Kalina submarine with a chemical plant. Domestic weapons and military equipment

Still, Russian nationalists are complete assholes in everything. Especially when they begin to "defend the USSR." From such defenders uKhi wither. Here I listened to Fursov's speech about the "traitors to Russia" ... And everything would be fine: Gorbachev, Yeltsin are undoubtedly scoundrels, worthy of every kind of censure, which can be seen with the naked voice and there is no need for intelligence here. Enough statistics.

But when it comes down to it, some kind of wildest ignorance of the "patriots" manifests itself. By the way, this also applies to the problem of Stalin. And this is a problem. If the Russian "liberals" mold Stalin into a universal villain - they, in fact, are - and today it is quite obvious - the followers of external enemies of the USSR, then the "Russian national patriots" - of those who defend Stalin (and there is also the "Black Hundred" - the last of the unfinished White Guard bastards who hate Stalin and the USSR for the privileges taken away from their ancestors), are incredibly superficial and their "Stalinism" is a banal protest against today's bastard situation in Russia. But this is a separate conversation.

Mr. Fursov argues that if THREE PROGRAMS were implemented in the USSR, the USSR would take a leading position in the world. He calls these positions:

1. OGAS - Glushkov
2. Cold thermonuclear - Filimonenko.
3. Integrated defense-offensive ocean-land-space complex - Chelomey.

I can disappoint Mr. Fursov.

None of the programs he listed could be realized, albeit for different reasons.

On the contrary, the USSR showed serious sanity that they did not get involved in their implementation: an attempt to implement two of them: OGAS and Chelomey's idea would cause an economic catastrophe, and Filimonenko's idea is the usual schizophrenic nonsense in the spirit of M. Kalashnikov, to whom classes in a rocking chair are clearly knowledge was not added.

I'll start with "cold fusion", as the most obvious.

To carry out a fusion reaction, two positively charged nuclei, say, deuterium and tritium, must approach a distance of about 10 -15 meters. If at distances of the order of the size of an atom: 10 -10 meters, - positive charge nuclei is partially or completely compensated by the negative charge of electrons (therefore, ordinary atoms are neutral), then inside the electron shell the nuclei turn out to be "bare" and, by virtue of Coulomb's law, repel each other due to their similar charge. To overcome this repulsion, the nuclei must be accelerated to the equivalent of about 100 million degrees or more. Otherwise, the nuclei simply will not reach each other and will not fall under the action of nuclear forces, which, in fact, are responsible for their fusion and energy release.

In this sense, all non-quantum (which will be discussed below) variants of a fusion differ only in the ways in which nuclei are accelerated. Thermal - how to heat a substance to a temperature of hundreds of millions of degrees - and keep it long enough for the reaction to take place (and, most importantly, for the reaction to take place deep enough so that the energy costs for heating are less than the energy released during the reaction) . Well, or you can use accelerators that accelerate nuclei (ions) to the desired speed ... Alas, this problem has not yet been solved. But, there will probably be solutions in at least one of the ways: either by confining a hot, but low-density plasma magnetic field enough for a long time, or simultaneous heating of the substance and its compaction to enormous values ​​by laser radiation. As far as accelerators are concerned, so far, alas, acceleration costs much more energetically than the output.

The only non-thermal conceivable fusion variant to associate with quantum mechanics, to be more precise, with the fact that a particle (including protons) are simultaneously waves and, therefore, can quantum-mechanically "leak" through potential barriers. For such seepage to occur, it is necessary that the nuclei can approach each other by a small number of "nuclear" lengths without having to increase them. kinetic energy. How to do it? - This is possible only if the positive charge of the nuclei is - in the image of atoms - shielded at the required distance by a compensating negative charge, and this charge lives long enough for the number of tunneled nuclei to be large enough. The idea is good. But in this case, we live in the world of elementary particles and stable particles capable of forming pseudo-atoms with a radius of, say, 10 -13 meters, and even live for any noticeable time only one: this is a massive "quasi-electron" - elementary particle known as the mu meson. Which, alas, is unstable and lives only 10 -6 seconds. There was hope - but it did not work out ... The energy spent on the production of mu-mesons turned out to be greater than the thermonuclear energy released during their lifetime as a result of reactions, as a result of quantum mechanical leakage of nuclei located in the center of "mesoatoms". Alas and ah. Hope was closed both theoretically and experimentally.

There are NO other ways. Therefore, we can say with a guarantee: unfortunately, "cold fusion" belongs to the category perpetual motion machines. I want to, but alas...

OGAS Glushkova Here TWO ERRORS of "formal techies" converge at once.

The first is the erroneous identification of the market with capitalism, and socialism with a DIRECTIVE plan. Why is the word "directive" highlighted? Because directive planning is an order to whom, what, how much and when to release. But there are other types of planning - for example, indicative. The name itself speaks of the meaning of the latter: it is the planning of indicators that integrally reflect the state of the economy as a whole, and not the range and quantity of individual products and services. These two approaches are perfectly combined in that part that directive planning makes sense (and even possible) only for a relatively small number of critical product items.

Directive planning, therefore, is a sign, not of socialism / communism, but of the MOBILIZATION ECONOMY (or the mobilization part of the economy) when SUCH DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES IS VITALLY NECESSARY, WHICH CANNOT BE REALIZED BY MARKET, ie, FREE, EXCHANGE.

The USSR of the Stalin period was forced to be in a state of mobilization: the market development of the industry, sufficient to win the war for the allotted time, was impossible in principle. By the way, this was the main mistake of Bukharin or Chayanov and others like him: they, like Stolypin in their time, did not take into account main resource: TIME. If the USSR had 100 years for smooth industrialization, the path through cooperation would have been wonderful. But these 100 years, like Stolypin's 20, the country simply did not have. Therefore, thanks to Stolypin's blindness, Russia lost the First World War and fell into a revolution, and thanks to Stalin's clarity of thought, the USSR won the Great War itself.

But the main mistake is elsewhere. Glushkov is not the only "programmer" who suffers from economic blindness. For example, Wasserman promotes similar nonsense, and Vaino's notorious "nooscope" is based on the same delusion.

The problem is that PLANNING PURELY TECHNICALLY IS POSSIBLE ONLY TO RELEASE A VERY Narrow SET OF PRODUCTS. And it's not even that "it is impossible to calculate a matrix containing 10 16 elements", although this is also, because, in fact, many economic problems are UNCOMPUTSABLE in the strict sense of the word. These are, as they joke, the problems of "Cristobal Khozevich Junta": how to solve problems if it is proved that they have no solution. In reality, there are other problems: that nature (society) is not considered. They live. And this means that since we cannot instantly create things and “uncreate” them just as instantly, conditions change during production, including demand, and what has already been put into production cannot be “uncreated”: minced meat does not scroll back well. As a result, strict planning is impossible. The only way dealing with this - these are his mug "hedge production" - that is, the scientists of the uncertainty of planning. This makes the idea of ​​"optimizing everything" meaningless - The task turns out to be stupidly unstable.

The reality is that you can plan only what has a clearly defined demand. For example weapons. And this must be done correctly. But this is only a small part of the problem. But even with the construction of such a homogeneous product as housing, there are problems.

In this sense, I note that the Lieberman-Kosygin reform is "wrong" in the eyes of some patriots, only because Lieberman is Lieberman, not Ivanov. For other "patriots" - this is an exhaustive proof of the author's wrongness.

It is not Stalin's fault that Stalin built a tank from the country. It was, as they say, "the call of the times." The main post-war problem of the USSR is that, for a number of objective and subjective reasons, the USSR could not demobilize.

And finally, Chelomey. Anyone who is familiar with the ideas of Chelomey cannot help but recall 100,000 Tukhachevsky tanks. They offered to build a bridge that could not be completed! - This is again a failure to take into account time constraints. The country did not have the economic opportunity to implement such a program abruptly. And with slow execution on a scale available to the country, it would become obsolete before it was completed. It's generally characteristic error many "formalists".

For example, in the USSR in 1985 there were not enough home telephones. Well, it wasn't enough!

Imagine that Gorbachev, to celebrate, would have thrown all his means to provide FOR A YEAR "each apartment by phone"? I would have thrown billions into telephonization, which were just barely enough ... Well, yes, at least ten years after that - before the creation mobile phones people would still at least use them ... And if the funds would only be enough for a twenty-year program? - The project simply would not have been completed, and the money invested would have been thrown to the wind, because by 1995 there was a massive transition to mobile phones and no network in the form it was seen in 1985 would simply be needed.

In practice, Chelomey's proposals would either bring down the country's economy more effectively than a nuclear attack, or, as planned, would lead to a senseless expenditure of funds.

This (as in the case of Glushkov) "optimization without constraints"- that is, worse than sabotage: bungling with burglary. Thank God it didn't happen.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Chelomei was born in 1914, studied at the Kiev Polytechnic until 1937, during his studies he published a solid textbook on vector analysis, and his works on the theory of dynamic stability became classics. In 1936 Chelomei passed industrial practice at an aircraft factory in Zaporozhye. It was at this time that an emergency happened at the plant. Shaft of one aircraft engines, intended for fighters, could not withstand the calculated loads and broke. The designers tried to prevent breakdowns by increasing the thickness of the shaft, but even after that the engine regularly failed. You can guess what it threatened the plant in those years. The chief engineer was already preparing for his arrest, when student-trainee V. Chelomey offered him his own way to eliminate the accident: to reduce the thickness of the shaft. A paradoxical decision: not to increase, but, on the contrary, to decrease! A drowning man clutches at a straw: “Do it, but under personal responsibility!” And the engine is running! The student gave a course of brilliant lectures at the plant on the dynamics of aircraft engines, presenting the results of his own research. (The glory and power of paradoxical decisions - decisions that seemed absurd, illogical to others, decisions that do not advance, but push forward, so that the movement of V. Chelomey's thought now seems explosive, pulsating - from now on did not leave him ... until the last moment, understand this literally.) 1939: defense of the candidate's thesis, 40th - invitation to the "Stalinist" doctoral studies (50 doctoral students in total). 1942: The first tests of a pulse jet engine, the result of the main studies of 1936-1940. (Author's certificate was received by Chelomey in 1938. In Germany, the Argus company instructs P. Schmidt at the beginning of the war to create a pulsating engine for an unmanned aircraft, at the end of the 42nd, such an engine and apparatus were created, this is the V-1, the creators of which for a long time cannot eliminate the effects of vibration on the instrumentation of the projectile aircraft. Tests of the Chelomey engine, devoid of this shortcoming, were carried out in Lefortovo and frightened Moscow with sounds similar to the firing of anti-aircraft batteries. The tests were attended by the commander of the Air Force, General A. A. Novikov and People's Commissar aviation industry A. I. Shakhurin.) After it became known about the creation of a German projectile aircraft, the young designer Chelomei was appointed chief designer and director of the plant, which was previously led by the famous "king of fighters" N. N. Polikarpov (in last years his life was hard: the planes did not go, it is not known why. Maybe they were in too much of a hurry...). The new chief designer is thirty years old. His character is not easy: the story is known of how he rolled out of his hangar a captured aircraft, the prey of Tupolev. Tupolev, furious, called Stalin. Stalin inquired how old the impudent one was. That is how the matter ended. Miraculously. In 1944, Chelomey began to create the first cruise missile on the basis of a pulsating engine. Further, very briefly: doctoral defense - 1951, corresponding member - 58th, General Designer - 59th, academician - 1962. Launch of the world's first maneuvering satellite - 1963. The launch, called in the West "aerobatics in space." Four Proton space laboratories, which were launched by the carrier rocket of the same name, which is fundamentally new in contrast to the royal design. (Until now, Proton launches lunar satellites, Cosmos, Mars, Vega .....) space, very soon manned space and almost immediately public space (yes, Korolev was classified, but the world guessed about the sole rule in Soviet space), then Vladimir Chelomey's company did not start as a space company.

In March 1945, Chelomey was summoned to a meeting at the Defense Committee: the issue of using a projectile aircraft was being decided. The cruise missile was called 10X: the tenth modification of an unknown weapon. The Americans had nothing of the kind. The Germans had a V-1 projectile. There is a year ahead until the day when Korolev is urgently delivered to the Peenemünde training ground captured by the Allied troops to select some of the equipment - the Americans will get the father of the V-2, Wernher von Braun. (There is an assumption that Brown, with a bandaged broken arm, was already in our hands, but did not arouse interest and hobbled to the Americans, after which the history of rocket science developed as it developed: many Germans worked for us, but Brown was not among them , which was, so to speak, by the nature of the results the German counterpart of Chelomey ...) During the 45th 10X, it was put into service Soviet army. The film where the rocket starts has been preserved. The meeting with Stalin on the use of 10X included moments that were dangerous at that time. Beria asked a tricky question: "So who - who?" This meant, obviously, the parallel movement of the design ideas of the creators of 10X and V-1. Chelomei coolly replied: “The fact that I could not borrow is obvious. Well, could the Germans have me - this is a question for you, Lavrenty Pavlovich. Further, Stalin asked the question: is it possible to use 10X already now? The designer gave a firmly negative answer, noting that the accuracy of the projectile hit would not make it possible to avoid casualties among the civilian population. Had the answer been different (in other words: had ambition mastered the designer for a moment, ambition and fear...), the horror of the bombing of Dresden by American aircraft would have been surpassed by us. Thus fate revealed the character of the future General.

The projectile was tested at Kapustin Yar, on the Black and North Seas. And Novikov and Shakhurin, who supported the designer, were arrested on charges of supplying defective aircraft to the front: Vasily Iosifovich Stalin, during a meeting with his father, praised American cars in Potsdam! .. It is known that the arrested Novikov was forced to testify against Marshal Zhukov.

Two professional leaders of the aviation industry waited for release until the death of Stalin. In 1953, another test of 10ХН was going on in Kapustin Yar, when, ten days before his death, Stalin signed a decree of the Council of Ministers on the liquidation of a number of enterprises. Undoubtedly, death did not allow the scenario to unfold. Chelomey's "firm" was also on the black list. That was the first, but the only case when Vladimir Chelomey was excommunicated from his work, giving it to another. (For memory: the 53rd, 70th, 81st, and all of them were a separate story.) Everything that had been worked out was given to Artem Mikoyan, who wanted to make a cruise missile, replacing the pilot in the MIG with an automatic system. Sergei Beria was also involved in the massacre, not getting along with one of the former employees of the cruise missile designer (G. Boltyansky and V. Avduevsky). There is another guess: by the time of Stalin’s decree, Beria’s son already had some kind of his own company, which was also related to rockets ... wasn’t the selection of the most important topics from the same Chelomey dictated by the paternal care of Lavrenty Pavlovich? After all, Mikoyan was engaged only in manned aviation, the idea of ​​​​combining a machine gun and an airplane mechanically does not stand up to criticism, but it could belong to an imperious non-professional ... What happened to Chelomey's company during these years leaves a feeling of ambiguity. The small design team that remained at Chelomey was located in Tushino and stubbornly continued its work - it was engaged in work to reduce the guides along which the 10X launched (the guides were reduced from 30 to 7 meters). Chelomey did not reconcile himself, he tried to get an appointment with Beria, which amazed him. Finally personally suggested to the leader navy the idea of ​​​​re-equipping the fleet and equipping cruise missiles(from this day is counted recent history Navy). In the summer of 1955, Keldysh called the disgraced designer: “A decision has been made to create a large enterprise to implement your proposals, a place has been allocated for construction.” So, on the outskirts of Moscow, the “Chelomey firm” began.

Three years later, the enterprise, barely getting on its feet, begins to design and create ballistic missiles: in December it was decided to create Missile troops strategic purpose. On the initiative of the General Designer, the company organized lectures on aerodynamics hypersonic speeds, remember the lectures of a Kyiv student at an aircraft factory in 1936: he was tireless as a teacher, his favorite expression: “Think! Think!

A year before the appearance of the secret letter of the cosmonauts, on October 12, 1964, a meeting of the company's senior staff was held at the Special Design Bureau No. general designer Vladimir Chelomei proposed the concept of a station for solving "defense, scientific and national economic problems." Chelomey, who devoted many years to the design of advanced military, primarily jet, technology, saw in such a station a powerful means of operational space intelligence, far exceeding in capabilities all the samples created by that time. He imagined a kind of space observation post with comfortable living conditions and good equipment, with a replaceable crew of two or three people for a flight period of one to two years. And Chelomey found understanding among the leadership.

Work on the station began by order of the Minister of General Engineering on October 27, 1965. The draft design of the station, called Almaz, was released in 1966. The Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 14, 1967 determined the timing of the implementation of the program and performance characteristics on-board facilities "Diamond". The station was supposed to be launched into orbit by a heavy launch vehicle "UR-500K" ("Proton-K") with a capacity of 20 tons, which was also created in OKB-52. At the first stage, they wanted to launch the astronauts together with the station - in a return vehicle located in its front part. Such a delivery scheme looks unusual in modern times, but then it was studied in depth, since the possibility of docking in orbit with the transfer of the crew from object to object had not yet been worked out at the proper level. With more detailed analysis it turned out that the proposed scheme has serious drawbacks, because the presence of a heavy reentry vehicle as part of the launched object significantly reduces the mass of the target equipment, which in itself reduces the potential of the station. In the end, the idea was abandoned, deciding to implement the docking procedure on Soyuz manned spacecraft.

The final draft design of the Almaz rocket and space complex, which includes base unit and the transport supply ship "TKS", equipped with a reentry vehicle, was adopted by the Interdepartmental Commission in 1967. The complex also included a launch vehicle, technical and launch positions, a ground point for receiving information and a network of ground points for the command and measurement complex (CMC). It was planned to create simulators for training crews.

According to the project, Almaz was supposed to become a more advanced orbital reconnaissance aircraft than automatic Zeniths, giving an obvious advantage in terms of the speed of receiving and processing information. The astronauts could look at the Earth in the visible and infrared spectral ranges through powerful "space binoculars". Seeing something suspicious, they would give the command to take a series of pictures. The film was developed on board under the control of the crew. Noteworthy fragments of the obtained images were supposed to be transmitted to Earth via a television channel. In addition, attention-grabbing areas of the planet could be viewed using side-scan radar.

The equipment that was created for installation on board the station was the most advanced, very complex and expensive by the standards of that time. In particular, a unique camera with focal length 10 m and a mirror diameter of about 2 m, comparable in resolution with modern orbital telescopes of the "Hubble" type ("Hubble"). On approval specifications employees of the Central Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering (TsKBM; this name was given to OKB-52 in 1966) and the Krasnogorsk plant "Zenit" spent three months. Only one blank for the production of a mirror had to cool in the mold for a year and a half!

When designing the Almaz station, the following dimensions were chosen: total length - 11.61 m, habitable volume - 90 m 3, launch weight - 18.9 tons. The station was designed for a crew of two and a total orbital time of up to 410 days. Power supply was carried out by panels solar panels with total area 52 m2.

Structurally, the station was divided into two parts, which can be conditionally called compartments of small and large diameters. The compartment of small diameter (the transverse dimension of the pressurized hull is 2.9 m) was located in front of the station. Next was a compartment of large diameter (transverse dimension of the pressurized hull - 4.1 m). The internal volume of the station included domestic, working, instrumental and transition zones.

The living area with several viewports was located in a compartment of small diameter and was intended for the astronauts to rest and sleep, eat, and conduct medical experiments. A table with canned food warmers, astronauts' chairs, water containers and built-in food containers were fixed at one side. A control panel for the life support system was mounted above the table. On the other side there were cabinets with medical equipment, sets of linen, household items and personal items, a tape recorder with a music library and a radio receiver. The end of the living area was given over to sleeping places.

The living area was followed by a work area. Its rear part was occupied by the Agat-1 equipment and the station control system. The "Agata-1" included a large optical telescope with a variable focal length for detailed observation of objects located on earth's surface, in the world's oceans and in the Earth's atmosphere. The telescope was combined with an ASA-34R wide-film camera and occupied a sealed niche from floor to ceiling. In the working area there was a processing machine for processing photographic film and a light table, on which it was possible to examine the developed frames in detail, with magnification. The most interesting and important pictures were read out, encoded and transmitted to the Earth via a radio channel. In the working area of ​​the large-diameter compartment, there were station control and monitoring panels, a pilot console with a display of the current coordinates and an indicator of the spatial position of the station, with a station orientation control knob, an optical measuring device "OD-4", which made it possible to "stop" the run of the earth's surface and observe individual areas with a resolution of 7–8 m, a panoramic observation device "POU-II" for a wide examination of the earth's surface, a periscope for all-round visibility and monitoring of the surrounding space. In addition, Pechora television equipment and an on-board information retrieval system were placed in the working area to quickly obtain data on the operation of Almaz equipment. A complex simulator with a treadmill for physical training and a mass meter (mass meter) were also installed there. Of course, a sluice for removing waste containers, a toilet, and a closet with personal hygiene items were also provided.

The instrument area housed the units of the station's on-board systems: orientation and traffic control, life support, power supply, radio communications, telemetry, command radio link, and others. The whole complex was controlled by a digital Calculating machine"Argon-12A" (essentially an on-board computer). Outside the pressurized compartment, panels of heat exchangers of the thermal control system, sensors of the attitude control system, telemetry and radio communication antennas were mounted.

The transition zone was spherical in shape and was rigidly connected to the working zone of large diameter. between transitional and working areas a hermetic hatch was located. Outside, at the end of the transition zone, there was a passive docking station of the "Konus" type with a manhole for the transition of astronauts from the transport ship to the station. A hatch for spacewalks was made in the upper part of the transition zone; there was also a container for packing spacesuits (in reality, not a single "Almaz" has spacesuits for working in open space did not have).

The propulsion system of the station had a displacement fuel supply and worked on high-boiling components: Nitric acid and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine. It consisted of spherical fuel tanks, pressurized balloons, six correction engines, sixteen hard stabilization engines, and twelve soft stabilization engines. The units of the propulsion system were located in the aft part of the station, only the engines of the stabilization system were located on the transitional compartment in the bow of the Almaz.

Despite the ability to transmit the resulting photographs as television images over the air, military intelligence officers wanted to receive film from Almaz directly into their hands and process it in their ground laboratories, therefore, from the very beginning, the designers faced the task of ensuring the delivery of the most important materials to Earth. To solve it, an information descent capsule (IDC) was designed. The cassette with the removed film was hung inside a shell covered with ablative thermal protection; placed on top parachute system and a powder propulsion system (PDU), including a brake engine and four stabilization engines. A special torus shock absorber was created for the capsule, which is inflated with compressed gas before landing. In the upper part of the torus, there were valves that, when landing on a hard surface, broke through, smoothly releasing gas. During splashdown, the torus served as a float. Only a few hours were allotted to search for the capsule, for which a special all-terrain vehicle with a thermostat was designed, built and tested, which was supposed to urgently deliver the KSI to the airfield, where an evacuation helicopter or plane was waiting. The terms of reference required the capsule to land strictly on the territory of the USSR. If the capsule missed, it worked automatic system demolition of the object. During the design process, it was possible to place additional small cassettes into the capsule, which were packed on the sides of the main reel - inside, films from a "star" camera were wound, which provided the coordinate reference of the captured ground objects. The crew of the "Almaz" equipped the capsule with the extracted materials, and it fired back at given moment through a special launch chamber. Equipment and preparation for the descent of the capsule weighing 360 kg, containing two kilometers of film weighing 120 kg, was not an easy task in itself. Therefore, to transfer it from the interior of the station to the airlock and install it in the launch chamber, a special manipulator was made.

The developers of Almaz knew that the United States was working on projects for military inspection satellites and maneuverable interceptor ships. To protect the station from enemy devices of this kind, it was equipped with aircraft gun designs of Nudelman-Richter "NR-23", modifying the finished tail gun of the Tu-22 jet bomber. The firing range against orbital targets was to be at least 3,000 m. The space gun fired 950 rounds per minute; moreover, a projectile with a mass of 200 g flew at a speed of 690 m / s. According to the memoirs of the designers of the station, in ground tests at a distance of more than a kilometer, a volley from a cannon was cut in half metal barrel out of gasoline.

The gun was rigidly installed under the "belly" of the station. It could be aimed at an enemy object through the sight, turning the entire station manually. The shooting was controlled by a software-control apparatus that calculated the salvo required to destroy the target with a projectile flight time to it from 1 to 5 seconds. The recoil when firing in the void was compensated by the inclusion of hard stabilization or marching engines. It is clear that Almaz could not attack anyone - what is the point of using a manned observation post weighing under 20 tons, equipped with a giant camera and other valuable stuffing, as a space fighter? But the station was quite capable of defending itself from an attack, and not a single aggressor satellite would have resisted its firepower. Fortunately, the Americans never dared to approach the Almazes flying in orbit.

Since the project of the transport supply ship "TKS", which was started at OKB-52, needed a long development, at the first stage of creating the system, it was decided to deliver crews to the station by manned spacecraft "Soyuz". However, the development of these new ships suddenly turned into a real nightmare for engineers and astronauts.