Victory near Narva in 1704. Northern War, Battle of Narva: description, causes, history and consequences

Battle of Narva one of the first battles of the Great Northern war between the Russian army of Peter I and the Swedish army of Charles XII, which took place on November 19 (30), 1700 near the city of Narva and ended in a heavy defeat of the Russian troops.

background

Beginning of the Northern War

In 1699, at the initiative of the Polish king August II Russian kingdom joined the coalition of northern states ("Northern Union"), which had territorial claims to the Swedish Empire. The members of the coalition hoped that the youth of the Swedish monarch Charles XII, who came to the throne at the age of fifteen, would provide the allies with a relatively easy victory. Russia expected as a result of the war to seize the lands of the Baltic States, which were once part of Old Russian state and secure access to the Baltic Sea. See Causes of the Great Northern War for more details.

Under an agreement with Augustus II, the Russian kingdom first of all laid claim to the Swedish Ingermanland (Ingria) - a territory approximately corresponding to the current Leningrad region. The largest Swedish fortress in the region was Narva, located on the western border of Ingermanland with Estonia. Ingria in general and Narva in particular became the main target of the Russian offensive at the beginning of the Great Northern War.

According to the agreement with Augustus II, Peter I declared war on Sweden immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty of Constantinople with the Ottoman Empire - on August 19 (30), 1700, and launched a campaign in Ingermanland.

Russian army at the beginning of the 18th century

Commanders of the Russian army

Although the attack on Sweden was planned in advance, the Russian army at the beginning of the 18th century had limited training and demanded the continuation of the reforms begun by Peter I. The Russian army was large, the Russian tsar could field up to 200,000 soldiers, however, both according to historians and according to Peter I's own assessment, made after the battle, was that the Russian army during this period lacked discipline, training, and material support. Continuing the practice of attracting military experts from Western Europe, begun by Ivan the Terrible, Peter I sought to use Western experience in combat and modernize the Russian army, however, by 1700, only two regiments formed on the basis of amusing troops, Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky, were fully organized according to the Western model , and two more - Lefortovsky and Butyrsky - are partially organized according to the Western model. In material support, the Russian army depended on the supply of weapons and equipment from abroad. In 1700, the Russian kingdom produced almost no muskets, smelted very little metal, and had an underdeveloped transport system. The training of the Russian army took place under the guidance of foreign officers according to the new military regulations of 1699, drawn up by Adam Weide on the model of the Swedish and Austrian military regulations. Despite all the shortcomings, before the battle of Narva, Peter I believed that the Russian army was quite ready for war with the Swedes.

Peter I planned to bring over 40,000 regular infantrymen to Narva, divided into three "generalships" (divisions): under the command of generals Anikita Repnin, Adam Veide and Avtonom Golovin, as well as 10,000 noblemen of the hundred service, including five thousand cavalry under the command of Boris Sheremetev, and 10,000 Little Russian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky - a total of over 60,000 soldiers. In addition, the Russian army included artillery regiment, consisting of 195 guns, under the command of Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky (Batonishvili). Initially, the commander-in-chief of the Russian army was Field Marshal F. A. Golovin (he received this title on August 19, 1700). Provision general Semyon Yazykov was responsible for supplying the army. At the last moment, the Duke de Croix joined the headquarters of the Russian army on the recommendation of Augustus II.

Swedish army at the beginning of the 18th century

Swedish army commanders

The Swedish army at the turn of the 18th century was a well-organized semi-professional structure, formed at the beginning of the 17th century by the Swedish king Gustavus Adolf. The principles of organization of the Swedish army were preserved with minor changes until the reign of Charles XII. In the Swedish army, the cavalry was formed on a voluntary contract basis - the estate, sending a mounted soldier to the army, received monetary compensation in the form of tax incentives. A mandatory recruitment of soldiers was made into the Swedish infantry - each territorial entity had to put up a certain number of soldiers, and besides this, any man who did not have a livelihood and did not stain himself with a violation of the law was sent to military service. All soldiers and their families were provided with public housing and salaries.

The Swedish army was well disciplined, which organically followed from the Lutheran ideology that dominated the Swedish Empire. The Lutheran Church supported the military actions and conquests of Sweden in the 17th century, proclaiming the success of the Swedish military campaigns as "the will of God."

The Swedish infantry was divided into battalions of 600 soldiers, and the cavalry into squadrons of 150 to 250 horsemen, the Swedish monarch traditionally acted as the supreme commander of the army. Charles XII, who ascended the throne in 1697, despite his young age, proved to be a decisive commander who, according to his contemporaries, was "in love with the war." The headquarters of Charles XII during the Battle of Narva included Lieutenant General Karl Gustav Rehnschild, Generals Arvid Horn, Otto Welling and Feldzeugmeister General Baron Johan Schöblad.

Preparing for battle

Campaign of the Russian army to Narva

The concentration of Russian troops near Narva was slow. Together with the foot soldiers, a convoy of 10,000 carts moved to Narva, which carried gunpowder, lead, cannonballs, bombs, hand grenades and other military supplies. Rainy weather hindered the movement of the convoy, the carts got bogged down in the mud and broke. The supply of the army was poorly organized: both the soldiers and the horses ate poorly, by the end of the campaign, horses began to die from starvation. During the campaign, the uniforms of the soldiers were disheveled and spread at the seams.

The advance detachment led by Prince Ivan Trubetskoy arrived at the fortress three weeks after the declaration of war - on September 9 (20). After another 2 weeks, on September 23 (October 4), Ivan Buturlin's detachment arrived along with Peter I. On October 14 (25), a detachment of Avtonom Golovin and Boris Sheremetev's cavalry approached. Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, Peter I managed to concentrate at Narva, according to various estimates, from 34 to 40 thousand people (21 soldier regiments, 7 archers, 2 dragoons, the Sovereign regiment, a regiment of the Smolensk gentry and part of the Novgorod Reiter regiment) and 195 artillery pieces: 64 siege guns, 79 regimental guns, 4 howitzers and 48 mortars. Two more large detachments did not have time to start hostilities near Narva: about 10,000 soldiers under the command of Anikita Repnin were in Novgorod, and 11,000 Little Russian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky took up positions in Pskov, Gdov and the Pechora Monastery.

Siege of Narva

The Narva fortress was defended by the Swedish garrison under the command of Colonel Gorn, which consisted of 1,300 foot and 200 mounted soldiers, as well as 400 militias. The city and fortress of Narva were located on the western bank of the Narva River (then called Narova), and on the eastern bank there was a fortified Ivangorod. Both fortresses were connected by a fortified bridge, allowing the passage between Narva and Ivangorod even under siege, which led to the need to besiege both fortresses at the same time.

To organize the siege, Augustus II recommended the engineer Ludwig Allart to Peter I, but Peter was "dissatisfied with his slowness" and personally took charge of the siege work. The besiegers placed artillery pieces around Narva and Ivangorod, and also built fortifications in case additional Swedish forces approached from the west. Taking advantage of the fact that the Narova River bends near Ivangorod and Narva, the Russian troops built a defense line two versts (about 2 km) west of Narva, consisting of a double earthen rampart. Both ends of the rampart - both northern and southern - ran into the river, and the Russian army, which occupied positions near Narva, was protected from the west by the rampart, and from the other sides by the river. The total length of the rampart was 7 versts (7.5 km).

On October 20 (31) the Russian army began regular shelling of the fortress. The charges lasted only two weeks, and the effectiveness of the fire was minimal. Russian shelling did not cause almost any damage to the fortress. The main reason for the failure of the artillery shelling was planning problems: most of the artillery delivered to Narva was small-caliber and did not harm the fortress walls. In addition, both Russian gunpowder and the guns themselves turned out to be of poor quality, which sharply reduced the effectiveness of shelling.

Campaign of the main Swedish forces to Narva

Landing in Pärnu

At the time of the attack of Russian troops on Ingermanland and Estland, Swedish troops in the region were not numerous. In addition to the garrison defending Narva, a large Swedish detachment (up to 8,000 soldiers) under the command of Otto Welling was located southeast of Pernov (modern Pärnu) in Ruevel (modern Ruyien) and small detachments were located in Revel (modern Tallinn) and in others cities, including Wesenberg (modern Rakvere).

The unsuccessful actions of the allies of Peter I led to the rapid surrender of Denmark, as well as to the fact that Augustus II lifted the siege of Riga and retreated. This development of events allowed Charles XII to send additional forces (about 10,000 soldiers) to Estland and Ingermanland, who landed in Revel and Pernov. Charles XII also arrived in Pernov along with his troops on October 5 (16), that is, a month before the main battle. He decided to give the newly arrived forces a long rest, since many soldiers suffered from seasickness, and on October 12 (23) he arrived in Ruevel and ordered Otto Welling with the main forces of his detachment to move north to Wesenberg, where, according to rumors, there were already reconnaissance detachments of Russian troops. On October 25 (November 5), Charles XII arrived in Revel, where he held a meeting with local residents. The Swedish monarch promised the Estonians additional privileges as part of the Swedish Empire and Revel provided 5,000 militias for the Swedish army.

Clashes at Purtz

Meanwhile, having received news of the landing of the troops of Charles XII in Pernov, Peter I on September 26 (October 7) sent the cavalry detachment of Boris Sheremetev along the Reval road going from Narva to the west. The distance from Narva to Revel (modern Tallinn) was about 200 versts, the road passed through marshland along the coast of the Gulf of Finland, and on the way there were the village of Pyuhayogi, the fortress of Purts and Wesenberg. Small detachments of the Swedes retreated to Reval, and Sheremetev, without meeting resistance, by October 3 (14) overcame 100 miles and took up the position of Wesenberg. According to various estimates, the number of Sheremetev's detachment ranged from 5,000 to 6,000 cavalrymen.

On October 25 (November 5), when Charles XII was in Revel, a detachment of General Welling approached Wesenberg from the south, who, on the orders of Charles XII, left Ruevel on October 12 (23). Having learned in advance about the approach of the Swedes, Sheremetev decided to retreat 36 miles back to the Purts fortress and disperse his detachment over several villages in the swampy area east of Purts to protect all roads leading to Narva (see the map of the environs of Purts). Sheremetev deployed small detachments of several hundred people in the Estonian villages of Purtz, Gakgof, Variel (Vergle), Kokhtel and Iov, and he himself with large forces stood in the village of Povanda (on the site of the modern Estonian city of Kohtla-Jarve).

On October 25 (November 5), the vanguard of Welling's detachment attacked the Russian cover in Purts. Taking advantage of the carelessness of the Russian soldiers stationed at Purca, the Swedes won an easy victory. On the evening of October 26 (November 6), advance detachments of the Swedes attacked Russian soldiers stationed in the village of Variel. Russian soldiers settled down in village houses without posting sentries, and turned out to be easy prey for a small Swedish detachment. The Swedes suddenly entered the village, set fire to it and got the opportunity to kill the Russians taken by surprise one by one. Several Russian cavalry managed to escape to Povanda and inform Sheremetev about what had happened. Sheremetev, in turn, immediately sent a large detachment to help, consisting of 21 cavalry squadrons, which managed to surround the Swedes at Variele. The Swedes left the encirclement with battle and losses, but two Swedish officers were taken prisoner by the Russians. These two officers, following the instructions of Charles XII, gave false information about the size of the Swedish army advancing on Narva, citing greatly inflated figures of 30,000 and 50,000 Swedish soldiers.

In spite of achieved success, Sheremetev decided not to gain a foothold in Purtsa, but, on the contrary, to retreat another 33 miles back to the village of Pyuhayogi. Sheremetev was wary of the decisive and unexpected attacks of the Swedes, saw the sluggishness of his cavalry in the swampy terrain, realized the danger posed by the Swedish tactics of setting fire to the villages, and, most importantly, feared that the Swedes could bypass his detachment and cut it off from the main Russian forces at Narva. Justifying himself to Peter I in connection with his next retreat, Sheremetev wrote:

Peter ordered Sheremetev to hold positions at Pihayoga.

Approach to Narva

Despite the fact that the number of Swedish troops in the region was significantly lower than the number of Russian troops, Charles XII did not concentrate all his forces for the battle near Narva, because he saw a possible danger in the south of Estonia. In Novgorod there were about 10,000 Russian soldiers under the command of Anikita Repnin and 11,000 Ukrainian Cossacks under the command of Ivan Obidovsky, and in addition, there was still the possibility of new actions from Augustus II, who, having lifted the siege of Riga, could join the Russians at Pskov and develop the offensive from there to Derpt. Guided by these considerations, Charles XII left several thousand regular soldiers and militias in Revel, and sent a thousandth detachment under the command of General Wolmar Schlippenbach to the south to Pskov, who on October 26 (November 6) inflicted a heavy defeat on the Pskov militia near Ilmen Lake. In this battle, more than 800 Russian soldiers died out of 1500 army, Schlippenbach also captured a dozen Russian ships and the banner of the Pskov province.

Having learned about the results of the clashes from Purtz, on November 4 (15), Charles XII decides to advance with a relatively small detachment of 4000-5000 soldiers to Wesenberg where to join the detachment of General Welling. On November 12 (24), having barely arrived in Wesenberg, the Swedish king, contrary to the advice of some of his generals, decides on a joint march to Narva. Charles XII, who has always been inclined to underestimate the role of artillery, makes an unexpected decision to leave his convoy in Wesenberg and go on a campaign light.

Meanwhile, Sheremetev, who took up a defensive position near the village of Pyuhayogi, made a serious tactical mistake. Not expecting such an early arrival of the Swedes and faced with serious difficulties in supplying his detachment, Sheremetev sent most his detachment to the surrounding villages for fodder. Sheremetev left only 600 cavalry in a key defensive position at Pyhayogi, and the rest of the soldiers, breaking up into small detachments, dispersed to search for food, and most of these detachments were located west of the village of Pyhayogi on the route of the Swedish army. The problem was aggravated by the fact that Sheremetev did not have any intelligence data and did not know either the exact location of the Swedish detachment or its strength. On the other hand, Charles XII regularly sent scouts ahead and learned of the disadvantageous position of the Russian cavalry. The Swedish king divided his detachment into two parts, sending them to Pyhayogi along two parallel roads. In each case, the Swedes, due to surprise and organization, panicked small Russian cavalry detachments and with large forces approached Sheremetev's main defensive line at a time when he was not able to provide a large Swedish detachment with worthy resistance. As a result, on November 16 (27), Sheremetev was forced to quickly and disorganized retreat to Narva, which "aroused the Tsar's strong wrath."

Main battle

Peter's departure

On November 17 (28), the Sheremetev detachment, which fled from Pyuhayogi, brought news to Peter I about the Swedish offensive. Due to the fact that Sheremetev did not conduct reconnaissance, and also due to the fact that he never entered into an organized battle with the main Swedish detachment, reliable data on the number Swedish troops the Russians did not, but there were false testimonies from Swedish prisoners about supposedly 50,000 Swedes approaching Narva. Having learned about the approach of the Swedes to Narva, Peter I on November 18 (29), accompanied by Field Marshal F. A. Golovin, leaves for Novgorod, leaving command to Field Marshal Duke de Croix. Thus the main battle that took place the next day was carried out in the absence of the king. According to the memoirs of Baron Allart, de Croix resisted this appointment, but failed to convince Peter.

After their decisive victory in the main battle, the Swedes spread the version that Peter I had fled out of cowardice. In Sweden, a medal was also issued depicting a weeping Peter fleeing from Narva. The same version is repeated in the popular press by some Russian historians-publicists, including A. M. Burovsky and I. L. Solonevich. Nevertheless, in modern scientific literature on history, such a version is rejected. Historians point out that in previous battles, for example, during campaigns against Azov, and in subsequent battles of the Northern War, Peter I never showed cowardice, so the reasons for Peter's departure should be sought elsewhere.

Peter I himself explained his departure by the need to replenish reserves, carts and meet with King Augustus II:

In the historical literature, such assumptions are made as to why Peter I decided to leave the army. Firstly, the Russian command probably did not expect such decisive actions from Charles XII and expected that the Swedish army, after arriving near Narva, would spend time resting and strengthening its positions before the battle. Therefore, Peter could consider that he had enough time before the main battle. Secondly, Peter I, on the one hand, could believe the rumors about the large size of the Swedish army and insist that Augustus II immediately resume hostilities in order to weaken Charles's pressure on Russia. On the other hand, Peter I, on the contrary, could seriously underestimate the enemy, have no doubts about the outcome of the battle of Narva in his favor, and already plan the next steps to encircle the Swedish troops in the Narva region with the help of Repnin, Obidovsky and the troops of August II.

Troop disposition

The deployment of Russian troops

Russian troops built fortifications in advance, protecting their positions from the west. On the left bank of the Narova River, a double earthen rampart was erected, the ends of which rested against the river. The distance between the rampart lines was 600 fathoms on the right flank, 120 fathoms in the center, and 41-50 fathoms on the left flank. The narrowness of the space between the ramparts - only 80 m on the left flank, which was still built up with barracks for soldiers, deprived the army of maneuverability.

The troops were divided into three groups: Golovin's troops, numbering about 14 thousand people, stood on the right flank; in the center on Mount Germansberg - a detachment of Prince Trubetskoy of 6 thousand people; on the left flank, the division of General Adam Weide, 3 thousand people; to the left of the Veide detachment, resting against the river bank - Sheremetev's cavalry of 5 thousand people. 22 guns and 17 mortars were located along the ramparts, and the rest of the artillery was located in positions near Ivangorod. The army headquarters was on the extreme right flank, on the island of Camperholm.

Having learned about the approach of the Swedes, the Duke de Croix ordered the troops to be put on alert and placed in one line between the ramparts, stretching the troops in a thin line for 7 miles and leaving no reserve.

The deployment of the Swedish troops

The Swedish army reached the positions of the Russian army at 10 am on November 30, 1700. The army of King Charles XII in the amount of about 9 thousand people, lined up in two lines. On the right flank, in the 1st line, detachments of General Welling stood up, in the 2nd line, the Wachtmeister's cavalry. In the center, in the 1st line, the detachments of Major General Posse, in the 2nd Major General Maydel. Baron Schöblad's artillery was placed in front of the centre. On the left flank were the detachments of Lieutenant General Rehnschild and Major General Gorn in the first line; behind them, in the second line, are the detachments of Major General Rebing. In the gap between the lines, the Guards grenadiers were placed on the right flank, and the Delicarlians on the left. King Charles himself was in front of the center.

Attack of the Swedes

On the night of November 30, 1700, the army of Charles XII, observing complete silence, marched towards the Russian positions. At 10 o'clock in the morning, the Russians saw the Swedish troops, who "at the sounds of trumpets and timpani, two cannon shots offered a fight. The Duc de Croix urgently convened a council of war. At the council, Sheremetev, pointing to the stretching of the army's positions, proposed to leave part of the troops to blockade the city, and bring the rest of the army to the field and give battle. This proposal was rejected by the duke, who stated that the army would not be able to resist the Swedes in the field. At the council, it was decided to remain in place, which transferred the initiative into the hands of the Swedish king.

Unlike the Russian command, which believed that it was opposed by a 30,000-strong Swedish army, King Charles knew perfectly well the number and location of enemy troops. Knowing that the center of the Russian army was most strongly fortified, the king decided to concentrate attacks on the flanks, press the Russians against the fortress and throw them into the river. The king personally commanded the army. In the center, on the Germanensberg hill, the Swedish artillery was located under the command of Feldzeugmeister General Baron Johan Schöblad. The right flank was commanded by Karl Gustav Rehnschild (three columns of 10 battalions each), the left flank was commanded by Otto Welling (11 infantry battalions and 24 cavalry squadrons). Ahead of the columns were 500 grenadiers with fascines.

The battle began at 2 pm. Due to heavy snowfall (visibility no more than 20 steps) and the wind in the face of the enemy, the Swedes managed to carry out an unexpected attack, coming close to the positions of the Russians. The first blow was made with two deep wedges. Russian troops stood in one line with a length of almost 6 kilometers, and despite the multiple advantage, the line of defense was very weak. Half an hour later, the breakthrough was in three places. The grenadiers filled the ditches with fascines and climbed the rampart. Thanks to speed, onslaught and coherence, the Swedes broke into the Russian camp. Panic broke out in the Russian regiments. Sheremetev's cavalry took flight and tried to ford the Narova River. Sheremetev himself escaped, but about 1,000 people drowned in the river. The panic was heightened by the screams "The Germans are traitors!", as a result of which the soldiers rushed to beat the foreign officers. The infantry tried to retreat along the pontoon bridge near the island of Camperholm, but the bridge could not withstand a large crowd of people and collapsed, people began to drown.

The commander-in-chief, the Duke de Croix, and a number of other foreign officers, fleeing from being beaten by their own soldiers, surrendered to the Swedes. At the same time, on the right flank, the Preobrazhensky, Semyonovsky and Lefortovsky regiments, with soldiers from Golovin's division who joined them, fenced off with wagons and slingshots, put up fierce resistance to the Swedish troops. On the left flank, the Weide division also repulsed all the attacks of the Swedes, the Swedish column of General Renschild was upset by the fire of the Russian guards. King Charles himself appeared on the battlefield, but even his presence, which strengthened the morale of the soldiers, could not help the Swedes. The fight ended with the onset of darkness.

The night led to an aggravation of the disorder in both the Russian and Swedish troops. Part of the Swedish infantry, breaking into the Russian camp, plundered the convoy and got drunk. Two Swedish battalions in the dark mistook each other for Russians and started a fight between themselves. Russian troops, despite the fact that part of the troops maintained order, suffered from a lack of leadership. Communication between the right and left flanks was absent.

Capitulation of the Russian army

On the morning of the next day, the remaining generals - Prince Yakov Dolgorukov, Avton Golovin, Ivan Buturlin and Feldzeugmeister General Tsarevich Alexander Imeretinsky decided to start negotiations on surrender. So did General Weide. Prince Dolgorukov agreed on the free passage of troops to the right bank with weapons and banners, but without artillery and baggage. The Weide division capitulated only on the morning of December 2 after the second order of Prince Dolgorukov on the terms of free passage without weapons and banners. All night from December 1 to 2, Swedish sappers, together with the Russians, made crossings. On the morning of December 2, Russian troops left the Swedish coast of the Narova.

As booty, the Swedes received 20,000 muskets and the royal treasury of 32,000 rubles, as well as 210 banners. The Swedes lost 677 killed and about 1,250 wounded. The losses of the Russian army amounted to about 7 thousand people killed, drowned and wounded, including deserters and those who died from hunger and cold.

In violation of the terms of surrender, 700 people remained in captivity of the Swedes, of which 10 generals, 10 colonels, 6 lieutenant colonels, 7 majors, 14 captains, 7 lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 4 sergeants, 9 fireworks and scorer, etc.

Results

The Russian army suffered a heavy defeat: a significant amount of artillery was lost, heavy casualties were suffered, and the command staff was badly damaged. In Europe, the Russian army was no longer perceived as a serious force for several years, and Charles XII received the glory of a great commander. On the other hand, this tactical victory sowed the seed for the future defeat of Sweden - Charles XII believed that he had defeated the Russians for a long time and greatly underestimated them up to Poltava. Peter I, on the contrary, after the defeat near Narva, realized the need for military reforms and focused on the training of national command personnel.

Following the results of the battle, Peter I, drawing conclusions, wrote:

The defeat at Narva greatly worsened both the military and foreign policy position of Russia. Repeated attempts by Peter, through the mediation of Austrian and French diplomats, to make peace with Charles remained unanswered. This led to the establishment of closer Russo-Saxon relations. The army of King Augustus, although retreated beyond the Western Dvina, still represented a significant force. On February 27, 1701, a meeting of the Russian and Saxon monarchs took place in the Exchanges. The negotiations ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Birzhay, which determined the conditions for joint actions of the parties against Sweden. On March 11, 1701, at a military council, the Russians and Saxons drew up a detailed plan of military operations.

The memory of the battle

Monument to Russian soldiers on the Victoria bastion

In 1900, on the 200th anniversary of the first battle near Narva, at the initiative of the Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky regiments and the 1st Battery of the Life Guards of the 1st Artillery Brigade near the village of Vepskul, a monument to the fallen Russian soldiers was erected. The monument is a granite rock with a cross, mounted on a truncated earthen pyramid. The inscription on the monument reads: “To the heroes-ancestors who fell in battle 19 N0 1700. L.-Guards. Preobrazhensky, L.-Guards. Semyonovsky regiments, 1st battery of life-guards. 1st Artillery Brigade. November 19, 1900".

The first Swedish monument to the battle was unveiled in Narva in 1936 and disappeared without a trace after World War II. The new one was opened in October 2000 by Foreign Minister Lena Helm Wallen. The funds were raised by the Swedish Institute. Engraved on granite: MDCC (1700) and Svecia Memor (Sweden Remembers).

§ 104. Great Northern War. First years of the war

From 1699, Peter began preparations for war with the Swedes. He entered into an alliance with Augustus II, the Saxon-Polish king and elector, and with the Danish king Christian. The allies convinced him that a very convenient time had come for action against Sweden, since the too young and frivolous King Charles XII reigned on the Swedish throne. However, Peter did not dare to start a war with Charles until peace was concluded with the Turks. In August 1700, he received the news that his ambassadors had achieved peace in Constantinople with the concession of Azov to Moscow, and immediately the Moscow troops were moved to the Baltic Sea. The famous Swedish war began - for as much as 21 years.

In his desire to seize the shores of the Baltic Sea, Peter was the successor to the policy of all the Muscovite tsars who preceded him. Ivan the Terrible endured a terrible struggle for the Baltic coast (§62). What was lost under Grozny from the Russian lands on the sea coast was returned to Moscow by Tsar Fyodor Ivanovich (§63) and again lost by Vasily Shuisky (§70). Emperors of the 17th century they did not forget this loss, approved by the Stolbovsky Treaty of 1617 (§ 77). Under Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, A. L. Ordin-Nashchokin especially insisted on the idea of ​​the need to break through to the Baltic Sea, namely to the Gulf of Riga, for direct maritime relations with middle Europe. But at that time, the realization of this age-old dream of the Moscow patriots was still impossible: Tsar Alexei was most of all connected with Little Russian affairs and the struggle against the Commonwealth and Turkey. Under Peter, relations in the south were established, and he naturally turned his impulse to the Baltic shores, obeying the spontaneous desire of Moscow to the West.

Peter sent his troops to the Gulf of Finland and laid siege to the Swedish fortress of Narva. But at this time it was discovered that the young and frivolous King Charles XII had great energy and military talent. As soon as the allies started a war against him, he gathered his available troops, rushed to Copenhagen and forced the Danes to peace. Then he charged the Russians towards Narva and attacked them as quickly and unexpectedly as he attacked the Danes. Peter near Narva had all his regular army (up to 40 thousand people). It stood in a fortified camp on the left bank of the river. Narova. Karl broke into this camp from the west, crushed and drove the Russians to the river (November 19, 1700). Having only one bridge on the Narova, the Russians escaped by swimming and perished. Only the “amusing” regiments of Peter (Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky) stood at the bridge and crossed the river with honor after the rest of the army fled. Karl got all the artillery and the entire camp of the Moscow army. Satisfied with an easy victory, Karl considered Peter's forces destroyed, did not pursue the Russians and did not invade Moscow. He went to his third enemy, Augustus, and by doing so he made a major mistake: Peter quickly recovered and rebuilt his army; Karl himself, in the words of Peter, for a long time "stuck in Poland", where Augustus took refuge from him.

Before the battle, Peter himself was near Narva and saw all the disorder of his army. It was poorly trained, poorly dressed and fed; it did not like those hired "German" generals to whom it was subordinate (Duke von Krui and others); for the siege there was not enough gunpowder and shells; the guns were bad. When Charles approached, Peter left for Novgorod, confident that the Swedes would invade Russia and that Russian fortresses should be prepared for defense. The defeat of the army near Narva did not lead Peter to despair. On the contrary, just as after the first Azov failure, he showed tremendous energy during the winter of 1700-1701. he managed to gather a new army and cast up to 300 new cannons, for which, due to a lack of copper in the state, even church bells were taken. Having met with his ally King Augustus (in Birzhakh), Peter concluded a new agreement with him on how they should stick together against Charles.

According to this agreement, all subsequent years, Peter waged war in two different areas. Firstly, he helped Augustus in the Commonwealth with money, bread and troops. The Russian army more than once went to Poland and Lithuania, and the matter was done there without defeat, but, it is true, without great success. It was important that it was possible to detain Charles XII in Poland and not allow him until the final triumph over Augustus. In this theater of war, Peter's favorite from his "amusing" Alexander Danilovich Menshikov was especially distinguished, to whom Peter entrusted all his troops here. Secondly, Peter, separately from his ally, undertook the conquest of the Finnish coast and in general the old Livonian lands (Estland and Livonia), taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of Charles were diverted to Poland. In 1701 and the following years, the Russian cavalry under the command of "Field Marshal" Boris Petrovich Sheremetev "stayed" in these areas: Sheremetev ruined the country, defeated the Swedish corps of General Schlippenbach twice (at Erestfer and Hummelshof) and took the old Russian cities of Yam and Koporye. Peter himself in the autumn of 1702 appeared at the head of the river. Neva and took the Swedish fortress Noteburg, which stood on the site of the old Novgorod Nut. Resuming the fortifications of this fortress, Peter called it Shlisselburg, that is, the "key-city" to the sea. In the spring of 1703, the Russians descended to the Neva mouth and took, at the confluence of the river. Ohty to the Neva, the Swedish fortification Nyenschantz. Below this fortification on the Neva, in May 1703, Peter founded the Peter and Paul Fortress and under its walls founded the city, which received the name of "Petersburg", or St. Petersburg.

It was for Peter a fortified exit to the sea, which he immediately took advantage of. Sea vessels were hastily built on Lake Ladoga (more precisely, on the Svir River), and in the same 1703 they were already launched. In the autumn of this year, Peter had already begun work on Kotlin Island for the construction of the sea fortress of Kronshlot (the predecessor of the present Kronstadt). This fortress became a harbor for a new Baltic Fleet. Finally, in 1704 the strong Swedish fortresses of Derpt (Yuriev) and Narva were taken. Thus, Peter not only acquired for himself access to the sea in his "paradise" of St. Petersburg, but also defended this exit next to strongholds from the sea (Kronshlot) and from land (Narva, Yam, Koporye, Derpt). By allowing Peter to achieve such success, Charles made an irreparable mistake, which he planned to make up for only when he dealt with his other enemy, Augustus.

At the end of November 1700, the first major battle took place during the Great Northern War between Russia and Sweden, which ended in the defeat of the troops of Peter I and went down in history as the Battle of Narva. The reasons that led to such an unsuccessful start to the military campaign were then analyzed and prompted the king to carry out a comprehensive modernization of the army and reorganize it according to the European model.

Creation of an anti-Swedish coalition

The impetus for the beginning of the Northern War was the entry of Russia in 1699 into the "Northern Union", shortly before that formed by the Commonwealth, Saxony and Denmark. All participants in this coalition were united by certain territorial claims against Sweden, and, starting the war, they hoped that the very young eighteen-year-old King Charles XII (his portrait is given below) would not be able to give them a worthy rebuff.

On the basis of an agreement concluded with the Polish king Augustus II, in the event of a victory, the territory occupied by the Leningrad Region today retreated to Russia. In those days, it was called the Swedish Ingrian Land and was of great strategic importance, since it provided its owner with access to the Baltic Sea. The Russian army set out on a campaign in August 1700, immediately after Peter I received a message about the conclusion of the Constantinople peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, which untied his hands for active operations in the north of the country.

Two opposing armies on the eve of the war

The main enemy citadel on the territory of Ingermanland was the fortress of Narva, located on its northwestern border, the capture of which was an indispensable condition further development military actions. By the beginning of the Northern War, Russia had a fairly large army, according to a number of estimates, numbering more than 200 thousand people, of which about 40 thousand became participants in the Battle of Narva in 1700. However, as Peter I himself later noted, they lacked proper training, material support and discipline to win.

The Swedish army was a well-organized structure, created on a semi-professional basis at the beginning previous century King Gustav II Adolf. Its cavalry units were formed exclusively from contract soldiers, and although the infantrymen were recruited through forced mobilization, each of them received a good salary and free public housing for his family. It was wonderful armed army, also bound by a rigid discipline based on the ideology of Lutheranism, the adherents of which were the majority of Swedes.

The beginning of a sad journey

The approach of the Russian troops to the Narva fortress was greatly hampered by the fact that, along with the combat units, a convoy consisting of 10 thousand carts was moving, transporting cannonballs, gunpowder, as well as hand grenades, bombs and other military supplies to the place of the upcoming battle.

The weather that year was rainy, which caused many carts to get stuck in impassable mud and break down. The supply at the same time was organized so poorly that the soldiers were constantly starving, and among the horses began to die from starvation. All this had the most negative impact on the outcome of the upcoming battle of Narva.

Under the walls of Narva

The troops of Peter I faced a very difficult task. Since the Narva fortress, located on the western bank of the Narva River (called Narova in those years), was connected by a bridge to another, well-fortified citadel ─ Ivan-Gorod, located opposite it, as a result, both fortresses had to be besieged simultaneously.

Peter 1 was going to lead the battle of Narva personally and therefore rejected the offer of the Polish king Augustus II to send him an experienced specialist in conducting such operations ─ Lieutenant General L. N. Allart. By his order, 284 guns were installed around the besieged fortress, the garrison of which consisted of about 1300 foot and 200 cavalry soldiers. The forthcoming outcome of the battle did not cause concern, since the numerical superiority of forces was on the side of the Russians.

First failures

In the last days of October 1700, Russian gunners began regular shelling of the fortress. However, when the entire supply of charges was used up two weeks later, it turned out that no significant damage had been caused to the fortress walls. The reason for such low efficiency was that the shelling was carried out exclusively from small-caliber guns that prevailed in the arsenal of the Russian army by the beginning of the Northern War. In addition, all of them, as well as artillery gunpowder and cores, were of extremely poor quality.

At that time, things were no better for the allies of the Russian Tsar. The Danish army very quickly capitulated and began peace negotiations with Sweden, and the Polish-Lithuanian troops were forced to lift the siege of Riga. These successes allowed Charles XII to send the entire vacant contingent of forces to help the besieged Narva.

Strengthening the Swedish army

In mid-October, the king personally arrived with a detachment of ten thousand in Pernov ( old name the city of Pärnu) and, before throwing it into battle, gave the soldiers and officers a good rest after the sea route. In the meantime, he himself went to Revel, where, having promised local residents additional benefits in the event that their city was annexed to the Swedish Empire, he received reinforcements from them in the form of 5 thousand militiamen.

The Russian troops suffered tangible damage even before the start of the decisive battle near Narva. Having learned about the landing of an additional contingent of Swedish troops in Pernov, Peter I sent a large cavalry detachment of Count Boris Sheremetev to intercept them. In the area of ​​the Purtse fortress, part of these forces was attacked by the Swedish vanguard under the command of General Welling and almost completely destroyed. The main forces that arrived to help them, although they slowed down the advance of the enemy, but general course events could not be affected.

Unsuccessful start of the battle

The beginning of the battle near Narva was preceded by two more events that took place in the camp of the Russian troops and also affected its outcome. The first of these was the betrayal of the commander of the bombardment company, Captain Yakov Gummert, who fled to Narva and handed it over to the commandant, Colonel Gorn important information. In addition, the sudden departure of Peter I himself came as a surprise to everyone, the reasons for which continue to be debated to this day. As a result, the command of the troops was carried out by the Saxon field marshal Duke de Croix.

The decisive part of the Battle of Narva began on November 30, 1700. Around 2 p.m., taking advantage of heavy snowfall, which extremely limited visibility, the Swedes managed to quietly come close to the enemy positions and unexpectedly attack them. Despite the numerical superiority of the Russian troops, their defense line was stretched for more than 6 kilometers and, in view of this, was not sufficiently reliable. During the first hour of the battle, the Swedes managed to break through it in several places and break into their camp.

Defeat and disorderly retreat

This unexpected turn of events caused panic among the defenders, which, in turn, caused their disorderly flight. Count Sheremetev's cavalry tried to escape by swimming across the Narova River. Many, including the count himself, succeeded, but about a thousand people drowned, unable to reach the opposite shore.

The infantrymen, fleeing from imminent death, rushed to the pontoon bridge, which collapsed, unable to withstand a huge crowd of people, and they began to drown in hundreds in the cold autumn water. The situation was aggravated by the cry thrown by someone: “The Germans are traitors!” As a result, the soldiers began to beat their foreign officers, many of whom, including the commander-in-chief, the Duke de Croix, were forced to flee to the enemy in order to avoid death.

The sad end of the battle

The result of the Battle of Narva was the surrender of the Russian troops. It was possible to soften the bitterness of defeat only due to the fact that Prince Yakov Dolgorukov managed to reach an agreement with Charles XII on the withdrawal from the encirclement of all the surviving soldiers and officers with weapons, banners, but without artillery and baggage. All the following night, Swedish and Russian sappers jointly built a panton crossing across the Narova River, after which the defeated left the Swedish coast.

The failure that befell the Russian troops brought rich booty to the Swedes. In their hands were 210 banners captured by them in battle, 284 guns, 20 thousand muskets, as well as the royal treasury, which contained a huge amount for those times - 32 thousand rubles. Losses on the Russian side amounted to 7 thousand people killed, wounded, drowned in the river and defected to the enemy, while the Swedes lost 677 people and 1200 were wounded.

Lesson learned from defeat

The defeat near Narva in 1700 greatly undermined the prestige of the Russian state in the international arena. For a long time the rulers European states did not perceive the country as a serious military force. However, as time has shown, the events of those tragic days indirectly had positive consequences for Russia.

The first of these was the incredible self-conceit of Charles XII, who believed that the Russians, defeated by him near Narva, would never again be able to resist Sweden. This erroneous belief greatly let him down 9 years later during the Poltava battle that ended ingloriously for him.

At the same time, the defeat suffered near Narva was a difficult but useful lesson for Peter I, thanks to which he fully realized the need for large-scale military reforms and made every effort to train domestic highly professional military personnel. This helped him in August 1704 to capture the fortress of Narva and, thus, take revenge for the earlier defeat.

11/19/1700 (2.12). - Battle of Narva; the defeat of Russian troops from the Swedish army of King Charles XII

Russia took part in the return of access to the Baltic Sea, lost in 1617, which seized the original Russian lands from Ivangorod to Lake Ladoga. Sweden at that time was the dominant power in northern Europe and started the war with a series of victories over the Saxons and Danes. Russia was part of the anti-Swedish coalition and was obliged to start hostilities. decided first of all to win Narva and Ivangorod from the Swedes.

The first major battle between the Russians and the Swedes was the Battle of Narva on November 19, 1700. In September, the 35,000-strong Russian army under the command of the Tsar laid siege to Narva, a strong Swedish fortress on the shores of the Gulf of Finland. At first, the fortress had a garrison of about 2 thousand people, and it could be taken, but in November a Swedish army of 10 thousand, led by King Charles XII, was sent to help them. The Swedes landed in the area of ​​​​Revel and Pernov (Pärnu). But even after that, the Russians were almost three times superior to the Swedes. However, the Russian units were only recently formed and were not sufficiently prepared for battle. The besiegers were stretched out in a thin line almost 7 km long without reserves.

Russian intelligence sent to meet the Swedes underestimated the number of the enemy. Not assuming an imminent Swedish offensive, on November 18, Peter left Duke de Croa at the head of the Russian troops and left for Novgorod to speed up the delivery of reinforcements. In the early morning of the next day, the Swedish army, under the cover of a snowstorm and fog, unexpectedly attacked the Russian positions. Karl created two shock groups, one of which managed to break through in the center. The absence of the Tsar weakened the discipline. Many foreign officers of the Russian army, led by commander de Croa, went over to the side of the Swedes. The change of command and poor training led to panic in the Russian units. They began a disorderly retreat to their right flank, where there was a bridge over the Narva River. Under the weight of the masses, the bridge collapsed. On the left flank, the cavalry under the command of Governor Sheremetev, seeing the flight of other units, succumbed to a general panic and rushed across the river by swimming.

Nevertheless, there were persistent Russian units, thanks to which the Battle of Narva did not turn into a massacre. At a critical moment, when it seemed that everything was lost, the Guards regiments - Semenovsky and Preobrazhensky - entered the battle for the bridge. They repulsed the onslaught of the Swedes and stopped the panic. Gradually, the remnants of the defeated units joined the Semenovtsy and Preobrazhenets. The battle at the bridge lasted several hours. Charles XII himself led troops into the attack against the Russian guards, but to no avail. On the left flank of the Russians, the division of A.A. Weide. As a result of the courageous resistance of these units, the Russians held out until the night, and in the dark the battle subsided.

Negotiations began. The Russian army lost the battle, was in a difficult position, but was not defeated. Karl, who personally experienced the stamina of the Russian guard, apparently was not completely sure of the success of the new battle and agreed to a truce. The parties entered into an agreement under which the Russian troops received the right to freely pass home. However, the Swedes violated the agreement: after the Guards regiments and the division of A.I. Golovin crossed the Narva, the Swedes disarmed the divisions of Veide and I. Yu. Trubetskoy, capturing officers. The Russians lost up to 8 thousand people in the Battle of Narva, including almost the entire senior officer corps. The losses of the Swedes amounted to about 3 thousand people.

After Narva, Charles XII did not begin the winter campaign against Russia. He considered that the Russians were already practically defeated. The Swedish army opposed the Polish king Augustus II, in whom Charles XII saw a more dangerous opponent. Strategically, Charles XII acted quite reasonably. However, he did not take into account one thing - the enormous energy of Peter I. The defeat near Narva did not discourage him, but, on the contrary, prompted him to take revenge. “When they received this misfortune,” he wrote, “then captivity drove away laziness, and forced day and night to industriousness and art.”

Preparations for the first battle on Narva

Peter was looking forward to hearing from Ukraintsev. He urged the Duma clerk to complete peace negotiations with the Turks.

Reading Peter's letters, you involuntarily get used to his manner of demanding that the addressee quickly fulfill the assignment. It is rare that any of the letters does not contain indications of the need to carry out the command "without delay", "with haste", "immediately", etc. without delay" only the seal of the king's temperament. He himself knew how to instantly assess the situation, grasp the main thing, quickly make a decision, and if there was no performer at hand, then carry out this decision.

In this case, Peter hurried Ukraintsev not in vain - this was required by the obligations of the tsar to the allies.

Back in December 1699, Peter wrote to Ukraintsev: "Do not hesitate to pay, as God will give you help." In February 1700, the tsar's appeal to his diplomat resembles a spell: "Only of course make peace: it's great, it's necessary." In anticipation of the conclusion of a peace treaty, Peter even delayed the answer to the letter of Augustus II. “Truly, there is a reason for this,” the tsar explained to the king in July 1700, “that if they didn’t receive useful news from the other side, they didn’t want to write, which we constantly expect.” To the ambassador of Augustus II, who had specially arrived in Moscow to hasten the Russians to begin hostilities, Peter said: "If I receive news of peace today, then tomorrow I will send my troops to the Swedes."

Peter kept his word. On August 8, the long-awaited report from Ukraintsev arrived that peace had been concluded for 30 years, and the next day he already informed August II that he had ordered the troops to march. A convoy of 10,000 carts stretched for tens of miles, loaded with equipment, artillery, and food. The tsar himself, with the rank of captain of the bombardment company of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, was also part of the troops. In Tver, Peter received disturbing news: the courier of August II informed him that the Swedish king with an 18,000-strong army was preparing to arrive in Livonia. Peter expresses doubts about the reliability of the news: "And I thought about it many times, is it true or a forgery? And if it is true, then of course Datskaya is mastered by united caravans."

Unfortunately, the information turned out to be correct. On the same day, August 8, when a messenger from Ukraintsev arrived in Moscow, one of the participants in the Northern Union - Denmark - was taken out of the game. The Swedish king Charles XII unexpectedly landed at the head of a 15,000-strong army near the walls of Copenhagen. The landing was delivered by "connected caravans" - Swedish and English ships. Frederick IV capitulated.

On September 23, the first Russian regiments numbering 10 thousand people, overcoming the autumn impassability, reached Narva. The rest slowly pulled up to the fortress, and their concentration was basically completed only by mid-October. The king ordered the placement of batteries and siege work. The bombardment of the fortress began on October 20 and lasted for two weeks without any effect - exactly as long as there was enough gunpowder, cannonballs and bombs.

Meanwhile, Charles XII approached Narva as unexpectedly as he approached Copenhagen. Having received news of the approach of the enemy, Peter immediately leaves from Narva, transferring command of the army to Duke von Krui, who had just been hired for Russian service. This act of Peter is difficult to explain. Many years later, in the "History of the Northern War", edited by Peter, it is written as follows: "Against the 18th, the sovereign went from the army to Novgorod in order to induce the marching regiments to get to Narva as soon as possible, and especially to have a meeting with the king of Poland." It is unlikely, however, that the king could have a more important task in these troubled days than being in the troops on the eve of their battle with the enemy army.

The first thing that comes to mind when trying to understand the behavior of Peter in these memorable days of November 1700 is the assumption that the king was cowardly. But it is worth taking a closer look at his actions during the Azov campaigns and in the years after Narva, as this assumption disappears. Neither before nor after Narva did the tsar sit out in the wagon train, he was always in the thick of battles and put his life at stake many times. Most likely, in this case, Peter underestimated the measures of danger hanging over the Russian army, for he knew that its numbers were many times greater than the army of Charles XII.

The defeat of Russian troops near Narva

The Swedish army concentrated at Narva on 18 November. The battle took place the next day. The location of the Russian camp was focused on the siege of Narva, so its fortifications stretched out in a thin line seven miles long. Before the start of the battle, heavy snow fell, allowing the Swedes to approach the positions of the Russian troops unnoticed. The swift attack of the Swedes caused a general panic. "The Germans have betrayed us," shouts were heard. Sheremetev, together with the cavalry, rushed to swim across the Narova, losing over a thousand people during the crossing. The bridge, along which the infantrymen from Golovin's division fled, collapsed, and many fugitives immediately went to the bottom. Von Krui and the foreign officers who were in the Russian service hastened to surrender. Only two guards regiments and the Lefortovo regiment showed stamina and, in this general confusion, retained their combat capability. Multiple attempts by the Swedes to crush the guards were unsuccessful.

At night there was a lull and negotiations began for surrender. The Russian troops were given the right to leave Narva with all their weapons, with the exception of artillery. However, the king treacherously broke his word. As soon as the guards crossed over the restored bridge to the other side of the Narova, the Swedes attacked the rest of the Russians, disarmed the soldiers, took away their property, and declared the officers prisoners.

So, the beginning of the war, the very first contact with the enemy ended in a crushing defeat for the Russian troops. Near Narva, the Russians lost 6,000 people killed, drowned, starved to death and all their artillery, 135 guns of various calibers. The army lost almost completely its senior officers. And this despite the fact that there were several times fewer Swedes near Narva than Russians: under the command of Charles XII there were 8-12 thousand people, while the Russian army numbered 35-40 thousand.

Historians have no sources at their disposal from which to extract information about state of mind Peter after Narva: not a single letter from the king from those dark days has survived, and maybe [perhaps he did not write them; the memoirists are also silent on this score. Almost a quarter of a century has passed. Turning to the reasons for the failures of the Russian troops near Narva in the History of the Northern War, the tsar wrote: “So the Swedes got victory over our army, which is indisputable; previously called Shepeleva); two regiments of the guard were only on two attacks near Azov, field battles, and especially with regular troops, they were never seen. Other regiments, except for some colonels, both officers and privates, were most recruits, like it was mentioned above, besides, there was a great famine after a late time, it was impossible to bring provisions for the great mud, and in a single word to say, the whole thing was like infantile play, and the art was below the surface. What a surprise to such an old, trained and practiced army to find victory over such unskillful ones? .. But when this misfortune (or, better, great happiness) was received, then captivity drove away laziness and forced day and night to industriousness and art a". Narva clearly showed Peter the backwardness of the country and the low combat effectiveness of the army. Narva was a cruel school from which lessons had to be drawn - to learn and teach to win.

The news of the victory of the eighteen-year-old Swedish king became the property of Europe and had a huge resonance. In a mockery of the Russian tsar, the Swedes knocked out a medal: on one side of it was Peter at the cannons that were shelling Narva, and the inscription: "Let Peter stand and bask." On the other, the flight of the Russians, led by Peter, from Narva: the cap falls from the head of the king, the sword is thrown, the king cries and wipes his tears with a handkerchief. The inscription read: "Gone out, weeping bitterly."

The prestige of Russia in Western European courts fell. The Russian ambassador in The Hague, Andrey Matveev, reported to Peter: “The Swedish ambassador, with great curses, himself going to ministers, not only blasphemes your troops, but also slanders your very person, as if you, frightened by the arrival of his king, went to Moscow from the regiments in two days ..." A similar report was sent by the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Pyotr Golitsyn.

Charles XII had a choice. He could, building on the success achieved near Narva, continue military operations against Russia and dictate to her a peace that was pleasing to him, or send an army to Poland against Augustus II. The Swedish king saw fit to move to Poland. The choice of direction was influenced by the attitude of Charles XII to Augustus P. If the Swedish king underestimated the Russian tsar, then he fiercely hated the Saxon elector, for he considered him the initiator of the Northern Union. “His behavior is so shameful and vile,” the Swedish king spoke of Augustus, “that deserves vengeance from God and the contempt of all well-meaning people.”

And yet, it was not the desire to deprive August of the Polish crown that determined the decision of Charles XII to move the theater of operations to the west. The Swedish king could not go on a long campaign to Moscow, having a Saxon army in the rear, the combat capability of which was then higher than the Russian one. Moreover, it was clear that Poland was ready to take advantage of any favorable opportunity to oppose Sweden, and besides, Denmark was able to quickly recover from its recent defeat and join the Northern Alliance.

While ridicule was heard in the camp of Charles against the Russian Tsar, Peter wasted no time. He knows neither weakness nor fatigue. The king was not one of those people who gives up and bows his head before failures. Trials, on the contrary, tempered Peter's will. As after the first Azov campaign, failure spurred him on, and he energetically and purposefully began to forge a future victory. The dry chronicle of his travels testifies to the enormous strain of his forces and to the limit of mobilized energy. At the end of January 1701, he rushes to the Exchange, returning from there to Moscow, hurries to Voronezh, where he spends two and a half months, then goes to Novgorod and Pskov. In subsequent years, the king could be met in Arkhangelsk, near Noteburg, at the Olonets shipyard, at the walls of Narva and Derpt, in St. Petersburg.

Peter rushes like a courier - day and night, in any weather and at any time of the year. An ordinary cart or sleigh was for him both a place to sleep and a dining table. He stopped only to change horses. Each movement of the king is not only a milestone in his personal life, but also a certain stage in the mobilization of the country's efforts to fight the enemy. This is the daily work of the king, his personal, so to speak, contribution to the common cause.

Peter went to the Stock Exchange on a date with Augustus II. The Polish king, who was distinguished neither by courage, nor by loyalty, nor by the desire to mobilize all resources to fight the enemy, who did not value anything like the Polish crown, and therefore was ready for any step to save it, was nevertheless an invaluable ally for Russia. The longer Charles XII chases after Augustus, the more time Russia will have to heal the effects of Narva. That is why Peter spared neither effort and time, nor material and human resources to support Augustus. The union agreement was confirmed at the Stock Exchange, according to which Peter undertook to place at the disposal of the Polish king a corps of 15-20 thousand and, in addition to it, an annual subsidy of 100 thousand rubles.

Construction of defensive structures in Novgorod and Pskov and Arkhangelsk

The tsar goes to Novgorod and Pskov to supervise the construction of defensive structures. According to his decree, dragoons, soldiers, priests "and every church rank, male and female," were involved in the work, so that they even had to stop serving in parish churches.

Arkhangelsk attracted the attention of Peter in connection with the news of the attack on the city by Swedish ships. The Swedes' attempt to burn Arkhangelsk failed, but the tsar went on a long journey to strengthen the only port city that connected Russia with the West.

At first glance, Peter's frequent visits to Voronezh were strange and seemingly not caused by extreme necessity. In fact, the expediency of the long-term stay of the tsar in Voronezh before the start of the Northern War is beyond doubt - a fleet was created there, intended for military operations on the Sea of ​​\u200b\u200bAzov. But why did the tsar go to Voronezh now, when the theater of operations had shifted to the northwest and Russia was fighting not with Turkey, but with Sweden? Was it necessary to replenish the Azov fleet with new ships and incessantly renovate those that were quickly rotting in fresh water Don only recently launched galleys and frigates? Moreover, none of the ships participated in any battle, and their guns did not fire a single salvo. Were these troubles of the king an aimless waste of national resources and a kind of tribute to his passion for the fleet and shipbuilding?

There can be no two opinions on this matter - Peter's unceasing concern for the Azov fleet paid off by the fact that they cooled the warlike ardor of the Turks and for a long time kept them from declaring war on Russia. The Russian resident in Turkey, Pyotr Andreyevich Tolstoy, reported to the tsar: "Most of all, they fear your naval fleet, sovereign."

Peter did not take his eyes off Turkey, closely following the changing moods of the Sultan's court. On June 24, 1701, the tsar wrote to the governor of Azov Fyodor Matveyevich Apraksin, who was planted in Azov to guard the acquisition on the southern sea: "Please be careful in doing this both in Azov, and especially in Taganrog, to defend that place." Two weeks later, he again reminds: "Please be wary of the Turkish side." The fears turned out to be unfounded, and in September Apraksin received new news from the king: "wars with the Turks are not tea, because the peace was confirmed by the sultan willingly."

The inaccuracy of the information that the tsar supplied to his governor is quite understandable - at that time Russia did not have a permanent diplomatic representation in Turkey, and in Moscow they had to be content with only rumors that reached roundabouts.

Peter breaks the tradition and sends his representative to Adrianople, the residence of the Sultan. The choice fell on Pyotr Andreevich Tolstoy, a man as gifted as he was crafty. “Oh, head, head, you wouldn’t be on your shoulders if you weren’t so smart,” the tsar once said in a moment of frankness to Tolstoy, hinting at his involvement in the conspiracy of Miloslavsky and Sophia back in 1682. Tolstoy zealously prayed for old sins. To please the king, he, being an adult, 40 years old, having a wife and children, voluntarily goes with volunteers to Venice to study naval affairs. Now, in 1702, the "smart head" had to leave for Turkey and follow the instructions drawn up by the king himself. Peter wanted to know the state of the Turkish army and navy; whether they train cavalry and infantry according to their old custom or use the services of European officers, and also whether the Turks are going to fill up the Kerch Strait in order to forever cut off the Russian access to the Black Sea.

Tolstoy was met in Adrianople more than cool. They reasoned: "It has never happened for a century that the Moscow ambassador lived near the Porte." Was it not for this that he granted to sow confusion among the Christians subject to the sultan?

It was not easy for Peter Andreevich to live in Turkey, but the tsar was pleased with his service. When the Sultan's court, sometimes kindly, sometimes arrogantly rude, became such a burden to Tolstoy that he asked for a change, the king replied: his wish will be fulfilled, but not now - "do not get bored for some more time; there is a great need for you to stay there ".

The "need" for Tolstoy's services was indeed "great", for the tides of peacefulness of the Porte alternated with the same tides of belligerence. This forced Peter to take care of the Voronezh shipyard among his most important concerns. He looked in there for several weeks, either alone or accompanied by his company. The laying of the ships and their descent were accompanied by a cheerful feast.

In Moscow, more precisely in Preobrazhensky, the tsar spent the winter months, that is, the time of the year when, as a rule, there was some calm in the theater of war: the enemy armies were located in habitable places and arranged a kind of respite in order to resume hostilities after the spring floods.

Restoration of the army after the defeat near Narva

Three worries overcame Peter: where to get money, where to get people and, finally, weapons to make up for the losses near Narva.

Andrei Nartov wrote down a story about how the money was obtained. The king thought about this in solitude for a whole day. To the "Prince-Caesar" Romodanovsky who entered, he says: there is no money in the treasury, the army is not supplied with anything, and there is no artillery, and this is needed soon. There is only one way out: "reduce treasures in gold and silver in the monasteries and squeeze money out of it." “This thing is ticklish, I must think of something else,” Romodanovsky objected and took the tsar to the Kremlin, where there was a secret storeroom. When they entered the chamber, "to his indescribable surprise, he saw his royal majesty piles of silver and gilded dishes and harness, small silver money and Dutch efimki." Romodanovsky told Peter the secret of treasures: “when your parent, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, went on campaigns at different times, then by proxy of his to me, he gave extra money and treasures to keep me. At the end of his life, having called me to him, he bequeathed, so that I don’t give this to any of the heirs until then, unless there is an extreme need for money during the war.

It is not possible to separate the authentic from the legendary in this legend, especially since, according to other sources, the tsar had this conversation not with Romodanovsky, but with Prozorovsky. However, it is known for certain that Peter overcame financial difficulties in an equally simple, but not very reliable way - he increased the productivity of the Mint: machines worked day and night, flooding the market with depreciated money: until 1700, they were issued from 200 to 500 thousand rubles a year , in 1700 about 2 million rubles were thrown into circulation, and in 1702 - over 4.5 million rubles. The royal treasury from this operation, accompanied by a decrease in the share of silver in the coin, derived a short-term income and the opportunity to fill the gaps in the budget.

Peter supplemented this old method of increasing incomes with two new ones.

On a January day in 1699, in the Yamsky Prikaz, someone found a sealed package planted with the inscription: "bring it to the pious sovereign, Tsar Peter Alekseevich, without opening it."

The author of the letter, as it turned out later, was the butler of Boris Petrovich Sheremetev, Alexei Kurbatov, who accompanied the master on a trip abroad. Kurbatov suggested that the tsar use a new source of income - the sale of stamped paper. Peter took care of the first profit-maker, appointed him a deacon of the Armory Department, rewarded him with villages. This is how it started brilliant career Kurbatov, the future president of the City Hall, and then the Arkhangelsk vice-governor. But no matter what position Kurbatov occupied, he did not leave the service of a profitmaker. "Command me," he turned to the king, "where it is possible to inflict what order arrived in which order or what encroachments in the affairs of the judge, in private to report fearlessly, in which I promise to show my zeal to you, the sovereign, like God himself."

Kurbatov's example was followed by many other inventors of taxes. They were ordered, as a contemporary testified, "to sit and repair the sovereign's profit."

The efforts of profitmakers, however, did not provide significant cash receipts. The income from the minting of money was also soon exhausted, and then Peter resorted to the introduction of an infinite number of taxes for a special purpose: for the purchase of saddles and horses, for the purchase of ammunition and the construction of ships, for carts and provisions, etc., etc.

Without much difficulty, it was possible to solve the second task - to make up for human losses. As needed, a certain number of courtyards of the city and rural population supplied one recruit to the army. This system of manning the army and navy, formalized in the first years of the 18th century, operated flawlessly throughout the Northern War.

Finally, the artillery park was restored in a short time. True, when casting copper cannons, due to a lack of copper, it was necessary to use the bells of churches and monasteries. But there was no shortage of cast-iron cannons - metallurgical plants, urgently erected at the beginning of the century, provided the army with excellent artillery, and Peter would repeatedly have the opportunity to note its high fighting qualities.

Peter met the greatest difficulties in staffing the army officers, and above all because in Russia until the 18th century there were no special educational institutions who trained military specialists. In 1701, Peter established the first such educational institution - the Navigation School, where mathematics, geometry, trigonometry, navigation, and astronomy were studied. According to the tsar, "this school is needed not only for sea traffic, but also for artillery and engineering."

Peter took advantage of the knowledge of the graduates of the Navigation School and other educational institutions created after it, only many years later. Meanwhile, time did not wait, military specialists were needed in this moment. And although the tsar knew that foreign officers did not show themselves near Narva in the best way, the need forced him to turn again to hiring military specialists abroad. In 1702, in the countries of Western Europe, a translated into German Peter's manifesto, inviting foreign officers to serve in Russia.

On December 5, 1700, that is, two weeks after the Narva defeat, the tsar, while in Novgorod, orders Boris Petrovich Sheremetev to “go into the distance, for better harm to the enemy. impossible to capture. What I am writing about: do not make excuses with anything. "

Sheremetyev's first victories over the Swedes

Sheremetev opened a series of victories over the Swedes. So far, he acted cautiously, daring to engage in battles, having only a double or triple superiority in strength, but at first any victories were important, they raised the morale of the army and gradually freed it from its stupor after Narva.

The first significant victory was won at the very beginning of 1702. Sheremetev, at the head of a 17,000-strong corps, attacked the Swedish general Schlippenbach and utterly defeated his 7,000-strong detachment near the village of Erestfer, not far from Derpt. Half of the Swedish troops were killed here. "We can finally beat the Swedes!" - Peter exclaimed, having received Sheremetev's report. The tsar generously rewarded the winners, noting everyone - from the soldier to the commander. Sheremetev Menshikov, on behalf of Peter, took the Order of St. Andrew the First-Called and a notice that he had been awarded the rank of field marshal.

From the autumn of 1702 to the spring of 1703, the main forces of the Russian troops were busy driving the Swedes from the banks of the Neva. Peter also took part in this campaign. Hostilities began with the siege of Noteburg, located on an island at the exit of the Neva from Lake Ladoga. High walls about two sazhens thick, erected near the water, numerous cannons dominating both banks, turned Noteburg into an impregnable fortress. For its siege, Peter concentrated 14 regiments. After a three-day cannonade, the wife of the commandant of the fortress, on behalf of all the officers' wives, sent a drummer to the Russian camp. In the report, this episode is described in a playful tone characteristic of Peter: the wives asked the field marshal "so that they could be released from the fortress, for the sake of great anxiety from fire and smoke and the disastrous state in which they find themselves." To which he, the bombardier captain Pyotr Mikhailov, gallantly replied to the garrison ladies: he does not dare to convey their request to the field marshal, “because he truly knows that his lord field marshal will not deign to grieve them by this separation, but if they deign to leave, they would deign to leave their kind spouses with bring out a lot."

The ladies, however, did not heed the kind advice of the bombarding captain, and the continuous shelling of the fortress continued for about two weeks. Then the buglers sounded the attack, and a 12-hour assault began, according to Peter's recall, cruel and extremely difficult. The feat of the Russian soldiers aroused the surprise of a foreign observer: "it is truly amazing how the Russians could climb such a fortress and take it with the help of siege ladders alone."

Russian troops captured the ancient Russian Oreshok. The tsar punned, using the consonance of the words "nut" - "Nutlet": "It is true that this nut was very cruel, however, thank God, it was happily gnawed. Our artillery miraculously corrected its work." Oreshek - Noteburg Peter renamed Shlisselburg (key city), emphasizing with this name the key position of the city on the Neva, which opened the way to enemy lands.

In mid-March, Peter arrived in Shlisselburg to lead military operations in the 1703 campaign. In April, the tsar informs Sheremetev about the readiness of the troops to start the operation: “and I can’t write anymore, it’s just time, time, time, and so as not to let the enemy forestall us, what we will grieve about later.” It was about an attack on Nyenschantz - a fortress that blocked the mouth of the Neva. After inspecting Nienschanz, Peter shared his impressions with Menshikov: “The city is much larger, as they said; however, it will not be with Schlutelburch. not overlaid, but with a rim (i.e., a circle) larger than Rugodev "(Narva). The Nyenschantz garrison laid down their arms without waiting for the assault. On May 2, Peter wrote to "Prince-Caesar" Romodanovsky in Moscow: "I know to Your Majesty that yesterday the Nyenshan fortress was fired from martyrs for 10 hours (also from cannons, only 10 shots were fired) on the acort." And then the order: "If you please, send this celebration well and that after the conciliar prayer from the cannons in the square, according to custom, it would be fired."

Peter's first naval victory over the Swedes

At Nyenschantz, three days later, the first combat clash with the enemy fleet took place. Two Swedish ships from the Numers squadron, not knowing about the surrender of Nyenschantz, entered the mouth of the Neva. Peter decided to attack them. Under his pen, the operation looked like this: on May 5, "an enemy squadron came to the mouth under the rule of Vice Admiral Mr. Numbers; about which, having learned, our Mr. Field Marshal sent us in thirty trays. And on the 7th day, having come to the mouth, they examined the enemy much, and in a deliberate battle they took 2 frigates, one Gedan with ten, the other Astril with eight guns, and fourteen windows. I even dare to write what is true from eight boats, but in fact it was.

Attacking ships with primitive boats, the crews of which had only guns and grenades, was associated with great risk. It took a lot of courage to take on this venture. Peter did not like to take risks, he preferred to act for sure, and the operation that ended successfully, it seems, was the only one where the king retreated from his rule.

In subsequent years, battles won on such a scale became so accustomed that, although they were celebrated with salutes, they were considered everyday events of military life. This victory led Peter into genuine delight, for she was the first on the water. He called her "the never-before Victoria." It laid the foundation for the glorious fighting traditions of the Russian Navy.

By order of Peter, special searches were even made in the archive - whether something similar had happened in bygone times. Peter hastened to notify his friends of the victory by sending letters. The content of these, as well as many others, letters and communications with a notice of victory reveals the essential feature of Peter. The tsar writes "we", "us", "our troops", "hit the enemy", "got victory", and plural uses by no means in relation to his own person, as monarchs did before and after him. For him, "we" means "Russian troops." At the same time, the author of the letters himself remained in the background, there is not a single line in the text about his actions and orders that determined the outcome of the victorious battle. But the most detailed information about the trophies, captured prisoners, losses of the enemy and the damage suffered by the Russian troops is reported. With this dry list, Peter, as it were, invited his correspondent to evaluate the degree of success that accompanied the Russian troops, and the extent of the catastrophe that befell the enemy.

The plan of attack for the two ships of Numers was drawn up by the king. 30 boats were divided into two groups: one of them cut off the Swedes' access to the sea, and the other attacked from the side upstream Not you. Peter directly participated in the attack, commanding one of the detachments, the actions of the second were led by Menshikov. However, according to Peter's letters, one can only guess that he was not an outside observer of what was happening: "Although we are unworthy, however, from the lords of the field marshal and admiral, the lord lieutenant (i.e. Menshikov) and I were made cavaliers of St. Andrew."

In honor of this event, the king ordered a medal to be knocked out with the following laconic inscription on it: "The impossible happens."

Nor did Peter say a single word about his personal participation in the siege of Noteburg. Only from Sheremetev's travel log do we learn that the tsar, "taking several soldiers with him, came under the city to the banks of the Neva River," was under fierce enemy fire.

Bookmark Peter St. Petersburg

After the capture of Nyenschanets, the entire course of the Neva from the sources, where Shlisselburg stood, to the mouth, was in the hands of the Russians. The tsar had no doubt that the Swedes considered their failures in this theater of war to be temporary and that in the coming months they would make desperate attempts to push the Russians back from the banks of the Neva. Therefore, measures were immediately taken to strengthen the mouth of the river. “After the capture of Kanets (i.e., Nyenschanz), - it is written in the History of the Northern War, - a military advice was sent, whether to fix the trench or find another convenient place (after all, it is small, far from the sea and the place is not much strong from nature ), in which it is supposed to look for a new place, and for several days a convenient place was found for that - an island that was called Lust Elant (that is, the Merry Island), where on the 16th day of May (in the week of Pentecost) the fortress was founded and named St. Petersburg. Thus, the future capital of the empire, Petersburg, arose. Its cradle was a fortress with six bastions hastily built by the forces of soldiers. At the same time, next to the fortress, the first civil building was erected - Peter's house, which has survived to this day.

The builders of the wooden fortress had a chance to experience the hardships of the harsh climate and the vagaries of the Neva. “City affairs are managed properly,” Menshikov, who was appointed governor of St. Petersburg, reported to Peter in July 1703. “Many working people from cities have already come and are constantly being added. walks high."

“Zelo, sir,” General Anikita Ivanovich Repnin wrote a month later, “we have severe weather from the sea, and in our place, where I stand with regiments, water is right up to my camp, and the night in the Preobrazhensky regiment at midnight and taverns of many sleepy people and their junk helped. And the locals say that at the present time it always floods that place. And here is a picture depicted by the tsar himself from life on September 11, 1708: “In my mansions, the top floor was 21 inches, and they freely traveled around the city and on the other side of the street on trays; however, it didn’t last long, less than 3 hours. it was very comforting to see that people were sitting on the roofs and on the trees as if during the flood, not only men, but also women.

All these inconveniences did not bother Peter. In his eyes, the new city was presented as "Paradise", that is, paradise. In the letters of the king there are such phrases: "I cannot but write to you from the local Paradise"; "It is true that we live here in paradise"; "Do not hesitate to doubt the local behavior, for there can be no evil in God's paradise." Even the letter describing the flood, when the water flooded the royal house, and the men and women fled to the trees, is marked: "From Paradise." According to Peter's original plan, Petersburg was supposed to be just a port city: "His Royal Majesty, not far from Schlotburg by the sea, ordered to build a city and a fortress, so that henceforth all the goods that came to Riga, Narva and Shants would have a haven there, also peach and Chinese goods would also come there. However, already in the autumn of 1704, Peter had the idea to turn St. Petersburg into the capital of the country. On September 28, he wrote to Menshikov from the Olonets shipyard: "We will finish tea on the second or third of the next month from here, and, if God wills, we will be in the capital in three days or four." So that the addressee would not doubt what is meant by the "capital", the tsar explained in brackets: "Petersburg".

But before the transformation of a small fortress into the capital and a major economic center of the country was still far away. This will happen many years later, and now, in 1704, it was necessary to defend the returned lands from a strong and treacherous enemy, who had repeatedly tried to break through at the mouth of the Neva. The king takes two urgent measures. First of all, he creates on the island of Kotlin, which is 30 miles from St. Petersburg, the fortress of Kronstadt. The commandant of the fortress had to be guided by the instruction signed by Peter on May 3, 1704: "Contain this citadel, with by God's help, even if it happens, even to the last man. "The tsar often visited the island, observing the construction of fortifications. When it came to an end, he said: "Now Kronstadt is in such a state that the enemy does not dare to appear close to the sea. Otherwise, we will break the ships into chips. We will sleep peacefully in St. Petersburg."

The defense of the territory only by the garrisons of the built fortresses gave the initiative offensive operations to the enemy. To deprive the enemy of this advantage, a fleet was needed. A figurative thought belongs to Peter: "Every potentant (i.e., ruler), who has a single land army, has one hand, and which he also has a fleet, has both hands." Having hooked on the banks of the Neva, Peter immediately set about creating a fleet. Already in 1703, the laying of 43 ships of various types took place at the Olonets shipyard, and the tsar himself, who supervised the construction, returned to St. Petersburg on a frigate with the symbolic name Shtandart. The name of the first ship of the Baltic Fleet was given "in that image, because then the fourth sea was added." Previously, a double-headed eagle was depicted on the royal flag, holding in its beaks and claws maps of the three seas that belonged to Russia. Now the image of the fourth sea appeared on the standard.

At the same time, the tsar founded a shipyard in St. Petersburg itself. The famous Admiralty shipyard, which ensured Russia's naval superiority in the Baltic by the end of the war, began building ships in 1705. The first warship was launched in April 1706.

The decree officially declaring St. Petersburg the capital was not issued. However, it is customary to consider 1713 as the date when the city on the Neva became the capital, when the court, the Senate and the diplomatic corps finally moved to St. Petersburg.

Reasons for the move of Peter 1 from Moscow to St. Petersburg

What guided Peter, transferring the capital from Moscow, geographical center country, which had long-standing economic ties with the periphery, to a new unsettled place on the outskirts of the state?

This decision was partly explained by personal motives - antipathy towards the old capital, manifested at least in the fact that from a young age he preferred Preobrazhenskoye to the Kremlin Palace. With Moscow, Peter associated forces that opposed him personally and against the cause he served: the old capital turned out to be the arena of his struggle for power with Sophia and the stronghold of the Old Testament traditions.

But, of course, it wasn't just that. The new capital was a window to Europe, it symbolized the transformation of Russia into a maritime power, which had the shortest routes for economic and cultural ties with the countries of Western Europe. Petersburg acquired the importance not only of a political center, but also of the most important naval harbor.

Calling Petersburg Paradise, Peter had in mind not so much the present city, built up with unsightly wooden houses and huts, as its future - a comfortable capital with luxurious palaces and parks, straight, stone-lined streets. Peter knew how to look far ahead, knowing that future generations would reap the fruits of his efforts. Once Peter, planting acorns, noticed that one of the nobles present at the same time smiled skeptically. The enraged king said: “I understand! You think I won’t live to see mature oaks. True! But you are a fool; I leave an example for others to do the same, the descendants build ships from them over time. ".

Surveying a small fortress and his modest one-story house with three chambers, cut down from pine logs and covered with shingles, but painted so that it seemed like it was made of brick and with a tiled roof, the king dreamed of a lively city with a harbor no worse than Amsterdam. At the berths there are barns with overseas and Russian goods, the multilingual dialect of foreign merchants who arrived from afar for Russian hemp, flax, mast wood, resin, linen. "If God prolongs life and health, Petersburg will be another Amsterdam," Peter used to say. In the meantime, I had to be content with little. In the autumn of 1703, the masts of a foreign merchant ship appeared on the horizon. To celebrate, the governor of St. Petersburg generously rewarded the entire crew of the ship that brought wine and salt to the new city. So modestly began its life the future capital of the empire - a window to Europe.

Peter, as we see, began the construction of St. Petersburg immediately after mastering Nyenschanets. When this was reported to Charles XII, he arrogantly declared: "Let the king work on the laying of new cities, we only want to reserve the honor of subsequently taking them." But the king was by no means going to give Charles a new city. On the contrary, he intended to multiply his Baltic acquisitions in order to "set a firm foot by the sea." The campaign of 1704 brought two significant victories to the Russian troops, obtained with the most active participation of Peter - the Russians captured Derpt and Narva.

Assault on Dorpat

Field Marshal Sheremetev led the siege of Derpt (Old Russian Yuryev), and for a long time the besiegers acted in vain. Peter found out about this, being near Narva, and immediately rushed to Dorpat. He rode there on July 3, examined the fortress and siege work with the experienced eye of an artilleryman and engineer, and was extremely dissatisfied with what he saw. Sheremetev, who was accompanying the tsar, mumbled something in excuse, but fell silent as soon as he noticed that the inflamed interlocutor threw back his head and his face convulsed - a sign that the tsar's irritability had reached its highest intensity.

Sheremetev fully deserved Peter's dissatisfaction: instead of building aproshi against a dilapidated and weakly fortified wall, which, in the words of the tsar, "is only waiting for a decree where to fall," the field marshal ordered to prepare an assault on the most powerful wall.

The assault on the fortress began on the evening of July 12. "This fiery feast continued from evening even until another day until 9 o'clock." The description of this "fiery feast" is found in Peter. Infantry poured into the three breaches pierced by artillery. On the ravelin, the attackers captured five cannons and immediately turned them against the enemy. The situation of the besieged became hopeless. One after another, four Swedish drummers died, trying to notify the readiness of the besieged to start negotiations - the drum beat was drowned in the roar of battle. Only the trumpeter managed to stop the assault.

Negotiations began. Peter, who for a long time remembered the behavior of the Swedish king near Narva, opposed the treachery of Charles XII with generosity and a chivalrous attitude towards the vanquished. Under the conditions of capitulation, the commandant of the fortress stipulated the right to unhindered exit from the city of the entire garrison with officers, banners, and weapons. He asked the soldiers, officers and their families to be supplied with a monthly supply of food. Peter, on behalf of Sheremetev, reasonably answered the commandant: “Mr. Field Marshal is very surprised that such requests are made from the commandant, when His Majesty’s soldiers are already at their gates, and who are so embittered that they are barely appeased; but when you wanted to make such a chord, then it would be necessary to repair it in advance, "that is, before the start of the assault. But as a sign of high appreciation of the courage of the besieged, Peter nevertheless allowed the officers to leave their swords, and the soldiers a third of their weapons. Soldiers and officers with their families, who were going home, were provided with the requested monthly supply of food, as well as carts for the removal of property.

Hastily celebrating the return of the "forefather city" with three shots of guns and cannons, Peter boarded a yacht, took captured banners and standards, and hurried across Lake Peipsi to Narva. How much the tsar was in a hurry to get there is evidenced by the fact that, contrary to his custom, he sent couriers to his friends about the victory from the battlefield only on July 20, that is, after a three-day stay near Narva.

Success inspired Peter and at the same time led to sad reflections. The assault on Dorpat cost the Russians more than 700 killed and wounded, while the losses of the Swedes amounted to about 2,000 people. And how many Russians would have died in the implementation of Sheremetev's plan, if he, Peter, had not been at hand? There were still few specialists among the Russians who knew their business. I had to resort to the services of foreigners, among whom were conscientious officers, but they are just mercenaries. And the one who led the technical side of the siege work near Derpt turned out to be "a kind man, but very quiet." However, the tsar was irritated most of all by Sheremetev's indiscipline.

The siege of Narva by Russian troops in 1704

Following Derpt, Narva fell. Its siege began in the last days of May, but went sluggishly: there was no siege artillery. The shelling of the fortress began only after cannons and mortars were delivered from near Dorpat and St. Petersburg. The commandant of Narva was the same Horn who commanded the garrison of the fortress in 1700. Much has changed since then in the Russian army, but Gorn, like his master Charles XII, had the same ideas about it. The Narva commandant believed that the same poorly trained and poorly armed Russian army stood at the walls of the fortress, as they had four years ago. When Gorn was offered honorable terms of surrender with the right to withdraw the garrison, he rejected them, mockingly reminding the besiegers of their past sad experience. Thorn's proud and insulting refusal Peter ordered to be read before the army.

For arrogance and arrogance Horn paid twice. The first time the tsar taught the arrogant commandant a subject lesson was back in June. Peter took advantage of Menshikov's advice and equipped several Russian regiments in Swedish uniforms. They moved towards Narva from the side where the besieged expected help from the Swedish general Schlippenbach. At the walls of the fortress, a staged battle unfolded between the "Swedes", commanded by Peter, and the Russian troops. Gorn heard the sounds of artillery and rifle fire, and for a long time he looked at the "battlefield" through a telescope, but did not notice the catch. Visible were the blue uniforms of soldiers and officers, the yellow and white standards of the Swedish army. Confident that the long-awaited "sikurs" approached Narva, Gorn ordered to attack the Russian troops from the rear and thereby help "his own" break through to the fortress. Together with the detachment, the civilian population left the garrison, hoping to profit from all the good things from the Russian convoy.

The military stratagem succeeded. Lured from the fortress, the Swedes were successfully attacked and suffered significant losses. Let us recall the laughter heard in the Swedish camp and in the capitals of European states after the first Narva. Now it's time for fun in the Russian camp. Peter threw a catchphrase:

The highly respected gentlemen of the Swedes put a big nose.

It is in vain this time to look in the tsar's letters for information about his personal participation in this episode. In two surviving letters, Peter writes about what happened so dully that if the historian did not have other sources at his disposal, it would be impossible to decipher their content: to him," wrote Pyotr Tikhon Streshnev. “I don’t know what else to write,” the tsar shared the news with Kikin, “just what happened recently before this, how clever fools were deceived, and, reasoning about this, I can’t figure out more than two things: the first thing that God enlightened, the other, that before their eyes a mountain of pride stood, through which they could not see this forgery.

Commandant Gorn learned another lesson after the successful completion of the 45-minute assault on Narva. Swedish resistance was as desperate as it was senseless. Russian soldiers, enraged by the arrogance of the Swedes and heavy losses, broke into the fortress, did not spare anyone, and Peter, in order to stop the excesses, was forced to draw his sword against his own soldiers. The tsar considered Horn to be the culprit of the bloodshed, who only at the last moment grabbed the drum and beat it with his fists, signaling surrender. But it was too late. Are you not to blame for everything? - Peter asked Gorn. With no hope of help, no means of saving the city, could you not have raised the white flag? Then, drawing a sword stained with blood, Peter said:

"Look, this blood is not Swedish, but Russian. I stabbed mine to keep the frenzy that you brought my soldiers to with your stubbornness." The king in his hearts gave the former commandant a heavy slap in the face.

Laconically, without boasting, Peter informed his friends about the victory. Using the play on words "Narva" - "abscess", he wrote to Kikin: "I can’t write Inova, just now Narva, which for 4 years abscessed, now, thank God, has broken through, which I will tell myself at length."

Russian victory near Narva

Having mastered two "forefather" cities - Derpt (Yuriev) and Narva (Rugodev) within a month, Peter, it seemed, could afford a respite. But he didn't sit still. First, he went from Narva in mid-August to Dorpat, taking with him generals and ministers. This voyage had an educational and instructive character, where the fortress walls, tunnels and aproshi were used as a visual aid. Fulfilling the duties of both a guide and a mentor, the tsar explained in detail to the listeners how the "fiery feast" took place near Derpt. From Derpt, Peter, through Pskov and Novgorod, is on his way to the north, where he was drawn by two urgent matters: at the Olonets shipyard, he had to look after the ships under construction, and in St. Petersburg they were waiting for his orders to build the Paradise. From Petersburg, the tsar rushes to Narva to give a farewell audience to the Turkish ambassador there. Peter deliberately chose Narva as the place of the ceremony: let the Turkish ambassador, having examined the powerful fortress, himself assess the strength of Russian weapons. From Narva, the tsar leaves for Moscow. There he intended to spend a happy year for him in 1704 and celebrate his victories. In Vyshny Volochek, Peter stopped for several days to inspect Tvertsa and Meta, in order to determine the place of their junction. Here the tsar ordered to dig the Vyshnevolotsky canal. On December 14, a solemn entry of the winners into the capital took place. The column of prisoners was led by Major General Gorn, followed by 159 officers. They carried 80 guns. "The people looked with amazement and curiosity at the captured Swedes, at their weapons drawn with contempt, at their triumphant compatriots and began to put up with innovations." These words belong to Pushkin.

Peter had many reasons to see off the year 1704 in an optimistic mood. Only four winters separated the first Narva from the second, but how strikingly they differed from each other! Then the Russian army was able to engage in "infant play", now it has entered the time of youth. Then she was defeated; now she triumphed. What Peter happened to observe was pleasing to the eye, and in his letters of 1704 there are previously unseen assessments of what he saw. "Here we found people in good order," he writes from near Dorpat. From Pskov: "Everything is good and fun with us." From the Olonets shipyard: "here, thank God, everything is pretty good." From Voronezh: "Here they found everything in good order."

News of the "good order" Peter sought to make the property of the population. The most important means of promoting reforms and military successes was the first printed newspaper in Russia, Vedomosti, founded by him at the end of 1702.

In the 17th century, handwritten "chimes" came out in one copy at the royal court, reporting foreign news for the tsar and his entourage. Petrovsky Vedomosti was designed for a wider readership, and the list of issues covered became more diverse. The newspaper printed materials about the construction of industrial enterprises, the search for minerals, military operations, and the most important events in international life.

The first issue of Vedomosti reported: "In the Verkhotursk district from the Novosibirsk iron ore a lot of guns have been poured and a lot of iron has been done. And they didn’t bring such soft and kind from the Swedish land because they don’t have such. And in Moscow, a pood of 12 altyn became imported with imports. "And here is a note about the partisan actions of priest Ivan Okulov in the Olonets region, published on January 2, 1703: "The city of Olonets priest Ivan Okulov, having gathered hunters on foot with a thousand people, went abroad to border and broke the Svei Rugozen, and Sumer, and Kensur outposts. And at those outposts he beat a lot of Swedes, and took the Reiter banner, drums and swords, fuzes and horses enough. And that he, the priest, took supplies and belongings, and with that he pleased his soldiers, and he burned everything that he couldn’t take away. “Moscow schools are multiplying”, that at the Navigation School “more than 300 people study and accept science well”, etc.

The theater also played the role of promoter of change. This was new. In the past, theatrical performances were watched only by courtiers. Now the spectacles were designed for a wide audience. The public theater was established in 1702. Peter instructed him to glorify the victories over the Swedes. Peter's contemporary Ivan Afanasyevich Zhelyabuzhsky wrote about this: "And in Moscow on Red Square, for such joy, the sovereign's wooden mansions and a canopy for a banquet were made; and against those in the choir, various funs were made on the same Red Square."

"Good order" did not escape the observant foreign diplomat either. The English ambassador Whitworth writes a report to London: the Russian tsar "with the power of his own genius, almost without outside help, by 1705 achieved success beyond all expectations, and soon, of course, he will raise his state to a degree of power that is formidable for its neighbors."

The goal for which the war was waged was achieved: access to the sea was won, the fleet was launched. However, no one, including the tsar, imagined that the salute with which Moscow on December 14, 1704 greeted the winners who captured Derpt and Narva would be separated from the salute in honor of the victorious peace for another seventeen years and that the next of them would be the most difficult years of trials. and hopes.