Bpk is brave. Dembel album

Retired Captain 1st Rank A. Zhbanov tells about the tragedy that happened on August 30, 1974 with the “Brave” BOD built in Nikolaev. Head of the ASS-PSS Black Sea Fleet in 1973-1986.

Exists wise proverb: "Victory has many parents, but defeat is always an orphan."

I repeat it quite often, especially when I remember the events of 1974 related to the emergency at the BOD “Brave”. I confess right away: for the death of the large anti-submarine ship “Brave”, I, along with other officers of the Black Sea Fleet, received a severe reprimand from the Commander-in-Chief Navy USSR Admiral Fleet Soviet Union Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov. The wording was as follows: "For insufficient initiative." Not entirely offensive, but this severe reprimand gives me the right to consider myself one of the "parents" of a serious defeat at sea - after all, the ineffective actions of the fleet's rescue forces failed in the end to save a modern, first-class warship.
I took the penalty from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which he subsequently withdrew from me personally, as quite fair, and was morally prepared for more serious sanctions. Many of us - the participants in this tragedy - were in a very depressed state for a long time. The feeling of guilt did not leave even after all the materials of the investigation were analyzed, and the Commander-in-Chief himself answered the question posed by him personally: “Was it possible to save“ Courageous ”? It is difficult to answer this question - the ship's keel was broken, but the Black Sea Fleet did not do everything to save it.
However, let's go back, up the stairs of time.
August 30, 1974, twenty miles from the main base of the fleet, in the afternoon, relatively good weather(sea waves did not exceed 4 points) with a completely sufficient number of rescue forces and means, in Peaceful time sank modern ship, designed to fight, even after receiving serious damage. People died during the accident. Who is to blame?
Constructors? Shipbuilders? Fleet? Crew? Forces involved in salvation? I have no right to judge anyone and give any assessment. I will try to describe only what I saw and what I personally participated in. Perhaps this will be useful for modern rescuers who, in difficult current conditions, provide search and rescue support for the once mighty fleet.
As for the analysis of the death of the ship and the performance of subsequent work on it, they were described in detail and objectively by the late colonel-engineer E. E. Leibovich in the story “The Fate of the BOD “Brave”. The article was written by a very experienced and authoritative specialist, from whom I accepted the position of head of the ASS Black Sea Fleet in 1973, it covers all aspects of this disaster.
According to official subordination - in the event of emergencies in the fleet, my place was determined at the command post of the fleet, as the deputy head of the search and rescue post, which was made up of the leading specialists of the fleet.

On that day, I was at the headquarters of the fleet and arrived at the post 3 minutes after the announcement of the alarm. The information received from the emergency ship did not allow a sufficiently objective assessment of its condition. The fire, as you know, started in missile cellar No. 8 from the spontaneous launch of the sustainer engine of the B-601 rocket, and the fleet command post received information about the explosion of an air cylinder in the second engine room. In general, the situation was incomprehensible from the very beginning, and I asked the Acting Fleet Commander Vice-Admiral V.A. Samoilov for permission to leave for the accident area.
I got permission instantly. There were other reasons why I wanted to take a direct part in saving the ship. And one of them worried me a lot, because the commander of the Black Sea Fleet rescue team was a former submariner. A good officer, but he did not have sufficient experience in leading the rescue forces in such a serious accident, moreover, on a surface ship. In addition, shortly before this accident, the ACC of the fleet conducted an exercise to assist the emergency ship of exactly 61 projects, and I wanted to put into practice the experience gained in this exercise.
By the way, like many naval officers, I did not like staff work, I never held staff positions. I had experience in command of three rescue ships, in three fleets, a division of rescue ships in the Baltic, and I was sure that, in the event of a ship accident, my place was at sea, and not at the fleet command post.
Overtaking on a high-speed missile boat the ships of the rescue squad, going at full speed to the area of ​​the accident, I received the reports of their commanders on their readiness for rescue operations, gave the necessary orders, and here is the first lesson that I remembered for a lifetime. In the air, on ultrashort waves, unimaginable chaos was happening. With excited voices, interrupting each other, many officials- ship commanders, fleet staff officers, radio operators serving them, transmitted conflicting information and orders: “The commander of the fleet ordered! ...”, “The commander-in-chief ordered! ...”, “The Minister of Defense ordered! ...”. There were so many orders and they were so obscure that it was impossible to carry them out.
In the course of combat training, the command of the fleet demanded from us a strict implementation of communication discipline, but in a real emergency, everyone forgot about it. A unified, strict, consistent and continuous command and control of the forces at the very beginning of the rescue work on the "Brave" was not organized. The command post of the fleet clearly understood that an experienced and authoritative chief of staff of the fleet, Rear Admiral V.Kh., was on board the emergency ship. Sahakyan, who was able to take charge of the forces himself, which is why he showed understandable delicacy. It was extremely difficult to manage the forces from the board of the emergency ship, whose crew did not know the root cause of the explosion and the complete situation on their own ship, was fighting for survivability, losing people, it was extremely difficult.
I must self-critically admit that I, too, was unable to realize my potential in this important matter and to provide the Chief of the Naval Staff with the necessary assistance in commanding the forces. On board the duty missile boat, controlled by Lieutenant Commander V. Isakov, on which I arrived in the area of ​​the accident, there were combat missiles and he, on behalf of V.Kh. Sahakyan, it was forbidden to approach the emergency ship, on which ammunition continued to explode in the flames of fires. I was forced to jump into the sea and swim to the fire-fighting ship moored to the side of the “Courageous”, the crew of which, under the leadership of commander senior lieutenant I.X. Nagervadze kept the fire from spreading to the bow of the emergency ship.
By combined efforts, the crew of the emergency ship, the 167th rescue party and PZhS-123 managed to keep the spread of fire on the 164th frame - the bow bulkhead of the aft engine room. I considered this some success and did not imagine that the death of the ship could come so quickly from another explosion - this time in cellar No. 10 and aviation fuel storage. This last explosion led to the flooding of the fifth compartment (the first four compartments were flooded earlier) and the ensuing loss of longitudinal stability of the ship.

The explosion that predetermined the death of the ship occurred 1.5 hours after my arrival in the area. Could it have been prevented? Here is how it is written in final act commission to investigate the causes of the death of the “Brave”: “ Decision about setting up a line of defense in the stern of the ship practically could not be carried out, since after the explosion of cellar No. 8, the fire spread to the tiller compartment and cellar No. 10. Landing of personnel on the stern of the Courageous BOD in order to unload aerial bombs and remove kerosene overboard was impossible."
And yet this question still haunts me. I personally could not believe that the “Brave” could die with such a large margin of buoyancy and stability that ships of the 61st project possessed. The sailors, foremen, midshipmen and officers who participated in the struggle for the ship's survivability and its rescue did not succumb to panic and remained fully capable of performing any, the most risky actions to the end. It was possible to send volunteers to flood cellar No. 10 and drain with the help of compressed air kerosene overboard. Would volunteers be able to solve this problem, or would they only increase the number of victims? I did not set such a task for my subordinates. Today I analyze and ask myself - unfortunately or fortunately?
It was possible to flood cellar No. 10 only by supplying water to it with hoses. Only later, several months after the disaster, we discussed this issue with the officers of the rescue service and the technical department of the fleet and came to the conclusion that by filling cellar No. 10, we would forcibly reduce the longitudinal stability of the ship, which would also lead to its overturning.
I can’t forget the energetic commands that were given from the “Brave”, it seems that Senior Lieutenant V. Fedorchenko shouted the most to the rescue ships: “Come on foam ...!”. These commands testified that the crew of the emergency ship sought to prevent a decrease in its stability and unsinkability due to the influx of seepage water, the amount of which was difficult to account for. But the ship, as it turned out, capsized not at all from the seepage water.
When, after the last explosion, the “Brave” began to noticeably list and settle aft, I, after consulting with the head of the technical department of the fleet, captain 1st rank - engineer Igor Vladimirovich Nikitin, persistently suggested that the chief of staff of the fleet begin the evacuation of personnel. This was the only case in my practice. Command "Abandon ship!" was carried out in a very organized manner, without fuss and panic. More than 50 people immediately switched to PZhS-123, the rest of the crew, on command, switched to the forecastle and jumped overboard from there. The commander of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik, was the last to leave the ship, when the tank towered 15 meters above the sea surface. His front jacket with orders and medals received for impeccable ship service remained in the commander's cabin. One of the last to leave the ship was the assistant chief of the electromechanical service of the 70th brigade anti-submarine ships senior lieutenant engineer Vasily Moiseevich Fedorchenko (now captain 1st rank engineer (reserve), one of the few surviving mechanical engineers who fought for the survivability of the Brave). Once in the water, he helped save several sailors who could not swim.
the day before anniversary the death of the ship, I met with Vasily Alekseevich and captain 1st rank of the reserve Vitaly Fedorovich Yurganov. The latter that day was the duty commander of the rescue squad of the fleet. When assisting the “Brave”, he replaced the commander of the SB-15, landed and worked with the ASG SB-15 on the starboard side of the “Brave”, in memory of this, he keeps his boots with soles burned to holes.

For 25 years, the passions around the “Brave” subsided, the mothers of the dead sailors and cadets grew old, we had no need to mask the bitter truth, and we agreed with the assessment of the catastrophe that Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, gave her.
Do not forget how the graceful hull of the ship vertically towered 50 meters above the surface of the calm sea, sinking like a candle to the bottom ... No one could believe in the reality of what was happening.
A few hours later, another job began for the rescuers - it was necessary to find and recover secret literature and equipment from the “Brave”, and in the future try to raise the ship as well.
These were unique works carried out at a depth of 127 meters. Here is how E.E. Leibovich: “The tasks assigned to the special ship-lifting detachment of the Black Sea Fleet for work on the Otvazhny BOD were completed in full.”
Being, nominally, the chief of staff of a special ship-raising detachment, in fact, I supervised the entire marine part works carried out on the “Brave”. The fact is that the commander of the detachment, Captain 1st Rank Lev Potekhin, is my immediate supervisor, and I dare to believe that my friend, being an excellent sailor and a talented organizer, had no real opportunity to be distracted from the daily management of the forces of the Office of Auxiliary Vessels and the Black Sea Fleet Emergency Rescue Service . The control forces of those “stagnant” times worked very hard in all the seas of the oceans. At a meeting at the fleet headquarters, Admiral L. Mizin, head of logistics of the Navy, under whose leadership I happened to serve in the Baltic, very strictly demanded that the order of the Commander-in-Chief be raised to raise the ship. I politely but persistently defended the position of the Chernomorians, declaring the insufficiency of forces and the necessary equipment for such a unique ascent. Of all the officers present at the meeting, only Captain 1st Rank V. Molchanov, a representative of the Scientific Research Institute of the ACC of the Navy, dared to defend this position. We were both heavily criticized and hurt by it. I am still grateful to Vladimir Alexandrovich, with whom we served on the Kamchatka military flotilla, for his clear, well-founded position, backed up by engineering knowledge and calculations.
Later it was confirmed that the ship could not be raised because of the danger of a spontaneous explosion, the ammunition on it, some of which was in the final equipped form, in particular, these were depth charges. The total weight of this ammunition was about 15 tons, but for its undermining and reliable detonation, it was necessary to put 113.6 tons of TNT on the ship. I think that no one in the world has done such work at a depth of 127 meters either before the “Brave” or after it.
On December 23, 1977, Senior Lieutenant Lupashin, at my command, turned on the switch on the rescue ship "SS-26" (now the SS "Epron"), applied current to the electric detonators. A flame shot up over the sea to a height of more than 30 meters, and a wall of water grew along the length of the ship, the “Brave” died a second time and forever.
I went down to the ship three times in the observation chamber and underwater vehicle. The first time was on the second day after his death, when the body of a galley worker, who could not be saved, protruded from the porthole in the galley. The flaps of his white jacket were fluttering with the current, and we surveyed the ship for details of its rise. The second time I had to go down to clarify some issues when laying explosive ammunition. The porthole in the galley was already empty. For the third time, I visually recorded the results of a powerful underwater explosion. In place of the handsome ship, there were only heaps of twisted metal that did not resemble a ship in any way. All problems with the explosiveness of the ship and its secrets were solved radically.
Diver Roman Todorovich Gavyuk died during the diving operations on the “Brave”. We mastered the new diving equipment SVG-200 and a faulty breathing mixture inlet valve, at a depth of 127 meters, caused the death of a strong and courageous man.
The work on the Otvazhny continued for more than three years, most of which was carried out by the crew of the Karpaty salvage vessel. Many rescue and difficult work fell on the crews of the rescue ships "Kazbek", SS-21, SS-26, SS-50, midget submarines, diving ships, rescue tugs, sea tugs and killers. I do not know of a single case when at least one of the crews of these ships would show cowardice, or an attempt to evade a difficult and dangerous task. Special courage, of course, was shown by deep-sea divers, low bow to them for their skill and courage.
A few words about the fabrications that appeared at one time, about the nuclear ammunition allegedly located on the "Brave". There was no nuclear ammunition on the ship at all, and it was not towed into the open sea, this is fiction clean water. I do not agree with many of the provisions of the late writer B. Karzhavin, who described the death of the ship in the book “The Death of the Courageous”. There is a good Finnish proverb: “When there is trouble at sea, there are always a lot of smart people on the shore.” Do not be smart about the "Brave". Walked cold war, the fleet with great tension carried out military service in all the oceans of the planet and achieved a respectful attitude towards itself from a potential enemy. He was armed with ships that were created by our domestic industry, and they were completed with people who were called from our cities and villages. These men deserve respect for their heroic service. This fully applies to the crew of the “Brave” and all those who selflessly sought to save it.

The death of the “Brave”, as well as the death of the battleship “Novorossiysk”, forced us to take a fresh look at many provisions regarding constructive and organizational measures to ensure the survivability and unsinkability of ships. The large ship fires that occurred in the subsequent years of my tenure as head of the ASS of the Black Sea Fleet on the Moskva anti-submarine cruiser stuffed with ammunition, the Sovrovshenny destroyer and the Berezina complex supply ship confirmed the correctness of the conclusions about the Brave, and I again went to sea to personally lead the rescue effort. On the Berezina, for the second time, I assisted Ivan Petrovich Vinnik, now a brigade commander and captain of the 1st rank. He had to endure many trials, bright memory to him and to all who died on the “COURAGEOUS”.

In connection with the rapid development of air defense and anti-aircraft missile systems by the beginning of the 1960s. there was a need for rocket ships of special construction.
The design of the ship began in 1956. According to the operational-tactical task, the functions of the ship included air defense of ship formations from attacks by aircraft and cruise missiles, as well as anti-submarine defense.
After the approval at the beginning of 1957 of the main tactical and technical elements, TsKB-53, headed by B. I. Kupensky, began to develop a draft design. The technical project (project 61) was completed and approved in 1958, after which at the plant. On September 15, 1959, 61 Communards in Nikolaev laid down the lead ship, Komsomolets Ukrainy. On December 31, 1960, it was launched, and on October 15, 1962, it was handed over to the Navy for state trials.
Frame
The ship's hull is welded from steel SHL-4 (10KhSND), smooth-deck, with a characteristic rise of the upper deck to the bow and an inclined stem. To provide high speed course, he had very sharp contours (the ratio of length to width was 9.5). The main watertight bulkheads divided the hull into 15 compartments. The double bottom occupied about 80% of the ship's length.
The ship had a 90-meter superstructure developed along the length with two masts, two bases for antenna posts of the Yatagan control system and two double chimneys. The exceptionally large size of the pipes lowered the temperature of the exhaust gases, reducing the thermal visibility of the ship, and also made it possible to replace the propulsion system through the hatches located in them. To reduce displacement and improve stability, the superstructure, masts and pipes were made of aluminum-magnesium alloys (for the first time on a ship, aluminum-magnesium alloys of the AMG-5V brand were used in large quantities, including for non-pressure bulkheads, baffles in superstructures and air ducts. The melting temperature of the first batches of alloys was 300-400 ° C, the combustion temperature was 1200 ° C. As it turned out, when extinguishing a fire with sea water, the released hydrogen interacted with magnesium and intensified the fire). Only the areas where the masts, launchers, antenna posts, as well as the navigation post were made of steel.
Propulsion system
From the very beginning, two options for the main power plant were considered - a traditional steam turbine (STU) and a gas turbine (GTU). The latter, due to its lightness and compactness (specific gravity 5.2 kg / hp versus 9 kg / hp), reduced the displacement of the ship from 3600 to 3200 tons and increased efficiency. In addition, starting from a cold state took 5-10 minutes for a gas turbine compared to several hours required for a PTU. For these reasons, a variant with gas turbine engines was adopted.
For the melodic whistle of gas turbines, the ships of the series in the fleet were dubbed "singing frigates".
The bow and stern engine rooms occupied one compartment each. Each housed the all-mode main gas turbine gear unit (GGTZA) M-3 with a capacity of 36,000 hp. manufactured by the Southern Turbine Plant in Nikolaev, two gas turbine generators GTU-6 for 600 kW each and a diesel generator DG-200/P for 200 kW.
Each GTZA consisted of two non-reversible gas turbine engines (GTE) with a capacity of 18,000 hp each. with reversible mating gear. Each gas turbine engine had its own gas outlet pipe. Each of the two shafts had a four-blade fixed-pitch propeller.
The compartments between the compartments were occupied by auxiliary mechanisms (roll damper, auxiliary boilers). Fuel was stored in double-bottom tanks with a capacity of 940 tons, 70 tons of fresh water for the crew and 13 tons of water for auxiliary boilers were also stored there.
Armament
The armament of the new ship was innovative. For the first time in Soviet shipbuilding, it was equipped with two anti-aircraft missile systems (M-1 Volna). Each complex was a two-beam launcher ZIF-101, a Yatagan control system and a store with two rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles each.
Artillery armament consisted of two twin 76-mm tower installations AK-726 (rate of fire 90 rds / min, range 13 km, height reach 9 km, ammunition load 2400 unitary shots) and two Turret fire control systems.
The ship had a five-pipe torpedo tube PTA-53-61 for SET-53 or 53-57 torpedoes with the Buzzer torpedo fire control system, two RBU-6000 and RBU-1000 rocket launchers each (ammunition load 192 RGB-60 and 48 RGB-10 respectively) with the Burya control system.

The ship provided for storage for 6 tons of aviation fuel and ammunition for the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter (anti-submarine torpedoes, depth charges, sonar buoys), however, due to the lack of a hangar, it was possible that there was only a temporary base.
The mine rails traditional for Soviet destroyers with slopes in the stern have been preserved. Two F-82-T launchers were envisaged for firing passive radar reflectors. Protection against torpedoes was provided by a towed BOKA-DU guard and a degaussing device.
The hydroacoustic means included the Titan all-round viewing station and the Vychegda fire control station, located in the wing fairing. The detection range of the submarine was 3.5 km.
Ship unsinkability was provided for the most unfavorable case of flooding of any three adjacent compartments when the ship was loaded in the range from standard to full displacement. When three adjacent compartments were flooded, the calculation provided for a steady static list of the ship of about 13 °, a freeboard height of at least 0.6 m at a maximum wind speed of 24 m/s, which the ship can withstand before capsizing.
With a normal displacement in deep water (at least 75 m), with a sea state of up to 3 points inclusive, the ship, moving at full speed, with a raised fairing, could develop a speed of 34 knots. It was planned to increase the speed and cruising range by supplying air to the channels of the propellers.
The crew of the ship according to the state of 1962 consisted of 266 people: 22 officers, 18 midshipmen and chief foremen and 226 foremen and sailors. According to the state, since 1974, 25 officers were provided on the ship.
For the Soviet Navy, 20 ships pr.61 were built.

The lead ship of the BOD series "Komsomolets of Ukraine"
BOD "Brave", to which this story is dedicated, was the seventh in this series (ships pr.61 were built at two shipyards in Nikolaev and Leningrad).
The large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" was included in the lists of ships of the USSR Navy on July 3, 1963 and on August 10, 1963 was laid down at the plant named after 61 Communards in Nikolaev. Launched on October 17, 1964, entered service on December 31, 1964 and was included in the Black Sea Fleet on January 25, 1965.

BOD "Brave"
length - 144 m. width (maximum) - 15.8 m. side height: at the stem - 13.2 m, at the midsection - 8.1 m, at the transom - 8.5 m., draft (at full displacement) - 4.6 m., displacement ( full) - 4510 t.
At the end of August 1974, a naval exercise was conducted in the Black Sea Fleet, headed by the chief of staff of the fleet. The first stage was held on 27 August. Previously, on August 26, a briefing was held for ship commanders in the conference hall of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters. The commander of the "Brave" was instructed by the commander of the 70th brigade
captain 1st rank Makarov and commander of the 41st separate brigade of missile boats (OBRK) captain 1st rank Komar.
It was at this time that the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Sahakyan, chose the BOD "Valiant" as his flagship and command ship at the second stage of the fleet's exercises, on August 30, during rocket firing by small missile ships (RTOs) of the 41st OB RK and to determine the effectiveness of the air defense system "Wasp" when repelling an air enemy. On August 29, the 70th brigade of the BOD, with the participation of the Brave, was supposed to carry out an anti-submarine mission and actual torpedo firing.
On August 29, the Courageous BOD, under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Vinnik, went to sea to perform a planned combat exercise with actual torpedo firing. The preparation of the ship for the battle and the campaign was carried out in full according to a two-hour schedule. The readiness of the ship to go to sea was checked by the headquarters of the 70th brigade of anti-submarine ships.
Their last combat exercise - torpedo firing - was successfully completed on the Courageous.
On the evening of August 29 and on the night of August 30, the Otvazhny BOD, together with the Bedovyy BOD and the Komsomolets Ukrainy BOD, took part in the anti-submarine exercise of the 70th brigade under the command of the brigade commander Captain 1st Rank Makarov.
Last trip
August 30, 1974, at about 5.30 am, "Brave" after the end of the night exercises of the search and strike group, consisting of several ships and a submarine, stood on the Streltsy roadstead of Sevastopol.
At 7:45 a.m., Rear Admiral V.Kh., Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived on the ship. Sahakyan with a group of officers of the fleet headquarters. After that, the "Brave", at 7 hours 52 minutes, again went to sea, on his last trip.
On this day, the ship was supposed to provide anti-aircraft fire from small missile ships at a training ground near Cape Khersones.
258 officers, midshipmen, foremen and sailors, 16 cadets (6 from the Frunze VVMU and 10 from the Kaliningrad VVMU) and 13 seconded went out to sea from the ship's crew. In total, there were 287 people on the ship, along with two admirals and staff officers. The chief of staff of the fleet was the senior at sea and in training by position and rank.
At 9:55 in the morning, the ship arrived at the training ground, and a combat training alert was announced on it.
The personnel took their places on alarm, some for the last time in their lives.
The foreman of the launch team, midshipman Shuportyak, arrived at the missile control post in the cellar of ZUR No. 8. Senior sailors Karyakin and Daukshte, sailor Vinclovas also ran there.
Cadets Filippov, Kolyshev, Borisov, Staritsyn, Belousko, Anikeev and Ionov did not leave at the signal of a combat training alarm from cockpit No. 4, which was next to the cellar of ZUR No. 8, presumably they clarified with newly arrived comrades which posts they should go to combat alert, although all those not scheduled for combat alert are required to appear at the ship's GKP.
In total, in the stern of the ship from the 164th frame, in the future emergency zone, there were 78 people, including 3 midshipmen, 13 foremen, 55 sailors and 7 cadets. According to the order given on the ship, the coca and the outfit of those working on the ship remained in the galley.
galley. This time they were cook-instructor foreman of the 1st article Petr Murgu, senior cook sailor Idzhyan Akop and senior baker sailor Sergey Petrukhin, as well as an outfit from BCH-3: senior miner Petr Bedakov, senior electrician-torpedo pilot Petr Goncharuk and torpedo pilot Yaroslav Vorozhbit.
Sailor Vladimir Prochakovsky, who remained in charge of the chief boatswain of the ship, and sailor Abrahamia from the supply service, who delivered admirals and officers to the ship in the morning on a boat and missed breakfast, had a snack in the galley.
Midshipman Shuportyak, who was at the console of the missile control post of the aft cellar No. 8, in which 16 V-601 missiles were stored in 2 vertical drums in combat condition, acting in accordance with the instructions, ordered the sailors on duty at the post to connect external power. After that, he turned the toggle switches on the power supply panel to the “on” position. Immediately after clicking the last toggle switch, at 10:01:15 (this time, and the time of subsequent explosions, was established by the commission during the investigation of the circumstances of the explosion approx.) he saw through the porthole a fairly strong sheaf of flame on the left drum. Then another strong flash followed, illuminating the entire cellar (the starting main engine of the B-601 rocket ignited the starting engine, an increase in temperature and pressure initiated the operation of solid-fuel engines of other missiles). The smoke that appeared began to envelop the glass of the post. As midshipman Shuportyak later stated, he seemed to be trying to report to the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Kostin, but he did not receive Shuportyak's report - the connection allegedly did not work.
Through the enveloping anti-ship missiles and the smoke quickly filling the cellar, flashes of fire sparkled, noise and rattle grew. It was clear that there was a fire in the cellar, threatening to explode rockets and fire. Shuportyak was frightened, did not, as it should be according to the instructions, manually turn on the missile irrigation system from the anti-ship missiles and, shouting: “Leave the PKS!” - rushed to run (during the experiment, when the entire crew of the "Brave", but already on board the BOD "Resolute" played all the actions of the tragic morning of August 30, Shuportyak could not show where the output of the stock of clinkets flooding his combat post ... approx).
Having jumped out into the cockpit No. 4, he ran past the cadets and the orderly along the cockpit and, without saying anything to them, ran out into the corridor No. 11, where the aft emergency party of midshipman Petrikin was located. Only here he shouted: “Now there will be an explosion!” - and ran further along corridors No. 8 and 9 and further into the bow of the ship.
The commander of the emergency party stood at a loss.
Without informing anyone about the causes of the explosion, Shuportyak hid somewhere on the ship and appeared only two hours later.
The commander of the ship in the navigation post, the admirals on the bridge, the officers on the GKP and in the PEZh did not know anything about the fire that had started in cellar No. 8 - about the flaring fire that would lead the ship to disaster.
In cockpit No. 4 BCh-3, the cadets, who were on the ship without a practice leader, continued to discuss and allocate their places at combat posts during rocket firing.
Noise was heard in adjacent compartments, and cut off in cellar No. 8, paint began to bubble on the bulkheads. Realizing that a dangerous situation had arisen, the sailors began to leave the compartments, but not everyone succeeded.
Columns of smoke emerged from the exhaust hatches on the deck. On the navigation bridge, Rear Admiral Sahakyan, noticing smoke in the area of ​​​​the stern pipe, said:
- Again, the mechanics are smoking the sky ...
Apparently, Sahakyan forgot that gas turbine plants do not produce smoke, which he observed earlier on his destroyer.
In cellar No. 8, where the flames raged and the pressure increased, the exhaust covers should have been triggered by sensors. Did they work? Unknown. The lids are supposed to be open. Then, from an increase in temperature, the inhibitor system was supposed to automatically turn on in order to fill the cellar with an inert gas and prevent air from entering it. One can only speculate whether the system worked or not; if she gave a signal to the Dozor post, then there was no one to take it (due to combat training, duty at the Dozor post was not provided approx.).
The fire in the cellar grew. The automatic activation of the cellar irrigation was disabled (due to the imperfection of the device automatic system extinguishing, it periodically spontaneously fired, flooding the magazines of ammunition, as a result of which the system was transferred from automatic mode to signal, with manual control approx.), midshipman Shuportyak did not turn it on manually from the missile control post (RCC). However, irrigation could still be switched on from corridor No. 11; But nothing was done...
As a result of the operation of the rocket engines, the temperature and pressure in the cellar began to rise rapidly, the fire increased, gases and flames intensively escaped through the exhaust covers. In the cellar, the hull structures melted and partially collapsed.
Petty officers of the 1st article Valery Vershinin and Algirdas Makshtutis were trapped in a fire trap in the assembly room and, apparently, immediately died. Both were only 21 years old.
The foreman of the 2nd article Ivan Volodin, who was on duty there, did not get out of the rampart line and, apparently, died immediately. He was only 19 years old.
At 10:01:30 a.m., the first powerful explosion, the flames burst out.
In the turret compartment of the aft gun mount, apparently, the exit was jammed. The commander of the anti-aircraft commanders department, Alexander Urupa, remained there. He was 21 years old.
In cellar No. 8, the temperature and pressure from the running rocket and fire engines were rapidly increasing, the intensity of the release of flame and gases through the exhaust covers increased. The sloping section of the cellar deck above the baffle in the recess area became hot, and the hull structures adjacent to the cellar began to collapse in the KMO.
4-5 seconds after the first explosion, in the cellar No. 8 there was a similar to the first, but stronger explosion.
The explosion was thrown overboard, the sailors Suleymanov and Tuikin, who were subsequently picked up by a boat. On the navigation bridge, where the admirals and officers of the fleet headquarters were located, they paid attention to the emission of smoke in the stern. Rear Admiral Sahakyan again began to scold the mechanics. At the same moment, the signalman reported: “Flame from the stern pipe!” (the signalman made a mistake, the flame rose above the pipes from cellar No. 8 approx.).
At 10:02:00 a.m., there was a third strong explosion in cellar No. 8.
Petty Officer 2nd Class Adam Achmiz, who jumped out of the cockpit to the upper deck after the first explosion, immediately after the second explosion rushed to the aft gun mount, apparently to the rescue of his comrade Alexander Urupa who was in it. He had already run up to the tower and grabbed the handrails of the door, opening it, he was thrown onto the deck by the shock wave and did not get up.
Within just one minute, in the stern, in the compartments adjacent directly to cellar No. 8, and on the upper deck, nine sailors died from explosions, burned alive, and a cadet from the Kaliningrad VVMIU Alexander Ionov, two more sailors (except for two of whom he picked up a boat) they were thrown overboard by an explosion, but, not being able to swim (perhaps as a result of a shell shock), they drowned.
After the second explosion, four cadets of VVMU them. Frunze rushed into the water, well prepared at the school, they confidently floated on the water. The hydraulic shock from the third blast hit them just as they thought they had escaped.
The third explosion, having torn off the cover of cellar No. 8, destroyed the longitudinal and transverse bulkheads of the cellar and caused partial destruction of other hull structures and fuel tanks in the cellar area. As a result, hot gases and flames burst into neighboring rooms. A fire broke out in the compartments adjacent to the 8th cellar, including in the KMO, cabins No. 3, 4, 5, corridors No. 11, 10, 9. As it turned out later, during a diving examination, there was a violation of the outer skin in the area of ​​the 3rd the cockpit on the starboard side is about 5 m long, 3.5 m high and with a sag of 0.6 m.


From the combat log of the BOD "Brave" for 08/30/1974:
10.02. Smoke, fire and explosion appeared in the area of ​​the stern pipe. Combat and emergency alerts declared
From the memoirs of the former senior assistant commander of the Courageous BOD, Captain 1st Rank V. V. Balashov:
“At 10:02 there was a strong explosion. The commander gave me the command: "Come out, first mate, look." I went to the upper deck.
In the stern to the stern pipe, the flames raged, and there was a lot of smoke. metal from high temperature twisted and melted.
There was a gaping hole in the area of ​​the aft launcher. There was a trim to the stern, she settled into the water along the transom. There was a list of 12-13 ° to starboard. The ship apparently took 1000-1200 tons of water. The fire approached cellars No. 6, 7 with anti-submarine ammunition. The rocket launcher dangled overboard. The PJ was out of order ... In front of my eyes, sailor Petrukhin partially climbed out of the galley through the porthole, he was burned, his skin peeled off, and his bones were exposed. I saw how the metal melted ... ".
At the call of Prochakovsky, only one sailor Abrahamia managed to run out of the galley. The third explosion jammed the door to the vestibule, threw the sailors onto the deck, boilers with boiling water overturned on them. Sailor Petrukhin was the first to come to his senses, got out into the 10th corridor, but the door from it also jammed. Choking on smoke and gases, he climbed into the narrow porthole of the galley and stuck in it, screaming in pain. The rest of the sailors, also scalded and slightly alive, got out into the corridors No. stressful situation, not knowing that the doors were jammed, everyone rushed to the doors and near them suffocated from the smoke approx.).
A fire broke out in the stern of the emergency ship. Through the destruction in the outer skin, outboard water began to flow into the cellar compartment No. 8, cellar No. 9 and the KMO. There was a roll to starboard and trim aft. The filtration of water into the cockpit No. 6 has begun.
In the navigation post, the commander of the ship Vinnik, who announced a combat and then an emergency alarm at 10:02, immediately gave the command to stop the vehicles and began to organize a fight for the ship's survivability, trying to find out the situation and the cause of the emergency. Midshipman Shuportyak, who knew the root cause of the explosion and fire in his cellar no. ship Vinnik, on alarm switched to the GKP which was inside the ship, Rear Admiral Sahakyan remained on the navigation bridge approx.).
The team remaining in their places, and the emergency party immediately began to fight for the survivability of the ship.
Meanwhile, on the navigation bridge of the ship, the confused commanders and officers of the fleet headquarters continued to discuss the cause of the fire, which, by the way, was never found out, for some reason main versions the explosion was considered an explosion of VVD cylinders.
Accepted by the command of the ship (unfortunately, as in the case of the battleship Novorossiysk, there were too many commanders on the bridge of the Courageous), the version of the explosion of cylinders in the KMO and the spread of fire from there to other compartments with explosions of missiles and ammunition in them did not allow to correctly assess the nature of the damage, including damage to the fuel tanks due to the burning of the deck by the fire of the operating marching and starting rocket engines in cellar No. 8 and their subsequent destruction by the rocket explosion. The fuel floating up in the compartment from the fuel tanks contributed to the increase in the fire.
What fire fighting equipment did the ship have at that moment?
In the event of a fire in cellar No. 8, it was planned to turn on irrigation from the RCC and corridor No. 11, but, as you know, it was not turned on; in case of fire in KMO - liquid volumetric fire extinguishing from the ZhS system with its inclusion in corridor No. 11 of the water spray system
niya in KMO. In the event of a fire in cellar No. 9, the irrigation of cellar No. 9 from the turret compartment or cockpit No. 5 should have been turned on. However, due to heavy smoke, and then a fire in corridor No. 11, a breakthrough of gases and flames from cellar No. 8 to KMO through the aft bulkhead , which caused a fire in the KMO itself, as well as in the cockpit No. 5, these stern fire-fighting equipment were not put into action. But perhaps the explosion damaged the fire main itself.
It was possible to use only fire nozzles and portable fire fighting equipment: air-foam guns and portable fire extinguishers, but only to localize the fire in rooms bordering on the zone of intense fire.
To pump out the water entering the KMO when extinguishing a fire with outboard water, two sump pumps located in the KMO were to be pumped out. Due to a fire in the KMO itself and corridors No. 9 and 10, they were not put into operation.
It was possible to use the sump pumps in rooms 6, 8 and 10, but this was also not done due to fires in the 11th corridor and the 5th cockpit. However, it is possible that these pumps were also damaged in the explosion.


It was necessary to immediately determine the area and volume of compartment flooding. This could be done according to the indications of the signaling devices on the board of unsinkability of the PES, but due to the smoke and lack of lighting, the personnel left the PES.
PEZH, which is the command post of the BS-5, designed to receive and evaluate information, to directly manage the fight for the ship's survivability, failed, primarily due to its location in a fire hazardous area. In this regard, the state of the aft compartments was not monitored all the time until the death of the ship, and the bow compartments up to the 164th frame - only visually. The GKP only tentatively assessed the area of ​​flooding. Spare PJ (nasal remote control), apparently, was not used.
Means of fighting fire and water were used only from the side of the bow of the ship: the bow bulkhead of the KMO on the 164th frame became the line of defense against fire and water. This
the border remained until the moment the ship was abandoned by personnel. However, from the aft side, the personnel could not localize the fire on their own. Power went out in the stern, leaving the fire main without water. Combat-ready personnel in the stern were left without leadership. It was impossible to pass from the bow to the stern of the ship through the fire zone.
Due to the lack of information and the inability to correctly assess the situation, no measures were taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull (in B. Karzhavin's book "The Death of the Courageous" on page 106, the following is written: “Due to the lack of information and the inability to correctly assess the situation, no measures were taken to restore the watertightness of the ship's hull, since they didn’t know anything about the hole in the GKP». This is unlikely, after the third explosion the ship received a list of 12-13 ° to starboard, here, probably, even any housewife would have guessed that water most likely penetrated the ship's hull, i.e. body has a crack or hole approx.).
Meanwhile, the fire in cellar No. 8 and in adjacent compartments intensified, fuel from damaged tanks floated to the surface of the water and supported intense combustion, this was also facilitated by the aluminum-magnesium alloys from which the ship's superstructures were made.
5 - 10 s after a strong third explosion in the area of ​​​​cellar No. 8, a series of successive explosions resembling a cannonade was heard approx.).

LARGE ANTI-SUB SHIP "COURAGEOUS" ( I-i part)

Large anti-submarine ship "Courageous"

Each ship, like a person, has its own name, its own destiny. The crew is the soul of the ship. From the first raising of the flag to the last descent, the crew and the ship are a single living organism that performs combat missions on long trips and on target practice.

But there comes a moment when the crew is lined up for the last solemn lowering of the flag. Solemn and sad this day. For the last time, the sailors will bypass their combat posts, cockpits, cabins and leave it forever, as if the soul leaves the body of a decrepit dying old man.

Unfortunately, this is not always the case.

Fatal coincidences of circumstances and the human factor sometimes play an evil role in the fate of the ship and its crew.

The event, which will be discussed in this article, took place in the Black Sea Fleet on August 30, 1974, during the exercises, the large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" exploded and sank.

But first of all, let's start from the beginning.

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAY.

On August 10, 1963, on the stocks of the Nikolaev shipbuilding plant "named after 61 Communards", a large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" of project 61 was laid down.

On October 17, 1964, the ship was launched, and on January 25, 1966, it was included in the USSR Black Sea Fleet. Port of registry city of Sevastopol.

The construction of ships of this type was caused by the appearance in the world of submarines with nuclear power plants, increasing their autonomy, cruising range and speed, in addition, nuclear missiles were based on them, which turned submarines into powerful strategic weapons.

With the advent of jet supersonic aviation, ships also needed new anti-aircraft missile systems to protect the ship from enemy attacks from the air.

To detect underwater and surface targets, the ship was equipped with a Titan all-round sonar and a Vychegda fire control station. The detection range of submarines was up to 8 km. in echo direction finding mode and 18 km in noise direction finding mode. A helipad was equipped at the stern of the ship, which could accommodate the Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopter. The ship also had a PTA-53-61 five-pipe torpedo tube with a Buzzer fire control system, two RBU-6000 and RBU-1000 rocket launchers with a Burya control system.

To effectively protect the ship from air attacks, the ship was equipped with two M-1 Volna anti-aircraft missile systems, located in the stern and bow of the ship. Each complex consisted of two ZIF-101 twin-beam launchers, a Yatagan control system, and a store with two rotating drums for 8 V-600 missiles. Two turret artillery paired 76 mm. AK-726 installations in the bow and stern of the ship. The rate of fire of each gun mount was 90 rounds per minute, the firing range was 13 km, the reach in height was 9 km, and the ammunition load was 2,400 unitary rounds. Each gun mount had its own Turret fire control system.

Maximum speed 35 knots.

The maximum cruising range is 3500 miles.

Endurance of navigation 10 days (according to provisions)

The crew consisted of 266 people, including 22 officers.

Armament placement Project BOD 61

On June 5, 1967, between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Algeria on the other, a armed conflict known as the Six Day War. In order to exercise its military presence in this region and, if necessary, intervene in a military conflict on the side of the countries of the Arab world, the government of the USSR sent an operational squadron of the Navy from the Black Sea Fleet and ships and submarines to the conflict area Northern Fleet based in Port Said. The squadron included the BOD "Brave". Helping the Egyptians armed forces, visits Port Said.

In 1968-69 is undergoing ongoing repairs in the city of Nikolaev. During the repair, missile weapons were modernized.

Vladimir Skosyrsky. In the photo on the left

On March 16, 1969, the ship's crew suffered their first losses. In Nikolaev, in inclement weather, while winding an additional mooring line on a barrel, sailor Sait Shaipov fell into the water and began to sink. Seeing that his subordinate was in mortal danger, Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Ivanovich Skosyrsky jumped overboard and swam to the aid of a drowning man. Broken ice floes floated in the cold water. With difficulty, the officer reached the drowning sailor, gathering his last strength, he pushed him onto the ice floe, but he himself did not have enough strength to escape. A floating ice floe covered him. For courage and courage, Senior Lieutenant V.I. Skosyrsky was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

In 1969, the "Brave" was declared an excellent ship of the Black Sea Fleet.

In September 1969, captain of the third rank Ivan Petrovich Vinnik was appointed to the post of commander of the ship.

From April 14 to May 5, 1970, large-scale maneuvers "Ocean" were carried out in the USSR, covering the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The ship as part of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet takes part in exercises and performs missile firing in the Atlantic Ocean. For the excellent performance of tasks, the commander of the ship was presented with a memorable gift from the commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Lobov, a model of a submarine in the ice.

In November 1970, in the Republic of Guinea, emigrants in opposition to the incumbent President Ahmed Sek Toure, with the support of Portugal, took part in an armed invasion of the republic in order to overthrow the government and defeat the bases of the partisans who fought for the independence of Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea-Bissau). To maintain stability and order and organize the defense of the capital of Guinea, Conakry, the Courageous BOD was sent to this region.

The feat of the foreman of the 1st article Yu. S. Chuikin

In March 1973, 4 years after the death of senior lieutenant V. I. Skosyrsky, on vacation, saving people's property from a fire, the foreman of the 1st article Yu. S. Chuikin died. For courage and bravery shown in the fight against fire, foreman of the 1st article Chuikin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

On October 6, 1973, another military conflict arose between Israel and a coalition of Arab countries due to the desire of Egypt and Syria to return the lost territories. Already on October 7, the USSR began to supply weapons and equipment to Syria and Egypt by sea. To ensure the safety of Soviet ships, a detachment of Soviet warships and submarines was formed, which included the Courageous BOD. In addition to escort, the ships were engaged in electronic intelligence.

From 1970 to 1974 the crew of the ship performs course tasks and live firing only for good and excellent marks. For excellent rocket firing in 1970, the crew was awarded the challenge prize of the Civil Code of the Navy, and in 1971 they retained this prize.

During its short life, the ship also visited Cuba, Alexandria (Egypt), Split (Yugoslavia), Taranto and Messina (Italy), participated in the Yug-71 exercises.

LAST TRAVEL

On August 29, 1974, the large anti-submarine ship "Courageous" went to sea for the last time. About that tragic event, twenty years later, the commander of the ship Ivan Petrovich Vinnik wrote in his essay "Notes of the Commander". The essay is written in the second person.

Ship commander I.P. Vinnik

Commander's Notes

“... On August 28, by order of the National Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral V. A. Saakyan, Captain 2nd Rank I. P. Vinnik was summoned from Donuzlav to Sevastopol to enter the Otvazhny BOD at sea in order to ensure missile firing of RTOs 1 of the 41st brigade . The commander of the 70th brigade, captain 1st rank L.A. Makarov, apparently reported to the NSH Black Sea Fleet that earlier the organization of rocket firing was worked out with commander Vinnik, and he was assigned from an artillery cruiser, so he did not go out.

Before going to sea, 5 tons of fuel for helicopters were taken to maintain full combat readiness. In the cellar were aviation bombs for helicopters.

On August 29, at 13.00, the ship went to sea according to the BP 2 plan. They performed torpedo firing at a surface target, at night they participated in practicing the task "PLZ-4" 3 and at 07.30 they approached booms 4, where they took Rear Admiral Sahakyan on board the NSh Black Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Putintsev, head of the Navy's air defense, deputy. the head of the 4th department, 5th captain 1st rank Shibkov and the commander of the 41st brigade, captain 1st rank Komar with his headquarters and as a control ship began to move to the BP area to participate in a special mission to carry out missile firing by ships of the 41st OBRK.

Due to the fact that the state of the sea was 3 points, it was difficult for missile ships (RTOs) to carry out missile firing. After discussing the situation and weather conditions and forecasts, the NSh Black Sea Fleet decided to carry out firing.

At 09.25, the BOD entered the Combat Training Range.

The missile boats took up combat positions and began preparations for missile firing. Firing radar 6 and observation stations were turned on, missile systems began preliminary preparation for the RS. 10 minutes before the aircraft took off from the Belbek airfield at 09.55, a combat training alert was played on the ship to prepare for the RTU 7 materiel against air targets.

At 0959, the commander received a report from SPK 8 on the readiness of the ship for the exercise. The missile systems of the ship were not prepared for firing, and the supply of missiles to the launchers was not even thought, however, on alarm, power was supplied to the switchboards of the missile systems and to the cellars (as it should be on a combat or training alarm).

At 10.02, the commander climbed from GKP 9 to the navigation bridge and saw white smoke and force of fire in the area of ​​​​stern pipes, an explosion suddenly thundered. The commander announced a combat alert and broadcast about a fire in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe stern vehicle, gave the command: "Bow and stern emergency parties to put out the fire."

After 15 - 20 seconds there was a second explosion. With the permission of the NSH Black Sea Fleet, the commander went down to the GKP to clarify the situation and control the struggle for the ship's survivability. On the navigation bridge he left the watch officer - the commander of the BCH-3 10 senior lieutenant S. A. Kachinsky to monitor the external situation. After 20 - 30 sec. the third and fourth explosions took place.

There was an assumption: either the launch cylinders in the aft engine room explode, or the rockets in the cellar.

Senior assistant captain-lieutenant V. V. Balashov played an emergency alarm. The commander ordered: "To the commanders of the BP (combat posts) and the command post (command post) report the presence of smoke, fire and water in their premises." I received a report that there was no communication with the stern vehicle, the stern missile cellar, the emergency party and the stern tower.

The commander sent the SPK to personally check the condition of the ship in the stern, passing along the upper deck. After inspection, the SPK reported that the stern missile cellar had been torn apart, and the launcher had been abandoned in the area of ​​the stern pipes. A strong fire in the cellar is moving into the stern vehicle and into the stern - to the gun mount area.

The commander made a report of the National Staff of the Black Sea Fleet to the navigation bridge and, in the prescribed form - to the command post of the fleet, division and through the air defense network, personally transmitted to the airfield about explosions and a large fire and asked to deliver a foam concentrate by helicopters or in cylinders of carbon dioxide in order to pour (drop) into the aft cellar .

The commander asked the RTO commanders to approach the stern of the ship to remove the personnel located on the quarterdeck and assist in extinguishing the fire spreading to the stern. One RTO approached from the stern of the BOD, removed several people from the board and lifted the personnel, who were thrown overboard by a shock wave, but no one dared to put out the fire and stay at the side of the BOD, because both the RTOs had ammunition, and missiles, and fuel, and the likelihood of another explosion was high.

The crew is fighting for the survivability of the ship

With the approach of the rescue ship PZhK-123, on which the captain of the 2nd rank A.V. Zhbanov was, to the port side, the personnel of the BOD, together with the PZhK, energetically launched an attack on fire thanks to the foam supplied through the fire hoses inside the premises and on the upper deck. The fire began to recede and clearly decreased. Water was supplied by fire nozzles with PZhK and ship fire fighting equipment. Until the last minutes, power was supplied to the BOD, and the means of drainage and fire pumps worked, which contributed to the successful struggle of personnel for the survivability of the ship. However, there were very small stocks of foam concentrate on the PZhK and on the ship, and everything was used up very quickly. The fire began to intensify again, and apart from water, there was nothing more from the fire system.

The commander of the BOD asked captain 2nd rank Zhbanov at the PZhK to give more foam, but received the answer: “There is nothing else”, the commander asked that water should not be poured into the interior without calculation, so that free surfaces would not form and water would not accumulate in the rooms above the waterline because the ship could capsize. More than three compartments were flooded on the ship.

Calculations showed that the ship was in critical condition.

EM 11 "Conscious" approached the board, onto which secret documents, equipment and documents of SPS 12 and the combat unit were reloaded, part of the personnel, staff officers were transferred. On board the EM was the brigade commander captain 1st rank L. A. Makarov.

Analyzing activities officers, midshipmen, according to the reports of members of the state commission and the commission of the Ministry of Defense, it can be said that the crew in this difficult and critical situation showed high moral, political and psychological qualities, high skills in the fight for the survivability of the ship, which actually made it possible to fight fires for 5 hours and 40 minutes and water and when more than three compartments were flooded, and in the presence of strong fires, when the metal melted and flowed like wax from a candle!

The actions of the command and personnel in accordance with BZZH 13 are most clearly characterized by the fact that the standard options from the documentation on the unsinkability of the ship unambiguously interpret that the ship sinks when three compartments are flooded. In fact, the "Brave" remained afloat - there was a good sealing of the premises and reliable lines of defense to combat water.

During the intensifying fire and its constant advance into the bow from the stern pipes to the torpedo platform, when the fire threatened live torpedoes and an explosion could occur at any moment, Lieutenant Commander Kamalov, midshipman Medvedev, foreman 2 articles Selimsultanov, Slivkin, sailor Kabanov cooled the torpedoes water and by order of the commander (after the report of the NSh Black Sea Fleet on the threat of an explosion), they manually dropped two torpedoes lying on the platform overboard (freed up space for a practical torpedo 14 for firing at an underwater target), and three - with shots from a torpedo tube (after a personal check situation by the commander of the ship).

When the bulkhead in the personnel canteen from the side of the stern vehicle began to heat up and there was a threat of an explosion in the 6th and 7th cellars with depth charges, by order of the commander (after the report of the National Staff of the Black Sea Fleet and a personal check of the situation), warrant officer Medvedev and foreman 2 articles Kozleneev and others with the help of fire hoses in the smoky room of the canteen of the personnel, the cellars were flooded, thereby preventing the explosion of about 5 tons of explosives and improving the stability of the ship, preventing the flooding of the huge canteen of the personnel.

Petty Officer 2nd Article Garibyan and sailor Nikitenko, in the area of ​​​​a strong fire near the stern pipe, threw overboard cylinders with acetylene and oxygen, on which the paint was already starting to burn.

Once in the galley and unable to leave the room due to the jammed doors and hatch, sailor Prochakovsky shouted through the porthole: “Comrades, everything is clear with me! Save the ship! Trying to get out of the emergency room, sailor Petrukhin got stuck in the porthole. The commander ordered to cut out the porthole, but neither gas welding nor electric welding could do this. The sailor, injured and with large burns, was given painkillers, but the advancing fire did not allow him and other sailors blocked in the galley to be rescued ...» . (To be continued)

1 RTOs- small rocket ship.

2 BP- combat training.

3 PLZ- anti-submarine task

4 Bon- a barrier that protects the entrance to the harbor or fairway from enemy ships.

5 4th department- counterintelligence of the Navy

6 radar– radar station

7 RTU- radio engineering exercises

8 SPK- Senior Assistant Commander.

9 GKP- the main command post.

10 warhead-3- on the ship mine-torpedo part.

11 EM- squadron destroyer.

12 THX– special communications

13 BZZH- fight for survivability

14 Practical torpedo - a training torpedo, which differs from a full-fledged lack of a warhead.

09/11/2013 6 487 0 Jadaha

Death of the "Brave"

catastrophes

A modern warship is a combination of the incompatible. Fuel and oxygen, explosives and electricity are crammed into an enclosed space. the slightest mistake can lead to tragedy. There were many such tragedies in the history of the fleet, but it was not customary to talk about them ..

On the morning of August 30, 1974, the large anti-submarine ship Brave left Sevastopol to participate in rocket firing. On board were 258 crew members, 16 cadets and officers of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters in total 287 people. The captain of the 2nd rank I.P. Vinnik commanded the ship.

By 10 o'clock in the morning, the "Brave" arrived at the designated square opposite Cape Khersones, where the destroyer "Conscious" and missile boats were already located.

At the signal "Training alarm" the crew fled to command and combat posts. A minute later, there was a bang in the cellar with ammunition. He poured smoke, seeping into the missile control post. Midshipman Shuportyak, who was sitting at his post, realized that things were bad, and rushed to run, forgetting the emergency fire extinguishing button ...

As it turned out later, the engine of one of the rockets went off in the cellar. After 20 seconds, the fire was already raging with might and main. A fiery plume, escaping from the nozzle of the rocket, burned through everything around. Two people who were nearby died instantly.

A fire on a ship is dangerous, and on a warship stuffed with ammunition to the eyeballs, it is doubly dangerous. And the worst was not long in coming..

“I ran after those who were ahead,” sailor Alexander Kolyshev recalled. - From the corridor through the washbasin I ran into the latrine, where the first explosion caught me. Everyone fell ... Insulation from the bulkheads rained down on us.

A few seconds later there was a second explosion. Apparently, the engines of another or even several rockets fired. The third explosion blew out the deck of the superstructure. A powerful column of flame escaped from there. The rocket launcher shot up, swayed from side to side, and was thrown into the chimney. The heat twisted the metal like birch bark and melted. The stern, pierced by the explosion, began to settle. The fire crept up to the cellars where the depth charges were stored. Boilers of boiling water fell on the sailors in the galley. Scalded people rushed about in the corridors, choking on smoke and gases. One of the sailors tried to get out through the porthole and got stuck. Captain 1st rank Balashov saw the skin peeling off the body of the doomed sailor...

The crew tried to stop the flames. The fire was even extinguished, but the carbon dioxide foam ran out, and the fire broke out with new force. Ammunition exploded. The aft bulkhead was pierced with shrapnel. People rushed around the deck, trying to get away from the flames devouring everything in their path. The fire cut off 13 people at the stern. They did not hear the commands transmitted over the speakerphone, did not know what to do, and, fearing another explosion, rushed overboard. Only one sailor who could not swim grasped the flagpole in horror.

An order was given to flood the cellars located next to the raging fire. The roll of the ship, already flooded through the hole, increased to 12 degrees.

Rescue teams landed on the blazing ship from the destroyer Conscious and the large anti-submarine ship Bedovy. But they could not help the crew of the "Brave". Fuel escaping from punctured tanks caught fire. Hot torpedoes flew overboard. The list increased to 16 degrees Around the "Brave" many ships gathered, but attempts to extinguish the fire with carbon dioxide foam or tow the ship to the shore were unsuccessful.

Secret documents were quickly evacuated from the ship. At 11:24 torpedoes were dropped into the sea, the list of the ship was reduced to 14 degrees. At the same time, ammunition cellars No. 6 and 7 were flooded with water using fire hydrants. At 11:55 a.m. BPC Komsomolets Ukrainy arrived at the scene to provide assistance.

At 11.59 the fire on board the ship was localized, white smoke began to fall from the cellars. However, after 7 minutes, the towing cables from the destroyer "Conscious" broke, new cables began to start from the "Troublesome". All this time, the fire in the aft engine room of the ship continued. At 12.27 a command was given to stop the water supply to the compartment, it was decided to use only foam. A chemical fire extinguishing system was activated in the aft engine room. The towing of the ship in distress at a speed of 3 knots began again at 12:49, at which time the roll of the anti-submarine ship reached 17 degrees.

At 12:55, the rescue ship Beshtau arrived at the scene at 13:20 - SS-15 and SS-26, a few minutes later the fire and decontamination vessel Flame. From these ships, foam was supplied to the area of ​​​​the burning cellars on board the BOD "Courageous". At 14:30 an attempt was made to pump out water from the aft compartments, but after 17 minutes an explosion of aviation ammunition located in cellar No. 10 occurred. Apparently, at the same time, the tank, which stored 5 tons of aviation kerosene, also exploded. All this seriously complicated the situation, the list of the ship to starboard quickly reached 19 degrees, increasing to 25. At 14.47, five hours after the start of the fire, a powerful explosion was heard in the stern. Kerosene burned. The ship lurched sharply, straightened up, and lurched again, sinking deeper and deeper.At 15:07, it stabilized at around 27 degrees. After another 3 minutes, the power supply to the instruments was cut off on the ship and the lighting turned off. At 15:12 the personnel received an order: "Personnel to leave the ship" , the last BOD left his captain.

“After this command,” midshipman Karpenko recalled, “headquarters officers, a financier and others began to jump on the lifeguard. Around the ships lowered longboats. I persuaded the sailors to jump. I look, the boatswain in the vest comes out on the upper deck. Not far from him is the sailor Ernazarov, who cannot swim. I say to the boatswain: "Give him your vest, we will lower him along the towline." I'm going down the port side, Ernazarov is behind me. It was already the bottom, I felt the shells with my hands. I say: "Jump after me when I sail." Jumped, and he hangs. "Jump!" - it hangs. Around already the fuel starts to burn - it hangs. A motor boat approached, and they tried to remove the sailor from it with a hook. I sailed away, looked back, I looked - it was hanging, and only when they stopped filming it, fell between the ship and the longboat. The sea was 3-4 points, strong wind carried the rafts thrown by planes and helicopters.

“People were afraid to jump from the Courageous,” said mechanic Gleb Umerenkov. - The height at the left side was about 15 meters. They began to push people to enter. One sailor in a vest clung to the handrail and handrails like that. that they couldn't pull it off. I handed him the second vest, he stretched out his hands to him, and then we pushed him into the water. I jumped too; we swim with him, he holds on to my shoulder and yells. Some lieutenant in the water sang: "The enemy does not surrender ...". The “Brave” was still pulled, but when he went down astern, the tugboat was cut off. The ship became vertical, and its bow was visible for about 30 minutes. He probably stood at the bottom ... "

At 15.35, the Otvazhny BOD began to dive into the Black Sea astern without capsizing, a tug was given from the destroyer Bedovoy. After only 12 minutes, the ship completely disappeared under the water. The depth at the site of its flooding was about 125 meters. In total, 5 hours and 47 minutes passed from the moment the fire was discovered on the ship to its flooding. As a result of internal explosions and holes in the hull, the ship took on board almost 3600 tons of water, 6 impenetrable compartments were flooded. At the same time, after flooding 4 compartments located in the stern, the trim and roll were stabilized, and the BOD had positive stability. But when the water completely flooded 2 more compartments, the ship's buoyancy was exhausted. However, even when it sank, the Courageous BOD showed a very high survivability. Ships specification this project could stay afloat only after flooding 3 adjacent compartments.

In the 60s, our fleet was replenished with a series of large anti-submarine ships (BOD) of project 61. With a standard displacement of 3500 tons, they became the world's first large warships equipped with gas turbine power plants. For the characteristic sound of the operation of these installations, the sailors nicknamed the BOD of this project “singing frigates”. Most of them became part of the Black Sea Fleet. Among these was the BOD “Brave”.

On the morning of August 30, 1974, the Courageous BOD left the Northern Bay of Sevastopol and headed for the sea for firing practice with anti-aircraft missiles. Already at the site of the exercises in preparation for firing at 10 hours 02 minutes in the aft cellar 16 anti-aircraft missiles the propulsion engine of one of them spontaneously started, then the starting engine of another rocket worked, after which the rest of the Volna anti-aircraft missiles stored there exploded. The shock wave tore off the roof of the aft superstructure along with launcher for these missiles, destroyed the transverse bulkheads and tore the ship's hull in several places. Through the cracks formed, water began to flow, quickly filling 4 compartments. After 8 minutes, the roll of the ship to starboard reached 12 degrees. A fire broke out on the stern that settled into the water by 1.5 meters. By 11 o'clock, large missile ships (BRK) "Troubled" and "Conscious" approached the scene of the tragedy, which landed rescue teams on the "Courageous", and then unsuccessfully tried to take it in tow. After 12 hours, the same type of BOD Komsomolets Ukrainy came to their aid, and at 13 hours 25 minutes - two rescue ships. All of them tried to shoot down the fire with water jets in the area of ​​​​the aft storage of aviation fuel and the ship's helicopter ammunition, but soon they were forced to retreat due to heavy fire. Due to the threat of new explosions, a torpedo tube was deployed on the Courageous and all five torpedoes were fired overboard.

At 1445 hours, despite all efforts to fight the fire, the aft cellar with aviation depth charges and jet fuel exploded. 2 more compartments were flooded, the ship plunged into the water to the aft tower, and the list reached 28 degrees. At 15:03, an order was given to leave the ship, and its crew with rescue teams moved to other ships. Soon, the BOD almost vertically, stern down, began to go under water. The depth of the sea in this place was 125 m, so when the stern of the 144-meter ship touched the bottom, its sinking slowed down. The bow part rose above the surface of the sea for several minutes, then it abruptly went under the water. It happened at 15 hours 57 minutes, 40 km from the Chersonese lighthouse at a point with coordinates 44 ° 44 'N. and 32° 59’ E 24 people died (including 5 cadets). 26 sailors were injured and burned.

Later, from the "Brave" were raised to the surface technical documentation, as well as parts of equipment and weapons with a total weight of about 40 tons, and in December 1977, the BOD hull was blown up. The death of the ship made it necessary to speed up work to improve the fire safety of ammunition depots. The results were not slow to affect: when in 1984 a similar accident occurred in the bow cellar of the Volna-M air defense system of another BOD of the Black Sea Fleet, the ship did not receive significant damage.