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Supreme Council outlined six conditions, the recognition of which was to contribute to the success of the whole plan:

a) No state has the right to impose on another state a system of property, internal economic life and government.

b) A state that grants credit to another must be sure that the property and rights of its citizens will be protected.

c) “Actual security guarantees cannot be restored until the governments of all states desiring to take advantage of foreign credit declare quite definitely that they recognize all public debts and obligations entered into or may be entered into or guaranteed by the state, municipalities or any other public organizations, as well as the obligation to restore all property belonging to foreigners or compensate them for losses caused to them by confiscation or sequestration of their property, and a system of legislation and court that would impartially protect the rights and obligations arising from commercial and other types of contracts, and would provide their coercive force.

d) The requirement to organize financial and monetary circulation, which ensures the conduct of trade.

e) refraining from propaganda aimed at overthrowing the existing order

f) urged all countries to make a mutual commitment to refrain from attacking their neighbors.

Germany was also invited to Cannes. The Germans decided to continue their game: to tear the Treaty of Versailles piece by piece, using the differences between the allies. To hide the true intentions of their delegation, the German government turned a blind eye to the persecution of Rathenau in the fascist press. They wrote that a new ultimatum awaits Germany in Cannes. With the help of the upcoming conference, Lloyd George intended to raise his prestige and increase the influence of the liberals in the country due to the aggravation of the internal situation caused by a severe economic crisis and catastrophic unemployment. The conference was intended, at least in part, to contribute to the correction or mitigation of the emerging situation and at the same time to bring Europe out of the crisis, primarily at the expense of Russia.

Lloyd George's plan can be summarized as follows:

During 1922, the Foreign Office received numerous reports of German-Soviet cooperation. At the same time, the British ambassador in Berlin, Lord D. Abernon, based on his communications with the German representatives, assured the British leadership that Germany would not take any steps that might be contrary to British interests in Russia. W. Müller, the British representative in Warsaw, was concerned about the possibility of cooperation between Germany and Soviet Russia. In the context of the signing of the Anglo-French security treaty on the eve of the Genoa Conference, he noted that France was concerned about a possible German-Soviet alliance, which could well have an anti-Polish orientation. Otherwise, she would not have turned to England for security guarantees.

The Genoese Conference was called upon to smooth out the contradictions between France and Great Britain on the issue of reparations and to establish peace in Europe. The conference was expected to bring back to the European system

Germany and Russia, which have been excluded from it since 1918.

One of the key issues at the Genoa Conference was the problem of debt obligations. According to the estimates of foreign economic publications, the amount of public and private debts of Russia amounted to approximately 18.5 billion gold rubles, which was completely unsustainable. K. Radek wrote quite convincingly about this, who noted in 1922: “If we assume for a moment that the Soviet government would agree to pay these debts in full, and on time, then the first installment with interest and with the repayment of 1/25 of the debt demanded would amount to about 1.2 billion rubles. The tsarist government, with a huge strain on the payment forces of the population, was able, on the basis of pre-war products and the pre-war volumes of foreign trade, which had an excess of exports over imports before the war by an average of 366 million a year, to pay interest and repayments of about 400 million rubles. in year. To be able to pay the indicated amount of 1.2 billion a year, Russia must not only reach the output of pre-war products by 1927, but also exceed it three times. In turn, the Russian delegation announced its own claims for economic compensation in connection with the damage caused to the country by the intervention and the Civil War. It is noteworthy that the total amount of claims amounted to 50 billion gold rubles, and this is more than two and a half times the amount of claims against Russia.

The current situation has clearly shown that it will not be possible to reach a quick consensus. An important point was the existence of significant disagreements between France and England in their approach to the issue of compensation for nationalized private property. France, supported by Belgium, believed that, since restitution was not considered, an exclusive, full restoration of the rights of the former owners or compensation to the former owners was necessary. England and Italy defended the principle of compensation. All contradictions came, of course, from different economic interests. France was primarily worried about pre-war debts, England - wartime debts, because they could be used to pay off the debt to America. It is precisely this that even caused the fact that Great Britain raised the question of the complete annulment of inter-allied war debts.

At the Genoa Conference, two lines of policy towards Soviet Russia clashed. Lloyd George's policy was to seek an agreement with Soviet Russia. The alternative political line was to isolate Russia, which was mainly done by France. In Paris, they did not believe the Kremlin's disarmament rhetoric. The Germans quite pragmatically perceived the French line at the Genoa Conference, since it essentially repeated the policy of Prime Minister R. Poincaré, who controlled the head of the French delegation of the Minister of Justice and Alsace and Lorraine, L. Barthou. What caused misunderstanding in Germany was the policy of Lloyd George, who, by hook or by crook, tried to avoid contact with representatives of the German delegation. This is explained by the fact that Lloyd was trying to maneuver in order to persuade Russia to pay off its debts to Western countries and act as the savior of the European economy.

The British Prime Minister relied on a semi-official discussion of the restoration of Europe and Russia with representatives of the Soviet side, but in the company of delegates from France, Belgium and Italy, so that a united front of states against the RSFSR was formed at the negotiations. question. At first, Lloyd George was very calm about the Soviet-German negotiations, seeing them as a means of putting pressure on France. At the same time, he believed that they would be under British control on the basis of those plans for the economic exploitation of Soviet Russia, which he discussed with Walter Rathenau in Cannes.

The complete disinterest of the allies in the needs of Germany provoked the latter to resume the negotiations begun in Berlin with the Soviet delegation. A telegram was sent to Berlin on this occasion:

“The political situation here seems to require the signing of a separate agreement with Russia in order to ensure German rights, which are threatened by the well-known London proposals. The content of the agreement will correspond to the draft kept by Gauschild. All party representatives and experts here are strongly in favor of concluding a treaty in order to avoid isolation.” As a result of Soviet-German negotiations, the Treaty of Rapallo was concluded, which led to an even greater aggravation of Anglo-French contradictions. A similar assessment of the treaty was given by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissingery “because the Western allies predetermined this event by “ostracizing the two largest European powers through the creation of a belt of small, mutually hostile states, as well as through the dismemberment of both Germany and the Soviet Union.” The Treaty of Rapallo meant the end of the international diplomatic isolation of the RSFSR. For Russia, this was the first full-scale treaty and de jure recognition as a state, and for Germany, the first equal treaty after Versailles39. The German armed forces were given the opportunity to train groups of pilots, tankers and chemical weapons specialists, as well as to train their officers in the handling of new weapons, the manufacture and possession of which was forbidden to Germany. The parties mutually renounced claims for reimbursement of military expenses and non-military losses and were able to agree on a format for resolving differences between themselves. The German side recognized the nationalization of German state and private property in the RSFSR and renounced claims arising from a number of measures by the RSFSR or its bodies in relation to German citizens or their private rights, provided that the government of the RSFSR would not satisfy similar claims of other states. The size of the German share capital nationalized in Soviet Russia was estimated in a memo by G.V. Chicherin dated March 2, 1922 at 378 million rubles40. The contract was concluded without specifying a period. The terms of the treaty took effect immediately. Only paragraph "b" of Art. 1 on the regulation of public and private law relations and Art. 4 on the most favored nation came into force from the moment of ratification.41 On May 16, 1922, by a decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Treaty of Rapallo was ratified. On May 29, 1922, the German government put the treaty up for discussion in the Reichstag and on July 4, 1922 it was ratified. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Berlin on January 31, 1923.

The Treaty of Rapallo was also a challenge to French security policy. For Germany, in turn, there was a very specific threat from Paris. Already on April 24, a week after Rapallo, French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré, in one of his public speaking On May 2, the commander-in-chief of the allied forces in the Rhineland, General Degut, in the light of the signing of the Soviet-German treaty, wrote to the Minister of War Maginot that France should not waste any more time if she wants to occupy the Ruhr basin. Further actions of Paris were not long in coming. At the end of 1922, the reparations commission noted a reduction in the supply of timber and coal from Germany. And already on January 9, 1923, Poincaré gave orders for the occupation of the Ruhr region - the industrial heart of the country by French and Belgian troops under the formal pretext of ensuring the activities of a control commission specially sent to the region. In fact, the purpose of the action was to be able to exploit the natural wealth of the region. With the occupation of the Ruhr, Germany lost 88% of coal, 48% of iron, 70% of cast iron. Among the Germans, this step caused a storm of protests, while the government called on the population of the occupied region to passive resistance. In the UK and the US, the French demarche was heavily criticized. It was supposed to contain secret articles concerning military cooperation between the two countries. French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré declared shortly after the signing of Rapallo that new Soviet-German relations could threaten Poland in the future and thus create an indirect danger for France as well. The Treaty of Rapallo made it possible to revise the conditions of Versailles in the East by force, and these are precisely the combination of circumstances that the French leadership tried to avoid in every possible way.

The French newspaper Tan recommended concluding an Anglo-French alliance as opposed to the Soviet-German one: "... it is necessary that England and France mutually undertake to act together in case of danger." The Journal de Deba, which expressed the opinion of R. Poincare, called for the exclusion from the conference not only of Germany, but also of Soviet Russia: “Why was the repressive measure applied only to Germany? Why is it not extended to Russia as well, or, better, why, without taking advantage of the opportunity, once the inconsistency of the treaty with the Cannes resolution has been proven, to demand from Chicherin a categorical recognition of the binding nature of the Cannes decisions? If he had refused, the Russian delegation would have been expelled; in other words, let's say, the whole conference would have failed; a result would be achieved, which is now the only desire of France. Other publications also demanded the dissolution of the conference. But at the same time, the press did not detract from the importance and significance of the Rapallo Treaty. The Parisian newspaper Er Nouvel wrote on May 5, 1922: “If Chicherin does not get any loans, he will nevertheless return to Russia with honor and increased prestige. He will have the Rapallo Treaty and the significant fact that among European statesmen he gave an example of splendid restraint and sacrificed nothing on the hated altar of capitalism.

The Treaty of Rapallo caused a sharp aggravation of relations between France and England. R. Poincare frightened Europe with the prospect of a military rapprochement between Germany and Soviet Russia, tried to achieve the annulment of the treaty and the dissolution of the Genoa Conference. Lloyd George, in contrast, was in favor of continuing the conference. He sharply responded to R. Poincaré, declaring that it was impossible to keep Russia and Germany in subjection all the time45. Lloyd George accused France of pushing Germany and Soviet Russia into signing the treaty. He was absolutely convinced that if R. Poincaré had not insisted so harshly on the recognition of Russia's pre-war debts and had not refused to discuss the German problem, then there would have been no Rapallo. L. George's dissatisfaction also grew due to the fact that R. Poincaré instructed the delegation to defend their interests in opposition to England. France was unhappy that there were secret negotiations between Germany and England. R. Poincare believed that at these meetings Germany acted as an intermediary between England and Soviet Russia. Subsequently, Lloyd George wrote that the nations met in Genoa to discuss in a friendly atmosphere questions of the economic recovery of Europe. Reparations issues could have been discussed in the same spirit, but this desire was ruined by Germany, which signed an agreement with Russia46. The efforts of Western democracies to put pressure on Germany and Soviet Russia with the help of economic levers failed, and the exit of the Soviet state from economic and political isolation served as a prologue to a revision of the position of the European powers on this issue and opened the way for the legal recognition of Soviet Russia.

The need to develop a plan was dictated by the crisis of 1923, when after the occupation of the Ruhr region by the Franco-Belgian troops in the Weimar Republic, an attempted coup d'état took place. The United States and Great Britain decide to limit France's ability to resolve the German issue, skillfully taking advantage of its financial dependence on them. In July 1924, the London International Conference was held, where a plan for the financial and economic rehabilitation of Germany was adopted, proposed by a commission of experts headed by the American banker Charles Dawes. Its content provided for a 4-year reduction in reparation rents while maintaining the total amount of reparations48. In the long term, the implementation of annual reparation payments was to be determined, based on the results of an analysis of the solvency of the German government.

Germany received significant financial assistance in the form of loans from the UK and the states, which was supposed to restart the German economy. Great Britain could not remain aloof from this problem, since Germany at that moment played a significant role for it both politically and economically in the context of ensuring the stability of European relations. Let's also not forget that by this time England no longer occupied a leading position in the field of world trade, the more relevant for her was the Anglo-German political and economic cooperation. In September 1928, an ad hoc committee of experts led by the American Owen Young proposed a revision of the plan in order to weaken financial and economic control over Germany. By agreeing to a revision of the Dawes Plan, England hoped to put an end to the payment of reparations to her in goods. British industry suffered from in-kind deliveries.49 The new Labor Party took the line of restoring Germany's great power political status, chiefly by revising the articles of the Treaty of Versailles. In a similar vein, as a process of eliminating the consequences of the war, the new reparation regulation was perceived.

Germany insisted on reducing the size and changing the timing of reparation payments. British Finance Minister Snowden demanded that Germany pay 457 million Reichsmarks to England annually instead of the planned 409 million. Snowden's demands also extended to an additional payment by Germany to Great Britain of 120 million Reichsmarks from the amount of German reparation payments that are not subject to deferral.50At meetings of the financial committee of the conference the British delegation eventually managed to get most of its demands accepted. Snowden achieved the expected increase in England's share of the UK's annual payments. The results of the Hague Conference in 1929 caused a very controversial reaction in Great Britain. On the one hand, these are the doxologies that have become common in the British press and the majority of the Labor Party.

The thesis that reparations and sanctions against Germany should be finally lifted was also habitual for the Labor Party. At the same time, there was a well-founded concern in public opinion about a possible escalation of confrontation with France, which could cause significant damage to the policies of the Labor cabinet and adversely affect the emerging trend of British foreign trade. In the interval between the First and Second sessions of the Hague Conference (August 1929 - January 1930), the British government was seriously concerned about the rejection of the Young Plan and the growing resistance from German nationalist circles. Another unpleasant circumstance for the British Labor leadership was the prospect of changing the reparation amounts paid by Germany. Nevertheless, the British were able to show flexibility and endurance at this difficult moment, and tensions in relations nevertheless decreased.

1.3 Locarno Accords

German diplomacy skillfully used the chance that world public opinion had given her regarding France's actions in the Rhineland. Berlin sought to present itself as a victim of French expansion, meeting the understanding of international political opinion. German representatives began to talk about the need to acquire international guarantees against violation of the Franco-German and German-Belgian borders. September 29, 1924

Germany declares its intention to join the League of Nations and claims to be a permanent member of the Council of the League, and on December 12 declared the demand to eliminate "inequality" in armaments, which followed from the Treaty of Versailles. The actions of the German side were taken with the favorable attention of Great Britain, which considered French ambitions a source of instability in Europe. Germany was looking for ways to free itself from the restrictions of Versailles and sought to achieve better settlements with former adversaries. “In my opinion,” Stresemann wrote in a secret letter to the former German Crown Prince on September 7, 1925, “German foreign policy faces three big tasks: a favorable resolution of the reparations issue and ensuring peace as a prerequisite for the future strengthening of Germany. Secondly, I include here the protection of Germans living abroad, i.e. those 10-12 million compatriots who are currently living in foreign countries under a foreign yoke. The third major task is the correction of the eastern borders, the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to Germany and the correction of the borders in Upper Silesia. reparation germany tension europe

In the future, the annexation of German Austria, although I am fully aware that this will not only be beneficial, but also very difficult problem of the German Empire 51 The first serious diplomatic success that shook the Versailles order, as mentioned above, was the treaty with Soviet Russia in Rapallo. The French draft treaty between the powers "having interests on the Rhine" - a Franco-Belgian-British alliance - gave a new opportunity for taking the initiative. Germany tried to prevent the formation of such a tripartite bloc, enlisting serious support from London. “Our political task in the West, designed for a long period, is not to revise the Treaty of Versailles, but to push France into the borders provided for by this treaty, that is, to ensure the security of the Rhine zone,” G. Stresemann noted. The memorandum repeated the main idea of ​​V. Kuno, which boiled down to the fact that “the powers that have interests on the Rhine, namely: France, England, Italy and Germany, would mutually undertake, with the guarantee of the American government, not to wage war against each other during the life of one generation, without having received special powers to do so by means of a plebiscite.

In a further edition, on the advice of Lord d'Abernon, the plebiscite clause was removed and the validity period was not indicated, it was proposed to "specially agree on this." had to be kept secret, he had no intention of entering into negotiations with Germany on a matter that would affect the security of France behind her back, and he referred to this proposal as premature. On January 25, 1925, the German government officially presented its own draft of the Rhine Guarantee Pact. The ensuing diplomatic correspondence and subsequent negotiations took place between Britain, Germany and France. Italy, for which, according to Mussolini, the Rhine border was of no interest, did not participate in them. But in Paris they well understood the logic of the British position and saw elements of the actual blocking of Britain and Germany against France. Therefore, it was beneficial for the French side to involve Italy in the negotiations, counting on its potential disagreements with Germany on the issue of Austro-Italian territorial disputes in the Alps. French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand tried to include Rome in negotiations on European borders. He proposed to conclude a guarantee pact for the eastern and southern borders of Germany with its neighbors, with the participation of France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Austria and Germany itself, with France taking on the role of guarantor of such an agreement. The misunderstanding between the alleged partners in the future pact was palpable. The French wanted, together with the pact, Germany would have signed arbitration agreements with France's eastern allies - Poland and Czechoslovakia, so France saw the creation of such a single guarantee complex.

But Great Britain interfered with this development of events, because it did not want to "encircle Germany", respectively, the Germans themselves were able to disown the legal consolidation of the inviolability of the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In Berlin, they were not even going to make a secret of the fact that the borders in the east of Europe were not final for them. It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that they were not considered as such in London either. First of all, we could talk about the border of Germany with Poland. The victorious European countries in the First World War tried through agreements to reduce tension in their relations with Germany. On January 10, 1925, the term of the unilateral most favored nation trade regime expired, and it was from that moment that Germany received the right to an independent trade policy, while export-oriented French and British enterprises insisted on easing general tensions, including political ones.

However, the treaty was of paramount importance for Germany. It was necessary to get out of international isolation, continue the revisionist policy and liberate the Rhineland. To achieve this goal, it was even possible to give up claims to Alsace and Lorraine, to compromise on the issue of maintaining the Rhine demilitarized zone and to obey the decisions of the League of Nations on territorial disputes. The military Franco-Polish alliance of 1921, which lost its force with the conclusion of the Locarno agreements, played a significant role. In the event of a conflict between Germany and Poland, and this was by no means excluded by the head of the diplomatic department, it was extremely important to avoid a war on two fronts. Since the violation of the German-French border automatically led to the intervention of the guarantor countries, France could no longer provide military support to Poland without coming into conflict with Great Britain and Italy. However, the French Foreign Minister, Briand, made an official political gesture by reaffirming allied relations with Poland in a guarantee agreement, also concluded on October 19, 1925. And despite this, it was clear to everyone - the security of Poland was significantly impaired by the new international guarantees issued in relation to the western borders of Germany. All attempts by Poland to neutralize these problems in the system of its security with similar guarantees regarding the eastern borders of Germany, suffered a complete failure due to the timely intervention of the German side.

The wing of the right-wing forces of Germany was negatively inclined towards the idea of ​​concluding the Locarno Treaties due to concessions to Germany, primarily on the issue of western borders. The German National People's Party even withdrew from the government in protest. On November 27, the Locarno Accords were ratified by the Reichstag. The government enlisted the support of the German Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party of Germany and, after signing the treaties, resigned, fulfilling its promise on December 5th. Actually, it must be said that the opposite, left wing, also had an extremely negative attitude towards the Locarno agreements, only the motivation was different, the left did not want the unification of Germany and the capitalist countries of Western Europe against the USSR. The obligations assumed by Germany to recognize the inviolability of the borders did not exclude, as Stresemann, who became German Foreign Minister at the end of 1923, the possibility of revising them through negotiations. Indeed, as soon as the Locarno Accords were signed, Germany immediately began secret negotiations with the Belgian government on the transfer of the cantons of Eupen and Malmedy to it. The Locarno Accords were the logical method for solving the German problem. The method chosen for this, Franco-German reconciliation, was the aim of French policy.

The foreign minister, Briand, sought a Franco-German truce, which he considered the key to European stability. At the first stage of the negotiations, according to archival materials from the French Foreign Ministry, Briand tried to secure borders for Germany's eastern neighbors as well. He decided to resort to the Locarno option only after his idea of ​​guaranteeing borders in the east of Europe met with fierce resistance from Germany, together with Great Britain. Briand's diplomacy after the Locarno period illustrates that he relied little on German forbearance and looked for ways to strengthen the military-political alliances of small countries, the next stage of the strategy was to analyze options for approaches to an agreement with Soviet Russia. It cannot be said that the assessments of the Locarno agreements were homogeneous, for example, in France there was a strong point of view of disappointment due to quite painful failures for the country, namely, it failed to achieve the Anglo-American guarantee promised at the time. The French were forced to put up with the fact that in the Locarno Pact, France and Germany were considered as politically equal parties. The guarantors of this pact were Great Britain and Italy, which it patronized. To top it off, neither England nor Italy began to extend their guarantees to the eastern borders of Germany, where France's allies Czechoslovakia and Poland remained. Naturally, French diplomacy could not classify the Locarno agreements as one of its own victories55. The Locarno agreements had a positive impact on the geopolitical situation in Europe by reducing tension and unrest among public opinion. Contemporaries assessed the agreements as "the highest point in the revival of Europe" and as "a watershed between war and peace." The "creators of Locarno" - French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, British Foreign Minister Austin Chamberlain and German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann - were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 192556. However, the fixation of two categories of borders - recognized by Germany and guaranteed by other powers and not recognized by Germany and not guaranteed by other powers - "it was not so much the appeasement of Europe as the definition of the field of new battles."

The Achilles' heel of the Locarno agreements was that they were too narrowly focused, focusing almost exclusively on Franco-German reconciliation. Due to such a bias, they could not become an effective mechanism for ensuring European security. It was already possible to predict that some pockets of instability would most likely be expected from the east of Europe. The Treaty of Locarno was not accompanied by the signing of one or more military conventions, and therefore no specific mechanism for including safeguards against a possible violation of the agreed terms was provided58. In the event of a serious conflict, the guarantor countries were only obliged to enter into negotiations to consider the possibility of taking measures against violators. The level of reliability of such guarantees does not stand up to criticism. Nevertheless, the signing of the agreements created in international relations the phenomenon of the "spirit of Locarno", as an expression of the common desire of European countries for reconciliation and cooperation, which became the main leitmotif of the nature of international relations in the second half of the 20s. It is worth noting that Paris also tried to use the United States to "balance" Germany.

A good example was Briand's initiative in June 1927 to conclude a bilateral "Pact of Eternal Friendship" between France and the United States. As a result, after the negative reaction of Washington to the original French project, which led to the signing of the multilateral and abstract Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 on the rejection of war as a means of national policy. In general, French attempts to deepen cooperation with Germany in the framework of discussions about European integration in the late 1920s. encountered, among other things, the unwillingness of Berlin to excessively spoil relations with Washington. Against the backdrop of various French initiatives, "Stresemann had already made reservations since 1928 about following a political course that could damage good relations between Germany and the United States - the latter were supposed to play the role of an incentive for economic growth in Germany and help in a favorable solution to the reparations issue"

1.4 Towards the aggravation of international relations at the turn of the decades

A cross-cutting issue of international relations regarding the peaceful 20s. can be considered a disarmament issue. The League of Nations could not remain aloof from the world pacifist movement and made certain efforts to resolve the issue diplomatically. Under its auspices, a preparatory commission was created from representatives of more than 20 countries, which considered numerous projects coming to Geneva, but the diversity of the participants and even, first of all, the incompatibility of their interests, did not allow finding a more or less productive solution to the task. The final result of the activity was a declarative convention on disarmament.

Against this background, the project proposed by French Foreign Minister Briand to US Secretary of State Kellag, about a kind of "eternal friendship" and outlawing war, at first glance seemed much more attractive and effective. The parties to the treaty, who gathered in Paris in August 1928, actually signed their renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy and declared: “The High Contracting Parties recognize that the settlement or resolution of all disputes or conflicts that may arise between them, no matter what nature or whatever origin they were not, should always be sought only in peaceful means.

On the readiness to resolve disagreements and conflicts, regardless of the nature of their origin, only through diplomatic and exclusively peaceful means. It is not difficult to imagine the excitement that reigned around the Briand-Kellogg Pact, if a year later, when it came into force, 44 states, including Soviet Russia, joined it. But it is important to remember that, strictly speaking, real guarantees of peace were not spelled out in it.

It is no coincidence that this episode of international relations of the 20s. XX century, we complete this analytical review. In addition to the chronological aspect, we are also guided by its exponentiality.

The Briand-Kellogg Pact would like to be called a "reflection" of the diplomatic history of this period. In the political moves of Great Britain, France and Germany with them, one can find many examples of both the high art of negotiation and vague diplomatic steps. It is a catchy fact that barely 10 years have passed since the entry into force of this treaty, when the most terrible war in the history of mankind broke out. In fairness, it is impossible not to note along with the above that one way or another, but the Briand-Kellogg Pact - meant the first step towards creating a system of collective security in Europe. Later, in the 1930s, the geopolitical situation in the international arena would begin to change rather quickly, and steadily slide towards a global military conflict, but the source of all these changes must be sought in the very birth of the Versailles-Washington system. The created order of the world order was based on the results of the First World War. The key roles in determining the conditions for peaceful coexistence were given to the victorious powers - Great Britain and France, and, roughly speaking, Germany was made the only one to blame. For a certain time, as much as possible, she was excluded from the world community. However, this political line quickly proved to be untenable. An unreasonable position from the very beginning and opposing actions over the next decade naturally led to an aggravation of international relations. We note right away that the theses expressed above are absolutely not aimed at blaming the countries-guarantors of the Versailles system for all the ensuing world troubles. The reasons for the marked deterioration in European relations, which ultimately resulted in the Second World War, are, of course, much more and they lie far from only in the diplomatic plane. Some of them will be discussed in more detail in the next part of the work.

Chapter 2. Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany in the last pre-war decade

2.1 The situation in the European diplomatic arena in the early 30s

In this paragraph, we will try to consider what tasks the Foreign Office faced, what main challenges they faced and how British diplomacy behaved in the international situation of the pre-war decade. Since England was the guarantor of the Versailles system, it would be right to single out the key hotbeds of tension that posed a threat to the system of international relations. One of these centers was undoubtedly the situation in the Far East, in connection with the Japanese aggression against China, but here we can state the practical inaction against the aggressor on the part of the Western powers. One more example of the growing tension must, of course, be cited by Italy's increased predatory activity in Africa. This episode will be considered in more detail below, as it is of greater importance for this study. Let us highlight the general point that here the League of Nations took the path of recognizing Italy as an aggressor and applied a set of economic sanctions against it, but the reaction did not go beyond the economic sphere, so there is no need to talk about the final effectiveness either.

The most striking focus of the world conflict was directly the situation in Europe itself. Where did Nazi Germany embark on the path of absolute disregard for the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, driven, in addition to its new ideology, by the sharpened idea of ​​revanchism. The apotheosis of such a policy of non-intervention was the Munich process of 1938, a catastrophic case of disregard for existing international legislation. In this paragraph, we will approach the analysis of the above events from the perspective of the Foreign Office. And we simply cannot ignore the issue of political development and struggle within it during this period. After the end of the First World War, the British Empire significantly increased its capabilities, gaining control of more than half of the territories mandated by the League of Nations. As the leaders of the British diplomatic department noted, England got everything she wanted, and now "the only goal is to keep what we have and live in peace"61. This thesis formed the basis of the British foreign policy doctrine of the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. However, the opinions of politicians on the priority of tasks, forces and means that should have been used for their implementation did not always coincide. British politicians throughout the 20-30s tried to build their political course in a balancing mode between, on the one hand, maintaining the unity of the complex organism of the Commonwealth of Nations, which united the metropolis, colonies and mandated territories. This can be illustrated by the Westminster Statute of 1931, where the following specifics of the mutual statuses of the mother country and dominions were fixed: “in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their internal and external affairs, although they were united by common citizenship to the crown and freely united as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations". On the other hand, official London, while declaring its adherence to the former unity, actually cared about strengthening its own positions. At the same time, it is believed that by the beginning of the 30s. The British Empire as a single organism has actually ceased to exist.

Faced with the need to solve various foreign policy tasks in parallel, the British were forced to link them together. Until the beginning of the decade, the British ruling circles did not see a direct threat to England from the continent, and for their part tried to avoid this, especially in Europe.

At the session of the League of Nations in 1935, S. Baldwin, speaking, drew attention to the danger for the world community of any European conflict, which can be interpreted as the realization by British politicians of the need to maintain global peace and prevent the emergence of a new conflict64. According to the English historian E. Ranson, the formation of the British foreign policy concept was greatly influenced by:

"the bitter memory of the First World War, with its terrible lists of casualties, and the conviction that pre-war negotiations with France had drawn Britain into a war that was not at all in her interests"65.

The guarantor powers were given the responsibility of pursuing a more far-sighted policy. Here we consider it necessary to refer to the position of the future Prime Minister of England, W. Churchill, who noted the particular importance of actions with the aim of: “... to reconcile the defeated people with their fate, helping the defeated country achieve maximum prosperity with their benevolent actions, and also to strive by all means to lay the foundation of true friendship and community of interests, so that there is less and less incentive to resort to force of arms again. Alas, as we all know, the efforts made by Great Britain in this direction were not enough to extinguish the revanchist fervor of the Germans.

In the early spring of 1930, the attention of British diplomacy was riveted to the situation in the highest political circles of Germany on the question of the likely refusal of the Reichstag to ratify the German-Polish liquidation agreement. Such attention is due to the fact that, in fact, the refusal of the Reichstag to ratify went against the interests of international capital in resolving acute financial disputes among European countries after they approved the Young Plan. Although the British government was well aware that the ratification of the treaty does not give them any special advantages in terms of influence on the contracting countries. The British leadership was aware that France was, of course, a serious barrier for Germany in resolving the issue of the eastern border. British diplomats repeatedly analyzed the situation in order to identify various possibilities for any compromises between Germany and France, but did not see the possibility of achieving them until the French side agreed to meet the German demands regarding the Polish side. According to the head of the Central European Department of the Foreign Office, O. Sargent, the issue of the German eastern border is assessed as the main task of Germany's foreign policy for the near future, the only controversial issue here was whether Germany would agree to cede its demands to Poland, in the event of a decision questions of reparations and evacuation of the Rhineland. The risk of an undesirable reaction from France in the event of the ratification of the liquidation agreement in the German Reichstag was much higher in comparison with the revealed facts of Germany's violation of the military restrictions established by the Versailles Peace Treaty: in particular, it was about subsidizing and building "pocket" cruisers (three German warships : "Lützow", "Admiral Scheer" and "Admiral Spee"). After the London Conference on Naval Armaments, the actual superiority of the United States over Great Britain was revealed, and in this context, the latter especially did not want to strengthen the French positions on the European continent.

After the conclusion of the London Naval Conference, Great Britain assumed the role of an intermediary in the negotiations between France and Italy, which resolved issues of naval construction; Such a position gave solid grounds for the British leadership to count on a favorable outcome of the negotiations. During this process, official London often and skillfully used the facts of subsidizing and building "pocket" cruisers in Germany to put pressure on France. Due to the growing global economic crisis and the customs war between the leading capitalist countries, the governments of European states resorted to various development projects for reformatting economic rules on the continent, for example, on May 17, 1930, France promulgated a memorandum on the organization of a European federal union.

Acceptance of the plan by Germany would mean an obvious rapprochement between the two leading continental powers. And although in Forinoffis, a Franco-German rapprochement was not considered very likely, in order to have a more serious confidence in this, it was necessary to find a solution to the question of Germany's eastern border in favor of the latter69. At this time, there is a possibility that the German side will be interested in revising the Young Plan. The seriousness of the situation is most clearly manifested at a meeting of the leadership of the National People's Party of Germany with the Minister of Finance W. Dietrich on September 11, where he, according to G. Rembold, denied the rumors that had spread on this topic, but at the same time noted that "in The Hague, since the Versailles peace treaty, obvious progress" in the issue of granting Germany equal rights with the European powers. Great Britain had to be more attentive to the internal political development of Germany, because, immediately after the success of the Nazis, rumors began to be heard in the German ruling circles about the possible beneficial cooperation of the ruling cabinet of G. Brüning with the leaders of the NSDAP. The results of the elections to the Reichstag caused a great resonance in the British press. The Daily Herald saw them as an obvious, widespread rebellion against democratic institutions. As a tool for resolving probable conflict situations in the future, the Foreign affairs magazine offered Germany, in exchange for territorial concessions made to it by Poland, "the guarantee of its eastern border from encroachments by the USSR"

In the new year, 1931, the question of the growing tension in German-Polish relations was raised more and more often at meetings of officials and representatives of the business circles of England and Germany. On January 17, 1931, during a meeting in Berlin with the British Foreign Minister J. Curtius, he raised the issue of the situation of the German minority in Upper Silesia, emphasizing at the same time that at the moment there was no desire to start discussing the revision of the borders. This could only mean that the possibility of discussing this topic in the future71 was allowed. A few days earlier, the British diplomatic department became aware that concessions regarding the Polish Corridor in favor of Germany were considered by official representatives of the German side, on the issue of disarmament, which was a key one for the Foreign Office. On March 24-25, 1931, the National Security Conference was held in London.

The agenda was aimed entirely at resolving the issue of relations between Germany and Poland, first of all, the issue of the possibility of changing the eastern border of Germany, the likelihood of a military clash between the two states was considered. The weak productivity of the political steps taken by the British diplomatic department in the direction of mediation in European relations can be clearly seen against the backdrop of the financial and economic crisis in the summer of 1931. The difficult situation in Germany forced the Western countries to look for ways to resolve this impasse in the shortest possible time. England's intention to formulate preliminary conditions so that the reparation obligations at the London conference convened in July 1931 could not be realized due to the sharply opposed position of France and the United States, so the issue of revising the borders temporarily faded into the background.

2.2 Growing tensions in Europe with the rise of the National Socialist Party in Germany

With the coming to power of the Nazi Party in Germany, foreign policy acquired a completely different character. Aggressive tasks came to the fore, which were detailed in Hitler's Mein Kampf. Basically they boiled down to the following:

1)predatory war against the USSR;

2)the defeat of France;

)the defeat of the British Empire and the small states in Europe.

Preparation was necessary to carry out these tasks. Therefore, the foreign policy program of the NSDAP proceeded from the need for a gradual progress towards both final and intermediate goals. "In the pre-war foreign policy of fascist Germany, three stages can be distinguished, the implementation of which should have preceded the transition to an open struggle for dominance in Europe."

The first stage, 1933 - 1935: internal consolidation of the regime, buildup of armaments, strengthening of foreign policy positions by destroying existing ratio forces in Europe.

The second stage, 1935 - 1937: the transition to an open arms race, the rejection of the territorial establishments of the Treaty of Versailles, actions to escalate international tension (intervention in the civil war in Spain, the creation of a political bloc Berlin - Rome - Tokyo).

The third stage, 1938 - 1939: the transition to aggressive actions in Europe, the seizure of the territories of sovereign states, forced military-economic, ideological and political-diplomatic preparations for war.

It is clear that in order to achieve such ambitious foreign policy goals, colossal diplomatic preparation was necessary, here is the need to search for allies, and destabilize the European security system and, of course, prevent potential enemies and victims from exposing their strategic plans. The Hitlerite government camouflaged its aggressive actions with the demands of revising Versailles and granting Germany equality with other powers in the matter of armaments. Another characteristic feature of his speeches was the emphasized anti-Soviet orientation of foreign policy.

In October 1933, at the ongoing Geneva Conference, the British side put forward a new plan for French arms control in Germany, which already took into account the interests of the French side to a greater extent. After that, the German delegation leaves Geneva and a little later Germany leaves the League of Nations. The main task remains the question of the possibility of legal weapons. On November 24, 1933, the French ambassador in Berlin, François-Ponce, held a meeting with Hitler, who announced that Germany would come to an agreement with France on "arms limitation". In reality, Germany sought sanctions from the Western powers, and primarily from France, to increase the strength of the Reichswehr to 300 thousand people and to reduce the service life in it. On December 11, another meeting between Hitler and François-Poncet took place, where the German leader demanded not only the full approval of German weapons, but also the immediate transfer of the Saarland to Germany. There is a strong opinion that “the French government did not actively resist such demands. But let's make a reservation right away that it certainly was not about the transfer of the Saar region, in this matter France was not going to concede to Germany without the plebiscite provided for in the Versailles Treaty. At that time, this demand remained unsatisfied, and of course, the French presented their reciprocal demands somehow: a guarantee of the inviolability of the Franco-German border, adherence to the Locarno agreements.

Strengthening of German revanchism, aggressive foreign policy could not but disturb France. By this point, they could no longer count on all those allies that supported them during the First World War. The republic tried to defend its positions by creating a system of alliances with small countries like Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia. But the reliability of such alliances was highly doubtful, especially in view of the ever-increasing power of Germany. Relations with Soviet Russia become strategically important at this moment for France. In the spring of 1930, the USSR and France began negotiations on a non-aggression pact and a temporary trade agreement. The first step here was, based on reciprocity, the abolition of discriminatory measures of a trade and economic nature, and then on August 10, 1931, they initialed the text of the pact. However, it was important for Paris to close the Soviet-French relations on the relations of the USSR with the French allies. In this connection, France actively stood on the need to conclude a Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact without fail, before signing the Soviet-French one. In the context of the Soviet-French negotiations, the USSR signed non-aggression pacts with Finland (January 21, 1931), Latvia (February 5, 1931), Estonia (May 4, 1932). The Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact was concluded on July 25, 1932, and the Soviet-French one on November 29, 1932.

With regard to France, German diplomacy tried to convince Paris that the only difference in relations between these countries was the issue of the Saar region. Taking into account the fact that by 1933, France is a country with one of the most powerful military potentials in Western Europe, the Nazi leadership intended to impose an unfavorable arms agreement on the French, and carried out activities aimed at destroying the system of alliances. In Paris in 1934, the intelligence officer Otto Abets was sent, who was able to organize the Franco-German Committee, which became the Nazis' springboard in Paris. The activities of the German agents were very effective. The proof is that at the beginning of 1935 France compromised with Germany on many issues. However, even the annexation of the Saarland to the Germans did not give the French guarantees of reconciliation with the Reich. The geopolitical position of France was also complicated by the fact that this position on smoothing out sharp corners in relations with Germany was realized more and more due to the neglect of the interests of the allies in the Little Entente. Plus, Poland was increasingly drawn into the sphere of influence of Germany. Undermining security was the so-called "Pact of Accord and Cooperation", or "Pact of Four", signed by representatives of the four powers of England, France, Germany and Italy on July 15, 1933. The parties to the agreement undertook to harmonize their foreign policy, to revise the peace treaties, to recognize the equality of the armed forces of the parties to the pact, that is, first of all, to actually approve the rearmament of Germany.

“The danger of the four-power pact was that it could give reason to believe that we are neglecting Russia and are going to untie Germany’s hands in the East,” wrote General Gamelin, chief of the French general staff.77 I must say, in Russian historiography on this issue, the words general sound like a prophecy, the pact was indeed perceived as a direct threat to the USSR. At that moment, this agreement failed, due to its sharp rejection by public opinion in France and the countries of the Little Entente. This pact is also interesting to consider from the standpoint of Great Britain. British politicians, regardless of party affiliation, noted with concern the extreme inefficiency of the functioning of the disarmament conference and the rapid weakening of the League of Nations in the issue of control over the aggressors. Therefore, to a certain extent, they were willing to revise the Versailles system for the sake of stabilizing European international relations. And just from here we come to an attempt to conclude a pact of four. In addition to the fact that the negotiations revealed the difference in the methods and motives of the leading European powers, they also illustrated the readiness of B. Mussolini to make significant efforts to ensure Italian interests in the Danube basin, in the Balkans, and also in Africa. Such a firm position of Benito allowed the British to see him as a possible ally in the problem of confronting the growing German revanchism. The danger of a close rapprochement between the two dictatorial regimes, if visible, is not yet very clear.

Separately, I would like to single out the Abessinian crisis, which became a serious test for a kind of alliance of great powers, moreover, it can be stated that it had a certain impact on the further development of international relations.

The Italo-Ethiopian military conflict that flared up in early October 1935 became the basis for formalizing the foreign policy of S. Baldwin's cabinet. And the League of Nations itself has become a platform for diplomatic struggle. The convened special assembly of the League of Nations went to implement the economic sanctions provided for by the charter against Italy. Against this background, the rapprochement between England and France was very successful. Hitler took this with all seriousness, in his understanding, all this meant the possibility of the transition of the Western powers to resolutely counteract the hotbeds of tension, and this seriously complicated the plans of the Third Reich, if not to say that it nullified them, here we are talking, of course, in the first place about the remilitarization of the Rhine zone and the creation of a military-political bridgehead near the Franco-Belgian border. In this regard, Germany behaved very actively in an effort to support Italy, trying to prevent its isolation. But since Germany was not a member of the League of Nations, she was naturally deprived of legal and effective opportunities to put pressure on the Western powers. Therefore, all vigorous activity did not go beyond diplomatic demarches and threats, such as the threat of the fall of the existing regime and the establishment of "communism" in Italy. It should be noted that the further policy of the British and French governments was dictated not so much by the intention to assist Mussolini in winning glory for Italian fascism. A more realistic assessment of the possibilities of economic sanctions has been a key driving force. Both Great Britain and France were aware that the effectiveness of economic measures could only be affected if an absolutely complete embargo was introduced, for a long time, and this required a comprehensive economic blockade, which was impossible, if only because the United States opposed it. because it was against their economic interests.

America during the hostilities in Ethiopia significantly increased the volume of oil sales to Italy. Great Britain faced a difficult problem, on the one hand, the public, forcing to act in line with the League of Nations, along the path of pacifying Italy, on the other hand, such behavior in the external arena would certainly bring closer the folding of the Rome-Berlin axis, and in other words, the rapprochement of dictatorial regimes. Under the circumstances, S. Baldwin considered the most profitable option - to join the French foreign policy line pursued by P. Laval, who became Prime Minister of the Third Republic in January 1935. He sought to secure peace for France through a direct agreement with Hitler's Germany, the fallback was, accordingly, an agreement with Italy. The British leadership knew about this intention, and was somewhat concerned about it. However, as mentioned above, this tactic, the essence of which was to satisfy the colonial claims of Italy, looked acceptable for British diplomacy. These actions were intended to prevent the rapprochement between Italy and Germany, and then to bring Italy into the sphere of British diplomatic influence in Europe.

Further, the leadership in this diplomatic party is taken over by France. B. Mussolini made clear his willingness to cooperate by taking part in the conference in Stresa, held in April 1935, where he joined the condemnation of Germany, which freed his hands in Ethiopia. In addition to this, P. Laval assured that the issue of Italian immigrants in French Tunisia will be resolved. Promising to simultaneously resolve the issue of the status of Italian settlers

Great Britain, of course, also did not stand aside, on the initiative coming from the assistant to the deputy minister of foreign affairs and at the same time the head of the personal secretariat of the prime minister, Robert Vansittart, the "Abyssinian problem" was discussed only at the unofficial part of the Stresa conference. Moreover, the First Secretary of the British Foreign Ministry, H. Thompson, warned the head of the African Department of the Italian Foreign Ministry that: "Italy cannot hope to cooperate with the United Kingdom in the event of an attack against Ethiopia."

However, it was too early to put an end to this issue. The head of British diplomacy, S. Hoare, under the pretext of a vacation, arrived in Paris in early December 1935, where tripartite negotiations were held with Laval and Mussolini (with the latter contact was maintained by direct telephone). . received in historiography the name: "the Hoare-Laval plan." The essence of the plan was that the military conflict was to be extinguished by concessions to Italy at the expense of the national interests of Ethiopia, which was to transfer the lion's share of non-Amharic lands under the mandate of Italy and renounce claims to territories that have been in direct Italian possession since 1896 .. For all this, Ethiopia was left with only a narrow passage to the sea through the territory of Somalia, controlled by Italy.

The example of the Abessinian crisis clearly shows the exceptional degree of flexibility that British diplomacy had to act with. Looking globally, it becomes clear that, first of all, Great Britain sought to prevent the weakening of the League of Nations, and that is why the sanctions method against Italy was not productive, since, according to the conservatives, Mussolini could follow the example of Germany and leave the League. And the preservation of the strength of this organization was considered by the British primarily in the wake of their influence on European politics, especially the ability to influence France and the USSR.

At a time when the representatives of England, France and Italy had already reached certain agreements, in France, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexi Leger, resorting to various information channels of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, went to disavow Laval’s actions, and on December 9, the “Hore-Laval plan” developed in secret became public knowledge. It was published by French newspapers, and the level of length and accuracy of the information can be judged by the fact that it even contained maps of the partition of Ethiopia. It is impossible in this case to avoid explaining such radical actions of the secretary. The motivation is not hard to find in his views, Leger was an inveterate representative of the French colonial circles. He saw French foreign policy in line with the issues of the Asian region, and it is quite natural that such actions of the Prime Minister were unacceptable for him.

Public opinion, from the exposure of the treaty, both in France and in England, was extremely negative. Opposition attacks on the government began in the British Parliament: the parliamentarians were outraged by the actions of the Conservative minister. There was a direct threat to the Baldwin cabinet, in connection with which, he did not lobby for the Hoare-Laval agreement, even though it was generally supported by the cabinet at the meetings of December 9, 10 and 11, 1935.

On the same month, S. Baldwin made a statement that the moral position of the government in the face of the public is paramount, in passing comparing the prime minister with an anchor holding the ship of the nation from imminent death. Further actions were the recognition of the agreement as "absolutely dead" and the subsequent resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Turning more thoroughly to the analysis of the diplomatic actions of Great Britain in these years, I would like to consider the following. The British leadership at that time preferred to level the contradictions with the fascist states through various agreements, which often caused both the Versailles system and third countries to suffer. Already on early stage fascist expansion, the British government made efforts to reach a similar agreement with Mussolini and Hitler. However, as The Times wrote in October 1935, by the summer-autumn of that year, the opinion of the British in relation to the fascist regimes had changed significantly and acquired a persistently negative connotation78. Public opinion in Britain initially held great differences between the Fascist regime in Italy and Germany. Italian fascism was generally assessed positively, was considered "an Italian regime for Italians." This opinion prevailed in British political circles until the end of 1933. The dispatch of Italian armed forces to the Austrian border in 1934 made it possible to avoid the Anschluss, and the British got a reason to be convinced of the discrepancy between the interests and goals of the German and Italian leaders. However, the Italian attack on Abyssinia in 1935 radically changed the perception of the Duce regime by British society and politicians, and 1935-1936. became a milestone in the development of both the domestic and foreign policy of the ruling groups in England. During these years, it became obvious to the British fundamental change the balance of power in Europe that followed the Nazi takeover in Germany. The subcommittee on defense needs of the Committee of Imperial Defense, formed in 1933, submitted a report to the British government in March 1934, which stated, in addition to the fact that Japan was the main security threat to England, it was also that Germany was perceived by experts as: “... the main and a very dangerous potential adversary against whom our long-term defense policy must be directed.

The external situation was not unequivocally perceived by the Conservative Party itself. There was a group of old politicians, led by S. Baldwin and the "Birminghamites" - the brothers Austin and Nevil Chamberlain, who could not part with the outdated ossified view of Europe in the 1920s. They saw a powerful empire with serious finances and leadership in the League of Nations, so it was quite logical for them to count on the possibility of reaching a compromise resolution of issues through some concessions in favor of the German side. They were opposed by the so-called "internal opposition", whose leader was W. Churchill, and L. Emery's group gravitating towards him. These politicians, who also formed their assessments of the European situation through the position of the Empire as a whole, saw the key to the security of Great Britain in the revival of the Entente. They argued the need for rapprochement with France by the requirements of protecting the mother country, which in the new situation becomes the rear of the Empire, and adhered to a "hard" course towards Germany. It was also obvious to everyone that in any case it was necessary to avoid a war on two fronts against Japan and Germany. Analyzing the alignment of possible Anglo-German negotiations, the British leadership naturally came to the issue of armaments, considering this aspect just as a possible concession to Germany. For example, the option of legalizing the achieved volume of German weapons, because, as we remember at that time, the actions of the young Third Reich in this area were illegal. For this, one could demand a return to the League of Nations.83 But in March 1935, a stunning event took place in England - the termination by Hitler of the restrictive articles of the Treaty of Versailles, from that moment on, the policy of "appeasement" had only one tool left, it was carried out directly at the expense of territories in Europe.

It was necessary to somehow respond to such a turn of events and, moreover, as quickly as possible. At the end of March 1935, Foreign Minister J. Simon and Minister without Portfolio A. Eden arrived in Berlin, where they tried to find a compromise solution to the problem - the conclusion of an air pact. To which Hitler replied that German aviation had already achieved equality with England, which the British delegation was also, to put it mildly, very surprised.

The possibility of finding a consensus with Hitler was exhausted, which led to the search for building bridges with Poland and a preliminary analysis of the position of Soviet Russia. The answer of the latter, which stated that the USSR intended: "...to live with Germany on friendly terms"86, could not satisfy Great Britain at all. From these events comes the idea of ​​the revival of the Anglo-French Entente, which had a fairly broad support in the French government circles. Started in February 1935 and continued in April of the same year, the Anglo-French negotiations, in which Italy was also involved as one of the Locarno guarantors, were aimed at strengthening the Anglo-French-Italian foundation of the Locarno treaty complex. The result was the speech of these countries with the condemnation of the termination by the Nazis of the military-political restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, which meant the beginning of the path to the consolidation of the forces of the Western powers.

Before Great Britain the question of rearmament was sharply raised, but it was far from being so obvious to the masses, seized at that time by the ideas of pacifism. In one of his speeches in the autumn of 1935 A. Eden said:

“We all live in an era when nations will try to understand each other. Only through the League of Nations can we hope to create a new order in which no country, even for a moment, will think of resorting to war as an instrument of national policy. We are ready at all times to play our part in maintaining peace.” In these words of A. Eden, (at that time the Lord of the Press) was, in fact, formulated the basis of the foreign policy program that the conservatives proposed to the voters and thanks to which they won. In the future, the Conservatives can sometimes be reproached for using the mood of the British public as an excuse for a foreign policy line aimed at "appeasement".

With the advent of the new head of the British Cabinet, Stanley Baldwin, a course was set for political balancing, or, one might say more roughly, adaptation to the foreign policy circumstances in which the British conservative cabinet had to act. This is expressed in a rather capacious formula, formulated by Baldwin himself: "politics cannot be made, but it must be allowed to develop itself" and "the main duty of the government is to remain in power."

It was important for Great Britain to prevent the annexation of Austria to Germany, since the implementation of this German plan would open the way for other aggressive actions of the Nazis. However, British diplomacy was clearly not enough to prevent the Anschluss. In this situation, Italy loomed favorably, the leader of which sought to prevent the growth of the positions of Nazism in Austria and in every possible way demonstrated his readiness to defend its independence. However, everything turned out to be not so rosy, an attempted coup d'etat took place in Austria, because of which Chancellor E. Dollfuss was killed, this even more heated the atmosphere and at the same time demonstrated Italy's inability to act according to its assurances. This situation arose due to the fact that the Duce expected that England and France, as guarantor countries, would support his intention to defend Austria, but they did not do this, and there were no other opportunities to influence the situation in essence. In order to effectively guarantee the borders of Austria and other states of the Danube-Balkan region, it was necessary to expand the base of cooperation between the three powers. On July 31, 1934, the Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A. Leger, proposed the creation of a tripartite commission in Rome to consolidate actions in the event of threats to the independence of Austria.

Suddenly, in early autumn, Britain refuses to participate in any guarantee regarding Austria. This step can be explained by the fact that the government of R. MacDonald was coalition, that is, the domestic political situation was not simple, the British had no desire to take on obligations that went beyond the League of Nations. Against this background, the French side also decided not to take part in agreements outside the League of Nations and without allies in the Little Entente. From February 1 to February 3, 1935, a Franco-British agreement was drawn up in London on the accession of Great Britain to consultations on the Austrian question. The terms of the declaration of 11 December 1932 were reaffirmed, and a wording about the refusal to unilaterally revise disarmament obligations was added separately. The agreement approved the principle of collective security and non-interference in the internal affairs of the states of Central Europe, and allowed Germany to return to the League of Nations. On March 16, 1935, Hitler decided to openly violate the military articles of the Treaty of Versailles by reintroducing universal military service. The French immediately appealed to the League of Nations. On March 25-26, J. Simon and A. Eden were in Berlin, who tried to regulate relations with Germany based on five provisions: disarmament, Germany's return to the League of Nations, the Danube Pact, the Eastern Pact ("Eastern Locarno"), the Pact on military air force, but these negotiations led nowhere. Mussolini was very worried about the plans of the German command, so he turned to Great Britain and France with a proposal to create another agreement in order to control the unilateral arming of Germany, at the same time guarantee the independence of Austria and prevent remilitarization

Rhine zone. This proposal received different responses from France and England. P. Laval expressed the opinion that Germany needed to issue a clear warning, but the British point of view was based on the intention to conclude an agreement with Germany in order to achieve its return to the League of Nations, which could allow the Germans to return to the collective security system and raise the question of disarmament again .

On April 11, a conference was held in Stresa on Franco-British and Franco-Italian cooperation. The result was a resolution dated April 14, in which the three governments announced a developed joint political line, namely: continued operation of security agreements in Eastern Europe; statements in support of Austrian independence were once again repeated; as a recommendation, it was said about the possibility of concluding an alliance between the governments concerned on the problems of Central Europe; and in addition to the above, the initiative of the pact on air power and the provisions on the question of disarmament, according to the communiqué of 3 February, were reaffirmed. The European press started talking about the fact that the aggressor was now opposed to the "Stresa front." in Europe. In general, it was rather intended to provide an answer on how to respond to such cases in the future. Ultimately, the conference did not have any real tangible political weight. Although during the first time after the conference, the Stresa Front, outwardly, gave the impression of being the basis of all European politics. It was in line with security guarantees that the Franco-Soviet security pact was concluded on May 2. But still, the goals of each of the three great powers were separate. England wanted, as mentioned above, to return Germany to the Euro-security system. Along this path, in June 1935, the countries concluded a naval agreement, the subject and essence of which was that Germany acquired the right to build a Navy in the amount of 35% of the power in relation to the total naval power of the British Empire. 90 Such an agreement hit primarily on the Stresa Front itself. Great Britain deliberately took the path of condoning the militarization of Germany, which means violating the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, by this she tried to secure a certain degree of control over this process. When it became obvious to Italy and France that England was not going to do anything for the Austrian security, they decided to consolidate mutual obligations by a military agreement, which they signed on June 28, 1935. As a result, the "Stresa Front" actually ceased to exist due to internal contradictions.

2.3 Apogee of international tensions in 1938

On the way to the culmination of the policy of "appeasement" - the Munich Agreement (conspiracy), Nazi Germany managed to carry out another strong foreign policy action, the Anschluss of Austria should undoubtedly be attributed to the category of diplomatic defeats of the great powers, which, after the end of the First World War, diligently tried to ensure its autonomous existence from Germany. Such a situation, in particular, was fixed by the Treaty of San Germain, not to mention the Treaty of Versailles. Back in 1931, the German and Austrian governments jointly proposed a variant of a customs union, but then the leading European countries did not allow these plans to materialize. A more favorable situation for Hitler developed in 1937, when the Western powers began to consider the capture of Austria not as another step towards the "appeasement" of Germany. In November, at the ongoing negotiations with Hitler, Lord Halifax agreed on behalf of his government to the "acquisition" of Austria by Germany. In our time, certain documents have been preserved that describe how everything happened when the case entered active circulation. Twenty-seven telephone conversations by Goering were documented, beginning at 02:45 on 11 March. The first time Seyss-Inquart called the field marshal was at 2.45 am. Goering told him that canceling the plebiscite was not enough, that after a conference with Hitler he would call back. He did it at 3.05. Schuschnigg, he declared, should resign, and Seyss-Inquart should be appointed in his place within two hours. Goering also ordered Seyss-Inquart "to send a telegram to the Fuhrer in accordance with the agreement." This is the first mention of a telegram that will be remembered many times over the next few hours and on the basis of which Hitler concocted a lie that justified the aggression against Austria in the eyes of the Germans and the whole world. The plans of the operation can be judged from the message of Hitler himself, classified as secrecy, it said in particular that the nature of the actions should initially be as peaceful as possible, however, when resisting, it was appointed to act in the most decisive way. On the night of March 11-12, 1938, German troops, previously concentrated on the border in accordance with the Otto plan, entered Austrian territory. On the 13th, Hitler himself entered Vienna, and the law was published: "On the reunification of Austria with the German Empire." On April 10, a plebiscite was held on the annexation of Austria to Germany, where the vast majority of the population voted "for" the Anschluss. After the annexation of Austria, Germany received a strategic base for the subsequent capture of Czechoslovakia, and further offensive in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkan direction, abundant sources of raw materials, impressive human resources and military production. The Anschluss of Austria meant that it turned out to be an important stage in the collapse of the Versailles order, which was eventually broken by force. As already mentioned above, the next target of the Nazi offensive policy was Czechoslovakia. The method of influence, and at the same time very effective, was actions through the “Sudet-German” party headed by K. Heinlein. Campaigns and propaganda were launched against the alleged oppression of ethnic Germans. Slogans for autonomy were put forward, which very soon grew into calls for complete self-determination of the Sudetenland.

The leaders of Great Britain and France did their best to find a compromise with Germany, which had become more active at the expense of Czechoslovakia. In this duet, Great Britain took the leading position more and more convincingly. The position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of England received the following assessment from the Soviet plenipotentiary, Maisky, regarding the issue of Czechoslovakia: “The emergency situation is an artificial state that is unable to either defend itself or receive outside help. England will not remain aloof from the Central European events, but France must put stronger pressure on Prague, demanding decisive concessions from the latter to Heinlein. We must force the Czechs to come to an agreement with the Germans. This was precisely the main purpose of the mission of the British Lord Runciman, who was in Czechoslovakia as an intermediary between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak government from August 3 to September 16, 1938.

Germany, actively using the Sudeten Germans, increased pressure on Czechoslovakia. In the draft directives for Operation Grün, signed by Hitler on June 18, 1938, the following was written: “In the foreground of my political intentions, as an immediate goal, is the solution of the Czech question on my own initiative. I intend to use any political pretext to achieve this goal starting from 10/1/1938…. However, I will make a final decision to start a campaign against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced, as was the case when the demilitarized zone was occupied and when the troops entered Austria, that France will not oppose us and this will not entail the intervention of England. It is imperative to keep in mind in this situation the factor of German propaganda, which seriously aggravated the situation and threatened with real military actions against Czechoslovakia, in case of ignoring or refusing German demands.

The position of the Czechoslovak side was greatly complicated by the fact that the country was under bilateral pressure, Germany was advancing on the one, England and France on the other, from which, under the initial disposition, Czechoslovakia had the right to expect real help. Instead, the Western democracies offered her to go for a significant reduction in her own borders, and all the territories of the Sudetenland, where the population consisted of half Germans, were offered to be given to Germany. But the conditions of Great Britain and France did not end there either, Czechoslovakia had to renounce mutual assistance treaties with France and the USSR, the latter, by the way, confirmed its obligations under the treaty, while noting the mandatory participation of France. Upon satisfaction of all these requirements, England and France were ready to take responsibility for guaranteeing new borders. The negotiation process was held in an extremely tense atmosphere, Czechoslovakia long time refused to accept such demands, however, the "guarantor countries" of the Versailles system only increased the pressure, hoping that a concession to Germany was the only way to avoid the capture of Czechoslovakia, moreover, the Anglo-French intended, in case of disagreement, to accuse the Czechoslovak side of starting a big war .

In this situation, the Czechoslovak government, on September 21, was forced to accept the Anglo-French ultimatum97. Then something happened that, after many years, seems quite natural and understandable, but at that time the Anglo-French foresight was probably not enough to foresee such a development of events - Hitler, at a meeting with Chamberlain, when he found out that the requirements had been met, satisfactorily went to them tightening, threatening military conflict in case of non-compliance. The essence of the new ones boiled down to the fact that the establishment of a new border of Czechoslovakia would be carried out without any international commission, as it was originally, and the evacuation from the areas transferred to Germany was significantly accelerated.

September, during the next Anglo-French negotiations, French Prime Minister E. Daladier admitted that Hitler's ultimatum meant "the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and German domination in Europe." Most British ministers refused to accept Hitler's demands, the French cabinet rejected them unanimously. The aggressive actions of Nazi Germany brought Europe to the brink of war. Throughout the Czechoslovak crisis, there was a tangible rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Poland, which tried to implement a similar scenario in relation to Czechoslovakia. Now the issue of autonomy and subsequent transfer was directed to the territory of Cieszyn Silesia. The reaction of England and France in this situation was limited to only informing Poland of the possible consequences of an armed attack through diplomatic channels. Left alone, Czechoslovakia was forced to capitulate here too, the Teszyn region was given to Poland. This loss was also painful because of the geographical factor, the main railway line connecting the Czech Republic and Slovakia ran through this territory.

Munich was a fatal disaster for the Versailles system, which, albeit with huge problems and shortcomings, tried to regulate European relations. Czechoslovakia became the main victim of the Munich crisis, during this process a huge threat to the very existence of the country was posed, the losses in the field of heavy industry were enormous. But for all the depressing situation of Czechoslovakia, it would be absolutely wrong to call it the only loser from such a result. After all, France suffered a deep political defeat - it was a discouraging blow to its strategy of building a system of alliances in Eastern Europe. Confirmation of this assessment can be found in the words of the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Paris Ya.Z. Surica: “The fact that France survived its second Sedan, and that it suffered a terrible defeat in Munich, is now understood by any Frenchman.” The international prestige of France was undermined in the context of providing guarantees. In addition, it became apparent that Paris began to follow in the wake of British policy.

The main goal of the policy of appeasement was the intention to prevent a global war, and those who adhered to this course were unable to resist the zealous pressure of the German leader, whose main message was statements about the need to revise the mistakes of the Versailles system. The quality of the appeasement policy was greatly influenced by discrepancies in the ruling circles of Great Britain and France, in addition, it is necessary to take into account the internal political situation. The positions of the leaders of the military departments of the two countries were also strong, declaring that they were not ready for a possible war. Well, one should also not discount the fear of Western democracies about the strengthening of the positions of “communist” Russia and the probable spread of the communist current across Europe.

In Russian historiography, there is an opinion that Munich became a kind of "point of no return", which led to further movement towards the beginning of the war. So, E.N. Kulkov and O.A. Rzheshevsky argue: "The fatal political event that ultimately led to the Second World War was the Munich Conference (September 29-30, 1938)"99. But still, the position of the Russian historian S.Z. Sluch seems more balanced:

“The Munich Treaty did not exclude an alternative development of international relations and was not a turning point on the road to war; it cannot be explained only by the anti-Sovietism of the leadership of the Western powers, since the main motive for their actions was the desire to avoid war at any cost.

The perception of Munich by Great Britain and France can be characterized as a vision of the possibility of a new concept of an international order, similar in its essence to the project of the "pact of four". This thesis is easily confirmed by the concluded Anglo-German declaration. On September 30, 1938, noting the fundamental importance of Anglo-German relations, both for the two countries and for the whole of Europe, A. Hitler and N. Chamberlain showed determination to use the consultation method to prevent possible sources contradictions for the sake of peace in Europe. Less than 3 months later, on December 6, the French and German foreign ministers signed a Franco-German declaration of a similar nature in Paris. It recorded the commitment of the two governments to the development of peaceful and good neighborly relations between the two countries and the absence of any unresolved issues of a territorial nature between them. Both governments decided to maintain contact with each other on all matters of interest to both countries, and mutually consult in case the subsequent development of these questions could lead to international complications.

The Franco-German agreement on consultations was perceived in Paris as a contribution to the preservation of peace in Europe. The calculation was made to appease Nazi Germany through concessions in Eastern Europe and colonial issues. The inconsistency in the positions of Great Britain, France, the USSR is explained by various factors. England and France at that time had already indicated their interest in preventing further strengthening of Germany's positions in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, they had already assumed certain obligations in relation to Poland, Romania, and Greece. Great Britain was not ready to accept the Soviet proposal to create a broad military-political alliance of three powers, capable of "repelling" many potential allies and rallying the members of the anti-Comintern pact. To this was added deep suspicion and mutual distrust between London and Paris on the one hand, and Moscow on the other. However, at the same time, experts from the British Foreign Office came to the conclusion that the Anglo-French-Soviet treaty was perhaps "the only means of preventing war."

May representatives and France in Moscow presented V.M. Molotov a draft tripartite agreement on mutual assistance against aggression.105 V.M. Molotov then officially admitted that the Anglo-French proposals meant “a step forward”, because they provided “in the event of a direct attack by aggressors, the principle of mutual assistance between England, France and the USSR on the basis of reciprocity”106. At the same time, in a conversation with representatives of Great Britain and France, Molotov declared a negative attitude towards the proposed document, putting forward various comments and reservations. The main unresolved issue was the issue of guarantees to the Baltic countries: Finland, Estonia and Latvia.

Most likely, the Anglo-French and secular proposals formed the basis for the conclusion of a tripartite agreement on mutual assistance and guarantees.

July, Daladier told the Soviet plenipotentiary: “We must finish as soon as possible, especially since I don’t see any serious disagreements now”107. The message of the French side contained the message that the main purpose of the agreement was to integrate the USSR into the Anglo-French system and maintain its support for the sake of Poland and Romania. Also, the goal was considered achieved.

In the spring-summer of 1939, there was an objective increase in contradictions between Germany and Great Britain, which made it almost impossible to reach a compromise between the leadership of the two countries. In addition, the tripartite talks in Moscow caused growing unease in Berlin. In this context, German diplomacy tried to intensify its contacts with Moscow. A number of attempts were made to gradually improve relations, the key stage of which was political rapprochement. Soviet diplomacy, however, did not have unnecessary illusions and perfectly understood that sooner or later Germany would put the Polish question as a subject of discussion. In parallel, tripartite negotiations were held with England and France. After the introductory official part, the Soviet representatives on August 14 raised the question point-blank: “Will the Soviet troops be allowed through the territories of Poland and Romania to contact the enemy in the event of an attack by the aggressor on England and France, on Poland or Romania, and also on Turkey”, and when foreign delegations tried to avoid answering, they were given to understand that, without a concrete explanation of this position, there was no subject for discussion. The negotiations stalled, although the French, in view of their greater interest, made an attempt to resolve this issue directly with Poland, but to no avail. After that, in a certain sense, the road to the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was predetermined.

The events that have taken place in the context of their significance for France, these are missed opportunities and unambiguously tragic consequences, in addition to regret, also raise questions. The inadequate assessment of the significance of the position of the USSR in August 1939 had its own reasons. One of them is a low opinion of the military capabilities of the Red Army, weakened by the "disappearances" in 1937-1939. its command top (this was written by French military magazines in 1939). But the main reason undoubtedly lies in the mutual distrust of the participants in the failed tripartite pact, in the lack of understanding of the main threat and, as a result, in the belated appearance of political will for an agreement. Unlike Nagiar, Bonnet and Beck did not believe that Stalin and Hitler would agree until the moment when it became a reality. The prevailing opinion was that the threat of a German invasion or a real attack against Poland should provoke the USSR to conclude an agreement with the Western powers.

If we are talking about the UK, then here, with a similar general background of results, there was, of course, its own specifics. The last days of peace passed for British diplomacy in a feverish activity aimed at preventing war through concessions to Germany at the expense of Poland. On August 22, 1939, Chamberlain turned to Hitler and offered mediation services in resolving the Danzig problem at the negotiating table between Germany and Poland 108. In a response letter, Hitler fiercely attacked Poland, accusing her of neglecting German rights in Danzig. He further assured the Prime Minister that he had never sought a quarrel with England and had always sought to strengthen Anglo-German relations. Such an exchange of messages, in fact, did not give anything in regard to the plans of the parties, but left the members of the British Cabinet hope for a peaceful settlement of the Polish question.

At the end of August, Germany proposed through Dahlerus its version of the draft Anglo-German agreement, in which Great Britain was required to recognize Germany's supremacy in Europe in exchange for a guarantee of its integrity. The Polish issue would be resolved in a negotiation format, and the contentious issues between Germany and Great Britain - in the format of top-level consultations.

In other words, Germany has made the final choice. An extensive agreement with England was not of great interest to her, since there were already very specific plans for a war with Poland. The era of agreements such as Munich has sunk into oblivion. But to guarantee success in the upcoming war, it was necessary to normalize relations with the USSR and ensure its neutrality. Other options for solving the problem, which were desirable for Great Britain and for which it had a lot to do, were no longer relevant for the German government.

Conclusion

A comprehensive study of the fullness of the diplomatic relations of Great Britain and France in relation to Nazi Germany illustrates, mainly, that throughout almost the entire interwar period, the policy of Western democracies was unconsolidated in relation to Germany, and could not be so, at least because of competing positions in the European region. According to the tragic irony for the guarantors of the Versailles system, both of them are the losers. So France, stage by stage since the 20s. surrenders its positions in the international arena to the assertive diplomacy of the Germans, and allows the complete loss of its political status, turning into a losing power.

During the period under review, there was also close cooperation between France and Germany, mainly in the economic sphere. Various agreements were concluded not only at the state, but also at the private level, and here it is also necessary to note the inconsistent nature of such cooperation, which had several reasons, often it was the result of rivalry with other countries, and the format of the Versailles system imposed certain restrictions, to refuse which, for France was impossible. You can also talk about the uncertain and indecisive political course of the French, which indirectly influenced the arrival of the National Socialist Party in Germany. One can judge for a long time what would have happened if the French leadership had adhered to a tougher policy towards Germany, from the point of view of historical retrospective, we can only say that the policy of "appeasement" and "containment" carried out by France did not bring the expected results and turned out to be unable to solve the problem of preventing war.

England, in a manner familiar to itself throughout the period under study, applied the concept of balancing power in its foreign policy. London still believed that it was necessary to meet the requirements of Germany, since this was required by objective changes in the balance of power in the international arena. The "containment" of Germany by the articles of the Treaty of Versailles seemed inappropriate to England, both because of the habitual desire to prevent French hegemony on the continent, and because of the significant growth in the military potential of the Soviet Union. To neutralize these factors, she used the traditional balance sheet policy. So, during the height of the Abessinian crisis, the preservation and strengthening of the authority of the League of Nations, according to the conservative leaders of England, was necessary for the implementation of its policy in Europe, in particular to influence France and the USSR, which could, using the agreement they concluded in May 1935 d. an agreement on mutual assistance, to go against the British foreign policy course.

In the same 1935, not disdaining to violate the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain agreed to conclude a maritime agreement with Hitler's Germany, which the British government satisfied Hitler's demand that "the power of the German fleet was 35% in relation to the total power of the British Empire." The proportion of 35:100 was to be applied both to the total tonnage of the fleet and to each class of ships. Thus, Germany received the right to build a fleet with a total tonnage of 420,595 long tons. For the construction of battleships, 184,000 tons were allocated, for heavy cruisers - 51,380, light cruisers and destroyers should not exceed a total tonnage of 119,700 tons. In fact, the Germans were given the opportunity to build 5 battleships, two aircraft carriers, 21 cruisers and 64 destroyers. The result of the agreement was the final elimination of all restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The British leadership at that moment did not hide the certain anti-Soviet direction of the concluded treaty, it was supposed to allow Germany to achieve military superiority in the Baltic Sea. There are several motives that prompted the British government to conclude such an agreement, among them the public mood, seized during this period by pacifism, and the instability of the domestic political situation, and the hypothetical threat from Soviet Russia.

The contradictions between the powers-guarantors of the Versailles system, their general distrust of the Soviet Union, reinforced by the revisionist goals of Italy and the general misunderstanding of the essence and scale of the Nazi threat ultimately led to the formation of an extremely unfavorable international situation in the European region by the mid-1930s. very unstable situation in the international arena by mid-1935.

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