Implementation of the "instant global strike" program in the United States. Should Russia be afraid of a “quick global strike”? Global strike

RAPID GLOBAL IMPACT CONCEPT

GRNTI: 78.21.00.

Belousov Oleg Mikhailovich,

Chernomazov Ilya Stanislavovich,

Perm Military Institute of Troops

National Guard of the Russian Federation

Lecturer at the Department of Tactics and Security Safety.

THE CONCEPT OF PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

BelousovO.M.,

lecturer in tactics and SBP

Chernomazov I.S.,

lecturer in tactics and SBP

Perm military Institute of national guard troops of the Russian Federation.

ANNOTATION:

The article discusses the concept of using a rapid global strike by the US armed forces, countermeasures and deterrence measures.

ABSTRACT:

In the article the question of the concept of the use of prompt global strike by the U.S. armed forces, measures for combating and deterring.

Keywords: rapid global strike, the concept of “non-contact warfare”, anti-missile surveillance system, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) of the Tomahawk type.

Keywords: prompt global strike, the concept of “contactless war,” missile surveillance, naval cruise missiles (slcm) and the air (krwb) - based missiles such as “Tomahawk”

Prompt Global Strike (PGS, also global lightning strike) is an initiative of the US armed forces to develop a system that allows a massive disarming strike with conventional (non-nuclear, English conventional) weapons on any country within 1 hour , analogous to a nuclear strike using intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

According to General James Cartwright, "At this time, unless there is a nuclear attack, it could be days, perhaps weeks" before the military can launch an attack with regular forces. The purpose of the BGU system is to provide the ability to deliver a quick and accurate strike to any region of the world in the event of a conflict or other emergency. The ballistic version could be launched directly from US territory. The BGU system will complement the formations of the Forward Deployment Forces, Expeditionary air force(which can be deployed within 48 hours) and Carrier Strike Groups (AUG, English Carrier battle groups, which can deploy to the theater of operations within 96 hours). The BGU will allow you to attack any area of the planet or near space within 60 minutes.

The United States is capable of implementing the concept of a rapid global strike exclusively to solve local problems.

Since the end of the Cold War, the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons, both by potential adversaries of the United States and by the Americans themselves, has steadily declined. The issue of revising the existing military doctrine was on the agenda. New concept implies the achievement of global military superiority by the United States by expanding the arsenal of its armed forces by creating super-effective non-nuclear weapons capable of delivering lightning strikes against threat sources.

At the end of 2012, information was disseminated in the media about the US military conducting a computer game to practice the skills of launching massive strikes with high-precision conventional weapons on a fictitious country in order to cause unacceptable damage to it and force it to accept political conditions dictated by the United States.

The purpose of these exercises was to develop the concept of the so-called rapid global strike (BGU, Promppet Global Strike), according to which the defeat of the most important military, political and economic objects enemy using existing and future models of high-precision weapons. It is assumed that as a result of such actions, the victim country will lose the opportunity to strike back at the aggressor, and the destruction of key objects of its economy will lead to the collapse of the entire state system.

The published materials indicated: the goal set within the framework of this war game was achieved. Analysis of the exercises showed that as a result of a strike on a fairly large and highly developed country with the consumption of 3,500–4,000 units of conventional high-precision weapons within six hours, it would suffer unacceptable destruction of its entire infrastructure and would lose the ability to resist.

It is quite obvious that this “leak” of information is not accidental and unauthorized. The Pentagon very clearly shows the world that the United States is getting high-quality the new kind strategic weapons, which make it possible to solve tasks previously assigned exclusively to nuclear forces.

In fact, the Americans are making an attempt to implement the concept of “non-contact war.” At a qualitatively new technical level, they are striving to do what they failed to accomplish in the 20th century: to achieve political goals in a major military conflict only with air strikes.

Is it possible to “bomb” the enemy? In 1993, an experimental launch of a Trident-2 ballistic missile with conventional warheads was carried out from the US Ohio-class nuclear missile submarine in order to test the possibility of hitting highly engineered point targets. However further work efforts in this direction have not been carried out intensively enough.

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, intensified this activity, and by January 2003, the Global Prompt Strike Project was approved by President George W. Bush. After a detailed study of this idea in the US Department of Defense and scientific institutions, it was recognized as technically feasible, which allowed Congress to approve the BSU concept in 2007.

In accordance with this doctrine, in the event of a threat of attack on the United States or American installations and citizens abroad, the US armed forces must be able to launch a high-power and precision strike anywhere in the world within 60 minutes to neutralize such attacks.

The Prompt Global Strike Force will become part of the US strategic triad and will operate in close coordination with other branches of the armed forces.

The BGU concept involves the creation of a full-fledged combat system, including, in addition to the strike components itself, reconnaissance and surveillance subsystems, command posts and communications, as well as electronic suppression equipment.

The basis of the strike weapons of this doctrine will be land- and sea-based ballistic missiles with non-nuclear equipment and hypersonic missiles long-range, launched from air carriers. In the long term, it is planned to use space platforms to carry out strikes.

Ballistic missiles equipped with conventional warheads are today the weapons that best meet the requirements for strike components of a BSU. They provide high accuracy of destruction (circular probable deviation - 100–150 meters), short delivery time of ammunition (no more than 30–40 minutes). Significant movement speed upon contact with an object allows you to destroy targets various types, including those buried in the ground. The large throw weight (up to 3.5 tons) makes it possible to use various types of warheads, including cluster ones, as well as special unmanned aerial vehicles.

At the same time, there are a number of conditions that make the use of conventional ballistic missiles very problematic.

Firstly, the anti-missile surveillance system of Russia, and in the near future also of China, can classify a group launch of such missiles (at least two or three are needed to reliably destroy an individual object) as a nuclear attack, which will lead to an adequate retaliatory strike.

Secondly, the START treaties limit total number deployed ballistic missiles and do not differentiate between their equipment. That is, land- and sea-based missiles with conventional warheads can appear in the United States only after a corresponding reduction in existing nuclear ones.

The United States proposes to resolve the first of these problems in relation to ground-based missiles through their separate deployment. However, as tensions increase, this factor may not work - Russia is quite capable of assuming that the United States has placed nuclear missiles in silos for non-nuclear missiles. The second obstacle can be eliminated by signing the appropriate agreements. It’s not in vain, apparently, that the Donald Trump administration is once again raising the topic of “nuclear zero.”

Taking into account these limitations, the number of sea- and land-based non-nuclear ballistic missiles that the US armed forces are able to put on combat duty in the medium term is in the range of 100–150 units.

The most important strike element of the BGU is the Kh-51A hypersonic missile being created with a flight speed of 6500–7500 kilometers per hour. However, four of her tests did not give a positive result. And although the development program is not closed, the appearance of such a missile can be expected only in five to ten years, and adoption and delivery to the troops only in the distant future.

Thus, in the medium and even long term, the US Army will not receive any fundamentally new weapon systems in sufficient quantities to achieve an operationally significant effect within the framework of the BSU concept.

In the future, it is possible that fundamentally new weapons of destruction will emerge, such as air- or even space-based hypersonic missiles, which will bring the Americans to a level of qualitative superiority in aerospace weapons relative to other states.

But this situation is unlikely to persist for quite a long time, since both in Russia and in China, which demonstrates exceptionally high rates of development in the military-technical sphere, such developments are also underway. Albeit with a lag, such models will be put into service, which will neutralize the American military-technical gap in this area.

In this regard, the United States, within the framework of the BGU concept, at least in the medium term, can rely mainly on sea-based (SLCM) and air-launched (ALCM) cruise missiles of the Tomahawk type, strategic, tactical and carrier-based aircraft.

The SLCMs in service with the American Navy, having a launch range of 1600–2400 kilometers, ensure that a target is hit with a warhead of 340–450 kilograms with an accuracy of five to ten meters.

These missiles can be used from all modern US ships and submarines. The 23 Los Angeles-class attack submarines can carry 12 SLCMs. The new American multi-purpose submarines of the Seawolf (three units) and Virginia (nine units) types each carry the same number of similar missiles. Under the program for converting Ohio-class missile submarines into Tomahawk carriers, four units were converted, each capable of carrying 154 SLCMs. All 62 of the newest American Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have vertical launchers(VPU) Mk.41 with 96 cells. In the strike version they accept up to 56 SLCMs, in the multi-purpose version - eight. Each of the 22 Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers, having 122 VPU cells, carries 26 SLCMs in a typical load. In total, up to 4,000 SLCMs could potentially be deployed on US Navy ships and up to 1,000 SLCMs on submarines.

However, in reality, given the degree of operational readiness, the US Navy is able to use no more than 3,000 SLCMs from ships and submarines.

In addition, American strategic bombers are equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Currently, the US Air Force has about 150 such aircraft in service, including about 60 B-52N, 50 B-1B and 16 B-2A. There are about 80 more aircraft in storage. Of these, carriers cruise missiles air-based aircraft are the B-52N aircraft, capable of carrying up to 20 ALCMs at maximum load. In total, the US strategic aviation group can use about 1,200 ALCMs per flight. In total, all cruise missile carriers are capable of using up to 4,200 missiles in one strike.

In addition to missiles, the first strike may involve up to 2,500–3,000 tactical and carrier-based aircraft, which can strike targets at a depth of up to 600 kilometers from the border.

These are quite impressive forces and, in the absence of effective counteraction, they are capable of destroying or disabling up to 1,000 important objects on Russian or Chinese territory in the first strike. As a result of such a strike, 80–90 percent of Russia’s nuclear potential or up to 90 percent or more of China could be destroyed, the system of state and military command and control could be partially disorganized, and the air defense system could be suppressed or weakened in certain operationally important areas.

But if we take into account some factors that will operate in a real situation, then the possibility of applying BGU becomes doubtful.

Firstly, the United States can make this decision regarding Russia or China only if relations between states sharply worsen.

Secondly, such a strike must be preceded by a sufficiently long period of threat, when the American leadership will be forced to conduct a serious information campaign to justify the upcoming aggression. At this time, the United States and its allies need to carry out the strategic deployment of their air force and naval groups to combat areas, create the necessary material reserves, build up military infrastructure in areas of upcoming combat operations, and conduct reconnaissance of targets for planned attacks. This is a very long time (probably several months), which is quite enough to accept responses, very effective measures. For example, as the experience of Iraq in 1991 and subsequent conflicts showed, due to high-quality operational camouflage measures, it is possible to direct a significant part of the enemy’s strike forces to false targets. Moreover, if the United States uses the main stock of its long-range cruise missiles in the first strike, there may not be enough of them left for subsequent strikes. And then the success of the operation will be in question.

Thirdly, the duration of this strike will last several hours (according to the experience of the mentioned computer exercises, up to four to six). And within one or two hours, when the scale of aggression becomes obvious to the leadership of Russia or China (even if operational surprise is achieved), a decision may be made to retaliate with a nuclear strike. At the same time, most of the strategic nuclear weapons will still remain. That is, for the United States, the high risk of such a conflict escalating from a conventional one to a nuclear one is absolutely obvious. Moreover, the enemy may be the first to decide to use strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Americans are unlikely to provoke such an attack on their territory without guarantees of its reliable repulsion.

And fourthly. Global strike will not be “fast”, since its preparation will take a lot of time - several months. That is, in fact, it will no longer be able to become a specific form of using air attack means - BGU. This will be a conventional first missile and air strike carried out as part of an initial air offensive operation.

Attacking Russia or China with limited air attack capabilities makes no political or strategic sense.

If we consider others as the object of such a strike large countries, for example, Iran, then its application makes sense only if it becomes part of a sufficiently large-scale military operation with the participation of other types of armed forces. That is, if this is the first missile and air strike of the initial air offensive operation.

A completely different picture emerges if we consider striking individual particularly important targets to achieve a local goal using a relatively limited range of weapons.

In this case, there is no need for lengthy preparation. An attack can be carried out by combat-ready forces immediately upon receipt of an order.

Such actions will be sudden not only operationally or strategically, but also tactically. The flight to a target of a limited number of cruise missiles or aircraft can be carried out at low and extremely low altitudes outside the observation zone of ground-based air control systems, with a minimum duration of the strike, when the enemy will reveal the fact of its delivery after the attack is completed.

Therefore, it can be argued that in the current state of affairs and in the medium term, the BSU concept makes sense for solving problems of an exclusively local nature against objects on the territory of states that are not able to respond to the aggressor and do not have security guarantees from third, sufficiently powerful states.

The speed, surprise and global impact (up to 60 minutes in accordance with the concept) can only be achieved if US Navy and Air Force groups are present in all vital areas. This means that to solve suddenly emerging problems, the Americans will be able to use very limited forces: several dozen long-range cruise missiles and tactical (car-based) aircraft. When creating conditions for the use of ballistic missiles in conventional equipment, it is possible to use a certain number of them.

These forces are capable of disabling or destroying, depending on the task at hand, one or two large enterprises, or two or three military or government controlled, or one or two area field research facilities or militant training camps.

That is, in the short and medium term, a quick global strike can be delivered solely for the purpose of solving local problems. For example, to eliminate certain politicians or destruction of the leadership of any organizations (declared terrorist), depriving individual states of the opportunity to implement development programs that the United States considers threatening their security, suspension of individual countries some areas of research activity that are dangerous for Americans and their allies.

In any case, the concept of BSU itself is a gross violation international law, since it involves striking targets of sovereign states without valid legal grounds and a formal declaration of war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Materials for the analysis of the Prompet Global Strike 2016 exercises.

For all “well-wishers” of Russia who are concerned about the country’s nuclear weapons, there are two pieces of news. One is good, the other is not so good. Good news: in 2018, the R-36M Voevoda intercontinental ballistic missile (or Satan according to NATO classification) is still planned to be removed from service.

The bad news: the “Satan” will be replaced by a technologically different and fundamentally different intercontinental ballistic missile RS-28 “Sarmat”, combat units which, in essence, will make any missile defense system meaningless.

About the departing and the coming

At one time, the Tsar Rocket R-36M caused a lot of noise. Experts admit that even though modern means of aerial interception of targets such as ICBMs are developing by leaps and bounds, what is contained in a two-hundred-ton missile is still sufficient to this day. However, the missile defense system, which is rapidly being built up by our good Western “friends,” makes us think about when the capabilities of “Satan” will be exhausted, because, as we know, eternity does not exist in this world.

In this sense, “Sarmat” is not just a successor missile to the “Voevoda”, but to some extent will determine in which direction the means will develop nuclear deterrence worldwide. By and large, with the start of work on the Sarmat ICBM, several tasks are being solved at once, including combat unit the rocket, or rather its mass, is not decisive.

Contrary to the approach of the developers of the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and Academician Yangel personally, who created a rocket capable of wiping out areas the size of Texas from the face of the earth, the creation of the RS-28 requires, first of all, to master higher speed indicators, thanks to which it will be possible to overcome any existing (and being developed in replacement) of any country's missile defense system.

4202

It is most correct in stories about “products” to start with the carriers of warheads. There are enough significant differences between the Sarmat and the Voevoda, and first of all this is the launch weight of the rocket. According to various estimates, a liquid-propelled intercontinental ballistic missile ready for operation will have a mass of 110 tons instead of the Voyevoda’s slightly more than 200 tons. However, what is interesting is not only and not so much the design of the rocket that launches the warheads into the separation area, but rather the capabilities of the warheads themselves and their purpose.

Experts note that trends in improving nuclear deterrent forces (or in the case of particularly democratic countries, nuclear as well as non-nuclear attack) will lead to the fact that the program, once called PGS, or Promt Global Strike (global lightning strike), has a high chance of life as part of the Strategic Missile Forces of the Russian Federation. Despite the fact that “product 4202” is a closely guarded secret, experts still undertake to speculate on how exactly hypersound can be used in the design of warheads of a new ICBM.

Controlled hypersound is even conceptually a very difficult task, not to mention bringing a finished hypersonic product to a test launch. There are plenty of features associated with the use of hypersonic warheads as ready-to-use weapons. The fact is that the warheads of modern, that is, intercontinental ballistic missiles currently on combat duty, usually “fall” from orbit at speeds close to hypersonic – about seven kilometers per second. At this speed, for example, the ISS moves in Earth’s orbit.

When entering the atmosphere, the speed of the warhead is reduced to approximately three times the speed of sound and is subjected to serious heating - up to one and a half thousand degrees. With the help of special thermal protection and speed reduction, the warheads can maneuver: each warhead is turned into a small missile with its own fuel supply, high-performance engine and guidance system. In the case of “product 4202,” experts talk about maneuvering warheads at speeds of six to ten thousand kilometers per hour. Ten speeds of sound.

In order to aim at a target and perform energetic maneuvers at such speeds, the usual controls are no longer suitable.

“If in space special maneuvering engines are responsible for maneuvers, then in the atmospheric part of the flight the control rudders are usually responsible for this. But the catch is that at speeds of 10 Mach such means simply will not work: imagine the effort that must be applied to change the trajectory of the warhead at ten thousand kilometers per hour, even with the help of hydraulics,” explains a military observer in an interview with Zvezda and weapons expert Alexey Leonkov.

Another important task is the control of the warhead: it will not be possible to control a “blank” flying remotely at a speed of 10M, which means that each warhead will probably be equipped with a control computer. Experts note that “pitch” and “yaw” on hypersonic units will most likely be carried out using special pulse engines. But even here it will not be without difficulties: the warhead’s dashing maneuvers with minimal loss of speed reveal several more problems related not so much to anti-missile system probable enemy, as with the ordinary laws of physics.

“We have to solve the issue of crazy overloads and kinetic heating. And if the issue with heating can be solved, let it be by using passive funds, in the case of overload, everything is a little more complicated: here it is required that the warhead be enclosed in a compound and be a monolith that is not affected by overloads in any direction,” explains the head of the department of scientific and technical information at TsAGI in an interview with Zvezda. . N. E. Zhukovsky Ivan Kudishin.

Combat use

Improved energy characteristics, which make it possible to equip the Sarmat with additional means of overcoming the American missile defense system, as experts note, are achieved precisely through hypersound. In early May, the Izvestia newspaper, citing foreign media, reported that Russia had tested hypersonic warheads for the newest Sarmat missile.

Defense Ministry specialists do not comment on media statements, however, based on publicly available information, we can conclude that work on hypersonic “products” for ICBM warheads is indeed underway and is at the finish line. Experts admit that the problems of the American PGS program, or global lightning strike, are mainly related to the fact that the American HTV GLA will not have a hypersonic flight speed and will switch to a “supersonic” flight mode at the final stage, becoming a target for air defense systems.

In turn, Russian specialists are working on the issue of the so-called permanent hypersonic regime, in which the warhead will maintain high speed even during vigorous maneuvers. If Russian science and engineering were able to solve this issue, then the information that over the past ten years up to six launches of “product 4202” using intercontinental ballistic missiles could have been carried out does not at all look like science fiction.

Considering that the concept of a global lightning strike could be rewritten for the sake of the national security of the Russian Federation, the use of several highly maneuverable hypersonic warheads with a nuclear warhead (or conventional, increased power) in the new Sarmat liquid-propellant missile is guaranteed to neutralize the entire potential of the American missile defense system.

Experts explain that the situation in the Russian economy is similar to the 90s, when work on promising directions, including hypersound, “were abandoned” does not prove at all that similar weapons impossible to create, test and put into service. This means that the secret of a global lightning strike has already been revealed by Russian specialists.

Despite the fact that experts in the field of weapons, and people not involved in the creation of the RS-28 missile and warheads for it, do not know and will never know everyone technical features missiles, the fact remains: the adoption of the Sarmat with hypersonic maneuvering warheads is planned for 2018.

This term refers to a special strategy that allows you to capture any country in just 1 hour. Such a lightning-fast global strike has much in common with a nuclear strike by intercontinental ballistic missiles A-9/A-10 ICBMs and their newer versions. The only difference is that when new technology in waging war, nuclear weapons will not be used, capable of destroying all life not only in the conquered country, but also on the planet in general.

BGU is planned to be carried out using other weapons:

Non-nuclear SLBM ballistic missiles;
- cruise missiles of the Boeing X-51 system, etc.

The Navy can launch all of these weapons from both land- and sea-based platforms, and directly from space. In the latter case, the United States has special space platforms at orbital, near-Earth stations. WITH missile strikes From space, the Thor project is most often associated. It precisely involves firing at ground targets from Earth orbit. For a country that will become the target of a BSU, this will be a real shock. After an hour-long massive attack, all she can do is surrender to the mercy of the winner.

In addition to the described weapons, the BGU also includes technologies such as the Rapid Deployment System (in 48 hours) and the use of aircraft carrier strike groups. All this is combined and allows you to conquer any state within an hour. According to the US, the BGU was created as a system to deter countries that are going to start a nuclear war. A quick global strike could be directed against a power that has nuclear weapons in its arsenal and demonstrates aggressive intentions.

It's important to remember that not all weapons are launched from space. There is also one that requires land (or sea) launch pads. Due to NATO's recent high activity in Eastern Europe It becomes clear that it is Russia that causes very specific concerns in the United States. US Secretary of Defense R. Gates openly stated back in 2010 that the BSU technology was fully developed and the Pentagon was ready to press the button at any minute.

Mk41 launchers can be used both to launch Standard anti-aircraft guided missiles and to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Russian military-political leadership and many military experts have recently expressed great concern about the American concept. Its essence is that the United States is striving to gain the ability to launch a non-nuclear strike on any point on Earth using hypersonic aircraft within half an hour.

In particular, such a strike could theoretically be delivered against Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF). That is, the United States will disarm Russia without arranging nuclear disaster, while the nuclear arsenal of the United States itself will remain intact. If a small number of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs survive, they can easily be destroyed by the American missile defense system.

Success must be complete

The author of this article in 2008–2011 repeatedly wrote about the threat of disarmament nuclear strike from the US side regarding our strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, it was said that such a strike would be delivered with the help of Tomahawk SLCMs and ALCMs, as well as with the help of B-2 bombers built using stealth technology.

The fact is that a disarming strike cannot be partially successful. It is impossible to destroy, for example, 20% of Russian strategic nuclear forces, evaluate the results of the strike, and then launch a new strike a few days later, since the surviving 80% of strategic nuclear forces will immediately (within an hour at most) after the first American strike go to the United States “under their own power,” after which a mutual reaction will occur. guaranteed destruction of the USA and Russia, and at the same time, apparently, the entire human civilization.

Therefore, there can be only one disarming strike, ensuring the destruction of 100% of Russian strategic nuclear forces, and almost simultaneously. And this is only possible if the strike is completely unexpected, that is, Russia should learn about the very fact of the strike at the moment when the first American missiles begin to hit Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarines. strategic missile carriers(RPK SN) and strategic bombers.

Such surprise can only be ensured by those aerospace attack weapons (ASCA) that are extremely difficult to detect, namely SLCMs, ALCMs and B-2s. Their common drawback is their subsonic flight speed, which is why, for example, the Tomahawk takes two hours to fly to its maximum range. And the discovery of even one cruise missile or one bomber immediately destroys surprise. But in the context of a sharp reduction in the number of Russian ICBMs and RPK SN and a very significant weakening of the air defense group, the strike became real, at least with the trends that emerged 10 years ago.

Now, however, the situation has changed significantly. The number of ICBMs and SLBMs in Russia generally remains stable, as well as, on the other hand, the number of SLCMs, ALCMs and B-2s that the US Navy and Air Force can actually use. But the Russian air defense group has greatly strengthened due to the adoption of new radars of several types for the radio technical troops (RTV), anti-aircraft missile systems (AAMS) for the anti-aircraft missile forces (ZRV), fighters and Su-30SM/M2, modernization of interceptors in aviation , as well as by strengthening the missile attack warning system (MAWS) by putting it into operation. Under these conditions, for the United States, a disarming strike using cruise missiles and B-2s is beyond the realm of possibility. And a “quick global strike” can in no way be a substitute for this option.

Anti-aircraft missile systems The S-400 and other modern air defense and missile defense systems are capable of thwarting any “global strike.”

The very hypersonic aircraft that should provide this blow are simply not yet available (at least in mass production and in service). But even when (and if) they appear, they will be carried by traditional ICBMs and SLBMs, or (for the X-51 missile) B-52 bombers. That is, in order to launch a “quick global strike,” the Americans will first have to remove nuclear warheads from ICBMs and SLBMs and install hypersonic vehicles instead (this in itself cannot be done quickly and quietly). And then we need to carry out a massive launch of these ICBMs and SLBMs across Russia. Despite the fact that all of our early warning systems (both the new Voronezhs and the old Daryals, as well as satellites in geostationary orbit) are “tailored” to detect this massive launch. Therefore, its surprise is absolutely excluded. In Russia, this will, of course, be perceived as a nuclear strike, after which a command will be issued to use all Russian strategic nuclear forces against the United States.

The result will no longer be mutually assured destruction, but unilateral suicide by the United States. After all, in this case they will launch a non-nuclear strike, and Russia will respond with a nuclear one. Even if the Americans manage to destroy some of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, the majority of ICBMs and SLBMs are guaranteed to reach the United States, after which this country is equally guaranteed to cease to exist. Neighboring Canada and Mexico will be hit very hard. The rest of civilization, including Russia, will have a hard time, but it will not perish. Moreover, the United States will not have any “spare” ICBMs and SLBMs, and even if they did, there would be no one and nowhere to install them. Accordingly, the Russian “fear” of a “quick global strike” apparently belongs to the realm of propaganda.

They take it out of fear

The same can be said about the American missile defense system. They have been intimidating us with it for almost a decade and a half, but the United States has never created anything real; America is even further from a full-fledged missile defense system than it was from a “prompt global strike.” The only real missile defense component is a naval system with several modifications of the Standard missile defense system, but they are not designed to defeat ICBMs and SLBMs. In particular, the missile defense system with ship-based UVP Mk41, which has already been installed in Romania and will be installed in Poland, theoretically cannot create any problems even for the most western missile divisions of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, since no one has yet managed to abolish the laws of physics.

The only Russian claim to the American missile defense system in Europe, which could be considered rational, is that instead of the Standards, the Mk41 UVP could theoretically be installed with Tomahawks, for which in this case the flight time to targets in Russia would be sharply reduced . But this threat today is actually fictitious. The ground version of the Mk41 has only 24 cells. It's simply too little. In addition, from the Mk41, which has not yet been installed in Poland, Tomahawks will have to launch “under the nose” of the Russian air defense group in Kaliningrad region, including one of the Voronezh-type radars. Therefore, surprise becomes impossible, and the destruction of detected Tomahawks is not a problem. It is too far from Romania to any Russian strategic nuclear forces facilities, and besides, the missiles would have to fly past Crimea, which is already saturated with various air defense systems.

US officials, both political and military, have repeatedly stated that both "prompt global strike" and missile defense are intended against terrorist groups that could gain access to ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction, or against countries with large but archaic organizationally and technically by armies (such as Iran or North Korea). It is difficult to believe in these statements due to, to put it mildly, the dubiousness of such “threats” and the obvious inadequacy of such a response to them. This is partly why so many conspiracy theories appear in Russia about how all this is directed against us.

Nevertheless, based on the practical actions of the United States, one has to admit that Washington was indeed guided by such a strange set of threats (at least, this was the case until 2014). Russia in the United States, apparently, was considered completely paralyzed in the political and economic spheres, and the RF Armed Forces were doomed to degradation to the level of Iran and the DPRK, if not lower. Therefore, no one in the Pentagon was actually preparing to fight it.

Mercenaries failed the Pentagon

The author of this article strongly disagrees with the widespread opinion that “Americans do not know how to fight.” The American army has always been one of the best in the world, it could fight and win wars of any complexity and intensity. But in the last two or three decades, the transition to the mercenary principle of manning and the focus on war with a deliberately “underestimated” enemy has in fact noticeably disfigured the US Armed Forces. They believed in the concept of “high-tech non-contact warfare,” in which the enemy would allow himself to be beaten without complaint and with impunity. And they began to lose the ability to wage a real war.

Directed against someone unknown, and at the same time very expensive, “quick global strike” and Aegis-based missile defense are still far from worst options. For example, as part of the creation of this very missile defense system, for almost 10 years the US Air Force tested YAL-1, a laser on a Boeing 747 aircraft designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in the active part of the trajectory. This concept turned out to be the height of absurdity from both the technical and tactical sides. Since there are more smart people in the United States than is commonly thought in Russia, they nevertheless realized this absurdity. In 2014, the laser plane was scrapped, having managed to absorb at least 5 billion Pentagon dollars.

Things almost immediately did not work out for the American military with the flying “laser gunboat” YAL-1.

Ten times more money“ate” the program for the construction of several types of MRAP (mine resistant ambush protected) armored vehicles. These mine-protected vehicles were intended for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, almost 30 thousand of them were produced. Since the deployment of MRAPs in both theaters began in 2007, when the peak of both wars had been passed, the United States lost quite a few of these vehicles (the loss was officially recognized as 77 units). At the same time, Americans are now rapidly getting rid of MRAPs, distributing them to everyone left and right, most often for free. It became clear that even for a very limited classical war these machines were completely unsuitable.

In the current wars in the Middle East, the armed forces of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kurdish forces have already lost more than 300 American-made MRAPs. In the same wars, the same armies lost half as many American M-113 armored personnel carriers, with almost the same number of them in the troops. The M-113 was created half a century (!) earlier than MRAPs, and even the Americans themselves do not consider it a masterpiece. But it was created for classical warfare, so it turned out to be much more stable than newfangled crafts.

However, the main combat vehicle of the US ground forces is not any of the MRAPs and not the M-113, but. The brigades of the same name are equipped with these same vehicles, which the American command still considers a very successful compromise between the mobility of light (airborne and air assault) formations and the combat power of heavy (tank and mechanized) formations. At the same time, however, the Stryker is an ordinary armored personnel carrier (created on the basis of the Swiss Pirana). It is, of course, better than MRAs and M-113s, but this vehicle can be shot into the side even from a heavy machine gun.

Stryker armored personnel carrier

The Stryker brigade does not have any heavier armored vehicles. And if on the battlefield such a brigade meets, for example, a tank brigade of the Korean People's Army, equipped with ancient T-62s, the North Koreans, to use football slang, will “take out the Americans.” Moreover, the Stryker brigade does not have any air defense of its own at all. As a result, it is unclear which enemy it is designed for? Approximately 90 Strykers were lost in Iraq and Afghanistan, although the enemy had no tanks, artillery, or aircraft. In 2014, it was on Strykers that the Americans staged a clown show in Eastern Europe, feigning their readiness to “repel Russian aggression.” Unfortunately, our propaganda responded to this ridicule with ritual shameful hysteria in the spirit of “NATO troops are approaching Russian borders.”

Miscalculations in air defense and naval forces

However, one should not be surprised by the lack of air defense in the Stryker brigades, this is a problem American army generally.

Can you imagine that the Russian ground air defense is armed only with the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems and the Igla MANPADS? And there is nothing in between - “Bukov”, “Torov”, “Tunguska”, “Shell”, there is not even “Osa” and “Strela-10”. This assumption is so stupid it's not even funny. Meanwhile, American ground-based air defense is designed exactly this way. It has Patriot and THAAD air defense systems (in much smaller quantities than we have S-300 and S-400), as well as Stinger MANPADS (either in the original portable version, or on a Hummer chassis called " Avenger"). There is nothing else, and nothing else is planned.

Moreover, TNAAD can only solve missile defense problems (shoot down operational-tactical missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles); it is not even theoretically capable of combating aerodynamic targets. And the Patriots remained almost exclusively in the PAC3 version, also focused on missile defense.

The “anti-aircraft” versions of PAC1 and PAC2 were mainly converted into PAC3 or sold abroad. As a result, to combat airplanes and helicopters, in fact, only “Stingers” remain with a reach of about 8 km in range and about 4 km in altitude. That is, the American command does not consider the possibility that troops could come under attack from enemy aircraft. Or he believes that American fighters will certainly cope with this aircraft. Only after all, fighters, unlike ground-based air defense, depend on weather conditions, on the availability of airfields and fuel and lubricants on them. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that enemy fighters will be no worse than American fighters in quality and there will be no less in quantity. But, apparently, the Pentagon has long ruled out this option. Which is not very reasonable, to say the least.

Trimaran "Independence"

The orientation towards war, it is unclear with whom, even affected the US Navy, which received (littoral combat ship, coastal action ship). As expected, a competition was organized for the best version of such a ship, to which the traditionally built Freedom and the futuristic trimaran Independence were put up. Friendship won this competition (that is, lobbyists from the military-industrial complex), both ships were accepted into service (previously it was believed that this was possible only in the USSR). However, the choice was actually very difficult: both Freedom and Independence have very weak weapons at a very high price.

As with the “prompt global strike” or “Stryker” cases described above, it is completely unclear what purposes these ships are intended for and against whom they are supposed to fight. More or less, they are suitable for the role of patrol ships, but “normal” patrol ships, built mainly in Europe, are not even several times cheaper, but orders of magnitude cheaper than both LCS options.

It is necessary to study foreign experience

In this article there is no need to look for schadenfreude or, especially, mischief. The US Armed Forces remain a powerful military machine; if there is an understanding of the situation and political will, they may well “bounce back to normal.” In this they are radically different from European armies, which have turned into soap bubbles, and this process has become irreversible. The point is completely different.

For the normal development of any sphere, the most thorough study of foreign experience, both positive and negative, is necessary. For the military sphere, this is doubly important, because the country’s armed forces exist to counter external threats, primarily foreign armed forces. Accordingly, the development of foreign armed forces provides the most important food for thought when organizing military development in the Russian Federation.

As surprising as it may sound, the Russian Armed Forces are now close to ideal. They ceased to be an army of the “Soviet-Asian type”, crushing the enemy with their mass, regardless of losses, but did not turn into soap bubble European type, which is an army only in name. And it is extremely important, having gone from one extreme, not to go to the other (and Russia, unfortunately, is very fond of extremes).

Until recently, the Israeli Armed Forces certainly had a similar ideal. When extremely reverent attitude to the life of every soldier, the IDF was capable of waging an arbitrarily brutal contact ground war, including against a numerically superior enemy. But the Israelis also became too carried away by the American “high-tech non-contact” concepts, which is why the Israeli army began to noticeably deteriorate. Evidence of this was the formally won, but in fact extremely unsuccessful war in Lebanon against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006.

In Russia, many people sincerely hate America, especially since this hatred is constantly fueled by official propaganda. At the same time, for the majority of Russians, including many haters and propagandists, America remains an absolute ideal that must be copied completely and in all aspects, including mistakes and outright stupidity.

I remember a story that took place in the late 40s, when in the USSR, under the name Tu-4, they copied the American “Superfortress” B-29, which flew to the Far East in 1944 after the bombing of Japan. Tupolev, whom Stalin ordered to supervise the copying, said he could make the plane better. To which Stalin responded with an epoch-making phrase: “It’s better not to. Make one like this." As a result, even an ashtray and a nest for a Coca-Cola bottle in the instrument panel were copied (although Soviet pilots were forbidden to smoke in flight, and they had no idea about Coca-Cola in the country), as well as a random hole (apparently from a Japanese bullet) in wing

Unfortunately, there is a danger that the leadership of our Armed Forces may also believe in a “high-tech non-contact war” against some meek, wordless enemy, that “the war is completely different now,” that “there will never be tank battles again,” etc. . and so on. Despite the fact that our budget is much smaller than the American one, we cannot afford the luxury of throwing away billions on useless crafts such as MPAP armored vehicles and LCS ships.

It is necessary to clearly and clearly understand that the fight against terrorism is not only not the only one, but also very far from the main task Sun. The army and navy must prepare organizationally, technologically and psychologically, first of all, for full-scale wars with the two strongest potential adversaries - the US Armed Forces and the updated PLA. The more prepared we are for these wars, the less likely it is that we will ever have to fight them.

/Alexander Khramchikhin, Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, nvo.ng.ru/

The S-400 complexes are capable of creating a reliable “security umbrella” for domestic nuclear forces. Photo by Reuters

The correct answer to the question posed in the title of the article is of decisive importance for the very existence Russian state. Currently, the main military task of the United States is the destruction of the Russian nuclear missile potential, which prevents Washington from becoming a world hegemon and disposing of the world's resources (human, material, natural, etc.) at its discretion. The elimination of Russian strategic nuclear forces (SNF) will allow the United States to solve all its main problems, including paying off the huge US public debt, which has reached almost $20 billion, with war.

As a result, there will be a real opportunity to fulfill the long-standing dream of the West about the “golden billion”, which will live on Earth forever in harmony with nature, while the remaining 6 billion inhabitants of the Earth become redundant, and the hegemon will control their fate at his own discretion. Thus, for the United States, the elimination of Russian strategic nuclear forces is a pressing task. In order to implement it, they are ready to violate both international agreements and many moral prohibitions, and commit any atrocities against Russia, Europe and all humanity.

In the current situation, how can we protect Russia from such an aggressor as the United States? Experts express different points of view on this issue.

The main watershed is the assessment of the likelihood of implementing a rapid global strike (GSU) against Russia. Let us consider the differences in attitude towards the problem of BSU using the example of two articles published in the weekly magazine “Nezavisimoe” military review"this year: Alexander Kalyadin “Strategy of quick global deception” (No. 18, 2017) and Leonid Orlenko “How to protect yourself from a quick global strike” (No. 9, 2017).

THE CONCLUSIONS ARE WRONG

Alexander Kalyadin believes that a quick global strike is a myth, the main purpose of which is to serve as a “horror story.” Main function“horror stories” - to intimidate Russians, cause panic in the Russian leadership, force them to make ruinous expenses. Since BGU is just a myth, money should not be spent on protection against BGU, but rather used to increase competitiveness Russian economy, healthcare, science, education, on social sphere.

In his article, Kalyadin tries to prove that the United States is not interested in launching BGU on Russia, even if it manages to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, in this case, the Russian and European economies will be destroyed, their entire territory will be contaminated with radiation, tens, and maybe hundreds of millions of people will die. As a result, the United States will lose its European allies and NATO will cease to exist. The United States will suffer colossal political losses, economic and diplomatic ties throughout the world will be severed, and the United States, instead of a world hegemon, will turn into a global outcast, hated by all peoples living on Earth.

We can agree with these predictions of the devastating consequences of BSU. But the death of Europe in nuclear war will cause little grief to the United States, since it is a competitor in the field of high-tech products and also consumes a large amount of resources needed by the United States. Currently, Europe serves as a valuable tool for America to combat the sovereignty of the Russian state. After a “successful” BSU in Russia, this function disappears.

According to Kalyadin, China will benefit from BSU in Russia, which will increase the chances of becoming main country world instead of the USA. Such a result of BSU also cannot be beneficial to the United States.

Kalyadin substantiates his understanding of the BSU problem as a myth. He writes that between the Russian Federation and the United States there are no such antagonistic contradictions that could not be resolved by political and diplomatic means. There are no ideological contradictions: both countries live within the capitalist system. There are also no territorial border disputes. Russia is not a competitor to the United States in the field of high-tech industry, since Russia accounts for only less than 2% of world GDP, and the United States - more than 24%, Russia's share in world exports of high-tech products is only 0.7%, and in the United States - 36%. Exports of high-tech products in Thailand are 6 times higher than in Russia, where there is a lot of talk about innovation at all levels, but no real action. At the same time, the growth rate of the Russian economy is less than 2%, which is lower than global growth rates. In such conditions, the creation of a high-tech economy is impossible, so the United States has nothing to worry about in this regard.

However, Alexander Kalyadin’s conclusion that there are no deep-seated disagreements between the United States and Russia is erroneous. As practice over many years has shown, contradictions that cannot be overcome through negotiations do exist. As long as the desire to become a world hegemon remains the basis foreign policy The USA, aimed at subordinating all countries of the world, including Russia, to its interests, antagonistic contradictions will persist. But on the path to US global hegemony, Russia’s strategic nuclear forces stand. Without them, Russia's independent foreign policy would be impossible. Hence the conclusion follows: reliable protection of Russian strategic nuclear forces is a necessary condition for the preservation of Russia as a sovereign state (see the mentioned article by L. Orlenko in NVO No. 9, 2017).

TECHNOLOGY OF DEPRIVATION OF SOVEREIGNTY

Alexander Kalyadin, considering the BGU problem, argues that currently there is a strategic nuclear missile balance between the United States and Russia, therefore, in the event of a rapid global strike by the United States, Russia will launch a retaliatory or retaliatory strike with nuclear missile weapons, which is unacceptable for America . In this case, the military-political leadership of Russia should be advised to restrain the military-political leadership of the United States from the BSU in Russia.

Since, according to Kalyadin, there are no antagonistic contradictions between Russia and the United States, all existing differences can be resolved through negotiations: on Syria, on Ukraine, on sanctions, etc. In addition, one must hope that the common sense of the US President will not allow him to dare to a deliberately failed, insane and criminal adventure - delivering a quick global strike on Russia. But can one hope for the common sense of the American president if there is a fierce struggle between him and the political establishment?

Donald Trump, in his election speeches, proposed to intensify work in the United States to create a sixth technological order (bio-, nano-, information and cognitive technologies) and become an example for other countries. However, those political structures that are fighting Trump continue a policy aimed at establishing a unipolar world and world domination by force, including using the concepts of a quick global strike and missile defense (BMD).

The works of Leonid Orlenko (“NVO” No. 9, 2017) and a number of other authors (Leonid Ivashov, Konstantin Sivkov, Sergei Brezkun, etc.) present a different point of view on the probability of BSU in Russia.

Firstly, Washington has now broken the strategic nuclear missile parity between the United States and Russia. Secondly, antagonistic contradictions between the United States and Russia that cannot be overcome through negotiations persist. The main direction of United States foreign policy remains the idea of building a unipolar world. America wants to have sovereignty, while other countries, including Russia, China, and European states, cannot have state sovereignty and must carry out the will of the hegemon. Currently, Russia is most actively opposed to such a policy, whose main goal, unlike the United States, is peace, which is necessary for carrying out reforms, creating an innovative economy in the country, improving the level and quality of life of the population, and developing every citizen in the intellectual, spiritual and moral fields, but also to ensure the internal and external security of the country.

To date, the United States has developed a technology for depriving countries of state sovereignty. First, soft power is used, and if it does not give the desired result, then a “hybrid war” begins. If in this case it is not possible to destroy the sovereignty of the unwanted state, then military force, which the author of this article outlined in detail in the material “Classification of Modern Wars”, published in “Izvestia RARAN” No. 3 for 2016.

In order to suppress the independence of Russia, the United States is currently waging a hybrid war against it: sanctions, information war, drawing Russia into military conflicts, using “agents of influence” to destroy the Russian economy, etc. If the ongoing “hybrid war” does not suppress Russia’s state sovereignty, then BSU may be inflicted, for which Russia is not sufficiently prepared. Hence the conclusion: protecting strategic nuclear forces is the number one priority in the field of defense.

IS THERE PARITY?

Currently, Russia has about 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed. Of these, about 400 are located approximately equally in silos and on mobile ground-based missile systems (GGRK). The remaining ICBMs are located on submarines (submarines). The coordinates of the mines and PGRK are known to American intelligence, and the US anti-submarine system has the ability to track submarines on combat duty in the seas and oceans.

As a result, the most likely attack is on the Strategic Missile Forces (about 400 ICBMs) and submarines stationed at the piers. For this, most likely, the United States will use its Ohio-class missile submarines armed with Trident 2-D5 missiles, each of which carries 14 nuclear units (NU) with a yield of 100 kt or eight units with a yield of 475 kt. There are 14 such submarines in the American fleet; they each carry 24 missiles, that is, 1,728 nuclear units, of which 384 have a capacity of 475 kilotons. The flight time of such missiles to Russian targets is only 10–15 minutes.

By and large, three Ohio-class submarines, armed with about 1000 nuclear weapons of 100 kt each, are capable of destroying up to 90% of Russian ICBMs in silos and PGRK, as well as submarines with ICBMs stationed at the piers.

The commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei Karakaev, believes that the use of camouflage makes the PGRK invisible to space reconnaissance. But this does not take into account the fact that to destroy the PGRK you do not need to see them, it is enough to know the route, since the radius of destruction when a nuclear charge with a power of 100 kt explodes on the surface of the Earth is 3 km. For example, if the route of a PGRK is 120 km, then to destroy all PGRKs located on the route, only 20 nuclear weapons are required. Therefore, we cannot assume that they are protected reliably enough.

ASYMMETRICAL RESPONSE

To destroy a nuclear unit flying towards a target (mine or others), Russia does not yet have the appropriate means, so it is necessary to use non-standard methods defenses that can be implemented relatively quickly and inexpensively within the existing defense budget.

Firstly, it is necessary to create in the north and east of the country with the help of the Northern and Pacific Fleet water areas protected from aircraft, helicopters, drones, submarines and ships, and place in such water areas two or three submarines with ICBMs, the coordinates of which are not known to the United States, which will protect them from BGU. In the future, instead of strategic submarines, it is quite possible to place ICBMs in a hull that is towed in the specified water area by any submarine.

Secondly, since Russia’s defense budget is 15 times smaller than the NATO budget, it is necessary to use asymmetric methods of defense to protect the country. To do this, the geophysical vulnerability of the US territory should be used. During the time of the USSR, academician Andrei Sakharov proposed to mine certain areas of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans near the US coast with several dozen unrecoverable nuclear mines. When mines explode, they create waves that can cause unacceptable damage to the United States. The signal to detonate mines will be given only if the United States launches a quick global strike on Russia. After mining, conditions are created for equal negotiations with the United States on mutual disarmament. For example, Russia is demining coastal areas, and the United States is removing all military bases around Russia, as well as missile defense in Europe, submarines and ships with missile defense systems located near Russian borders. Mining precedent nuclear mines has already taken place. During the existence of the USSR, the border between the countries of the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO in Europe was mined by the United States with nuclear mines.

Reliable protection from BSU is necessary for Russia to carry out reforms in order to create an innovative economy. A condition for the successful implementation of reforms is the replacement of the liberal-monetarist model of economic management, which is destructive for Russia, with a planned market model, economically and socio-politically more effective than the Chinese economic model.

In the final part of the material, it is necessary to point out such a serious mistake made by Alexander Kalyadin in his article. Thus, he believes that the American project “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), announced by President Reagan in 1983, served only as a decoy launched to ruin the USSR.

However, Kalyadin apparently does not know what happened next. American firms secretly continued to work on SDI, and currently this program is the number one priority in US defense plans (see material by Vladimir Ivanov in NVO No. 18, 2017). To implement these plans, an unmanned reusable aircraft was launched two years ago. spacecraft X-37B, which is capable of shooting down satellites in space, as well as launching missiles with nuclear warheads at ground targets. Such a rocket flies to any target on the surface of the Earth in only two to three minutes. Currently unavailable technical means combat such missiles. The X-37B's mission is to provide the United States with complete control over the globe.

Mining of the American coast is blocking this new project USA.