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The T-26 tank with a single turret was born from the concept of a “tank-fighter”, a tank armed with a powerful 37 mm gun in a single conical turret. According to the outlines, the T-19 turret could be used as such. S. Ginzburg advocated such a design as the main vehicle, while Tukhachevsky considered the two-turret design more preferable for clearing trenches from enemy infantry.

Initial design of the tank.

The practical implementation of the fighter tank project was achieved only in the thirty-second year. Due to technological difficulties from conical tower temporarily had to give up. At the beginning of March, the Izhora Plant presented for discussion to the UMM of the Red Army its own design of an enlarged cylindrical turret, armed with a cannon and a machine gun, unified for BT and T-26 tanks.

The project was received favorably and soon the Izhora plant produced two towers of its own design. Both turrets are armed with a twin mount of a 37 mm cannon and a machine gun. The main differences are mainly technological:

• welded tower with double-leaf hatch;
• riveted with a single-leaf hatch;

Preference was given to riveted construction. When fired from a heavy machine gun, it showed better durability, while the welds cracked when bullets hit them close to them, and the bottom and roof sheets were deformed. Of course, everyone understood that the issue here was the imperfection of the technology, but they still decided to settle on a riveted connection.

During the first two autumn months 1932, a 37 mm cannon was installed in a riveted turret and tested, which it passed generally successfully and was recommended for production to equip T-26 tanks. The only thing the military insisted on was the installation of an armor box at the rear of the turret, in which it would be possible to place either additional ammunition or a radio station.

By the time they had just begun to master the “big tower” in production, a 45-mm tank gun mod. 1932 (20K). Gun designed by the design bureau of the plant named after. Kalinin, in which the 37-mm Renmetall gun was taken as the basis.

Although slightly superior in armor penetration compared to the 37 mm gun, the 45 mm gun promised a significant gain in the fragmentation effect of the projectile. So it was decided to test it with the T-26 turret and put it into service, with the condition that the identified deficiencies would be eliminated later.

To install a 45 mm cannon, some changes had to be made to the design of the T-26 turret, since the turret of the existing design turned out to be cramped. Design Bureau 174 of the plant quickly developed several projects, from which the UMM of the Red Army chose a project with a more developed niche in the stern. The tower itself was similar in design to the previous one, differing in that the niche was a continuation of the side sheets. The joints of the armor plates are welded, although riveting was used in some places.

In publications on tank topics, the single-turret version of the T-26 tank is usually called the Model 33 version, although in the papers of that time this designation is absent.

According to initial plans, production of the T-26 with a 45-mm cannon was supposed to begin in the spring of 1933, but due to the lack of both the guns themselves and optics, their production was only in the summer. Except for the tower new car at first it did not differ from the two-turret version. A year later, some changes were made to the design of the T-26; a fan was installed in the turret, and it itself was slightly shifted to the left.

20K brought a lot of problems at first. Like with a semi-automatic that did not throw away spent cartridge case, and with the very release of these guns. Semi-handicraft production did not ensure the interchangeability of parts, and the guns themselves constantly broke down.

Since December of the thirty-third year, a strangulated weapon, which is now called mod. 34g., or as before model 32/34g. The design of the gun was significantly improved, as was its reliability. It was this weapon that became the most popular in the domestic tank industry before the war. For this weapon, at the beginning of the thirty-fourth year, the “heavy grenade” O-240 was developed, which was used in Soviet tanks until the very end of the war.

In the fall of 1933, the T-26 tanks received the 71-TK-1 kit complete with a handrail antenna. This modification was not a command modification, as is commonly believed; all tanks were divided into radial and line tanks and were produced in certain proportions.

At the end of the thirty-fifth year, the aft niche began to be equipped with a ball mount with a DT machine gun. Around the same time, some machine guns began to be equipped with double optics and a larger capacity tank was introduced, doubling the power reserve.

Tank T-26 with a riveted hull, produced in 1933

Tank T-26 mod. 1933 in section.

Booking scheme.

Radium tank manufactured in 1935.

In 1937, to protect against attacking aircraft, the T-26 was equipped with a P-40 turret with an anti-aircraft machine gun; a year later it was replaced by a modified model.

To simplify production in 1935, the welded gun mantlet was replaced by a stamped one, and for some time they were produced simultaneously. In the same year, headlights for night shooting began to be installed on the T-26. Headlights were attached to the mantlet of the female gun, at the rate of every fifth T-26, until the end of autumn 1939.

New trends in tank building.

If at the time of its birth in the USSR the T-26 tank was actually the most powerful tank in its weight class, then starting from the second half of the thirties, the situation changed dramatically. Foreign tank building was able to master the production of tanks with armament power comparable to the T-26 tank and superior to it in mobility and armor. The most interesting results were achieved by designers from Czechoslovakia, Japan and France.

The assessment of foreign tanks brought a generally disappointing result - the development of Soviet tanks occurred mainly along the path of increasing armor and did not affect such important components as the engine and transmission. Which led to the T-26 tanks becoming overloaded and prone to frequent breakdowns.

According to Soviet designers, the T-26 tank had completely exhausted itself by the beginning of 1937. So S. Ginzburg, back in the early autumn of 1936, proposed new project infantry escort tank, which for a number of reasons did not find support from the military.

Plans for the modernization of the T-26 in the thirty-seventh year were still not original. They provided:

• increasing the engine power of the T-26 tank to 105-107 horsepower;
• increase in armored weapons to 204 artillery rounds and 58 disks for machine guns;
• improvement of armor protection, for which it was necessary to switch to 20-22 mm armor plates for the hull and turret of the T-26 and position them at an angle;
• suspension reinforcement;
• improve the ability to evacuate a tank in combat conditions.

Power was increased thanks to a new carburetor and increased engine speed. However, this decision led to massive valve failures during tank operation. Which, under the conditions of that time, inevitably led to accusations of sabotage and the subsequent arrest of the specialists involved. Production and acceptance of the T-26 was stopped until the causes were identified and eliminated. As a result, the production plan for the thirty-seventh year was disrupted, and repression put an end to further modernization.

However, some changes were introduced, such as the installation of a new carburetor and the transfer of the engine to first-grade gasoline, which made it possible to slightly increase the power.

Modernization of the T-26 tank in 1938.

The production of a new modification of the T-26 began in 1938. The car received a 100 l/s engine and a more powerful domestic starter. The hull, with a rational slope of the armor plates, was not ready on time. The tank hulls were similar to the welded hulls of previous years of production. Escape hatch managed to add in '38. The conical turret was ready on time, and as a result, the T-26 was tested with a new turret, the same hull, a forced engine and reinforced suspension springs.

Tests in the spring of 1938 revealed the fact that the T-26 was still overloaded and its cross-country ability was insufficient. The armament is still relevant, but the armor does not match modern trends, and there are no possibilities to strengthen it. The tank's testers especially emphasized that the T-26 is an outdated design and that there is an urgent need to develop a replacement for it.

Modernization of the tank in 1939

The next stage of modernization, the T-26-1 model or model 1939, incorporated those technical solutions that were prevented by the repressions of 1937. This modernization included a turret box with inclined armor plates, as well as reinforced springs. The thickness of the side plates was increased to twenty millimeters, but essentially the armor protection remained the same, since cemented armor plates were replaced with homogeneous armor. The frontal shield of the turret and the driver's shield began to be made by stamping.

The ammunition load was only raised to 186 rounds in a linear tank, or 165 rounds in a radium tank. This was achieved by abandoning the stern and spare machine guns. Conventional fuel tanks were replaced by bakelite ones, which suffered less from lumbago. Additional radiator protection was introduced, the antenna was replaced with a whip antenna, etc.

Layout of the T-26 tank produced in 1938/39.

General view of the T-26 tank produced in 1939

Radio tank T-26 produced in 1936/37.

Radio tank T-26 produced in 1938

View of the hull and bottom of the T-26 tank.

Radium tank produced in 1940

Changes made to the design of the T-26 led to its weight increasing to 10.3 tons. Despite the fact that the chassis design was strengthened, it still worked to the limit. The tracks often flew off when turning, and the T-26's ride quality decreased significantly.

Cross section of the conical turret of a tank produced in 1939.

Section of the cylindrical turret of the T-26 tank

Sectional view of a tank's conical turret

Reservation diagram for the T-26 tank with a conical turret

Performance characteristics of the T-26 tank of all years of production.

At the beginning of the forty-first year, production of the T-26 by plant No. 147 was discontinued. Production was supposed to be reoriented to the production of the T-50, but for many reasons this never happened. With the beginning of the war, production of the T-26 resumed, fortunately there was a large backlog of turrets, hulls and various types of equipment and units. Data on the number of cars produced in 1941 vary greatly.

From the archive.

entrance. No. 516 from April 4, 1939
NOTES
about the defects and shortcomings of our tanks known to me and recommendations for their elimination / from experience tank battles in the area of ​​Lake HASAN/.

Machine T - 26.

• The oil cooler has access to itself, through which the enemy can freely pierce it with a bayonet.
  Place reverse blinds on top, which should consist of rotating plates. The plates must be one under the other.
• On older tanks, the driver's hatch did not close tightly. There were cases when the enemy opened it and destroyed the crew.
  We have a lot of such T-26 tanks.
• Ventilation cannot be used in combat, as there is a danger of bullets and lead splashes getting inside the vehicle. Make ventilation like a BT car.
• During the battle, a lot of powder gases accumulate at the top of the turret, which has a detrimental effect on the health of the crew; there were cases of fumes. It is necessary to make a fan at the top of the tower, where the hatch for installing the periscope is located.
• The air in the tank during battle, due to the presence of a large amount of powder gases, high air temperature from the engine installation, sweat and other reasons, adversely affects the crew's breathing. Breathe outside air through a special tube with a sealed chemical filter.
• The chassis is not protected from the outside.
• Very frequent cases of hits in the tank. Make streamlined armor for the hull and turret.
• The tower's fastening is not strong enough, as evidenced by several cases of the tower being thrown to the ground.
• Dropping caterpillars. The tracks were dropped because the existing caterpillar track did not meet the tank's mobility requirements at all. So, when turning, not to mention sharp, the caterpillar is thrown off, and sharp turns on the battlefield are indispensable.
• There were frequent cases when rubber tires flew off the rollers.
• There were cases when a shell jammed the exit hatches and the tank caught fire. The crew could not get out of the tank and burned along with the tank.
• Poor visibility from the tank during battle, and in a number of tanks, especially older ones, there are no viewing slots in the turrets at all, and those available are clearly not enough to view the area.
• Tanks burn very hotly due to the presence of gasoline, rubber bands and very frequent painting on the occasion of holidays and the arrival of big bosses.
  When repainting, do not put a new layer on top of the old one, but first remove the old paint.
• Large dead space. When the enemy found himself in dead space, he became invulnerable to the fire weapons of the T-26 tank.

Tank T-26 on video.

• Tank T-26 video
• Armory. Light tank T-26. Video

T-26 is a light Soviet tank based on English tank Vickers Mk.E, purchased by the USSR in 1930.

History of the T-26

In the early 1930s, the USSR was mainly armed with massive lightweight T-18 tank (aka MS-1) and various types of British vehicles from the times. But already in 1929, the characteristics of the T-18 were very unsatisfactory, and when getting acquainted with the tanks of other countries, it was concluded that Soviet tanks were seriously lagging behind.

In 1929, it was decided to begin production of a new tank, which was supposed to be light, easy to maintain and fairly cheap to produce. The basis for this new Soviet tank was the Vickers Mk E, which was purchased along with a production license. The British did not sell the production technology itself, so it had to be developed independently. This was done within a year, and in February 1931 the T-26 was put into service, even before the first prototype was manufactured.

Tank modifications

The T-26 was created on the basis of another tank, and was modified and modified many times in accordance with increasing requirements and based on the results of field tests. As a result, several variants of the T-26 tank were created:

• Model 1931 - linear two-turret tank with machine gun armament;
• Model 1932 - linear two-turret tank, one of the turrets has a 37-mm cannon;
• Model 1933 - linear single-turret tank with a 45-mm cannon and a cylindrical mass. This modification of the T-26 produced the most copies;
• Model 1938, linear single-turret tank with a welded hull and a conical turret;
• Model 1939 - a tank of the 1938 model with additionally reinforced armor and an improved conical turret.

Also, based on the T-26, many tanks with various features were created:

• T-26RT – single-turret T-26 with radio station 71-TK-1;
• T-26 TT – teletank (tank controlled by radio) as part of a telemechanical group;
• T-26 TU - control tank in the same group;
• The T-26A is an artillery support tank with a spacious turret and a 76 mm short-barreled gun. 5 prototypes were produced;
• XT-26 is a tank with flamethrower weapons in a small turret. 552 were independently produced, another 52 were converted from twin-turret serial T-26s;
• XT-130 - single-turret flame-throwing tank, the flamethrower was installed instead of a gun in the T-26 model of 1933;
• XT-133 – flamethrower tank model 1938;
• XT-134 – flamethrower tank model 1939;
• ST is a chemical tank for supplying smoke screens, flame throwing, degassing the area and using toxic substances. The project remained unrealized;
• OU-T-26 is a completed chemical tank with an installed flamethrower.

Also based on the T-26, the T-26T was produced - an artillery tractor with an armored or canvas top. In addition, the T-26 served as the basis for many designs Soviet technology, such as SU-1, SU-5, SU-6 and many armored personnel carriers.

TTX T-26 model 1933

basic information

• Classification - light infantry tank;
• Combat weight - 8 tons;
• Crew – 3 people;
• Years of production – 1931-1941;
• Years of operation: 1931-1960;
• Number of units produced: 11,218 pieces.

Dimensions

• Case length – 4620 mm;
• Case width – 2440 mm;
• Height – 2190 mm;
• Ground clearance – 380 mm.

Booking

• Armor type - rolled homogeneous steel;
• Body forehead – 15 mm;
• Body side – 15 mm;
• Hull stern – 15 mm;
• Bottom – 6 mm;
• Housing roof – 10 mm;
• Turret forehead – 15 mm;
• Gun mantlet – 15 mm;
• Turret side – 15 mm;
• Turret feed – 15 mm;
• Tower roof – 6 mm.

Armament

• Caliber and brand of gun - 45 mm 20K;
• Barrel length - 46 calibers;
• Ammunition - 203 shells;
• Machine guns - 2 × 7.62 mm DT.

Mobility

• Engine type - in-line 4-cylinder carburetor air-cooled;
• Engine power – 90-91 hp;
• Highway speed – 30 km/h;
• Cruising range on the highway – 120 km;
• Suspension type: four-blocked, with leaf springs;
• Climbability - 40°;
• The wall to be overcome is 0.75 m;
• The ditch to be overcome is 2.0 m;
• The fordability is 0.8 m.

Application

The T-26, along with various modifications of the BT, were the main Soviet tanks before the start of the Great Patriotic War. At one time, the T-26 was very popular, although due to its slow speed and lack of a radio, it was quite an easy prey for the enemy. However, there were a number of techniques that made the T-26 truly effective on the front line.

When the T-26 still had a double turret, gunners from the left and right turrets often interfered with each other’s fire, which is why single-turret modifications appeared in the future. Also, when anti-tank rifles appeared, the thin armor of the T-26 turned out to be very vulnerable to them. This eventually led to a gradual improvement in booking. But even despite the rather thin armor, the T-26 was quite durable due to the fact that the tanks and engine of the tank were located in its rear behind the fence. Also, the T-26 had a very large ammunition supply by those standards. All this ultimately made the T-26 a very good light infantry support tank for that time.

Between 1936 and 1938, 281 T-26 tanks were sent to Spain for the Civil War, where they took an active part in the battles. He took part in the battles at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin Gol.

However, the T-26 was used most intensively in the Winter War, as well as at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the T-26 was the most numerous Soviet tank.

Already in the first months of the war, a lot of tanks were lost - by October 28, 1941, only 50 T-26s remained. Gradually it became clear that the T-26 was not effective enough against modern cars, and its use has almost disappeared. The last time this tank was used was in 1945, in Manchuria, against the Kwantung Army.

Tank in culture

The T-26 tank is widely represented in various computer games, such as:

• "Blitzkrieg";
• "Sudden Strike"
• "Steel Panthers"
• "Flashpoint: Resistance", in the modification "Liberation 1941-45";
• "Second World War»;
• "Behind Enemy Lines"
• Multiplayer games "World of Tanks" and "".

Often Tank performance characteristics in games do not correspond to real ones.

To the cinema

Authentic T-26s can be seen in the film Tankers (1939, USSR).

Memory of a tank

The T-26 tank is widely represented in various museums around the world, for example, in:

• Bovington Tank Museum;
• Museum of the breakthrough of the siege of Leningrad (model 1933);
• Finland in the barracks in the Karkialampi area;
• Military History Museum of Lenino-Snegiri (model 1933);
• Moscow Museum of the Great Patriotic War (model 1931);
• Tank Museum Parola;
• Kubinka Museum;

There are also several T-26 monuments. One of them was installed in Pitkäranta as a monument “Glory to the Heroes”. Local historians claim that this T-26 took part in the Soviet-Finnish war and was raised from the bottom of Lake Ladoga in 1998.

On May 28, 1930, the Soviet procurement commission, headed by I. A. Khalepsky, head of the newly created Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, entered into a contract with the English company Vickers for the production of 15 double-turret Vickers Mk.E mod.A tanks for the USSR. The first tank was shipped to the customer on October 22, 1930, and the last one on July 4, 1931. Soviet specialists also took part in the assembly of these tanks. Each combat vehicle purchased in England cost the Soviet Union 42 thousand rubles. (in 1931 prices). For comparison, let’s say that the T-19 “main escort tank” manufactured in the USSR in August of the same year cost over 96 thousand rubles. In addition, the B-26 tank (British vehicles received this designation in the USSR) was easier to manufacture and operate, and also had better mobility. All these circumstances predetermined the choice of the UMM Red Army. Work on the T-19 was curtailed, and all efforts were devoted to mastering the serial production of the B-26.

On February 13, 1931, by decree of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, the Vickers-26 tank was adopted by the Red Army under the designation T-26. Its production was supposed to be launched at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant under construction, then at the Stalingrad (also under construction), and at the latter it was planned to create a special workshop capable of producing up to 10 thousand tanks per year in wartime. But in the end they settled on the Leningrad Bolshevik plant, which already had experience in tank building. Design work for the preparation of mass production, as, indeed, everything further work to modernize the tank, were carried out under the leadership of S. A. Ginzburg.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1931 with machine gun armament

In August 1931, the Defense Committee adopted a resolution on a tank building program in wartime conditions. In accordance with it, during the first year of the war, factories were to produce 13,800 T-26 tanks. Of course, this was a clear utopia, as was the production plan for 1931, released to the Bolshevik plant - 500 units. Already in February it was reduced to 300 units, with the condition that the first tank be delivered no later than May 1. But this also turned out to be unrealistic. In the spring of 1931, only preparations were underway for mass production of the T-26 using temporary, or, as they say today, bypass technology. In parallel, the assembly of two reference machines was carried out. Working drawings were largely completed by May 1, and were approved on June 16 technological process. The plant began manufacturing tools and equipment for mass production.

Assembly of the first ten production T-26s, the so-called “installation batch,” with non-armored steel hulls, was completed in the summer of 1931. In the fall, full-fledged production vehicles began to leave the factory buildings. In February 1932, a new plant No. 174 was organized on the basis of the tank production of the Bolshevik plant. K. K. Sirken was appointed its director, and S. A. Ginzburg was appointed chief designer.

Despite all these measures, the 1932 plan could not be implemented. Back in April, K.K. Sirken reported that the lag behind the tank assembly schedule was mainly due to the fault of subcontractors who were delaying the delivery of components and assemblies. Moreover, the latter were extremely Low quality. For engines, the percentage of defects reached 88%, and for armored hulls - up to 41%. In 1932, Plant No. 174 produced 1,410 tanks, presented 1,361 for delivery, and the troops accepted only 950. A similar picture was observed in the future. Nevertheless, by the second half of 1941, 11,218 tanks left the factory floors. The T-26 became the most popular combat vehicle of the Red Army in pre-war period.

The two-turret version, produced since 1931, was not much different from the British prototype. The tank's riveted hull had a box-shaped cross-section. On a turret box with a vertical frontal plate, two cylindrical towers were placed on ball bearings. Each of them provided space for one crew member. The driver was located in front of the hull on the right. Perhaps the only difference between the first production T-26 and the British vehicles was that their turrets were adapted to mount DT machine guns, and the Vickers tanks had round embrasures instead of rectangular ones. Since the autumn of 1931, tanks of the so-called “second series” began to be equipped with turrets of increased height with an observation window. An inspection slot was cut in the driver's hatch cover, but still without the triplex glass block. On March 1, 1932, a special casing began to be installed on the T-26 above the air outlet duct, protecting it from precipitation, primarily snow. A month later, this casing began to be made as a single unit with the air outlet box.

The tank was equipped with a carburetor, 4-cylinder air-cooled T-26 engine with a power of 90 hp, which was a copy of the English Armstrong Siddeley engine. The mechanical transmission consisted of a single-disc main dry friction clutch, a driveshaft, a five-speed gearbox, side clutches, final drives and band brakes located on the housings of the side clutches.

The chassis for one side included eight dual rubber-coated support rollers with a diameter of 300 mm, interlocked in pairs into four balancing bogies suspended on quarter-leaf elliptical springs, four rubber-coated support rollers with a diameter of 254 mm, a guide wheel with a crank tensioning mechanism and a drive wheel front location with removable gear rims (pinion engagement). Tracks with a width of 260 mm were made of chromium-nickel or manganese steel.

There were no means of external communication on linear tanks. To communicate between the commander and the driver, a “sound pipe” was initially installed, which was later replaced by a light signaling device.

Light tank T-26. Double-turret modification with cannon and machine gun armament. A handrail antenna is installed along the perimeter of the body

At the beginning of 1932, the question arose about strengthening the armament of the T-26, since machine-gun vehicles could not “hit enemy firing points at a long distance and defend against attacks by enemy fighter tanks.” In March 1932, the T-26 tank arrived at ANIOP, instead of the right turret of which a small gun turret of an experienced heavy tank T-35-1, armed with a 37 mm PS-2 cannon. In April of the same year, such turrets were tested on two more T-26 tanks. The PS-2 gun had a very good characteristics, but was not adopted by the Red Army, since the GAU preferred the German 37-mm Rheinmetall cannon. Based on the latter, the B-3 (5K) cannon was created and put into service. Compared to the PS-2, the B-3 had a smaller recoil and breech size, which made it possible to install it in a standard T-26 machine-gun turret with almost no modifications. However, Plant No. 8 named after. Kalinin was unable to organize the production of B-3 guns in the required quantities. In addition, since the summer of 1932, all existing B-3 guns were transferred to arm BT-2 tanks. Therefore, the 37-mm PS-1 (or “Hotchkiss-PS”) cannon, which was well developed by industry, was installed in the right machine-gun turret of the T-26. True, the production of these guns was curtailed, and their stock in warehouses was not as large as expected. Therefore, it was necessary to dismantle the guns from the T-18 and even Renault tanks transferred to SOAVIAKHIM or decommissioned. According to the rearmament plan, guns were to be installed on every fifth tank. In reality, several more such vehicles were produced: out of 1,627 double-turret tanks produced in 1931–1933, about 450 vehicles were armed with the PS-1 cannon.

In March 1932, the 45-mm anti-tank gun 19K, developed at Plant No. 8, was adopted by the Red Army. Following it, its installation and tank were designed, which was called the “45-mm tank gun mod. 1932" and factory index 20K. Compared to the PS-2, the 20K tank gun had a number of advantages. Armor penetration increased slightly, the mass of the fragmentation projectile increased sharply (from 0.645 kg to 2.15 kg), and the mass of the explosive in the projectile increased from 22 g to 118 g. Finally, the rate of fire was increased due to the introduction of a vertical wedge semi-automatic bolt. True, the debugging of the semi-automatic system took about four years, and only in 1935 were guns with well-functioning semi-automatic operation on all types of ammunition sent out.

Flamethrower tank XT-130

In December 1932, the Defense Committee ordered the production of T-26 tanks with a 45-mm cannon. A new turret was designed for this gun, coaxial with a DT machine gun, for the T-26 and BT-2 tanks. Firing tests showed its complete reliability.

Since 1935, tanks have been equipped with a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934. On this gun, semi-automatic mechanical type was replaced by semi-automatic inertial type. The latter worked fully only when firing armor-piercing shells; when firing fragmentation rounds, it was like a quarter of automatic operation, i.e., opening the bolt and extracting the cartridges was done manually, and when the next cartridge was inserted into the chamber, the bolt closed automatically. This is due to various initial speeds armor-piercing and fragmentation shells.

Since 1935, tank hulls and turrets began to be manufactured using electric welding. The gun's ammunition capacity was reduced to 122 rounds (for vehicles with a radio station - 82), and the fuel tank capacity was increased. The tank's weight increased to 9.6 tons. In 1936, a removable rubber band was introduced on the road wheels, the tension mechanism was changed, and a second DT machine gun was installed in the turret niche. At the same time, the gun's ammunition load was reduced from 136 to 102 rounds (on tanks without a radio station), and the tank's weight increased to 9.65 tons. In 1937, DT anti-aircraft machine guns began to be mounted on turret mounts on parts of the vehicles. Two so-called “combat light” spotlights were installed on the gun, a new VKU-3 and a TPU-3 intercom were introduced. The engine was boosted, and its maximum power increased from 90 to 95 hp. In 1937, only radio tanks were produced, and with radio stations 71-GK-3. The ammunition load of tanks with a radio station reached 147 rounds (107 for tanks without a radio) and 3087 rounds of ammunition. The weight of the tank was 9.75 tons.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1938 with conical tower. “Combat light” spotlights are installed on the gun mantlet.

In 1938, instead of a cylindrical one, the T-26 was equipped with a conical turret with a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934. In the guns produced in 1937 and 1938, an electric shutter appeared, which ensured the firing of a shot by impact and using electric current. Guns with an electric shutter were equipped with a TOP-1 telescopic sight (since 1938 - TOS), stabilized in the vertical plane. Unlike previous tanks, which had one 182-liter fuel tank, the vehicle was equipped with two such tanks with a capacity of 110 and 180 liters. which allowed to increase the power reserve. The combat weight was 10.28 tons.

T-26 tanks with a conical turret and a straight turret differed in the presence or absence of a 71-TK-3 radio station with a handrail antenna, a rear turret machine gun DT, anti-aircraft machine gun mount and “combat light” searchlights. In addition, there were two types of conical towers - with welded and stamped frontal shields. On some tanks, mainly with radio stations, a commander's panorama of the PTK was installed.

In 1939, the tank underwent another modernization, during which a turret box with inclined armor plates was introduced, the rear machine gun was removed from some of the vehicles, and an additional ammunition rack for 32 rounds was installed in its place. As a result, the ammunition load on tanks without a radio station increased to 205 rounds and 3,654 (58 discs) rounds. On tanks with a walkie-talkie, it was 165 rounds and 3,213 rounds of ammunition. The TPU-3 intercom was replaced by TPU-2. The engine underwent some changes (the compression ratio was raised), after which its power reached 97 hp. Has undergone changes and chassis, mainly in the direction of strengthening the suspension. The vehicles with an inclined turret also differed from the T-26 tanks of the previous modification in the external stowage of spare parts.

In 1940, the last cycle of changes to the design of the T-26 tank was carried out. Screens were installed on some vehicles during the war with Finland. The cemented armor of the turret box, 15 mm thick, was replaced with homogeneous armor 20 mm thick. In addition, a unified viewing device, a new turret ring and bakeliting of fuel tanks were introduced. The weight of the T-26 with screens exceeded 12 tons.

A large number of combat vehicles were produced based on the T-26 special purpose: flamethrower tanks XT-26, XT-130 and XT-133, bridge laying trucks ST-26, telemechanical tanks TT-26 and TU-26, self-propelled artillery mounts SU-5-2, artillery tractors, armored personnel carriers, etc.

The first tank formation to receive the T-26 was the 1st Mechanized Brigade named after K. B. Kalinovsky (MVO). The vehicles that entered service with the troops before the end of 1931 had no weapons and were intended mainly for training. Their more or less normal operation began only in 1932. At the same time, a new staff of the mechanized brigade was approved, according to which it was supposed to have 178 T-26 tanks. The formation of other mechanized brigades began in this state.

The study and generalization of the experience of the exercises conducted in 1931–1932 revealed the need to create even larger formations. After preliminary study of this issue, the Red Army Headquarters (as the General Staff was called in those years) developed the organizational and staffing structure of the mechanized corps. Their formation began in the autumn of 1932 in the Moscow, Ukrainian and Leningrad military districts. The corps included two mechanized brigades, one of which was armed with T-26 tanks, and the other with BT. Since 1935, mechanized corps began to be armed only with BT tanks.

Since the T-26 mod. entered service with the troops. In 1933, a mixed platoon, consisting of one single-turret and two double-turret tanks, became standard in mechanized brigades for some time. However, as the troops became saturated with single-turret tanks, double-turret vehicles were mainly transferred to combat training parks, as well as to tank and tank battalions of rifle divisions. By the beginning of 1935, the tank battalion rifle division consisted of three tank companies of 15 T-26s each.

Light tank T-26 mod. 1938 with a conical turret and sloping turret armor

In August 1938, mechanized corps, brigades and regiments were converted into tank ones. By the end of 1938, the Red Army had 17 light tank brigades with 267 T-26 tanks each and three chemical tank brigades, also equipped with chemical tanks based on the T-26.

Baptism of fire The T-26 was received in Spain. On July 18, 1936, a rebellion began in this country against the government of the republic, led by General Francisco Franco. The mutiny was supported by most of the Civil Guard army and police. Having landed the Army of Africa in mainland Spain, within a few weeks Franco captured half the country's territory. But in the large industrial centers of the north - Madrid, Barcelona, ​​Valencia, Bilbao and others - the rebellion failed. A civil war began in Spain.

Yielding to the request of the republican government, the USSR government decided to sell military equipment to the Spaniards and send military advisers, including tank crews, to Spain.

On September 26, 1936, the first batch of 15 T-26 tanks arrived at the port of Cartagena, which were supposed to be used for training Spanish tank crews. But the situation became more complicated, and these tanks were used to form a tank company, command of which was taken by Red Army captain P. Arman. Already on October 29, the company entered the battle.

On November 1, Colonel S. Krivoshein’s tank group, which included 23 T-26s and nine armored vehicles, struck the Francoists. At the same time, some of the vehicles had Spanish crews.

From the beginning of December 1936, T-26 tanks and other tanks began to arrive in Spain en masse. military equipment, as well as personnel led by brigade commander D. Pavlov. The commanders and driver mechanics were career military men sent from the best units and formations of the Red Army: the mechanized brigade named after Volodarsky (Peterhof), the 4th mechanized brigade (Bobruisk), the 1st mechanized corps named after K. B. Kalinovsky (Naro-Fominsk). Based on almost 100 units of arrived equipment and personnel, the formation of the 1st Republican Tank Brigade began. Mainly due to Soviet assistance, by the summer of 1938 the Republican army already had two armored divisions.

All the way to the end civil war The Soviet Union supplied Republican Spain with 297 T-26 tanks (only single-turret vehicles of the 1933 model were supplied). These vehicles took part in almost all combat operations carried out by the Republican army, and showed themselves to be very good. German Pz.I and Italian CV3/33 wedges, which had only machine gun armament, were powerless against the T-26. The last circumstance can be illustrated by the following example.

During the battle near the village of Esquivias, Semyon Osadchy's T-26 tank rammed an Italian CV3 wedge and threw it into the gorge. The second wedge was also destroyed, and the other two were damaged. The loss ratio was sometimes even greater. So, during the battle of Guadalajara, in one day on March 10, a platoon of two T-26s under the command of the Spaniard E. Ferrer knocked out 25 Italian tankettes!

It should be emphasized, however, that Soviet tank crews faced a worthy opponent. The rebel infantry, especially the Moroccan ones, suffering heavy losses from the tanks, did not leave the trenches and did not retreat. The Moroccans abandoned combat vehicles grenades and bottles of gasoline, and when they were not there, enemy soldiers with rifles at the ready rushed right under the tanks, hit the armor with rifle butts, and grabbed the tracks.

The fighting in Spain, which demonstrated, on the one hand, the superiority of Soviet tanks over German and Italian ones in armament, on the other hand, also revealed their main drawback - the weakness of the armor. Even the frontal armor of the T-26 was easily penetrated by German and Italian anti-tank guns.

The first military operation of the Red Army in which T-26 tanks participated was the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict at Lake Khasan in July 1938. To defeat the Japanese group, the Soviet command brought in the 2nd mechanized brigade, as well as the 32nd and 40th separate tank battalions. The Soviet tank group consisted of 257 T-26 tanks, including 10 HT-26, three ST-26 bridgelayers, 81 BT-7 (in the reconnaissance battalion of the 2nd mechanized brigade) and 13 self-propelled units SU-5-2.

Even before the start of hostilities, the 2nd mechanized brigade suffered significant losses. On July 27, three days before moving to the battle area, its brigade commander A.P. Panfilov, the chief of staff, the commissar, battalion commanders and a number of other units were arrested. All of them were declared enemies of the people. As a result, 99% of the command staff were newly appointed people, which negatively affected the subsequent actions of the brigade. For example, due to poor organization of the movement of columns and haste, the brigade completed a march of only 45 km in 11 hours! At the same time, some of the units, due to complete ignorance of the route, wandered around the city of Voroshilov-Ussuriysky for quite a long time.

During the assault on the Bogomolnaya and Zaozernaya hills occupied by the Japanese, our tankers encountered a well-organized anti-tank defense. As a result, 85 T-26 tanks were lost, of which 9 were burned. After the end of hostilities, 39 tanks were restored by military units, and the rest were repaired at the factory.

The brunt of the fighting of tank units in Mongolia near the river. Khalkhin Gol “fell on the shoulders” of BT wheeled-tracked tanks. As of February 1, 1939, the 57th Special Corps had only 33 T-26 tanks, 18 HT-26 tanks and six T-26-based tractors. “Betashek”, for comparison, there were 219 units. The situation changed little in the future. So, on July 20, 1939, units of the 1st Army Group had 10 HT-26 tanks (in the 11th Tank Brigade) and 14 T-26s (in the 82nd Infantry Division). By the August battles, the number of "twenty-sixths", mainly chemical ones, had increased slightly, but they still constituted a relatively small percentage of total number tanks participating in the battles. Nevertheless, they were used quite intensively.

Here it would be interesting to cite some excerpts from documents drawn up in the 1st Army Group following the results of hostilities, insofar as they relate to T-26 tanks and vehicles based on them.

“The T-26s showed themselves to be exceptionally good, they walked perfectly on the dunes, the tank had very high survivability. There was a case in the 82nd Rifle Division when a T-26 received five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was destroyed, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it came to SPAM under its own power ( collection point emergency vehicles. - Note author)". After such a flattering assessment, a much less flattering conclusion follows, concerning the armor protection of the T-26 (as well as our other tanks): “the Japanese 37-mm cannon easily penetrates the armor of any of our tanks.”

The actions of chemical tanks deserve special praise.

“By the beginning of hostilities, the 57th Special Corps had only 11 chemical tanks (XT-26) as part of the combat support company of the 11th Tank Brigade (two platoons of 5 tanks each and the company commander’s tank). There were 3 charges of the flamethrower mixture in parts and 4 in storage.

On July 20, the 2nd company of chemical tanks from the 2nd tank chemical brigade arrived in the combat area. It had 18 XT-130 and 10 charges of flamethrower mixture. However, it turned out that the company personnel were very poorly prepared for flamethrowing. Therefore, before the company went directly into the combat area, they were given practical lessons in flamethrowing and the combat experience already available to tank chemists of the 11th Tank Brigade was studied.

In addition, the 6th Tank Brigade that arrived at the front included 9 XT-26s. In total, by the beginning of August, the troops of the 1st Army Group had 19 HT-26s and 18 LHT-130s.

During the August operation (August 20–29), all chemical tanks took part in the battle. They were especially active during the period August 23–26, and on these days the LHT-130 went on the attack 6–11 times.

In total, during the conflict, chemical units used 32 tons of flamethrower mixture. Losses in people amounted to 19 people (9 killed and 10 wounded), irrecoverable losses in tanks - 12 vehicles, of which XT-26 - 10 (of which the 11th Tank Brigade - 7 and 6th Tank Brigade - 3), XT-130 - 2.

The weak point of using flamethrower tanks was poor reconnaissance and preparation of vehicles for attack. As a result, there was a large consumption of fire mixture in secondary areas and unnecessary losses.

During the very first battles, it was established that the Japanese infantry could not withstand flamethrowing and were afraid of the chemical tank. This was shown by the defeat of the Azuma detachment on May 28–29, in which 5 HT-26s were actively used.

In subsequent battles, where flamethrower tanks were used, the Japanese invariably abandoned their shelters without showing resilience. For example, on July 12, a Japanese detachment consisting of a reinforced company with 4 anti-tank guns penetrated deep into our location and, despite repeated attacks, offered stubborn resistance. The introduction of only one chemical tank, which fired a stream of fire at the center of resistance, caused panic in the enemy ranks, the Japanese from the front line of trenches fled into the depths of the pit and our infantry arrived in time, occupying the crest of the pit, this detachment was completely destroyed.”

The cannonade had barely died down Far East, as the guns spoke in the West. German divisions crossed the Polish border, and World War II began.

On the eve of World War II, T-26s were mainly in service with individual light tank brigades (256–267 tanks each) and individual tank battalions of rifle divisions (one company - 10–15 tanks). As part of these units and units, they took part in the “liberation campaign” in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.

In particular, on September 17, 1939, 878 T-26s of the Belorussian Front and 797 T-26s of the Ukrainian Front crossed the Polish border. Losses during combat operations during Polish campaign were very insignificant: only 15 “twenty-sixths”. but due to various technical malfunctions during the marches, 302 combat vehicles were out of action. The losses of tanks, including T-26s, during the “Winter War” were significantly greater.

The Soviet-Finnish, or, as it is often called, the Winter War, began on November 30, 1939. The 10th Tank Corps, the 20th Heavy, the 34th, 35th, 39th and 40th Light Tank Brigades, and 20 separate tank battalions of rifle divisions took part in the war with Finland. Already during the war, the 29th light tank brigade and a significant number of separate tank battalions arrived at the front.

The experience of the war forced changes to be made to the structure of tank units. Thus, in the conditions of the northern theater of operations, the T-37 and T-38 tanks, which equipped two companies in the tank battalions of the rifle divisions, turned out to be useless. Therefore, the directive of the Main Military Council of the Red Army of January 1, 1940 provided for each rifle division to have a tank battalion of 54 T-26s (of which 15 were chemical), and each rifle regiment to have a tank company of 17 T-26s. At the same time, the formation of seven tank regiments with 164 T-26 tanks each began. They were intended for motorized rifle and light motorized divisions. However, only two of the latter were formed.

On the front road there are T-26 tanks mod. 1933 and 1939 Karelian Isthmus, December 1939

The fleet of T-26 tanks used during the “winter” war was very varied. In the brigades that were armed with combat vehicles of this type, one could find both double-turret and single-turret tanks of different years of production, from 1931 to 1939. In tank battalions of rifle divisions, the equipment, as a rule, was old, produced in 1931–1936. But some parts were equipped with brand new T-26s, straight from the factory. In total, by the beginning of hostilities, there were 848 T-26 tanks in the tank units of the Leningrad Front.

Like combat vehicles of other brands, the “twenty-sixths” were used as the main striking force in breaking through the “Mannerheim Line”. I am mainly involved in the destruction of fortifications: from execution anti-tank bumps before firing direct fire at the embrasures of Finnish pillboxes.

The actions of the 35th Light Tank Brigade are of greatest interest, since it was this formation that carried out the largest and perhaps the only battle with Finnish tanks.

During the first days of fighting, the brigade operated in the direction of Kiviniemi, and then was transferred to the Khottinen area - height 65.5. Until the end of December, the brigade's tanks, suffering heavy losses, attacked the enemy, supporting the 123rd and 138th rifle divisions, and then were withdrawn to reserve. In January, tankers were engaged in the evacuation and repair of materiel, and conducted training sessions to practice interaction with infantry, sappers and artillery. Taking into account the experience of previous battles, wooden fascines were made. They were placed on a sled attached to the tank from behind. Fachines were intended to fill ditches and passages between gouges. At the suggestion of the fighters, a wooden bridge was made to cross the ditches. It was assumed that it could be pushed in front of the T-26 on skids. However, the design turned out to be very bulky and heavy, which prevented the bridge from moving in rough terrain.

By the beginning of the breakthrough of the main line of defense - the “Mannerheim Line” - the brigade’s tanks were assigned battalion-by-battalion to the 100th, 113th and 123rd rifle divisions, with which they operated until the end of the war.

At the end of February 1940, the 4th Finnish tank company, consisting of 13 Vickers 6-ton tanks, 10 of them armed with a 37-mm Bofors cannon, was advanced into the offensive zone of the 35th light tank brigade. Finnish tanks received the task of supporting the infantry attack of the 23rd Finnish infantry division.

At 6.15 on February 26, eight Vickers (with Bofors guns) moved into battle. Due to breakdowns, two cars stopped, and to the positions Soviet troops only six tanks came out. However, the Finnish tankers were unlucky - the infantry did not follow them, and due to poorly conducted reconnaissance, the Vickers ran into the tanks of the 35th Tank Brigade. Judging by Finnish documents, the fate of the Vickers was as follows.

The tank number R-648 was hit by fire from several Soviet tanks and burned down. The tank commander was wounded, but managed to reach his own people. The three remaining crew members were killed. The Vickers R-655, crossing the railroad, was hit and abandoned by the crew. The Finns were able to evacuate this tank, but it could not be restored and was subsequently dismantled. Vickers R-664 and R-667 received several hits each and lost speed. For some time they fired from the spot, and then were abandoned by the crews. Vickers R-668 got stuck trying to knock down a tree. Of the entire crew, only one person survived, the rest died. A Vickers R-670 was also hit.

In the operational report of the 35th brigade for February 26, the details of this battle are stated very succinctly: “Two Vickers tanks with infantry reached the right flank of the 245th Infantry Regiment, but were shot down. Four Vickers came to the aid of their infantry and were destroyed by the fire of three tanks of company commanders who were going on reconnaissance.”

The entry in the “Journal of Military Operations” of the 35th Brigade is even shorter: “On February 26, the 112th Tank Battalion, together with units of the 123rd Infantry Division, entered the Honkaniemi area, where the enemy offered stubborn resistance, repeatedly launching counterattacks. Here two Renault tanks and six Vickers were destroyed, of which one Renault and three Vickers were evacuated and handed over to the headquarters of the 7th Army.”

ABOUT future fate of captured Vickers, all that is known is that one tank each was exhibited at the “Defeat of the White Finns” exhibitions in Moscow and Leningrad. One entered the 377th separate tank battalion, and one (R-668) went to the Kubinka training ground, where it was tested in the spring and summer of 1940.

An XT-130 tank from the 210th separate chemical tank battalion is firing. Karelian Isthmus, February 1940

T-26 tanks of the 35th Light Tank Brigade are preparing to attack. February 1940

It should be noted that the battle with enemy tanks was described in much more detail and more emotionally by its direct participant V.S. Arkhipov, at that time the company commander of the 112th tank battalion of the 35th light tank brigade. Here's what he writes:

“On February 25, the vanguard of the 245th regiment - the 1st rifle battalion of captain A. Makarov with our tank company attached to it - moving along railway to Vyborg, captured the Kamyarya station, and by the end of the day - the Khonkaniemi stop and the nearby village of Urhala.

The infantry dug trenches in the snow and rested in them in shifts. We spent the night right in the tanks, in the forest. They were on platoon duty, camouflaging their vehicles in the clearing. The night passed calmly, and when the tank platoon of Lieutenant I. I. Sachkov went on duty and it began to get light, a drowsiness fell on me. I’m sitting in the car, in my usual place, by the cannon, and I don’t understand whether in a dream or in reality I’m thinking that we have pulled far ahead, there is no connection with the neighbor on the right. What is there? There is a good position: on the left there is a lowland - a swamp under snow or a swampy lake, and on the right - an embankment of the railway and a little behind us, near the stop, a crossing. There are the rear of the battalion - a medical unit, a field kitchen... The tank engine was running at low speed, and suddenly I stopped hearing it. Fell asleep! With effort I open my eyes, and the roar of a tank engine bursts into my ears. No, not ours. It's nearby. And at that moment our tank jerked violently...

So, with the incident, the first and last Stand with enemy tanks. Remembering it today, I come to the conclusion that it was equally unexpected for both us and the enemy. For us, because until that day, until February 26, we had not met enemy tanks and had not even heard about them. This is the first. And secondly, tanks appeared in our rear, from the side of the crossing, and Lieutenant Sachkov mistook them for his own, for Kulabukhov’s company. Yes, and it was no wonder it was confused, since easy english The Vickers tank was similar in appearance to the T-26, like a twin. Only our gun is stronger - 45 mm, while the Vickers has a 37 mm gun.

Well, as for the enemy, as it soon became clear, his reconnaissance did not work well. The enemy command, of course, knew that yesterday we captured the station. Not only did it know, it was preparing a counterattack on the stop and, as a starting position, outlined a grove between the lowland and the railway embankment, that is, the place where we, the tankers and riflemen of Captain Makarov, spent that night. Enemy intelligence overlooked the fact that after the capture of Honkaniemi, having placed the battalion headquarters and up to a hundred infantrymen on the armor, we had already advanced another kilometer and a half to the north of Honkaniemi at dusk.

So, our tank was hit by a blow from outside. I opened the hatch and leaned out of it. They heard Sergeant Korobka downstairs expressing his opinion aloud about the driver of the tank that hit us:

Here's the hat! Well, I tell him!..

Not our company's car! No, not ours! - radio operator Dmitriev said confidently.

The tank, which touched our caterpillar with its own (our car was standing on the side of the clearing, camouflaged by a spruce forest), moved away. And although I knew that it could only be a tank from Kulabukhov’s company, anxiety seemed to prick my heart. Why - I figured this out later. And then I saw a grove of trees around me in the morning, frost was falling, and, as always, when it suddenly gets warmer, the trees stood in a snowy lace - in kurzhak, as they say in the Urals. And further, at the crossing, a group of infantrymen could be seen in the morning fog. Single file, dressed in short fur coats and felt boots, they walked towards the forest with bowler hats in their hands. “Kulabukhov!” I thought, looking at the tanks that appeared at the crossing and began to slowly overtake the infantrymen. One of the shooters, having contrived, put the bowler hat on the armor of the tank, on the engine, and hurried alongside, shouting something to his comrades. Peaceful morning scene. And suddenly I understood the reason for my alarm: there was a blue stripe on the turret of the tank moving away from us. Soviet tanks did not have such identification marks. And the guns on the tanks were different - shorter and thinner.

Sachkov, enemy tanks! - I shouted into the microphone. - Fire on the tanks! Armor-piercing! - I ordered Dmitriev and heard the click of the gun bolt closing.

The turret of the tank, which was the first to overtake our infantrymen, turned slightly, a machine-gun burst passed through the forest, through nearby bushes, and hit the roof of my turret hatch. Small fragments cut my hands and face, but at that moment I did not feel it. Diving down, he fell to the sight. In the optics I see infantrymen. Snatching their rifles from behind their backs, they throw themselves into the snow. They figured out whose engines were heating the pots of porridge. I catch the starboard side of the Vickers in the crosshairs. Shot, another shot!

It's burning! - Box shouts.

Shots from Sachkov's tanks thunder nearby. Soon others join them. This means that Naplavkov’s platoon also joined in. The tank that hit us stood up, hit. The rest of the enemy vehicles lost formation and seemed to scatter. Of course, it is impossible to say about the tanks that they are panicking - the crews are panicking. But we only see cars that rush in one direction or the other. Fire! Fire!

In total, on this day, 14 English-made Finnish tanks were knocked out in the area of ​​the Honkaniemi stop, and we captured three vehicles in good condition and, by order of the command, sent them by rail to Leningrad. Then I saw them - they stood in the courtyard of the Leningrad Museum of the Revolution as exhibits. And after the Great Patriotic War, I no longer found Vickers there. Museum employees said that in the fall of forty-one, when the fascist blockade of the city began, the tanks were repaired and sent with their crews to the front.”

It is difficult to say how reliable the last statement is, but V. S. Arkhipov clearly overestimated the number of destroyed Finnish tanks. As follows from the above documents, only 6 enemy combat vehicles were shot down. Of course, the actions of the small Finnish tank units did not have any impact on the course of the fighting. But the Finnish anti-tank defense turned out to be much more effective. The figures for our losses in armored vehicles speak eloquently about this.

Over the entire period of hostilities from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940, the Red Army lost 3,178 on the Karelian Isthmus, of which 1,903 were combat losses and 1,275 were losses due to technical reasons. The losses of T-26 tanks of all variants amounted, according to incomplete data, to about 1000 units, that is, they exceeded the number of “twenty-sixths” at the beginning of the war. However, during the fighting, tanks arrived as replacements, both from factories and as part of new tank units being transferred to the front. In February 1940, for example, the 29th light tank brigade consisting of 256 T-26 tanks arrived on the Karelian Isthmus from Brest.

On June 1, 1941, the tank forces of the Red Army had 10,268 T-26 tanks of all modifications, including special ones, which accounted for 39.5% of the entire tank fleet of the Red Army. The number of T-26 tanks in the western military districts is also of interest.

In total, in the western, or, as they are often called, border military districts, by June 1, 1941, there were 4875 T-26 tanks of all modifications. Of this number, 709 combat vehicles belonged to the 3rd and 4th categories, that is, they required medium and major repairs. It goes without saying that these tanks were not combat-ready. Formally, combat-ready vehicles included tanks of the 1st and 2nd categories. 828 tanks of the 1st category were equipment that was in storage. After being removed from storage, these tanks were ready for battle. The situation was more complicated with vehicles of the 2nd category (3339 units), which included both tanks that were completely serviceable and usable, and those requiring routine repairs. The concept of “routine repair” included operations such as replacing batteries, track tracks, road wheels, etc. If we take into account the shortage of spare parts that existed in the Red Army, it becomes clear that some of the tanks of the 2nd category were not combat-ready. In some units, up to a third of the vehicles stood motionless (especially for the T-26 there were not enough tracks and fingers), although they were listed in the 2nd category. In addition, up to 30% of the tanks were vehicles produced in 1931–1934, which had a limited service life.

German soldier inspects a broken T-26 tank. Army Group Center, June 1941

Thus, in the five western military districts there were approximately 3,100–3,200 technically serviceable T-26 tanks and vehicles based on them, which is slightly less than the entire German tank fleet intended for the invasion of the USSR, and approximately 40% of the total number of Soviet tanks available in these districts.

During the fighting in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, most T-26s were lost mainly from artillery fire and air strikes. Many vehicles failed for technical reasons, and the insufficient provision of military units with evacuation means and the lack of spare parts did not allow them to be repaired. During the retreat, even tanks with minor damage had to be blown up or set on fire. The dynamics and nature of losses can be illustrated by the example of the 12th Mechanized Corps, which was stationed in the Baltic Special Military District on the eve of the war. As of June 22, 1941, the corps included 449 T-26 tanks, two chemical tanks and four T-27T tractor-transporters. By July 7, 201 T-26s, both chemical tanks and all transporters were knocked out. Another 186 T-26s failed due to technical reasons.

During the same period, 66 T-26 tanks were lost in the 125th Tank Regiment of the 202nd Motorized Division, 60 of them irretrievably.

By July 21, 1941, in the 28th Tank Division of the 12th Mechanized Corps there were still 4 BT-7s, 1 T-26 and 2 BA-20s, in the 23rd Tank Division - 4 T-26s, in the 202nd Motorized Division - 1 T-26! The corps practically ceased to exist as a connection tank troops.

Tank T-26 mod. 1939, abandoned by the crew due to the left track falling off. Southwestern Front, June 1941

Tank T-26, stuck in a swamp and abandoned by the crew on the distant approaches to Leningrad. Northwestern Front, 1941

By the fall of 1941, the number of “twenty-sixths” in the Red Army had noticeably decreased, but they still continued to make up a significant percentage of the material part. So, for example, on October 1, 1941, there were 475 tanks in the tank units of the Western Front, 298 of them were T-26s. This was 62%! However, the technical condition of many of them left much to be desired. This is what was said, for example, in the “Report on the combat operations of the 20th Tank Brigade,” which received 20 T-26s on the way to the front in early October: “The T-26 tanks that arrived from the repair base started up with difficulty, from towing, and 14 of them wouldn’t start at all.” Apparently, this was the case in many other brigades. In any case, this situation only contributed to the rapid decline of combat vehicles of this type.

A month later, on October 28, 1941, at the height of the German offensive on Moscow, our Western Front had 441 tanks. Only 50 of them were T-26s, and 14 of them were under repair.

The “Twenty-Sixth” took part not only in the defense of Moscow. They were armed, for example, with the 86th separate tank battalion of the Leningrad Front. On December 20, 1941, he received the task of supporting the attack of our infantry from the Kolpino area in the direction of Krasny Bor, Tosno. During this combat operation, the platoon commander, junior lieutenant M. I. Yakovlev, accomplished his feat. Here's what the award sheet says about it:

“Comrade In battles with the fascist occupiers, Yakovlev proved himself to be a faithful son of the Socialist Motherland, a hero of the Patriotic War. For 6 days, from December 20 to 26, 1941 (in the battles for Krasny Bor), the commander of the T-26 tank Yakovlev did not leave the vehicle, mercilessly destroying enemy personnel and equipment.

After our units captured the anti-tank ditch, the Germans tried to regain the advantageous positions they had lost. They counterattacked our tanks three times.

Comrade Yakovlev, allowing the Nazis to come within 100 meters, shot them point blank and went on the attack again.

In just one night from December 22 to 23, he destroyed over 200 enemy soldiers and officers, two bunkers, three anti-tank guns, 4 machine gun nests, three mortars with servants and an ammunition depot in the village. Krasny Bor.

Yakovlev’s tank had 9 holes, but the brave commander managed to take it out of the battlefield.”

Junior Lieutenant Yakovlev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

As for the T-26 tanks, they continued to be used in combat operations along the entire Soviet-German front from the Barents to the Black Sea throughout 1942. True, in significantly smaller quantities than in 1941.

So, for example, as part of the 22nd tank corps As of May 9, 1942, that is, on the eve of the attack on Kharkov, the Southwestern Front had 105 tanks. Six of them are T-26. Unfortunately, there is no complete data on the composition of the tank group of the Southwestern Front, so it is impossible to indicate which other tank units of the front had combat vehicles of this type. It is known for sure that the mentioned six T-26 tanks were in service with the 13th Tank Brigade.

All brigades of the 22nd Tank Corps entered into battle with the German tank group ( battle group 3rd and 23rd tank divisions) May 13, 1942, repelling a counterattack on the flank of the advancing troops of our 38th Army. The German group consisted of more than 130 tanks. As a result of the battle, the 13th Tank Brigade, as well as the other two brigades of the corps - the 36th and 133rd, lost all their tanks. At the same time, according to reports from brigade commanders, more than 100 enemy tanks were destroyed.

The last major operations of the Great Patriotic War, in which T-26 tanks took part in more or less noticeable quantities, were the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus.

On July 15, 1942, the “twenty-sixth” were available only in the 63rd tank brigade (8 units) and the 62nd separate tank battalion (17 units) of the Southern Front. During the fighting, by the end of July, 15 T-26 tanks were lost. The 126th separate tank battalion (36 T-26 tanks) operated as part of the troops of the Primorsky Group of the North Caucasus Front.

On August 10, 1942, the 126th battalion was redeployed to the Abinskaya-Krymskaya region with the task, together with the 103rd Red Banner Rifle Brigade, to “stubbornly defend the mountain passes to Novorossiysk, using tanks as fixed firing points, burying them in the ground.”

On the morning of August 17, the enemy, with up to 18 Pz.IV Ausf.F1 tanks with two companies of machine gunners, supported by 2-3 artillery and mortar batteries, went on the offensive from the station. Akhtyrskaya in the direction of the station. Abinskaya.

This settlement was defended by the 1st company of the 126th separate tank battalion, consisting of 11 T-26 tanks. For two hours she fought with enemy tanks, and then retreated to reserve positions, from which the tanks fired from the spot. On the western outskirts of Abinskaya began street fight with enemy tanks. By the end of the day the company had lost from artillery fire and tank battle 7 tanks. Another 3 damaged vehicles were blown up on the orders of the company political instructor. The damaged tanks were not evacuated due to the lack of evacuation means.

Attack of T-26 tanks. Western Front, October 1941

On August 18, the 2nd Tank Horn entered battle with the enemy. Up to 30 German tanks and 20 vehicles with infantry were moving in the direction of the Krymskaya village. As a result of three days of positional battles with enemy tanks and infantry, the company lost two tanks. German losses- 4 tanks and several dozen infantrymen.

The 3rd Tank Company together with the battalion of the 103rd Infantry Brigade attacked the enemy from the eastern outskirts of Crimea several times and did not give the Germans the opportunity to capture the station until the end of the day on August 19. However, the very next day the Germans, having brought up their reserves, captured Crimea. All tanks of the 3rd company of the 126th separate tank battalion were surrounded and died. In this battle, the enemy lost 5 tanks, a mortar battery and up to a company of infantry.

By August 22, 1942, the battalion had lost 30 tanks. At the same time, from air strikes - 5 tanks, from artillery fire and enemy tanks - 21, from flamethrower fire - 1. In addition, 3 tanks were blown up by the crews.

The remaining 6 “twenty-sixths” were used as fixed firing points for the defense of mountain passes 25 km north of Novorossiysk.

The battalion suffered heavy losses due to the improper use of tanks, which, without the support of infantry and artillery, fought defensive battles along a 20 km front in groups of 3–5 vehicles.

T-26 tanks in the Vyazemsky direction. 1941

The personnel of the 126th separate tank battalion fought heroically. The commander of the 2nd company, Lieutenant Meleshko, personally destroyed 4 German medium tanks on his T-26 on August 20, 1942.

Another unit that was armed with a significant number of T-26 tanks was the 207th Tank Brigade. At the beginning of December 1942, it consisted of 52 tanks: 46 T-26 and 6 T-60.

At the end of December, the 207th Tank Brigade fought the most intense battles with the enemy (compared to other tank units of the Transcaucasian Front), trying to destroy the tank battalion of the SS Viking motorized division in the Surkh-Digora area. During December 27 and 28, due to poor organization of combat operations, the brigade lost 37 T-26 and T-60 tanks, while knocking out 14 enemy tanks (10 of them were evacuated by the Germans from the battlefield).

It should be noted that in almost all cases, after the loss of T-26 tanks, the brigades and battalions that had them received combat vehicles of other types, either in mass production or received under Lend-Lease, as replacements. In particular, T-60 and T-70 vehicles entered service with light tank battalions of tank brigades.

In 1943, T-26 tanks were no longer used in most sectors of the Soviet-German front. Basically, they were preserved where the front was quite stable, where long time There were no active hostilities, and also in some rear units.

In this regard, it will be interesting to mention the 151st Tank Brigade (45th Army, Transcaucasian Front). A brigade consisting of 24 T-26s and 19 British light tanks Mk. VII "Tetrarch" guarded the state border of the USSR with Iran. In January 1943, the brigade was transferred to Tuapse at the disposal of the 47th Army.

Repair of the T-26 tank at one of the Leningrad enterprises. 1941

For quite a long time, the “twenty-sixth” remained in the troops of the Leningrad Front. In particular, by the beginning of the operation to lift the blockade in January 1944, the 1st and 220th tank brigades of the Leningrad Front each had 32 T-26 tanks.

On another stable sector of the Soviet-German front - in Karelia and in the Murmansk direction - the T-26 was in service even longer - until the summer of 1944.

The last combat operation of the Soviet Armed Forces, in which the T-26 took part, was the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1945. In the Far East, by 1945, quite a lot of tanks of old brands remained, primarily T-26 and BT-7. They staffed several tank brigades, which throughout the Great Patriotic War were on the Manchurian border and did not participate in hostilities. In order to increase their combat capabilities, in the summer of 1945, 670 T-34-85 tanks arrived from the factories, which equipped the first battalions in these tank brigades. The T-26 or BT-7 tanks remained in service with the second and third battalions. With this composition, these units took part in the battles with the Japanese.

Statement of the task of a tank unit. Sevastopol, January 1942

Before assessing the T-26, it is necessary to decide on the classification. In most modern reference books, this machine is classified as light tanks. This is not entirely true. In fact, the T-26 is a light infantry tank, or a light infantry escort tank.

However, to be absolutely precise, the classic version of the escort tank is a machine-gun version of the T-26. So to speak, a complete analogue of the British Vickers Model A, which was purchased by the Soviet Union. After equipping the T-26 in 1933 with a 45-mm cannon, they received something like a fighter tank. All that remained of the infantry tank was its limited movement speed.

However, regardless of the nuances of the classification, it should be recognized that the Vickers 6-ton model A and its Soviet version T-20 mod. 1931 fully corresponded to the tasks assigned to them. Their maneuverability and armament fully fit into the concept of a light infantry tank. Bulletproof armor protection at that time cannot be considered a disadvantage. At the end of the 1920s, no army in the world had specialized anti-tank guns. There was also no theoretical (and practical) basis for the anti-tank defense system. The tank almost completely dominated the battlefield.

Tank T-26 in the Nevskaya Dubrovka area. Leningrad Front, 1942

T-26 tank in ambush. Western Front, 1942

By the time the T-26 mod. In 1933 the situation changed dramatically. From 1930 to 1933, first 37-mm and then 45-mm anti-tank guns were adopted by the Red Army. The tank version of the latter was armed with the T-26. When assessing the armor protection of a tank, the following criterion exists: its armor must “hold” the shells of its own gun. The T-26's armor absolutely did not meet this criterion. Nor did it “hold” shells from smaller caliber anti-tank guns that had appeared abroad by that time. So by 1933 the T-26 should be considered obsolete. However, understanding of this came only after the war in Spain, and then not to all the military leaders of the country. In any case, work on creating tanks with projectile-proof armor was proceeding neither shaky nor slow. The final verdict on the “twenty-sixth” was passed by Khalkhin Gol and Winter War.

It cannot be said, however, that no steps were taken to strengthen the T-26’s armor. The introduction of the conical turret, and then the inclined armor of the turret box, certainly contributed to an increase in the bullet resistance of the armor. But only bulletproof! It still didn’t save us from shells. A radical increase in armor protection was impossible. Neither the chassis, nor the engine, nor the transmission could withstand the inevitably increasing mass. The weight of the T-26 by the end of serial production had already increased to 12 tons, which had the most negative impact on its technical reliability.

In an amicable way, it was necessary to remove the T-26 from production already in 1936–1937. But hopelessly outdated and conceptually (by this time infantry tanks with powerful armor protection - R-35 and N-35 in France and "Matilda I" in the UK), and technically the car continued to be produced until 1941. It was not possible to begin mass production of the T-50 escort tank, which had armor at the level of the average T-34.

However, the reader is most often concerned not with the question of how outdated the T-26 was in 1941, but with its real capabilities when meeting German tanks. When answering this question, it is necessary to analyze in comparison three main evaluation parameters: mobility, security and firepower.

The mobility of the T-26 was rather poor - it was inferior to all Wehrmacht tanks, with the exception of the Czechoslovak 35(t). The latter was generally close in its performance characteristics to the T-26, since it was created within the framework of the same concept and in the image and likeness of the Vickers 6-ton.

The T-26's protection was even worse - even the German Pz.I (essentially a wedge with a rotating turret) had thicker armor than the T-26. All other light German tanks of 1941 were protected by frontal armor of 25–30 mm, and medium and heavy ones (we remind the reader that until 1942 the Germans divided tanks into classes not by combat weight, but by gun caliber) - up to 50 mm.

“Order - cross the border!” A rally in one of the tank units before the start of the war with Japan. August 1945

Perhaps, only the T-26 had everything in order with its weapons. The powerful (for 1941) 45-mm cannon to a certain extent compensated for the lack of armor protection of the T-26 and equalized the chances in a fire duel with German tanks.

However, it was not the shortcomings of this combat vehicle that caused the high losses of 1941. A number of combat examples given above convincingly prove that with proper use, the T-26 could effectively resist both Pz.III and Pz.IV, and not only in 1941, but also in 1942.

Already in 1929, the command of the Red Army came to the conclusion that the tank armament of the Red Army did not meet modern requirements. It was not possible to solve this problem on our own, because Soviet designers did not have sufficient experience, and the production base of the Soviet Union was still in an undeveloped state. It was possible to get out of the situation only by turning to foreign experience.

In 1930, a delegation from the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, led by Innokenty Khalepsky, purchased a number of equipment models, including tanks, from abroad. Among the purchased vehicles were British Vickers Mk. E, better known as "Vickers six-ton".

This tank model is interesting because none of its modifications were of interest to the British army. And not because the car was bad. It’s just that the military of Foggy Albion, to put it correctly, were too different creative approach to the formation of armored forces. And they decided that the Vickers six-ton ​​tank did not fit into the concept. So the developers had to focus on external consumers.

Double-turret modifications of the tank armed with machine guns were purchased for the USSR. They were assigned the code B-26. At first, the tanks received rather reserved reviews from experts. However, on January 8, 1931, the Vickers were shown to the command of the Red Army and the Moscow Military District. Seeing how dashingly the tanks rushed around the training ground, jumped over trenches and almost spun on the spot, the distinguished guests were delighted. Literally the next day, K. E. Voroshilov gave the order to immediately resolve the issue of the feasibility of organizing mass production of the B-26 in the USSR. The conclusions of the commission led by S. Ginzburg stated that it would be optimal to produce the car not in its original form, but in a “hybrid” form - using structural elements The T-19 tank, which was being developed at that time in the USSR. However, in the end, it was decided to begin production without changes, because, according to intelligence data, Poland was already planning to mass produce and put into service the six-ton ​​Vickers. These data were not entirely true, but the command’s verdict had to be carried out. Vickers went into the series, receiving the index.

The Leningrad Bolshevik plant received the task of producing the T-26. He was heavily loaded with other orders, but there was still no alternative: Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk factories were just under construction. All production work, and later modernization work, was led by S. A. Ginzburg.

In the best traditions of the command-administrative system, the plant was given a completely unrealistic order to produce 500 T-26 tanks by the end of 1931. Almost immediately the plan had to be reduced to 300 pieces, which was also clean water utopia. The entire first half of 1931 was spent just to convert the tank's drawings into metric units, prepare the production base and produce reference samples. At the first stage of work, any attempts to make changes to the design were strictly suppressed, even if they were aimed at simplifying production and improving technology.

Soviet manufacturers managed to copy the elements of the machine. It was not possible to make them work once assembled. Therefore, those 10 tanks that left the assembly lines before the end of the summer could at most be called operational models. Their engines broke down constantly and in a variety of ways. It was considered normal that motor defects should not exceed 65%. The cylinders and pistons in the engines did not fit together, the valves broke, and it was impossible to properly harden the crankshaft. The armored hulls produced by the Izhora plant had through cracks in the armor plates. And the quality of the steel was so low that 10-mm armor could be penetrated by an armor-piercing rifle bullet from 100-150 meters, although this was considered fundamentally impossible. Only by 1934 was it possible to ensure acceptable quality of manufactured vehicles.

The first T-26 models were produced with two machine gun turrets, which were located on the hull next to each other. This design made it possible to fire in different directions simultaneously. This was considered a very good option for an infantry support tank. As an alternative to a machine gun, the option of installing a 37-mm cannon in one of the turrets was considered.

In 1933, a very important change occurred in the design of the T-26. Instead of two turrets, the tank received one - circular rotation. They were going to install a 45-mm gun in it due to its clear superiority in lethality over the 37-mm. They wanted to rearm all new tanks, but due to a shortage in the supply of new guns, until the end of 1933, both single-turret and double-turret tanks were produced. The new turret and gun made the vehicle heavier, so it was necessary to develop a new engine and strengthen the suspension. The designers did not achieve much success here. The T-26 has become much more clumsy and less passable.

By the beginning of 1936, tank builders had finally given up on the concept of wheeled-tracked vehicles. But the tank that had appeared by that time turned out to be too expensive and complex. Work on improving the T-26, which had already been curtailed, had to be resumed. The previous riveted hulls were replaced with welded ones, which increased their strength. The design of the gun mantlet was changed and the fuel supply scheme was improved. We changed the design of the chassis, thanks to new technology hardening with high-frequency currents made it possible to achieve exceptional strength of the track pins.

But all these improvements could not affect the fact that by the end of the 30s, the T-26 was no longer even the most outstanding combat vehicle among its weight counterparts. Various countries already had tanks in service that were comparable or even superior to it. An attempt was made to arm the tank with a 76-mm cannon, but due to a defect in the gun, powder gases leaked into the fighting compartment, so the work was curtailed.

The T-26 was first used in combat during the Spanish Civil War. The tanks supplied to the Republicans by the Soviet Union took part in almost all operations and performed very well. Although a significant role in the fact that the T-26 was a formidable adversary was played by the fact that it was opposed by German and italian tanks, armed with machine guns. At the same time, due to weak armor, Soviet tanks were easily destroyed by enemy guns. Having assessed the results of the use of the T-26 by the Spaniards, Soviet designers installed additional armor screens on it.

Soviet tank crews tested the T-26 during the battles near Lake Khasan. As a result of inept command, the tanks suffered heavy losses. So, during the assault on the Zaozernaya hill, the vehicles encountered well-prepared anti-tank defense. Taking into account the weak armor of the Soviet tank, a frontal assault simply could not help but end in heavy losses. And so it happened: 85 cars were hit, 9 of them were burned. Based on the results of this forced test by shelling, Red Army commanders noted in their reports the high survivability of the tank. The T-26 could withstand five or six hits from Japanese shells. One can only regret that this quality was determined not in testing conditions, but in real combat.

In all the conflicts where the T-26 was used, the traditional problem of Soviet tanks - low reliability - manifested itself in all its glory. A large number of vehicles failed without taking part in the battle. During Soviet-Finnish war In 1939-1940, the Red Army lost 3,178 tanks on the Karelian Isthmus, of which 1,275 were due to technical reasons. In general, this war was very difficult for tanks, since the fighting took place in terrain that was not very suitable for armored heavy equipment.

By June 22, 1941, the troops had about 10 thousand tanks of this type. Their use in initial period The war can safely be called a failure. The first reason for the huge losses and extremely low efficiency of the T-26 is the technical weakness and backwardness of the vehicle. Even in the thirties, this tank was ordinary and did not stand out in any way. By 1941 he had become downright weak. Its armor provided only bulletproof protection. Due to the low-power engine, the tank had very low mobility. Besides, he was unreliable. A large percentage of T-26 losses occur in vehicles abandoned by the crews due to breakdowns for which there were no material resources or time to eliminate them.

The second reason is the human factor. Objectively speaking, the level of Red Army commanders at that time was very low. Often they simply had no idea how to properly use armored vehicles. Frontal attacks on the enemy were used, which were suicidal for the “cardboard” T-26. Instead of using tanks in large numbers, units were fragmented down to individual vehicles. There was practically no coordination between units, because the troops had very few walkie-talkies, and even those that they had, they often did not know how to use. The situation with commander cards was also catastrophic. Often I had to navigate according to a diagram drawn somehow by hand. But even if the commander had a map, this did not mean that he knew how to handle it (many such cases were recorded in memoirs and reports).

This weight led to the fact that most of the T-26 tanks were lost in the first six months of the Great Patriotic War.

The last battle in which these vehicles took part was the defeat of the Kwantung Army in the Far East in 1945.

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