Man-made disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP: what really happened. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station or the Yenisei raged

The tragedy at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP occurred on August 17 at 08:13 local time (04:13 Moscow time).

Due to the destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2, water began to flow into the power plant room under high pressure. The load on the hydroelectric power station almost immediately dropped to zero, constantly arriving water in a short time flooded the entire hall and the technical rooms below it. All ten hydraulic units of the station were damaged, three of them were completely destroyed. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the HPP.

As a result of the disaster, 75 people died and 13 were injured. Up to 50 tons of turbine oil got into the Yenisei.

The accident at the hydroelectric power station has no analogues in the domestic and world hydropower industry.

About the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after P.S. Neporozhny (SSHGES) is the most powerful hydroelectric power station in Russia. Its installed capacity is 6400 MW, the annual output is about 24 billion kW/h. The HPP is located on the Yenisei River in Khakassia near the city of Sayanogorsk. Included in JSC "RusHydro" as a branch of the company.

Construction of the station began in 1968. The first of ten HPP hydroelectric units was launched in December 1978, the last - in December 1985. The station was put into commercial operation in 2000.

SSHHPP is a high-pressure hydroelectric power plant of the dam type. Its pressure front is formed by a concrete arch-gravity dam deeply cut into the rocky shores. The height of the hydraulic structure is 245 m, the length along the crest is 1074.4 m, the width along the base is 105.7 m and along the crest is 25 m. The area of ​​the reservoir is 621 sq. m. km. There are 10 hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each in the turbine hall of the station.

Continuation

Rescue operation

Emergency Minister Sergei Shoigu and Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko flew to the scene of a large-scale emergency. During the night of August 17-18, the number of people involved in the elimination of the consequences of the accident increased tenfold.

The flooded premises were examined by divers. The search and rescue operation was carried out mainly in the engine room of the hydroelectric station. "Divers work in difficult conditions: the water is muddy, mixed with engine oil, but all corners of the engine room are carefully examined," said Alexander Kresan, head of the Siberian search and rescue team.

On the day of the accident, two people were saved, but already on August 18, the probability of finding living people in the flood zone was assessed as insignificant.

If a person got into an air bubble, then there is hope for his salvation. If he ended up in water, given that its temperature does not exceed four degrees, then the chances of saving him are minimal.

Alexander Tolokonnikov

former general director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station

On August 20, the pumping of water from the premises of the turbine hall began, by this time the number of victims had reached 17 people.

RusHydro announced that it plans to pay more than 300 million rubles in support of the families of the dead and injured.

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"The largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world"

The investigation into the causes of the disaster was carried out through several departments. Immediately after the accident, the Investigative Committee joined him as part of an initiated criminal case, and a commission of Rostekhnadzor was also created.

First versions

Initially, a water hammer version was put forward as a possible cause of the accident, but it did not find support, as well as the version of a transformer explosion that caused the wall of the turbine hall to collapse. The Investigative Committee ruled out the possibility of a terrorist attack.

RusHydro specialists suggested that the accident occurred as a result of the destruction of the turbine due to a factory defect. However, the heads of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Energy warned against hasty conclusions.

Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko called what happened at the largest Russian hydroelectric power station "the largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world."

Report of Rostekhnadzor

On October 3, 2009, Rostekhnadzor submitted a report on the investigation into the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The document ran to over 100 pages. It was prepared by a commission of 26 specialists led by the head of the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear Supervision Nikolai Kutyin. In the act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident, it was noted that the accident occurred due to a combination of reasons, including negligence, technical and organizational miscalculations.

Rostekhnadzor, which once every three years came and checked the state of the station, should act as an "axe" that constantly hangs over the management of the station

Vladimir Pekhtin

co-chairman of the commission from the State Duma

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the last unit of which was put into operation in 1985, was officially put into operation only 15 years later, in 2000, without a state examination. The corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais, who at that time headed RAO UES of Russia. The report also said that several dozen cases of turbine equipment failures occurred during the initial period of operation of the HPP.

The Rostekhnadzor Commission named six people involved in the accident at the hydroelectric power station. Among them - the former head of RAO "UES of Russia" Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, CEO TGC-1 Boris Vainzikher, Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation in 2001-2004 Igor Yusufov. The list of persons involved in the accident also includes Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Central Commission for Commissioning the Sayano-Shushensky Hydropower Complex in 2000 Anatoly Dyakov and Managing Director, Head of the Yug Division of the RusHydro Company, Chief Engineer of the SSHHPP in 1983- 2006 Valentin Stafievsky.

Report of Rostekhnadzor: six involved

As noted in the document, Vyacheslav Sinyugin carried out decisions on the withdrawal of repair personnel from the HPP staff list, without ensuring that the requirements for regular monitoring were included in the repair and maintenance contracts technical condition main equipment. He "did not create the conditions for a proper assessment of the real state of safety of the SSHHPP. He did not take effective measures to develop, finance and implement compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP, including not ensuring the implementation of the decision on the speedy construction of an additional spillway at the SSHHPP, did not take effective measures on the replacement of impellers on hydraulic units that reduce the impact of "non-recommended zones" of their operation, did not ensure the adoption of a program for the safe operation of hydraulic units involved in power control and, therefore, having increased wear.

Boris Vainzikher, according to the conclusions of the commission, was responsible for the introduction of RAO "UES" standards aimed at strengthening the safe operation of equipment and did not ensure the safe operation of the SSHHPP at the proper level.

Anatoly Chubais, the document notes, "approved the Act of the Central Commission for the acceptance into operation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex. At the same time, a proper assessment was not given to the actual state of safety of the SSHHPP." In addition, timely compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSH HPP were not developed and implemented, including the decision to “start work on the construction of an additional spillway at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP as soon as possible”, impellers on hydroelectric units were not replaced, and a program was not developed compensatory measures for the safe operation of hydraulic units involved in power control and, therefore, having increased wear.

Valentin Stafievsky, according to the conclusions of Rostekhnadzor, "knowing about the real state of the equipment operated at the SSHHPP, did not create conditions for RusHydro to take effective measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP. Participated in the removal of maintenance personnel from the staff list, failing to ensure compliance with the requirements for regular monitoring of the technical condition of the main equipment SShGES".

Anatoly Dyakov was the chairman of the Central Commission for the acceptance into operation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex and signed the acceptance certificate with an assessment of "good". "The act of the commission did not fully reflect the actual state of the operating buildings, structures and equipment of the SSHHPP, which created the prerequisites for underestimating the real consequences of further operation," the Rostekhnadzor document says.

Igor Yusufov, "being the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, he did not create mechanisms for real state control and supervision over the safe operation of energy facilities, including those included in RAO UES of Russia," the act of Rostekhnadzor notes. Yusufov, the document says, "did not provide development and adoption of the foundations of state policy in the field of safe operation of energy facilities, contributed to the transfer of control functions from the state to operating organizations without making decisions on increasing their responsibility for the energy security of the Russian Federation"

Continuation

Rostekhnadzor also reported that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was related to the fire at the Bratsk HPP on 16 August. It was because of this that the load on the SSHHPP had to be increased and the second hydroelectric unit had to be put into operation. “It cannot be said that the Bratsk hydroelectric power station is to blame for the accident at Sayano-Shushenskaya, but the conditions were created just at the time of the fire at Bratskaya,” said Nikolai Kutyin, head of Rostekhnadzor.

Parliamentary Conclusions

In parallel with the commission of Rostekhnadzor, a parliamentary commission established in September 2009 conducted its own investigation. Members of the commission - deputies and senators - visited the accident site and enterprises that produced equipment for hydroelectric power plants.

The commission determined that more than 20 persons were involved in creating the conditions for the accident. Among them are the management of the station, including the general director and chief engineer, technical services that were responsible for repair work and the technical condition of the equipment, as well as organizations that supplied various equipment to the hydroelectric power station, including automation.

The commission turned to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation with a request to identify the persons involved in the accident and establish the degree of their guilt.

Immediate cause of the accident

In the course of the investigation into the causes of the accident, the commission of Rostekhnadzor and the parliamentary commission named the direct cause of the destruction of hydroelectric unit No. 2 as the fatigue failure of the turbine cover fastening studs as a result of vibration.

Continuation

Sentence for seven defendants

More than 300 witnesses were interrogated in the case, 234 examinations were carried out, including forensic, genetic, technical, metallurgical, as well as explosive and seismological examinations.

"Due to the large amount of materials, and more than 850 material evidence was attached to the criminal case, the examinations lasted for a year, based on the results of which a mathematical model of the development of the accident was compiled," said Vladimir Markin, a representative of the Investigative Committee.

accusation

Seven employees of the station were in the dock: director of the SSHHPP Nikolai Nevolko, chief engineer Andrey Mitrofanov and his deputies Yevgeny Shervarli, Gennady Nikitenko, as well as employees of the HPP equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach.

The families of the victims still cannot come to terms with the loss of loved ones. However, a month ago, information appeared that the perpetrators of the accident would allegedly go unpunished. The fact that the criminal case can be closed due to the limitation of time has outraged people

Nikolai Popov

They were charged with violating the rules of labor protection, which negligently caused the death of a person. The article provided for imprisonment for up to three years. But by the time the case was received by the prosecutor's office on December 8, 2011, amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation came into force, and this article was classified as a minor gravity. The statute of limitations for it is 2 years and by that time had actually expired, in connection with which the prosecutor's office returned the criminal case for additional investigation.

Investigative actions in the case of the accident at the SSHHPP were completed in June 2012. Seven defendants were charged under a new article - Part 3 of Art. 216 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - "Violation of safety rules in the course of work, resulting in the death of more than two persons and causing major damage." They face seven years in prison.

According to investigators, the defendants for a long time allowed the operation of the hydraulic unit No. 2 in an unsatisfactory vibration state. HPP employees were inactive and did not take measures to eliminate the malfunction, including during the scheduled repairs carried out in January-March 2009.

162 people were recognized as victims. On June 4, 2013, the criminal case was sent for consideration to the Sayanogorsk City Court of the Republic of Khakassia. On July 15, 2013, preliminary hearings were held in the court and on July 19, the trial began.

Sentence and amnesty

On December 24, 2014, the defendants in the criminal case on the accident at the hydroelectric power station were sentenced. The former director of the hydroelectric power plant, Nikolai Nevolko, was sentenced to 6 years in a penal colony, the same term was given to chief engineer Andrei Mitrofanov. His deputies Yevgeny Shervarli and Gennady Nikitenko were sentenced to 5.5 years and 5 years 9 months in a penal colony. Employees of the equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach were sentenced to 4.5 years in prison without the right to occupy leadership positions. Moreover, Vladimir Beloborodov was released under an amnesty.

19 complaints were filed against the decision of the Sayanogorsk city court by the victims, the defense and convicts. Three victims individuals, as well as a representative of the RusHydro company, which was also recognized as the injured party, asked to acquit the convicts. In turn, the state prosecution asked to leave the verdict unchanged.

On May 26, the Supreme Court of Khakassia changed the verdict of two defendants in the case. Employees of the HPP equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko and Alexander Klyukach, previously sentenced to 4.5 years in prison, were granted an amnesty on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. The rest of the defendants were left the sentence unchanged.

The statute of limitations for the criminal case on the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP expired on August 17, 2015. If the decision of the Sayanogorsk Court had not entered into force before this date, all the convicts would have been released and the case closed.

Restoration work and modernization of the station

It took more than five years and 41 billion rubles to restore the HPP. The first work at the station began in August 2009. By October, the blockages in the engine room were dismantled, by November the walls and roof of the hall were restored, which made it possible to create a thermal circuit and ensure work was carried out in the cold season.

At the first stage (2010-2011), hydroelectric units Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 least damaged in the accident were restored and a new hydroelectric unit No. 1 was put into operation (in December 2011). In October 2011, a new onshore bypass spillway of the HPP was put into permanent operation, allowing for additional water flow of up to 4 thousand cubic meters. m (the cost of construction is about 7 billion rubles) and meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters.

At the second stage (2012-2013), new hydraulic units No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 began to operate, and the previously restored units No. 5 and 6 were replaced with new ones.

At the final stage in 2014, the updated unit No. 4 was included in the network - on May 22, President Vladimir Putin gave the command to launch it during a video bridge - and the equipment at unit No. 3 was updated.

The production and installation of new hydroelectric units for the station was carried out by OJSC Power Machines (a contract worth 11.7 billion rubles was signed with OJSC RusHydro on November 30, 2009).

Work on the reconstruction of the station was completed in November 2014, the station has reached its design capacity (6400 megawatts).

Completion of the full modernization of the HPP is scheduled for 2015.

What has changed since the emergency

After a large-scale accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, it was decided to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of the station and equip it with new and modern equipment with improved performance and meeting all reliability and safety requirements.

The service life of the new hydraulic units has been increased to 40 years. Open switchgear units will be replaced with closed type units to reduce wear and tear. The HPP will have a complex automated system control of the state of the dam. Commissioned in permanent operation in October 2011, the new onshore bypass spillway of the station meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters, it allows for additional water passage of up to 4000 cubic meters. m per second. Also in 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation instructed, during scheduled repairs, to replace all turbine cover fasteners and install registration devices ("black boxes") at all Russian hydroelectric power plants.

Station map

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station on the Yenisei River is the largest hydroelectric power station in Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world. It is located on the border of the Krasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia. The construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1968, the first hydroelectric unit was put into operation in 1978, the last - in 1985. The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000 . Technically, the HPP consists of a concrete arch-gravity dam 245 m high and a hydroelectric dam building, which houses 10 radial-axial hydroelectric units with a capacity of 640 MW each. The installed capacity of HPPs is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 22.8 billion kWh. The HPP dam forms a large seasonally regulated Sayano-Shushenskoye reservoir. Downstream of the Yenisei is the counter-regulating Mainskaya hydroelectric power station, which, with the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, forms a single production complex. The HPP facilities were designed by the Lenhydroproekt Institute, the hydraulic power equipment was supplied by the LMZ and Electrosila plants (now part of the Power Machines concern). The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is owned by JSC RusHydro.

Catastrophe

At the time of the accident, the station carried a load of 4100 MW, out of 10 hydroelectric units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13 local time on August 17, 2009 there was a sudden destruction of the hydraulic unit No. 2 with the flow of significant volumes of water through the shaft of the hydraulic unit under high pressure. The power plant personnel, who were in the engine room, heard a loud bang in the area of ​​hydroelectric unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. Oleg Myakishev, an eyewitness to the accident, describes this moment as follows:

Streams of water quickly flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, while short circuits occurred on the working hydroelectric generators (their flashes are clearly visible on the amateur video of the disaster), which put them out of action. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a de-energization of the station itself. A light and sound alarm went off at the station's central control console, after which the console was de-energized - operational communications, power supply to lighting, automation and signaling devices were lost. The automatic systems that stop the hydraulic units worked only on the hydraulic unit No. 5, the guide vane of which was automatically closed. The gates at the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and water continued to flow through the water lines to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (the stators and crosses of the generators were badly damaged). Water flows and flying fragments of hydroelectric units completely destroyed the walls and floors of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydraulic aggregates No. 2, 3, 4. Hydroaggregates No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with fragments of the turbine hall. Those employees of the station who had such an opportunity quickly left the scene of the accident.

At the time of the accident, the chief engineer of the HPP A.N. Mitrofanov, the acting chief of staff of the civil defense and emergency situations M.I. Chiglintsev, the head of the equipment monitoring service A.V. Matvienko, the head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift supervisor M. G. Nefyodov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the territory of the station after the accident.

Due to the loss of power supply, the gates could only be closed manually, for which the personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 08:30, eight operational personnel reached the shutter room, after which they contacted the station shift supervisor by cell phone, who instructed the shutters to be lowered. Having broken the iron door, the station workers A. V. Kataytsev, R. Gaifullin, E. V. Kondrattsev, I. M. Bagautdinov, P. A. Mayoroshin and N. N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates of water intakes within an hour by stopping the flow of water into the engine room. The closure of water conduits led to the need to open the gates of the spillway dam in order to ensure sanitary release in the downstream of the SSHHPP. By 11:32 a.m., the dam crest gantry crane was powered by a mobile diesel generator, and at 11:50 a.m. the gate lifting operation began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water flow began.

Rescue work

Search and rescue, repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees of the Siberian Regional Center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations. On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, Sergey Shoigu, flew to the area of ​​the accident, who led the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident, the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to examine the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in "air bags" and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, as early as August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as negligible. On August 20, pumping of water from the turbine hall began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been found, 58 people were listed as missing. As the internal premises of the station were freed from water, the number of found bodies of the dead grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when work on pumping water entered the final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of a search and rescue operation to the phase of restoring facilities and equipment. On August 28, the state of emergency introduced in connection with the accident was canceled in Khakassia. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the HPP) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5,000 m³ of debris was dismantled and removed, more than 277,000 m³ of water was pumped out of the station premises. In order to eliminate oil pollution in the Yenisei water area, 9683 meters of booms were installed and 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

Investigation of the causes of the accident

The investigation into the causes of the accident was carried out independently by various departments. Immediately after the accident, a commission of Rostekhnadzor was created, an investigation committee under the prosecutor's office began its investigation as part of an initiated criminal case under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of labor protection rules). On September 16, the State Duma created a parliamentary commission to investigate the causes of the accident, led by V. A. Pekhtin. The non-obviousness of the causes of the accident (according to the Minister of Energy of Russia S. I. Shmatko, “this is the largest and most incomprehensible hydropower accident that has ever happened in the world”) caused the emergence of a number of versions that did not find their confirmation in the future. Immediately after the accident, a version of the water hammer was voiced, and there were also suggestions about the explosion of the transformer. The version of a terrorist act was also considered - in particular, one of the groups of Chechen separatists posted a statement stating that the accident was the result of sabotage; however, no traces of explosives were found at the crash site. The Rostechnadzor commission initially planned to announce the causes of the accident and the amount of damage caused by September 15, but the final meeting of the commission was first postponed to September 17 due to "the need to further clarify certain technological aspects in the draft final act of the commission", and then postponed for another 10 days. "The act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident..." was published on October 3, 2009. The report of the parliamentary commission investigating the circumstances of the accident was presented on 21 December 2009. The investigation, conducted by the Investigative Committee, was completed on March 23, 2011.

Causes of the accident

The results of the investigation of the accident by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the website of the department in the form of a document under official name"The act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 in the branch of the Open Joint Stock Company RusHydro - Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhny. The act provides general information about the hydroelectric power plant, lists the events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The immediate cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows:

The parliamentary commission, the results of which were published on December 21, 2009 under the official title "Final Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Investigation of the Circumstances Related to the Emergence of a Man-made Emergency at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP on August 17, 2009", formulated the causes of the accident as follows:

Prerequisites

Operating zones of hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Changes in the readings of the sensor of radial vibrations of the bearing of the turbine of the hydraulic unit No. 2

Hydro unit No. 2 underwent the last overhaul in 2005, its last average repair was carried out in the period from January 14 to March 16, 2009. After the repair, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibrations of the equipment were recorded, which, nevertheless, remained within the permissible values. During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration state gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it passed the permissible level. The deterioration continued in the future; so, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 microns, with the maximum allowable 160 microns; at 8:13, just before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the plant, in accordance with regulatory documents, was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the causes of increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed at hydroelectric unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and the plant management when making decisions.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, like other large hydroelectric power plants, played an important role in the system of automatic control of the mode of power systems by frequency and power flows (ARChM) of the United Energy System of Siberia and was equipped with a group control system of active and reactive power (GRARM), which allowed automatic control of change the load on hydroelectric units depending on the current needs of the power system. The GRARM algorithm of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP provided for the inadmissibility of the operation of hydraulic units in a zone not recommended for operation, but did not limit the number of passages of hydraulic units through this zone in the process of changing their power according to GRARM commands. In 2009, hydroelectric unit No. 2 passed through the zone of non-recommended work 232 times, being in it for a total of 46 minutes (for comparison, hydroelectric unit No. 4 made 490 passes through the zone of non-recommended work during the same period of time, having worked in it for 1 hour 38 minutes ). It should be noted that the operation of hydraulic units in the zone not recommended for operation was not prohibited by the turbine manufacturer, and there were also no restrictions on the passage of hydraulic units through this zone.

Development of the accident

Hydroelectric unit No. 2 was put into operation from the reserve at 23:14 local time (19:14 Moscow time) on August 16, 2009 and was assigned by the plant personnel as a priority for changing the load when the power control ranges were exhausted. The change in the power of the hydraulic unit was carried out automatically under the influence of the GRARM regulator in accordance with the commands of the ARCM. At that moment, the station was operating according to the planned dispatch schedule. At 20:20 Moscow time, a fire was recorded in one of the premises of the Bratsk HPP, as a result of which the communication lines between the Bratsk HPP and the dispatching office of the Siberian energy system were damaged (a number of media hastened to declare these events the “trigger” of the disaster, which forced the launch of the ill-fated hydraulic unit No. 2, overlooking the fact that by this point it was already in the works). Since the Bratskaya HPP, which operated under the control of the ARCM, "fell" out of the control of the system, the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP took over its role, and at 20:31 Moscow time the dispatcher gave the command to transfer the GRARM station to the automatic control mode from the ARCM. In total, 6 hydraulic units (No. 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) worked under the control of GRARM, three more hydro units (No. 3, 8 and 10) worked under the individual control of personnel, hydro unit No. 6 was under repair.

From 08:12 there was a decrease in the capacity of hydroelectric unit No. 2 at the direction of GRARM. When the hydraulic unit entered the zone not recommended for operation, the turbine cover studs broke. The destruction of a significant part of the 80 studs was due to fatigue phenomena; at the time of the accident, six studs (out of 41 examined) were missing nuts - probably due to self-loosening as a result of vibration (their locking was not provided for by the turbine design). Under the influence of water pressure in the hydraulic unit, the rotor of the hydraulic unit with the turbine cover and the upper cross began to move upward, and, due to depressurization, water began to fill the volume of the turbine shaft, acting on the generator elements. When the impeller rim reached the level of 314.6 m, the impeller switched to the pumping mode and, due to the stored energy of the generator rotor, created excess pressure on the input edges of the impeller blades, which led to the breakage of the guide vane blades. Through the vacated shaft of the hydraulic unit, water began to flow into the machine room of the station. The automatic control systems of hydroelectric units, which stop them in case of emergency, could only function if there was power supply, but in the conditions of flooding of the turbine hall and a massive short circuit of electrical equipment, the power supply to the station itself was lost very quickly, and the automation managed to stop only one hydroelectric unit - No. 5. Water inflow to the station turbine hall continued until the station personnel manually closed the emergency gates from the crest of the dam, which was completed by 9.30.

According to the head of Rostekhnadzor N.G. Kutyin, a similar accident associated with the destruction of the hydraulic unit cover fasteners (but without human casualties) already happened in 1983 at the Nurek hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan, but the USSR Ministry of Energy decided to classify information about that incident.

Alleged perpetrators

The act of the commission of Rostekhnadzor indicates six officials involved, in her opinion, "in creating conditions conducive to the occurrence of an accident", including the former head of RAO UES of Russia A. B. Chubais, the former technical director of RAO UES of Russia B. F. Vainzikher, the former head of JSC " RusHydro "V. Yu. Sinyugin and former Minister of Energy I. Kh. Yusufov. In addition, the act contains the names of 19 officials "responsible for the prevention of incidents and accidents at the plant", and lists the violations identified by the commission in the course of their implementation. official duties. Among these persons are the management of JSC RusHydro, headed by the acting chairman of the board V. A. Zubakin, as well as the management of the HPP, headed by its director N. I. Nevolko. On August 28, 2009, N. I. Nevolko was removed from the post of director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, on October 26, 2009, the board of directors of JSC RusHydro terminated the powers of S. A. Yushin (the financial director of the company) and A. V. Toloshinov ( head of the Siberia division of the company, former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP). On November 23, 2009, the powers of V. A. Zubakin, acting chairman of the company's board, as well as 4 members of the company's board, were terminated. E. V. Dod, who previously headed JSC Inter RAO UES, was elected the new head of JSC RusHydro. In the report of the parliamentary commission, 19 people were named as involved in the accident, including 10 people representing the management of the station, 5 people who were members of the management of JSC RusHydro, 2 officials of Rostekhnadzor, as well as the heads of OOO Rakurs and OOO Promavtomatika who carried out work on the creation and installation of control systems for hydroelectric units. On December 16, 2010, the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee charged the former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP; On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee announced the completion of the investigation. 162 people were recognized as victims in the case. The investigation brought charges under article 143 part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of safety regulations and other labor protection rules, committed by a person who was responsible for observing these rules, which negligently caused the death of two or more persons):

• former director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP Nikolai Nevolko;
• First Deputy Director - Chief Engineer of the station Andrey Mitrofanov;
• Gennady Nikitenko, Deputy Chief Engineer for the technical part of the station;
• former Deputy Chief Engineer for Station Operation Yevgeny Shervarli;
• Alexander Matviyenko, Head of Station Equipment Monitoring Service;
• Lead Engineer for Adjustment and Testing of the Monitoring Service ( former boss laboratory of technical diagnostics) of the station to Vladimir Beloborodov;
• to the leading engineer of the equipment monitoring section of the equipment monitoring service (former leading engineer of the technical diagnostics laboratory - group of vibration and strength measurements) of the station Alexander Klyukach.

Criticism of the official version of the causes of the accident

Some of the conclusions set out in the act of the commission of Rostekhnadzor are criticized by a number of experts as unfounded. In particular, it is noted that the conclusion about the unacceptable level of vibrations of hydraulic unit No. 2 is based on the readings of only one sensor (TP R NB), which cannot be considered reliable, since this sensor showed exorbitant vibrations even when the hydraulic unit was stopped, which indicates a sensor malfunction. Nine other vibration sensors installed at hydroelectric unit No. 2 did not record increased vibration, but their readings were not given in the Rostekhnadzor report. The normal vibration state of hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident is confirmed by data from an automatic seismometric station located on the dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Specialists CKTI them. II Polzunov, the leading scientific and technical institute in Russia in the field of hydropower equipment, concluded that the passages of hydroelectric unit No. 2 through a non-recommended zone could not be the direct cause of the destruction of the studs.

It should be noted that the act of Rostekhnadzor was signed by two members of the commission (Khaziakhmetov R. M. and Meteleva T. G.) with dissenting opinions that were not published.

Chief engineer of the institute "Lengidroproekt" (general designer of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) Ph.D. n. B. N. Yurkevich at the IV All-Russian Conference of Hydropower Engineers (Moscow, February 25-27, 2010) stated the following:

The peculiarity of this accident, which had a very strong psychological impact on all of us, is that it occurred under normal conditions. It happened when everything worked properly, repair regulations were followed, and operating requirements were met. No one violated anything, the station fully complied with all norms and requirements, the operating personnel complied with all prescribed regulations.

At the end of June 2012, a few days after the announcement of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Investigative Committee) on the completion of investigative measures in the criminal case of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the press service of RusHydro issued the following statement:

We are aware of the conclusions of the TFR, formed on the basis of the results of the investigation. The company previously received for review the results of a comprehensive technical examination (CTE), commissioned by the Investigative Committee by the Center for Independent Forensic Expertise of the Russian environmental fund TECHECO.

In the course of studying the CHP, RusHydro's technical experts concluded that the factors identified in this document as the causes of the accident are ambiguous. ... We believe that a professional look at the problem will clearly determine the causes of what happened ...

At the same time, KHPP sets out an approach to the causes of the accident, which is considered to be official.

In this regard, it should be mentioned that during the first year that has passed since the Sayan catastrophe, Ph.D. n. Yuri Lobanovsky for its explanation, as a development of the ideas of Dr. F.-M. n. Valery Okulov, the theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations of pressure systems of hydroelectric power plants was created. Its main provisions and results of application not only to the events that occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, but also to similar incidents at other hydroelectric power plants are briefly described below.

According to the theory of Yu. I. Lobanovsky, the separation of the turbine cover of the second hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and the ejection of its central unit to a height of about 14 meters occurred as a result of a catastrophic increase in pressure pulsations in the water conduit of the hydroelectric unit. The pulsations arose as a result of the excitation of self-oscillations in the water conduit by a precessing out-of-turbine vortex (that is, a vortex whose axis of rotation rotates itself). Then this first self-oscillatory process initiated a second, more powerful one, the development of which, as a result, led to a catastrophe. Such a scenario describes everything that happened at the time of the catastrophe, and is fully consistent with the phenomena observed there.

According to the author of the theory, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is the most famous incident of this kind, but it was not the first. 5 more hydro- and hydroaccumulating stations are known, in the water conduits of which either self-oscillations were excited, or balancing took place at the very border of this dangerous phenomenon. In particular, such processes were observed three times at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The application of the theory of hydroacoustic excitation of self-oscillations and the purposeful collection of information on various strange and obscure incidents with detachment of turbine covers of hydroelectric units, as well as the occurrence of very strong vibrations that do not allow for the normal operation of these units, made it possible to fully understand the details of what happened to the second hydroelectric unit SSH HPP August 17, 2009.

Lobanovsky outlined his arguments in a number of works. The result is summed up in the article "The Threat to the Chosen Ones", and a more detailed justification of the proposed approach is described in the work "Hydroacoustic excitation of the pressure system of the second hydraulic unit of the SSH HPP - the cause of the Sayan catastrophe". Two articles were published in the specialized journal "Hydrotechnical construction": "Auto-oscillations of pressure systems and the destruction of hydroelectric units" and "On the calculations of the hydroacoustic stability of Yali, Teri and Irganai hydroelectric power plants" . The results of the research were reported in the report "Hydroacoustics of the water conduit / turbine system and the safety of HPPs and PSPPs" at a scientific and practical conference within the framework of the International Congress "Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia: the priority vector of development is safety."

At the same time, the conclusions of Lobanovsky, who had not previously been involved in research in the field of hydropower, are criticized by some specialized experts as unfounded, primarily by B.N. Yurkevich, the chief engineer of Lenhydroproekt OJSC, where the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was designed. He wrote a review of an article by Yu. I. Lobanovsky in the journal "Hydrotechnical Construction" about self-oscillations in pressure systems. Lobanovsky, in turn, wrote a response to Yurkevich's review, in which he criticized his conclusions.

Effects

Social Consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the turbine hall of the station, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the hall floor (327 m mark) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor level (at elevations of 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were employees of the station, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work ( most of of them - employees of JSC Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the zone affected by the accident). As a result of the accident, 75 people died and 13 people were injured. The body of the last deceased was found on September 23 . with an indication of the places where the bodies were found was published in the act of the technical investigation of the commission of Rostekhnadzor. A large number of The death toll is explained by the presence of most people in the internal premises of the station below the floor level of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these premises.

From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who could be inside the water-flooded turbine hall were disappointing. In particular, a member of the board of the RusHydro company, the former general director of the HPP, Alexander Toloshinov, said:

The lack of official information about the accident and the state of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, later, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the settlements lying downstream of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk, Abakan, Minusinsk . Residents hurriedly left to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby higher ground, leading to many queues at gas stations, traffic jams, and car accidents. According to Sergei Shoigu,

In this regard, the Khakass Department of the Federal Antimonopoly Service conducted an inspection of gasoline prices, which did not reveal an increase.

Compensation and social assistance

Financial assistance to the families of the victims was provided from various sources. RusHydro made payments in the amount of 1 million rubles to the families of each of the victims, separately paid two months' wages for the victims, and allocated funds for organizing the funeral. Those who survived but were injured in the accident received lump-sum payments ranging from 50,000 to 150,000 rubles, depending on the severity of the damage. The company is working to provide housing for families in need, and also implements other social programs assistance to the families of the victims. In total, the company allocated 185 million rubles for social assistance programs.

The family of each deceased was given compensation in the amount of 1.1 million rubles additionally from federal budget.

As part of its own charitable program, Sberbank of Russia undertook to repay mortgage loans to the families of the victims for a total of 6 million rubles.

Environmental consequences

The accident rendered negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of the thrust bearings of hydraulic units, from the destroyed control systems of the guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting slick stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m³, of which approximately 45 m³, mainly turbine oil, entered the river. In order to prevent further spread of oil along the river, booms were installed; to facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent was used, but it was not possible to promptly stop the distribution of oil products; The spot was completely eliminated only on August 24, and it was planned to complete the coastal cleanup by December 31, 2009. Water pollution with oil products has led to the death of about 400 tons of industrial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river; there were no facts of fish death in the Yenisei itself. The total amount of environmental damage is tentatively estimated at 63 million rubles.

Economic consequences

Damage to structures and equipment of the power plant

As a result of the accident, hydraulic unit No. 2 was completely destroyed and thrown out of the shaft, and the shaft of the hydraulic unit was also destroyed. At hydraulic units No. 7 and No. 9, generators were destroyed. Other hydraulic units also received significant damage. The walls and roof of the machine room were destroyed in the area of ​​hydraulic units No. 2, 3, 4. In the area of ​​hydro units No. 2, 7, 9, the overlap of the machine room was destroyed. Other equipment of the station, located in and near the turbine hall, received varying degrees of damage - transformers, cranes, elevators, and electrical equipment. The total losses associated with equipment damage are estimated at 7 billion rubles. According to the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Sergey Shmatko, the cost of restoring the SSHPP may exceed 40 billion rubles. "Only the turbine hall will be largely replaced - by about 90% - the cost will be up to 40 billion rubles," he said. The Minister stressed that the restoration of the HPP is in any case beneficial, since the dam, which was not damaged in the accident, is 80% of the total cost of the plant. According to the management of JSC RusHydro, the full restoration of the station may take more than four years. The need to allocate funds for the restoration of the station led to the need to change the investment program of JSC RusHydro.

The property of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was insured by ROSNO for $200 million, and employees were also insured by ROSNO for 500,000 rubles each. Property risks under this contract are reinsured for international market, predominantly in Munich Re. The civil liability of the owner of the HPP, JSC RusHydro, was insured by AlfaStrakhovanie, the sum insured amounted to 30 million rubles. in all cases (according to the data given in the act of investigating the causes of the accident, civil liability was insured for a total of 78.1 million rubles).

Impact of the accident on the power system

As a result of the accident, a number of industrial enterprises were completely or partially disconnected from the power supply for a short time: the Sayan Aluminum Plant, the Khakass Aluminum Plant, the Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Plant, the Kuznetsk Ferroalloy Plant, the Novokuznetsk Aluminum Plant, a number of coal mines and cuts; power supply was disrupted, including social facilities and the population, in the Altai Territory, the Kemerovo Region, the Republic of Khakassia, the Novosibirsk Region, the Tomsk Region Siberia and the Central Dispatching Office, which quickly distributed the load between other power plants and involved transit from the combined energy systems of the Urals and the Middle Volga through the territory of Kazakhstan, managed to avoid a cascade shutdown and “redemption” of the IPS of Siberia, similar, say, to the accident in the energy system of the USA and Canada in 2003. In this regard, on September 14, President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev awarded the employees of the United Dispatch Control of Siberian Energy Systems "for conscientious, highly professional work during the accident and the post-accident period at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP" with a certificate of honor from the President. 8 hours after the accident, all restrictions were lifted due to the commissioning of reserve capacities at thermal power plants and an increase in the flow of electricity from the European part of the country. Until the completion of the restoration of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, the underproduction of electricity by it will be compensated by the increased load of thermal power plants operating mainly on coal (in connection with which the volume of its transportation has significantly increased), by importing electricity from Kazakhstan, and also due to the commissioning in 2011 of the first stage of the Boguchanskaya HPS.

The reaction of the stock markets

The announcement of the accident had a predictable impact on the company's share prices on Russian and foreign stock markets. On the day of the accident, August 17, trading in RusHydro shares on the Russian trading floors RTS and MICEX was suspended at the request of the company itself. This happened just a few minutes after the opening of trading, but during this time they managed to lose more than 7% of the cost. Depository receipts for RusHydro shares lost 14.8% on the London Stock Exchange. On August 18, RusHydro shares were not traded on Russian stock exchanges, and on August 19, after the resumption of trading, the company's shares fell by more than 10%.

Simultaneously with the fall in RusHydro's quotes, shares of electric power companies with generating capacities in Siberia began to rise, which, according to market participants, will be able to benefit from increased capacity utilization. As the power of Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is expected to be replaced by electricity from more expensive thermal power plants, investors expect both higher electricity prices in the region and higher revenues for energy companies.

Ensuring the safety of hydroelectric power plants

External view of the dam

As a result of the failure of all units of the station and the blocking of water conduits, the culvert capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP dam was reduced by 3600 m³ / s (10 units of 358.5 m³ / s each), which raises concerns about the safety of the passage of severe floods (subsequently, the launch of three hydroelectric units somewhat weakened, but did not eliminate these fears). To solve the problem, work on the construction of the onshore spillway of the hydroelectric power station was accelerated, for which 4.3 billion rubles were allocated from the federal budget. According to Yury Gorbenko, a member of the board of JSC RusHydro, the construction of the spillway was carried out around the clock; 36,000 m³ of concrete were laid per month. The first stage of the spillway was put into operation on June 1, 2010. In 2010, it was planned to spend 3.5 billion rubles on the construction of the spillway.

During the operation of a regular spillway, a cloud of water dust is formed; since the spillway had never been operated in winter prior to the accident, there were concerns that this could lead to significant icing of the station's structures. A number of measures have been taken to prevent this phenomenon.

According to Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko, government commission to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP instructed JSC RusHydro to replace the fastenings of the turbine covers of high-pressure HPPs during scheduled preventive repairs. The Ministry of Energy, Rostekhnadzor, RusHydro and other organizations operating HPPs were also instructed to carry out a complete flaw detection of the fastenings of the turbine covers of hydropower plants with the replacement of those unsuitable for use. HPPs must be provided with protective systems, sources of autonomous emergency power supply, as well as automatic recorders of the parameters of the equipment in operation (“black boxes”). The commission also instructed to analyze the compatibility of the System Operator's control devices with local HPP control systems, and the Ministry of Energy and Rostekhnadzor, together with the Russian Academy of Sciences, were instructed to prepare a comprehensive program to improve the safety of HPPs by December 2009. The Ministry of Energy must also submit proposals for the development regulatory framework of the Russian Federation to establish technical requirements for the subjects of the electric power industry necessary to regulate the flow of electricity and power.

Station recovery

Work on the restoration of the HPP began almost immediately after the accident. On August 19, 2009, the directorate for the elimination of the consequences of the accident was created, headed by the chief engineer of the station A. Mitrofanov. At the first stage of work, the main task was to restore the power supply to the station and clear the debris in the turbine hall. The rubble was completely dismantled by 7 October. On September 21, 2009, the restoration of the walls and roof of the turbine hall began, this work was supposed to be completed by November 11, according to the plan, but was completed ahead of schedule, on November 6. At the same time, work is underway to dismantle the most affected hydroelectric units; Of particular difficulty was the dismantling of the remains of hydroelectric unit No. 2, the completion of which was originally planned for the end of January 2010, but was actually completed only in April 2010.

Work on the restoration of the HPP is planned to be completed by December 2014. The plan for the restoration of the station includes the gradual replacement of all 10 hydroelectric units with new ones - the same capacity, but with improved performance. New hydroelectric units will be manufactured by Power Machines - 6 units will be delivered in 2011, the remaining 4 - in 2012, the total cost of the contract for the supply of equipment amounted to 11.7 billion rubles.

In 2010, the least affected hydro units No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were launched. The fifth hydro unit was put on idle on December 30, 2009; It is planned to completely dismantle hydroelectric unit No. 2 by March 1, to complete work on the seventh unit - by March 15, and on hydroelectric unit No. 9 - by April 30, 2010. Until the end of 2009, it was planned to start up hydroelectric unit No. 6 at idle to dry the generator insulation; the start-up was carried out on December 30, and on February 24, 2010, the unit was put into operation with the participation of V.V. Putin. On December 22, 2010, hydroelectric unit No. 3 was launched, the station's capacity reached 2560 MW.

Ratings

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, at a meeting on the socio-economic development of the Siberian Federal District on August 24, 2009, called all statements about the onset of the so-called "technological collapse" in Russia "nonsense", but confirmed the conclusions of news agencies. On the topic of the accident, he said:

Notes

1. Act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Rostekhnadzor (October 3, 2009). (unavailable link - story) Retrieved October 5, 2009.(unavailable link)(the file was originally posted at , then renamed "due to technical problems caused by a large number of hits to the site upon the publication of the Act"). The MD5 hash of the authentic file is 2E7E94FEBDA2D3E9F683B1AE7A79B426. .
2. Causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Conclusions of Rostekhnadzor. Main theses. vesti.ru (October 03, 2009). Archived from the original on 17 October 2012. Retrieved 10 September 2012.
3. The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station: parliamentarians will establish the causes. Interfax.ru (September 17, 2009). Retrieved October 24, 2009.

On August 17, 2009 at 8:13 a.m., workers in the engine room of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Russia's largest hydroelectric power plant, heard a loud bang and then saw what was hard to believe. A multi-ton turbine literally took off on a column of water, destroying the ceilings of the building. Over the next few minutes, most of the interior of the station was rapidly flooded. Who (or what) is to blame for the deaths of 75 people - equipment defects or personnel negligence? We will tell you how a catastrophe of this magnitude could happen with the pride of the Soviet, and then the Russian energy industry.

In 1920, speaking at the Moscow Provincial Party Conference, V. I. Ulyanov (Lenin) uttered his sacramental thesis "Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country." Everything was more or less in order with the Soviet authorities by that year, but there were big problems with electricity. They escalated even more with the onset of industrialization: the explosively growing heavy industry was in desperate need of cheap electricity, and for this it was necessary to conquer rivers.

Although the first of the large stations - DneproGES - appeared before the Great Patriotic War, the construction of the hydroelectric power station, on a scale inherent in the Land of Soviets, really began after it ended. In relatively short time the main rivers of the European part of the country - the Dnieper, Volga, Kama, Don - were put at the service of man. But the main potential lay, of course, beyond the Urals, where Angara, Zeya, Bureya and, of course, the great Yenisei were waiting for their turn.

The Yenisei is an ideal river for the construction of hydroelectric power plants. At 3500 kilometers of its length, it repeatedly crosses various mountain ranges, where it is extremely convenient to build hydroelectric power stations in whole cascades. Particularly suitable conditions for this have developed in the so-called Sayan corridor - a narrow gorge in the ridges of the Western Sayan. Plans for its use for the benefit National economy began to be developed in the second half of the 1950s, and the first hydraulic engineers landed on the banks of the Yenisei in 1961. A year later, experts chose a specific place - the Karlovsky alignment of the Sayan Corridor, where in the future no less than the largest hydroelectric power station of the Soviet Union and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world was to appear.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP really appeared, but in order to understand the scale of the facility and the complexity of its construction, it is necessary to add: construction (from the start of preparatory work to acceptance into permanent operation) took 37 years! 37 years of almost continuous struggle with the harsh Siberian nature, climate, river, bureaucracy, interruptions in funding and constant emergencies. However, none of them even came close to being able to compare with what happened in August 2009.

The Yenisei was blocked by an arch-gravity dam, which had no analogues in the Soviet Union. In terms of its dimensions, it was a curved concrete trapezoid with a base width of more than 100 meters and a crest of 25 meters. The height of the dam was 242 meters, and the length along the ridge was more than a kilometer. Thousands of builders, engineers, geologists, power engineers have done tremendous work to tame the great Siberian river. The bridge they created, which took more than 9 million cubic meters of concrete, with high level water withstands a pressure of 18 million tons of water from the created reservoir.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is able to withstand such a fantastic load thanks to its design. The stability of the dam (which is why its type is called arch gravity) is achieved by a combination of two factors: its monstrous weight and arch geometry, which distributes the load on the load-bearing walls. The rocky shores of the Sayan corridor act as the latter. It is the availability of suitable natural conditions made it possible to build such a powerful hydroelectric power station in this place.

How does a hydroelectric power plant work? Water enters the conduits located in the dam, and through them enters the blades of a hydro turbine, which drives generators that produce electricity. At the Sayano-Shushenskaya station there are 10 water conduits and, accordingly, 10 hydroelectric units with a capacity of 640 MW each. Thus, the total installed capacity of this HPP is 6,400 MW, and according to this indicator, it has not been and is not equal to it in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, it was on this energy giant, the great construction site of communism, which for several decades was built with the efforts of literally the whole country, that it became possible, moreover, a tragedy occurred that turned out to be one of the largest in the hydropower industry of the whole world.

The chain of events that led to the disaster on this summer day in 2009 took seconds.

“... I was standing at the top, I heard some kind of growing noise, then I saw how the corrugated coating of the hydraulic unit was rising, rearing up. Then I saw how the rotor rises from under it. He was spinning. My eyes didn't believe it. He climbed three meters. Stones flew, pieces of reinforcement, we began to dodge them ... The corrugation was already somewhere under the roof, and the roof itself was blown ... "- said in an interview with "Kommersant" one of the eyewitnesses of the accident.

The emotions of the station employee can be understood. It is difficult, unthinkable to imagine how, right in front of you, a massive, multi-ton unit pulls out of the engine room shaft and, like a match, raises a column of water into the air.

On the territory of the HPP building, where all 10 hydroelectric units were located, there were 116 people, 52 of them - at the level of the turbine hall floor, 63 - in the internal premises at the lower levels (another 1 person worked on the roof). Most of them carried out repairs of hydroelectric unit No. 6 that was not functioning at the time of the disaster. At 8:13 there was, in the dry words of the technical report, "the sudden destruction of hydroelectric unit No. 2." Its fragments and parts of the mechanism destroyed the walls and the ceiling of the engine room. What this shrapnel did not do was completed by the Yenisei that broke free.

Dozens, hundreds of cubic meters of water that entered the engine room every second quickly flooded the remaining hydraulic units and, most importantly, the interior of the engine room. The people who were there had practically no chance of escaping. At the same time, short circuits occurred at the still working, but flooded hydraulic units. They stopped working, which led to the de-energization of the entire station. In its turn, automatic systems, which were supposed to block the access of water to the hydroelectric units in the event of an emergency, worked only on one of them. Water continued to flow to the rest of the turbines through the conduits, which ultimately led to damage to some and destruction of others.

In order to stop the flow of water into the dilapidated turbine hall in the absence of electricity, the employees of the hydroelectric power station were forced to manually reset the gates of the dam's intakes. This was done only at 9:20, more than an hour after the development of the catastrophic situation.

Immediately after this, a new threat arose, because the Yenisei was completely blocked. Fortunately, the overflow of the reservoir with the unpleasant prospect of water overflowing over the crest of the dam and even its possible destruction, which could lead to a completely incredible cataclysm, was avoided. At 11:32, with the help of a special diesel generator, it was possible to supply current to the gantry crane and open the gates of a special spillway. The initial threats were eliminated. Now the station staff had the task of finding out the causes of the accident, and the rescuers were looking for survivors.

Unfortunately, due to the almost instantaneous development of the disaster, the employees of the HPP, who were in the interior of the turbine hall, had practically no chance. Rescuers of the Ministry of Emergency Situations managed to find only two people who were in air bags. In total, as a result of the tragedy, 75 people died, another 13 received injuries of varying severity.

What is the reason for what, it seemed, should never have happened at an object of such scale and such strategic importance? The hydroelectric turbines used at the station had a major drawback. Two zones of their permitted operation (a zone is a certain combination of turbine power and water pressure) were separated by a zone not recommended for operation. In this mode, increased noise and vibration occurred in the turbine. The problem was that, each time switching between the zones of permitted operation with an increase or decrease in their power, the hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were forced (albeit for a short time) to find themselves in an unrecommended zone, being subjected to additional vibrations.

In hydraulic unit No. 2, these vibrations, due to which fatigue deformations accumulated in the metal studs holding the turbine cover, exceeded a certain critical threshold on the morning of August 17th. At 8:13, with the next decrease in the power of the unit (and, accordingly, with the next increase in vibration), a significant number of studs simply suddenly collapsed at the same time. The remaining attachment points could no longer withstand the pressure of water. The cover of the turbine was torn off, the turbine itself was thrown into the engine room by pressure, after which tens and tens of cubic meters of water began to flow through the shaft into the building of the hydroelectric power station. The flooding happened quickly.

This is the direct cause of the disaster, voiced in the official report of the technical commission investigating the accident. The specific perpetrators of the tragedy were also identified there. The matter did not end with complaints about the imperfection of the design of hydraulic units. The experts drew attention to the blatant, from their point of view, negligence of the management of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and the station personnel, who actually ignored the fact of increased vibrations in hydroelectric unit No. 2 and in no way controlled the accumulation of fatigue changes in the attachment points of its turbine cover. The defendants in the case of the events of August 17 were named seven people from the management of the station and the monitoring service of its equipment. At the end of 2014, four of them - the former director of the hydroelectric power station, the chief engineer and two of his deputies - received real prison terms.

All of them pleaded not guilty to the incident. For example, the convicted director of the station believes that the cause of the disaster was the production of a turbine. This could be regarded as a natural attempt in his situation to evade responsibility by shifting it to the conscience of others, but many independent experts, including those with extensive experience in hydropower, also pointed out obvious inconsistencies in the report of the technical commission.

These experts note that there were no vibrations in hydroelectric unit No. 2 that would exceed the values ​​allowed by the regulations for its operation. They were fixed by only one sensor of many, moreover, faulty. In the same way, for some reason, not a single regulatory document required a mandatory flaw detection of the turbine cover studs. The staff simply could not know that critical fatigue changes had appeared in them.

It sounds incredible, but the vibration control systems on the covers of the hydraulic units in the engine room were installed only after this disaster. Before tragic death It turns out that 75 people were not interested in how the operation of a mechanism weighing one and a half thousand tons affects this very cover. Only after the tragedy of August 2009 did it become clear that all the automation that controls the operation of the colossal power plant could be destroyed within a few seconds - simply flooded with water that caused short circuits. At the same time, there was no backup power supply in principle, and the gates, which ultimately blocked the access of water to the water conduits, and from there to the turbine hall of the hydroelectric power station, had to be manually reset.

It took a whole hour. For a whole hour, the Yenisei continued to flood the station building, flood its premises, and kill people only because the design of the hydroelectric power station did not provide for a reliable backup of its power supply. After all, so many people died not at all due to the fact that hydraulic unit No. 2 was thrown out of its mine, but because it was not possible to quickly stop the access of water to the turbine hall.

Boris Yurkevich, Chief Engineer of the Lengidroproekt Institute that designed the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, speaking at the All-Russian Conference of Hydropower Engineers a few months after the disaster, said: “The peculiarity of this accident, which put a lot of psychological pressure on all of us, is that it happened under normal conditions. It happened when everything worked properly, the repair regulations were followed, and the operating requirements were met. No one violated anything, the station fully complied with all norms and requirements, the operating personnel complied with all prescribed regulations. Literally in a second, all defense systems were destroyed. Drove, no holes, nothing. Then once - and fell apart. That's what happened here."

Now all the bottlenecks that made possible the tragedy that occurred "in normal mode" have, of course, been eliminated, including at other Russian hydroelectric power plants. The vibration of the turbines is tightly controlled, the studs of their covers undergo regular flaw detection, and the power supply of the HPP is repeatedly backed up. Now the "car" just can not fall apart. The only scary thing is that 75 human lives had to be sacrificed for this.

Moscow. August 17th. site - A major accident occurred in the Republic of Khakassia on Monday morning - a wall collapsed at the famous Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, as a result of which the engine room was flooded. At 04:42 Moscow time, a message was received about the destruction of the third and fourth conduits at the hydroelectric power station. As a result of the accident, according to preliminary data, 10 people died and 11 were injured. Another 72 people are considered missing, said Andrey Mitrofanov, chief engineer of the SSHG. On the fact of the accident, a criminal case was initiated under Art. 143 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Violation of labor protection rules).

As a result of the accident, the Sayansk and Khakassk aluminum smelters were disconnected from the power supply, the power supply to the Krasnoyarsk and Novokuznetsk aluminum smelters, as well as the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant, was reduced. It is worth noting that such interruptions in the supply of electricity are fraught with serious consequences for the aluminum industry, since the shutdown of some production processes can be fatal for plants. Later, the power supply of the Khakass and Sayan aluminum smelters was partially restored due to the redistribution of energy from other HPPs. As for the energy supply of the population, according to the interlocutor of the agency, it is carried out in the usual mode, since the load is being redistributed between the power plants of the Siberian region. The valves of the second conduit are blocked, a generator from Khakasenergo LLC was sent for additional power supply to the units of the SSHHPP. Discharge of water is organized through the Mainskaya HPP. "As of 05:15 Moscow time, the destruction in the wall has been eliminated, the flooding has been stopped," the Ministry of Emergency Situations said in a statement. The source also noted that the dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station was not damaged as a result of the accident, the threat of flooding settlements no.

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In the area of ​​the downstream of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, a large oil slick is spreading along the Yenisei. As Interfax was informed by the press service of the Siberian regional center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, oil leaked out of one of the damaged HPP units. "This is transformer oil. The amount is relatively small, but the film stretched downstream for 5 kilometers. According to our estimates, there is no big threat to the environment," the press service noted.

In connection with emergency situations at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP operational services OAO Interregional Distribution Grid Company of Siberia (IDGC of Siberia) has been put on high alert. The personnel of operational mobile teams and operational personnel at the substations of IDGC of Siberia have been transferred to a high alert mode. If necessary, power engineers are ready to power socially significant facilities (hospitals, kindergartens) with the help of mobile diesel generators, the IDGC of Siberia said in a statement.

Divers of the contracting organization of the company "RusHydro" inspect the turbine room of the hydroelectric power plant. "Divers continue to inspect the hall and remove debris. We hope that the number of deaths as a result of the accident will not increase," Interfax told the news agency. official representative"RusHydro" Evgeny Druzyaka. According to him, the collapsed hydraulic unit of the SSHHPP was under repair, and it was through it that water poured into the plant's engine room. As a result, the hydroelectric unit was flooded with water by one third. "This is the most serious accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP in its entire history," Druzyaka said. At the same time, the representative of RusHydro stressed that there is no threat of destruction of the dam and flooding of settlements.

Rescuers, meanwhile, are trying to calm the local population - frightened by the incident, people begin to panic and even try to evacuate in the direction of the hills. "We did not have any evacuation measures planned, since there is no danger to nearby settlements. Now we are trying to calm the population and prevent panic," he said.

Reference

The Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex is unique in its kind and even entered the Guinness Book of Records as the most reliable hydraulic structure of this type. The hydroelectric power plant is located on the Yenisei River in the southeast of the Republic of Khakassia in the Sayan Canyon at the river's outlet into the Minusinsk Basin. As noted on the official website of the HPP, the complex includes the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and the counter-regulating Mainsky hydroelectric complex located downstream.

The hydroelectric power plant has become the top in the cascade of Yenisei hydroelectric power plants and one of the largest in the world - its installed capacity is 6.4 million kW with an average annual output of 22.8 billion kWh of electricity. The pressure front of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is formed by a unique concrete arch gravity dam 245 m high, 1074.4 m long along the crest, 105.7 m wide at the base and 25 meters along the crest. In plan view, the dam in the upper 80-meter part is designed in the form of a circular arch with a radius of 600 m along the upper edge and a central angle of 102°, and in the lower part the dam is a three-center arches, and the central section with a spanning angle of 37° is formed by arches similar to top.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP has 10 hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each. The spillway dam has 11 spillways, the thresholds of water intakes of which are buried 61 m from the FSL. The catchment area of ​​the river basin, which provides inflow to the site of the HPP, is 179,900 sq. km. km. The average long-term runoff in the alignment is 46.7 cubic km. The area of ​​the reservoir is 621 sq. km, the total capacity of the reservoir is 31.3 cubic meters. km, including useful - 15.3 cubic meters. km. The estimated maximum discharge flow through the hydroelectric complex with an inflow probability of 0.01% is 13,300 cubic meters. m/sec.

As for the Main hydroelectric complex. it is located downstream of the Yenisei, 21.5 km from the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Its main task is to counter-regulate its downstream, which makes it possible to greatly smooth out fluctuations in the level in the river when the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP conducts deep regulation of the load in the power system. The Mainsky hydroelectric complex includes right-bank, channel and left-bank soil dams, a hydroelectric power station building with three hydraulic units with rotary-blade turbines and a concrete spillway dam with five spans of 25 m each. The installed capacity of the Mainskaya HPP is 321 thousand kW, the annual electricity generation is 1.7 billion kWh.

The surface area of ​​the reservoir at the FSL is 11.5 km2, the total volume of the reservoir is 115 million m3, and the useful volume is 48.7 million m3.

November 4, 1961 is considered the starting point for the creation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex. On this day, the first team of surveyors from the Lengidroproekt Institute, headed by the most experienced surveyor P.V. Erashov arrived in the mining village of Maina. Already in July 1962, an expert commission headed by Academician A.A. Belyakov, was able to choose the final version for the creation of the hydroelectric power station - Karlovsky site based on the materials of the survey. The construction of the Main hydroelectric power station was planned 20 km downstream.

The project of the unique arch-gravity dam of the SSH HPP was developed by the Leningrad branch of the Hydroproject Institute. The creation of a dam of this type in the conditions of the wide alignment of the Yenisei and the harsh climate of Siberia had no analogues in the world. The design task was developed under the guidance of the chief engineer of the project G.A. Pretro in the Department of the Sayanskaya HPP, and, after its approval in 1965, Ya.B. Margolin. The development of the technical project begun under him was continued by L.K. Domansky (1968-72) and A.I. Efimenko (1972-91).

The launch of the first hydraulic unit took place on December 18, 1978, the last - the tenth - on December 25, 1985. It is recognized by specialists of domestic hydraulic engineering construction that the high-altitude arch-gravity dam of the SSH HPP, by its appearance, outstripped the evolutionary process of developing design models of such structures.