The history of the establishment of the military industrial commission. Working Group of Military Industrial Committees

This article discusses some economic aspects of the development of the domestic military-industrial complex throughout Soviet period history of the 20th century In our work, we rely heavily on archival data.

During the years of the Civil War and "war communism", in conditions of international isolation, all weapons had to be produced within the country, relying on domestic resources. Since 1919, enterprises that served artillery, navy, aviation, sapper troops and commissariat were removed from the jurisdiction of various departments and transferred under the authority of the Council of the Military Industry All-Russian Council National economy(VSNKh).

With the transition to the New Economic Policy, the reorganization of the management of the national economy began. In the state industry, including the military, group associations began to be created - trusts, which were supposed to work on the principles of cost accounting. In accordance with the decree on trusts of April 10, 1923, the Main Directorate of the Military Industry of the USSR was created as part of the Supreme Council of National Economy, to which weapons, cartridge, gun, gunpowder, aviation and other factories of a military profile were subordinate; Aviatrust existed independently. In 1925, the military industry came under the jurisdiction of the Military Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy, consisting of 4 trusts - weapons and arsenal, cartridge and tube, military chemical and rifle and machine gun.

In general, the military industry since the mid-20s. began to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies of the state, self-supporting principles in this area turned out to be unviable. With the onset of accelerated industrialization, there was a transition to a more rigid system of state planning and industrial management, first through the system of sectoral central administrations, and then sectoral ministries 1 .
Bystrova Irina Vladimirovna - doctor historical sciences(Institute of Russian History RAS).

The starting point for a new round of militarization and the creation of a military industry can be considered the so-called period of the "military threat" of 1926-1927. and the subsequent rejection of the NEP - the "great turning point" of 1929. By the decision of the Administrative Meeting of the Council of Labor and Defense (RZ STO) of June 25, 1927, the Mobilization and Planning Directorate of the Supreme Economic Council was created, which was supposed to lead the preparation of industry for war. The main "working apparatus" of the RZ STO in matters of preparation for war were the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which was responsible for preparing the army, and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which was in charge of developing control figures for the national economy "in case of war." The People's Commissariat of Finance, in turn, had to consider "estimated emergency expenses for the first month of the war" 2 .

In specially developed resolutions of the State Planning Commission and the RZ STO, according to the control figures for the 1927/28 financial year, this time period was considered as “a conditional period when the main processes of transition to working conditions during the war (mobilization) are taking place in the national economy”, and the entire next year - as the period when "the main transient processes have already been completed." In the context of the "military threat" most of these plans had a paper-declarative character. Military spending has not yet grown significantly: the main funds were directed to the preparation of the "industrial leap", and the defense industry has not yet been allocated organizationally.

This period includes the emergence of secret, numbered factories. At the end of the 20s. "Personnel" military factories began to be assigned numbers, behind which the former names were hidden. In 1927, there were 56 such factories, and by April 1934, the list of "personnel" military factories approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks included 68 enterprises. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated July 13, 1934 established a special regime and benefits for defense enterprises - the so-called special regime plants.

The main task of the secrecy regime was "to ensure the greatest safety of factories of defense importance, to create strong guarantees against the penetration of class-hostile, counter-revolutionary and hostile elements into them, as well as to prevent their actions aimed at disrupting or weakening the production activities of factories" 3 . This system was greatly strengthened and expanded in the post-war "nuclear" era of the development of the defense industry.

To finance the so-called special works of a narrow defense nature at civilian industry enterprises, special loans were allocated from the budget, which had the intended purpose of ensuring the independence of defense work from the general financial condition enterprises 4 . The figures for the actual military expenditures of the state were allocated in the budget as a separate line and were kept secret.

The emergence of specific defense industries became possible only on the basis of accelerated industrialization and the creation of heavy industry. After the liquidation of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1932, the defense industry passed into the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Since the mid 30s. the process of organizational isolation of the defense industry from the basic branches of heavy industry began. In 1936, military production was allocated to the People's Commissariat for Defense Industry (NKOP). This was the stage of "quantitative accumulation". The growth rate of the military industry, according to official data, noticeably outpaced the development of industry as a whole. So, if the total volume of industrial production for the second five-year period increased by 120%, then defense - by 286%. During the three pre-war years, this advance was already threefold 5 .

1939-1941 (before the start of the war) were a special period when the foundations of economic structure military-industrial complex (MIC). The restructuring of the national economy had a pronounced militaristic character. During these years, a system of defense industry management bodies was formed. General management of the development of mobilization planning in 1938-1941, as well as supervision over the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, was carried out by the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, whose chairman was I.V. Stalin. The Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars oversaw the activities of the defense industry. During the war years, all the functions of managing the defense industry were transferred to the State Defense Committee (GKO).

In 1939, the NKOP was divided into specialized defense people's commissariats: weapons, ammunition, aviation, shipbuilding industries. To coordinate the mobilization plan of industry in 1938, an interdepartmental Military-Industrial Commission was created. Military departments - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were the main customers and consumers of military products. characteristic feature During the period of the first five-year plans, the military played a significant role in shaping the defense industry, which increased even more in the prewar years. So, from 1938 to 1940. The contingent of military representatives of NGOs at defense industry enterprises increased one and a half times and amounted to 20,281 people. 6

For our study, this period is especially important as the experience of the functioning of the military mobilization model of the Soviet economy, the essential features of which manifested themselves in subsequent stages of the history of the USSR and became the foundation of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Among these features was the subordination of the interests of the civilian consumer to the solution of military tasks. One of the main tasks of the third five-year plan, the government considered strengthening the defense capability of the USSR "on such a scale that would provide a decisive advantage for the USSR in any coalition of attacking capitalist countries." In this regard, according to the third five-year plan, compared with 1937, spending on the national economy as a whole increased by 34.1%, on social and cultural events - by 72.1%, and on defense - by 321.1% . Military spending was to amount to 252 billion rubles, or 30.2% of all state budget expenditures 7 .

A characteristic feature of the Soviet mobilization model was the attraction of funds from the population through the so-called state loans (many of which the state was not going to return). In 1937, a special loan for strengthening the defense of the USSR was issued for 4 billion rubles, however, according to the People's Commissariat of Finance (NKF), the subscription to this loan was even higher - 4916 million rubles. (most of it was in the urban population). As stated in the NKF circular of April 9, 1938, in accordance with the "great growth in current year fund of wages and incomes of the collective-farm village" there were opportunities "in the current year to significantly exceed the amount of the loan" 8 . This practice became an integral feature of the Soviet economic system.

Even sharper shifts towards militarization were outlined in the so-called Special Quarter IV of 1939, when the mobilization plan - MP-1 - for arming the army was put into effect, requiring the restructuring of the entire industry. It provided for the establishment of a list of construction projects, for the development of which funds were allocated in excess of the established limits, and the military departments received priority over civilian consumers. Of the total investment in construction of 5.46 billion rubles. investments in defense construction projects and enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion rubles, i.e. more than half 9 .

Emergency mobilization plans were adopted in 1940-1941. In connection with the introduction of mobilization plans, military orders were placed at enterprises in all sectors, up to factories for the production of children's toys and musical instruments. Often, the implementation of these plans required a complete change in their production profile from civilian to military. At the same time, the process of transferring enterprises from civilian departments to military departments, which later became massive during the war years, began. In total, in 1940 more than 40 enterprises were transferred to the defense departments 10 .

The actual average annual growth rate of defense production for the first two years of the pre-war five-year plan was 143.1%, for three years - 141%, against 127.3% of the average annual rate established by the third five-year plan. The volume of gross output of the people's commissariats of the defense industry increased 2.8 times in three years 11 . An even more strenuous program was planned for 1941. The industrial authorities were obliged to ensure that military orders for aviation, armaments, ammunition, military shipbuilding and tanks were carried out in the first place before all consumers.

In the prewar years, a new military-industrial base began to be created in the east of the country. The idea of ​​developing the eastern regions from the very beginning of its inception was strategically linked to the growth of the country's military potential and the solution of defense tasks. Even before the war, the Urals became the new center of military production, development began from this point of view and Far East. However, a decisive shift in this respect occurred during the war years, which was associated primarily with the occupation or threat of the enemy seizing most of the European territory of the USSR.

During the war period, there was a massive relocation of industry to eastern regions: in total, more than 1,300 enterprises were evacuated and restored in the east, most of which were under the jurisdiction of the defense people's commissariats. For 4/5 they produced military products.

The structure of industrial production has also changed radically, and it is mandatory that it be transferred to meet military needs. According to rough estimates, military consumables accounted for about 65-68% of all industrial output produced in the USSR during the war years 12 . Its main producers were the people's commissariats of the military industry: aviation, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons, shipbuilding and tank industries. At the same time, other basic branches of heavy industry were also involved in securing military orders: metallurgy, fuel and energy, as well as the People's Commissariats of light and food industries. Thus, the development of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex during the war years was in the nature of total militarization.

During the Great Patriotic War, the country lost three-quarters of its national wealth. The industry was severely destroyed in the territories that were under occupation, and in the rest of the territories it was almost completely transferred to the production of military products. Total population The population of the USSR decreased from 196 million people. in 1941 to 170 million in 1946, i.e. for 26 million people 13

One of the main tasks in the first post-war years for the USSR was the restoration and further build-up military economic country bases. To solve it in the conditions of economic ruin, it was necessary first of all to find new sources of restoration and development of priority sectors of the national economy. According to official Soviet propaganda, this process was supposed to be calculated on "internal resources", on delivering the country from economic dependence on a hostile capitalist environment.

Meanwhile, this dependence by the end of the war remained very significant. An analysis carried out by Soviet economists of the ratio of imports of the most important types of equipment and materials and their domestic production for 1944 showed that, for example, imports of machine tools amounted to 58%, universal machines - up to 80%, crawler cranes (their domestic industry did not manufacture) - 287%. The situation with non-ferrous metals was similar: lead - 146%, tin - 170%. Particular difficulties arose with the need to develop domestic production of goods that were supplied during the war years under Lend-Lease (for many types of raw materials, materials and food specific gravity of these supplies ranged from 30 to 80%) 14 .

In the early post-war years, one of the most important sources of resources was the export of materials and equipment for the so-called special supplies - trophy, as well as reparations and agreements from Germany, Japan, Korea, Romania, Finland, Hungary. Created at the beginning of 1945, the Commission for the Compensation of Damage Caused by the Nazi Invaders made a general assessment of the human and material losses of the USSR during the war years, developed a plan for the military and economic disarmament of Germany, and discussed the problem of reparations on an international scale.

The Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as special commissions from representatives of economic departments, were engaged in the practical activities for the export of equipment. They compiled lists of enterprises and equipment, laboratories and research institutes that were subject to "withdrawal" and send to the USSR on account of reparations. Decree of the Council of People's Commissars "On the dismantling and export to the Soviet Union of equipment from Japanese power plants, industrial enterprises and railways located on the territory of Manchuria "the management of this work was entrusted to the authorized Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars M.Z. Saburov. By December 1, 1946, 305,000 tons of equipment from Manchuria had arrived in the USSR with a total value of 116.3 million US dollars. Altogether, during the two years of the work of the Special Committee, about 1 million wagons of various equipment were exported to the USSR from 4,786 German and Japanese enterprises, including 655 enterprises of the military industry 15 . At the same time, German developments in the field of newest species weapons of mass destruction.

By the summer of 1946, there were about two million prisoners of war in the USSR - a huge reserve of labor. The labor of prisoners of war was widely used in the Soviet national economy (especially in construction) during the years of the first post-war five-year plan. German technical groundwork and the labor of specialists were actively used at the initial stages of domestic rocket science, nuclear project, in military shipbuilding.

Eastern European countries also played the role of suppliers of strategic raw materials at the early stage of the creation of the nuclear industry in the USSR, especially in 1944-1946. As uranium deposits were explored in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet authorities followed the path of creating joint stock companies for their development under the guise of mining companies. In order to develop the Bukovskoye deposit in Bulgaria, the Soviet-Bulgarian Mining Society was created in early 1945 under the auspices of the NKVD of the USSR 16 . The deposit became the main source of raw materials for the first Soviet reactor.

The countries of the Eastern bloc continued to be the most important source of uranium until the early 1950s. As N.A. Bulganin emphasized in his speech at the “Anti-Beria” Plenum of the Central Committee of July 3, 1953, the state was “well provided with uranium raw materials”, and a lot of uranium was mined on the territory of the GDR - “maybe no less than they have in Americans at their disposal" 17 .

critical resource post-war reconstruction and building up the economic and defense power of the USSR was the mobilization potential of the centrally planned economy to concentrate forces and means in the most priority areas from the point of view of the country's leadership. One of the traditional levers of forced mobilization was the financial and tax policy of the state. At the end of the war, in the fourth quarter of 1945, the state, it would seem, gave relief to the population, reducing the military tax by 180 million rubles, but at the same time a war loan was organized (subscribed by the peasants) for 400 million rubles. 18 Food prices were raised in September 1946 by 2-2.5 times. In 1948, the size of the agricultural tax increased by 30% compared with 1947, and in 1950 by 2.5 times.

In general, the course taken by the leadership of the USSR for military-economic competition with the West, and above all with the much more economically and technologically advanced United States, was carried out at the cost of considerable hardship for the majority of the country's population. At the same time, it should be noted that the implementation of the Soviet nuclear and other programs for the creation the latest weapons In general, in the post-war years, it corresponded to the mass mood of the Soviet people, who were willing to endure hardships and hardships in the name of preventing a new war.

One of the resources of economic mobilization was massive forced labor. The NKVD camp system became the basis for the creation of the nuclear and other branches of the military industry. In addition to the labor of imprisoned compatriots, in the late 40s. the labor of prisoners of war was widely used and a system of organized recruitment of labor from various segments of the population was used. A peculiar semi-compulsory form was the work of military builders and specialists, the importance of which especially increased after the abolition of the system of mass camps in the mid-1950s.

In the early post-war years, it was impossible to maintain the size of the armed forces and the size of defense production on a wartime scale, and therefore a number of measures were taken to reduce the military potential. In this regard, two stages are outwardly distinguished in the military-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership: 1945-1948. and late 40s - early 50s. The first was characterized by tendencies towards the demilitarization of the Soviet economy, the reduction of the armed forces and military spending. A real indicator of these trends was the demobilization of the army, carried out in several stages from June 1945 to the beginning of 1949. In general, by the end of 1948 - the beginning of 1949, the Soviet Army was generally reduced from more than 11 million people. up to 2.8 million people twenty

In the first post-war years, the country's leadership also proclaimed a policy of restructuring industry for civilian production. After the reorganization of the management system in May 1945, the number of defense people's commissariats decreased, and military production was concentrated in the people's commissariats for armaments, aviation, shipbuilding, agricultural and transport engineering (in March 1946 they were renamed ministries).

The implementation of the policy of reducing military production and increasing the output of civilian products began already at the end of 1945 and was under the personal control of the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (after the war - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) L.P. Beria, who concentrated control over heavy industry. However, his instructions on the "conversion" of enterprises to civilian production were rather contradictory. On the one hand, he urged the directors of enterprises in every possible way, who were accustomed to working in emergency military conditions, to drive defense products and experienced great difficulties in switching to civilian production. On the other hand, Beria ordered to maintain and increase the production of a wide range of military products - gunpowder, explosives, chemical munitions, etc. 21

In 1946-1947. the production of a number of types of conventional weapons - tanks and aircraft - was significantly reduced. The heads of the military-industrial departments actively resisted the policy of "conversion": ministers D.F. Ustinov, M.V. Khrunichev, M.G. Pervukhin and others attacked higher authorities, up to Stalin himself, with requests to preserve "unique" military production and on increasing the production of new types of defense products. Attempts to demilitarize industry led to a deterioration in the state of the industrial sector of the economy, already destroyed by the war. Within 6-9 months from the beginning of the restructuring of industry, the output of civilian products only to an insignificant extent compensated for the decline in military production. This led to a decrease in the total volume of production, a deterioration in quality indicators, and a reduction in the number of workers. Only in the second quarter of 1946 did the volume of military output stabilize, while civilian output increased, and a gradual increase in production began.
According to official sources, the post-war restructuring of industry was completed already in 1947, as evidenced by the following figures22:

According to official data, military production in 1940 amounted to 24 billion rubles, in 1944 - 74 billion, in 1945 - 50.5 billion, in 1946 - 14.5 billion, in 1947 the level 1946. However, these figures must be treated with a certain degree of conventionality: they rather show the general dynamics than are reliable in absolute terms, since prices for military products have been falling repeatedly since 1941. 23

The dynamics of military spending of the state budget was as follows: in 1940 - 56.7 billion rubles, in 1944 - 137.7 billion, in 1945 - 128.7 billion, in 1946 - 73.7 billion, in 1947, the level of 1946 was preserved. Thus, even according to official statistics, state spending on military needs by the end of the “conversion” period exceeded the pre-war figures of 1940.

In general, the process of reducing military production mainly affected the rapidly obsolete armaments of the models of the past war, which were not required in the previous quantities. In 1946-1947. the share of civilian and military products has stabilized.

However, already in 1947, plans for the production of civilian products began to decline in a number of defense ministries (shipbuilding, aviation industry), and since 1949 there has been a sharp increase in military orders. During the first post-war five-year plan, the nomenclature of "special products" was almost completely updated, i.e. military products, which paved the way for what began in the 50s. rearmament of the army and navy.

At the end of the 40s. was developed perspective plan production of armored vehicles until 1970. After the failure of the tank production program in 1946-1947, a sharp drop in their output in 1948, starting from 1949, a constant and steady increase in the production of this industry was planned. In connection with the war in Korea, since 1950, the volume of production of aviation equipment has sharply increased 24 .

In general, behind the external "demilitarization" was hiding a new round of the arms race. Already in 1946, the Council of Ministers adopted a number of resolutions on the development of the latest weapons, decisions on developments in the field of jet and radar technology. The construction of warships, mothballed during the war, resumed: a ten-year military shipbuilding program was adopted, and the construction of 40 naval bases was planned. Emergency measures were taken to accelerate the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.

Along with the traditional defense ministries, emergency bodies were created under the Council of People's Commissars (since March 1946 - the Council of Ministers of the USSR) to manage the new programs: the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate (on the atomic problem), Committee No. 2 (on jet technology), the Committee No. 3 (by radar). The extraordinary, mobilization and experimental nature of these programs has necessitated the concentration of resources of various departments in special supra-ministerial governing bodies.

In general, "demilitarization" was rather a sideline of the post-war restructuring of industry, the main strategic direction of development of which was the development and build-up of the latest types of weapons. Plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1951-1955. for the military and special industries provided for a significant volume of deliveries of all types of military equipment, which increased from year to year, with special attention paid to the preparation of capacities for the production of new types of military equipment and strategic raw materials, the replenishment of special production capacities switched after the end of the war to other sectors of the national economy.

For six defense-industrial ministries (aeronautical industry, armaments, agricultural engineering, transport engineering, communications industry, auto-tractor industry), the average output of military products over the five-year period was to increase by 2.5 times. However, for some types of military equipment, a significantly greater growth was planned: for radar and armored vehicles - by 4.5 times. On a larger scale, the production of atomic "products" increased, which was planned separately even from all other types of military products. To eliminate "bottlenecks" and disproportions in the national economy and to create new branches for the production of weapons - jet technology and radar equipment - the plan outlined the volume of capital investments in the main branches of the defense industry in the amount of 27,892 million rubles.

Moreover, in the early 1950s this plan has been repeatedly adjusted upwards. In March 1952, the size of capital investments in the military and defense-industrial departments was noticeably increased. Arbitrary adjustment of plans in general was a characteristic feature of the Soviet planning system. Another long-term trend, with the exception of certain periods, was the predominant growth of investments in the defense sector compared to other industries. During the period under review, a kind of military-industrial revolution began in the country, accompanied by a sharp increase in military spending, expansion defense programs and at the same time increasing the influence of the professional military elite on the decision-making process on defense issues. From the beginning of the 1950s increased production plans various kinds conventional weapons of modernized models - tanks, self-propelled guns, aircraft; forced rearmament of the army began.

According to official data, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased in the early 1950s. up to almost 6 million people. According to recently declassified information from the archives, quantitative composition the central office of the War Ministry on September 1, 1952 increased compared to the pre-war figure - on January 1, 1941 - by 242%: 23075 people. against 9525 25 . The unwinding of a new spiral of arms race and confrontation was partly due to the aggravation of the international situation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (Berlin crisis, creation of NATO, war in Korea, etc.), partly with the strengthening of the role military machine in the life of Soviet society and the state.

Despite the new growth of the military programs of the USSR in the early 1950s, by that time the military-industrial complex had not yet gained the political weight that would allow it to decisively influence the policy of the Soviet leadership. In 1953-1954. a steady course towards the deployment of a military confrontation with the West gave way to a controversial period in economic and military policy. 1954-1958 became a rare period in Soviet history of a decrease in military spending and an increase in the share of the consumption sector in the gross national product.

In contrast to the growth of military programs in the preceding 1950-1952, the second half of 1953 and 1954 were already marked by some shift towards civilian production and consumerism. For example, the plan for survey and design work for the Military Ministry for 1953 initially amounted to 43225 million rubles, and then was reduced to 40049 million, i.e. more than 3 million rubles. The plan for the military and special industries for 1954 was also adjusted downward: the growth in production in 1954 compared to 1953, instead of 107% according to the plan and 108.8% at the request of the War Ministry, was reduced to 106.9 %.

When evaluating the dynamics of the gross national product, one should take into account the 5% reduction in wholesale prices for military products from January 1, 1953, as well as the growth in the output of civilian products. The decline in the gross output of a number of ministries in 1953 and according to the draft plan for 1954 was also explained by a decrease in the output of defense products and an increase in the output of consumer goods, which had lower wholesale prices. In general, the output of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954 significantly exceeded the volume of production provided for these years according to the five-year plan for 1951-1955. 26

The trend towards a reduction in military spending continued in subsequent years, when the influence of N.S. Khrushchev in the top leadership increased, until the establishment of his autocracy in the summer of 1957. The military spending of the USSR was reduced by a total of one billion rubles. By the middle of 1957, the size of the army and navy had decreased by 1.2 million people. - up to about 3 million people. - due to the program announced by Khrushchev to reduce the traditional types of the Armed Forces (in particular, this concerned Stalin's plans for the deployment of conventional naval forces and weapons) and a shift in priorities towards missiles, electronics and nuclear weapons.

According to some Western estimates, during the first three years of Khrushchev's rule, the share of military spending in the country's gross national product (GNP) decreased from 12% to 9%, while the share of the consumption sector increased from 60% to 62% 27 . In 1959, the growth in the cost of manufacturing the latest weapons reversed this trend, and the military spending of the USSR again increased to the level of 1955, although due to the rapid growth of the gross national product during this period, the percentage of military spending in GNP remained the same. After 1959, their share in GNP began to slowly but steadily increase. Military spending again took a priority place in the economic policy of the Soviet leadership. According to Western estimates, in the time interval from 1952 to 1970. 1961-1965 became the period of the highest growth rates in the USSR's military expenditures, when their average growth rates reached 7.6% 28 .

At the same time, the lion's share of military spending was precisely the cost of the production and operation of the latest weapons and their systems, and not the maintenance of troops. This trend of predominant growth in the cost of military equipment developed more and more noticeably in the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution.

The period of the late 1950s - early 1960s. characterized by the search for new principles for organizing the management of the national economy of the USSR, including the defense industry. By the time of the reorganization of the management of the national economy undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev in 1957-1958. the main armaments production programs were concentrated in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (atomic program), the Ministry of Defense Industry (renamed in 1953 from the Ministry of Armaments), the Ministry of Radio Engineering Industry (created in 1954), as well as in the Ministries of Aviation and Shipbuilding Industry. As you know, in the late 1950s, the system of sectoral ministries was abolished, defense industry enterprises, like other sectors of the economy, were transferred to local councils National economy. To organize research and development work on the creation of weapons, the State Committees for Aviation Technology, Defense Technology, Shipbuilding and Radio Electronics, and the Use of Atomic Energy were created.

On the whole, Khrushchev's reform led to a well-known decentralization and the establishment of links between defense and civilian enterprises, the expansion of the geographical and social boundaries of the Soviet military-industrial complex. According to N.S.Simonov, enterprises for serial production of defense products were included in the system of regional economic relations, leaving the state of production and technological isolation. Local economic management bodies were able to place orders for them that met local needs. Enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC) even began to show a tendency towards economic independence, which manifested itself in the establishment of real contractual relations with the customer - the Ministry of Defense - in matters of pricing 29 .

At the same time, in the context of decentralization of defense industry management, the coordinating role of the most important state body at the supra-ministerial level, recreated in the late 1950s, increased. Military Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It was headed in turn by the largest leaders of the Soviet military-industrial complex D.F. Ustinov, V.M. Ryabikov, L.N. Smirnov. The commission became the main governing body of the defense industry in the period of the 1960s - 1980s.

The return to the ministerial system after the dismissal of N.S. Khrushchev at the end of 1964 contributed to the strengthening of the centralized planning principle in the management of the defense industry. Another “gathering” of military enterprises into centralized sectoral ministries began. In particular, in 1965, the Ministry of General Machine Building was created, which concentrated work on rocket and space technology (previously, these developments were scattered among the enterprises of a number of ministries). As a result of the reform of 1965, the so-called "nine" defense-industrial ministries were finally formed, in which military production was mainly concentrated (Ministries of the aviation industry, defense industry, general engineering, radio industry, medium engineering, shipbuilding industry, chemical industry, electronic industry, electrical industry). They were joined by 10 allied ministries, which were also engaged in the production of military and civilian products.

The economic structure of the military-industrial complex was in fact the supporting structure of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR. As of the end of the 1980s, defense industry enterprises produced 20-25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing the lion's share of the country's resources. The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the defense industry: up to 3/4 of all research and development work (R&D) was carried out in the defense industry. Enterprises defense complex produced most of the civil electrical products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About Uz of the country's population lived in the area where the OPK enterprises were located 30 . All this, at the same time, led to an excessive inflating of the zone of "unproductive" expenditures on the production of weapons to the detriment of the sphere of consumption.
The Soviet military-industrial complex became the most important supplier of weapons for the countries of the "third world" and the "socialist camp". In the early 1980s 25% of weapons and military equipment produced in the USSR were exported abroad. The size of military supplies for many years was considered especially classified information, which was partially open to the Russian public only in the early 1990s. During the post-war period, the USSR participated in armed conflicts and wars in more than 15 countries (by sending military specialists and contingents, as well as by supplying weapons and military equipment in order to provide "international assistance"), including 31:

In general, by the beginning of the 1980s. The USSR became the world's first supplier of weapons (in terms of supply), ahead of even the United States in this respect. The Soviet military-industrial complex went beyond the boundaries of one state, becoming the most important force in the world economy and international relations. At the same time, it became an increasingly heavy burden on the country's economy and an obstacle to raising the standard of living of the Soviet people.

1 For more details, see: Simonov N.S. Military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920-1950s: economic growth rates, structure, organization of production and management. M., 1996. Ch. 2; Mukhin M.Yu. The evolution of the management system of the Soviet defense industry in 1921-1941 and the change in the priorities of the "defense industry" // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 2000. No. 3. S. 3-15. On the structure of the defense industry in the late 20s - early 30s. see also: Russian State Archive of Economics (hereinafter - RGAE). F. 3429. Op. 16.
2 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 164.
3 See: ibid. D. 186. L. 107.
4 Ibid. F. 3429. Op. 16. D. 179. L. 238.
5 See: Lagovsky A. Economy and military power of the state // Krasnaya Zvezda. 1969. October 25.
6 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 132.
7 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 173. L. 115.
8 Ibid. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 67. L. 45.
9 See: ibid. D. 158. L. 29-34.
10 Ibid. D. 310. L. 37.
11 Ibid. F. 4372. Op. 92. D. 265. L. 4.
12 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. S. 152.
13 See: The USSR and the Cold War / Ed. V.S. Lelchuk, E.I. Pivovar. M „ 1995. S. 146.
14 Based on documents from the RGAE funds.
15 For more see: State Archive Russian Federation(hereinafter - GA RF). F. 5446. Op. 52. D. 2. L. 45-116.
16 See: GA RF. F. 9401. On. 1. D. 92. L. 166-174.
17 See: Case of Beria // Izv. Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 169-170.
18 See: RGAE. F. 1562. Op. 329. D. 2261. L. 21-22.
19 The USSR and the Cold War. S. 156.
20 See: Evangelista M. Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised // Soviet Military Policy Since World War II / Ed. by W.T.Lee, KF.Staar. Stanford, 1986. P. 281-311.
21 For more details, see: Postwar Conversion: On the History of the Cold War, Ed. ed. V.SLelchuk. M., 1998.
22 See: GA RF. F. 5446. Op. 5. D. 2162. L. 176.
23 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 687.
24 For more details, see: Bystrova I.V. Development of the military-industrial complex // USSR and cold war. pp. 176-179.
25 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 164. D. 710. L. 31.
26 According to the RGAE documents.
27 See: Soviet Military Policy... P. 21-22.
28 See: Bezborodov A.B. Power and the military-industrial complex in the USSR in the mid-40s - mid-70s // Soviet society: Weekdays of the Cold War. M.; Arzamas, 2000, p. 108.
29 See: Simonov N.S. Decree. op. pp. 288-291.
30 See: Zaleschansky B. Restructuring of military-industrial complex enterprises: from conservatism to adequacy // Chelovek i trud. 1998. No. 2. S. 80-83.
31 Red star. 1991. May 21.

All history Soviet power can be conditionally, but quite accurately, divided into four periods: war, preparation for war, again war and again preparation for war. It is clear that with such a history, the military-industrial complex (MIC) had to play a special role in the USSR - the role of the core of the entire economy, its system-forming principle. As a result, according to many economists and historians, it was the military-industrial complex that ruined the Soviet Union, becoming an unbearable burden for the national economy. At the same time, the military-industrial complex of the USSR is something more than military production, since it covered not only the defense industries proper for the production of weapons, but also a significant part of the civilian industries that produced dual-use products. As a result, the Soviet military-industrial complex included, in particular, all high-tech, innovative enterprises that simultaneously produced a large range of civilian products. Therefore, the history of the Soviet military-industrial complex can be viewed as the history of the entire Soviet economy. This is what the book of Nikolai Simonov, a leading researcher at the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is about.

The revolution of 1917 was largely predetermined by the defeats that royal Russia on the fields of the First World War. The country approached it unprepared, primarily in military-technical terms. And although by 1917 the military-industrial complex of Russia had grown significantly, it was already too late: the tired army was extremely demoralized and preferred the revolution to the continuation of the war. The possibilities of the military-industrial complex formed during the war were used by the Bolsheviks, who, largely due to the fact that he was in their hands, won. However, the destruction during the two wars was so great that after civil war Soviet Russia did not have the opportunity to maintain a full-fledged military-industrial complex, and it was significantly reduced. Only by 1927, after the NEP restoration of the Soviet economy, did the country's leadership turn to the problems of the military-industrial complex in full measure. It was confident that the capitalist encirclement would not put up with the existence of a proletarian state. Although the blow was expected not at all from those countries with which they had to fight in the future, but from Poland, France, and Great Britain. And there were reasons for that. On May 27, 1927, the British Conservative government announced the severance of diplomatic and trade relations between Great Britain and the USSR, and on June 1, 1927, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued an appeal in which it called Soviet people be ready to repulse imperialist aggression. And a comparison of the Soviet military-industrial complex with the military-industrial complex Western countries made a depressing impression. As the author notes, compared with France alone, “the military industry for the production of combat aircraft was seven times smaller. For tanks - 20 times less ... for artillery - three times less. And in 1929, called "the year of the great turning point", the Politburo of the Central Committee sets the task for the armed forces: "In terms of numbers - not to be inferior to our potential opponents ..., in terms of technology - to be stronger ...".

Adopted in 1928

Meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission / Photo: kremlin.ru

The Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation is celebrating its anniversary. Sixty years ago, on December 6, 1957, the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on military-industrial issues was created. Portalprofiok.com talks about why the countdown is from this date, although the management of the defense industry in our country began to line up much earlier.

Before the war: mobilization at any cost

War always presupposes a special clarity and coordination of actions. It is no coincidence that the first body that controlled the defense of the state on a national scale appeared precisely during the war. In 1915, during the First World War, the so-called Special Conference on Defense appeared (literally, the name sounded like this: “A Special Conference to discuss and unite measures for the defense of the state”). This government body, which included industrialists and representatives of state authorities, was headed by the Minister of War. A special meeting on defense resolved the issues of supplying the army and coordinated the activities of industrial enterprises for the production of the necessary products. By the way, enterprises were not always domestic: there were special Russian divisions in Japan, the USA and Great Britain, which placed orders with manufacturers in these countries. In modern terms, the Defense Conference placed and managed the execution of the state defense order (GOZ). There were also military-industrial committees - structures that ensured the production of the necessary weapons at private enterprises.

After the events of 1917, a number of transformations took place in the management of industry, including the military. After several reorganizations, defense enterprises were subordinated to the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). Actually, then no one really thought about defense: factories mastered peaceful production, armed forces decreased, military spending - even more so. This continued until the early 1930s, when war was in the air again.

Since 1932, defense enterprises came under the control of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, from which the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry spun off in 1936. In 1938, the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) was created under the Defense Committee of the Council of People's Commissars, which consisted of the military leadership, as well as the heads of security and industry. The composition of this commission, for example, included Kliment Voroshilov (People's Commissar for Defense), Mikhail Kaganovich (People's Commissar for the Defense Industry), Nikolai Yezhov (head of the NKVD) and Nikolai Voznesensky (chairman of the State Planning Commission). The main task of the military-industrial complex was to prepare enterprises of the defense and non-defense profile to fulfill the orders of the Defense Committee. Simply put, it meant the mobilization of all the country's industries to fulfill a common task.

The military-industrial complex considered mobilization applications, checked calculations, compiled a consolidated mobilization plan (comparing it with the USSR State Planning Committee!), distributed tasks between the people's commissariats of the USSR and the union republics, controlled the distribution of orders between specific enterprises and their execution, proposed measures to increase production capacity, ensured the distribution of labor forces (including engineers and technicians), monitored the accumulation and storage of mobilization stocks, as well as the use of various technical inventions in production. If disagreements arose between various departments, the final decision was with the military-industrial complex.

During the Great Patriotic War, the State Defense Committee took over the management of defense production.

Post-war period: gradual formation of the system

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the tasks of restoring the national economy came to the fore. Therefore, at first, the country's leadership did not create any single governing body military industry, and the development of industries was led by individual industry bureaus - for shipbuilding, aircraft building, mechanical engineering, and so on.

The restoration of the systemic leadership of the defense industry was discussed in 1948. One of the initiators of raising this issue was Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, who at that time held the post of Minister of Armaments. In his opinion, a single body should have been involved in coordinating the work of all branches of the defense industry and creating new models of weapons and military equipment. As a result, in 1951, under the presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, a Bureau for Military-Industrial Issues appeared, which was engaged in the removal and commissioning of certain types of products, planning research work, and discussing plans for military orders. True, it was an advisory body: the Council of Ministers still made the final decisions.

In 1953, another series of reorganizations followed: the branch bureaus were liquidated, and the deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers, as well as the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, were engaged in coordinating the activities of various branches of the defense industry.

On December 6, 1957, the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues (VPK) was established under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. This body worked for 34 years - until the collapse Soviet Union. Today we can say that the heyday of the Soviet defense industry fell precisely on the period of the existence of the military-industrial complex.

The Military-Industrial Commission coordinated the work on the creation of new types of weapons and military equipment, together with the State Planning Commission was engaged in the development of defense industries, was responsible for the implementation of plans, for raising the technological level of production, for the quality and cost of products, participated in the development of weapons programs, offered figures for expenditures USSR for the development and production of weapons and military equipment. All this happened as follows: at first, the Commission carefully studied the materials and prepared state decisions, and after their adoption, it controlled the implementation.

Over time, the scope of the Commission's activities has expanded. Since the early 1960s, the military-industrial complex has controlled the formation and approval of R&D plans for the creation of weapons and military equipment; since the late 1960s, it has coordinated the development of chemical and nuclear weapons, since the 1970s - laser weapons and the creation of so-called non-traditional weapons. Under the leadership of the Military-Industrial Commission in the USSR, high-tech models of military equipment were created, which provided our country with a confident position in the international arena.

The Military Industrial Commission oversaw the activities of nine ministries that ensured the development of various branches of the defense industry. The legendary "nine", which, it must be said, is still periodically sighed by representatives of the domestic defense industry, included the ministries of defense, aviation, shipbuilding, electronics, electrical, radio and chemical industries, as well as general and medium engineering. At the same time, the military-industrial complex was entitled, if necessary, to attract the resources of all civilian departments that were related to the production of military products. The decisions taken by the Commission were binding - just like the decisions of the Council of Ministers.

The Military-Industrial Commission included representatives of the governing bodies of the Soviet Union, as well as representatives of research institutes, design bureaus and military-industrial enterprises, and the Ministry of Defense. It is important that these were not just, in modern terms, managers. They were engineers, scientists, representatives of the manufacturing sector, who knew the specifics of their institutions and industries and were ready to make proposals worthy of implementation.

Under the military-industrial complex was also created scientific and technical council, which included more than a hundred well-known scientists up to academicians and corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Meetings of the Military-Industrial Commission were held, as a rule, weekly and always in the same place - in the Oval Hall of the Kremlin.

Throughout the 34 years of the existence of the military-industrial complex, not a single important decision related to the defense sphere was made without it. Managing the development of the Soviet defense industry from a single center allowed the USSR to create new models of weapons and military equipment that are not inferior in quality foreign analogues. As a result, strategic parity was achieved with NATO countries and the United States of America. Nuclear weapons and the system of missile and space defense developed, shipbuilding and aviation developed, in industrial production the most daring design solutions were introduced.

The revival of the military-industrial complex in modern Russia

After a rather long failure in the management of military-industrial production in the 1990s, the country's leadership again remembered a comprehensive approach to the leadership of the defense industry. Apparently, decisions were made on the basis of studying the experience of the USSR, which means that it was decided to preserve and continue historical traditions. In the summer of 1999, a commission on military-industrial issues was created under the government, and in 2006, by presidential decree, it was transformed into military industrial commission under the government of the Russian Federation.

For several years, the military-industrial complex was headed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, then by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin (from 2012 to 2014).

On September 10, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree according to which the Military Industrial Commission came under his direct supervision. Dmitry Rogozin took the post of deputy chairman of the military-industrial complex and chairman of the collegium of the military-industrial complex. Such a reform ensured an increase in the status of the military-industrial complex, which means that the solution of issues related to the defense industry began to take place even more clearly.

Today, the Military-Industrial Commission solves the problems of creating new models of weapons and military equipment, coordinates the implementation of the state armament program and the state defense order, oversees military-technical cooperation, implements import substitution programs in the defense industry, monitors the modernization of defense industry enterprises and helps them solve problems related to with production diversification.

“The defense industry has really changed beyond recognition over the past few years,” said Yury Smyslov, deputy director of the Center for Economic Development and Certification (CERS INES). - A systematic approach works wonders: enterprises finally felt like part of a single whole, gained confidence that the state would not leave them to their fate as the state defense order decreased, as happened in the early 1990s. It is important that the leaders of the military-industrial complex see systemic management not only in purely managerial tasks, but also, for example, in the management of applied scientific research. Most recently, the institute of general designers and general technologists was introduced into the military-industrial complex, which makes it possible to consolidate efforts to create advanced weapons systems.

It is important that the board of the military-industrial complex devotes a lot of effort to the formation of the personnel potential of the industry. With the active participation of Oleg Ivanovich Bochkarev, Deputy Chairman of the Board of the Military-Industrial Complex of the Russian Federation, INES developed a special course for the heads of enterprises of the military-industrial complex "Strategic Management", within which several hundred leaders of the domestic defense industry improved their skills. Oleg Ivanovich Bochkarev is pleased to meet not only with the directors of enterprises, but also with promising young professionals - for example, he personally attended the finals of the All-Russian competition "Young Analyst". When the defense industry sees that they are not just "ruled" but are trying to build a dialogue, the work goes much more productively.

As for the experience of the USSR, it is really invaluable and it really can be used - of course, adjusted for modern conditions. Not so long ago, we held a seminar for students of the special course "Strategic Management", where Georgy Dmitrievich Kolmogorov, who in Soviet times held the post of chairman of the USSR State Committee for Standards, spoke. The continuity of traditions was felt right in the process of dialogue: it was noticeable that the current defense industry and the representative of the Soviet defense industry understand each other perfectly. However, nothing strange: by and large, their tasks are similar.

Hence the wishes of today's military-industrial complex: unity of purpose, clarity and loyalty to traditions. The leaders of the Russian defense industry have someone to look up to.”

Managers from capital letter

MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, the central body of state administration of the military-industrial complex in the USSR.

1) The Military-Industrial Commission under the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, established in 1938, existed before the creation of the USSR State Defense Committee at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45. The main task of the Military-Industrial Commission is to prepare the industry for "full implementation of the plans and tasks of the Defense Committee for the production and supply of weapons to the Red Army and the Navy." The military-industrial commission considered and distributed mobilization applications and assignments; drew up a consolidated mobilization plan for the entire industry; checked the implementation of the mobilization plan and the program of current military orders by enterprises and people's commissariats; examined the production capacities of enterprises; worked out mobilization measures at enterprises or in industries; monitored the introduction of inventions into the military industry; carried out the selection and training of personnel for the mobilization bodies of industry, etc. Chairman - L. M. Kaganovich (1938-41).

2) Military-industrial commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Formed in December 1957 by a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR as the Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues (since 1985 the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers on military-industrial issues, since 1991 the Commission of the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR on military-industrial issues), liquidated in 1991 year. Composition of the Military-Industrial Commission: Chairman (with the rank of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR); 1st Deputy Chairman (with the rank of Minister of the USSR); several vice chairmen; members - 1st Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR (in charge of defense industries), ministers of defense industries, 1st Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR (Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces), Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for armaments, etc. The main tasks of the Military-Industrial commissions; coordination of the work of the defense industries, ministries and departments of the USSR involved in the creation and production of weapons and military equipment; operational management and control over the activities of defense industries; preparation, together with the State Planning Committee of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense, programs for the production of weapons and military equipment and their submission for consideration and approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU; introduction of advanced technologies in the production of weapons and military equipment; coordination of foreign economic activity of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. Chairmen: D. F. Ustinov (1957-63), L. V. Smirnov (1963-85), Yu. D. Maslyukov (1985-88), I. S. Belousov (1988-91).

3) In Russia, in 1999, the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on military-industrial issues was established (since March 2006, the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation; Chairman of the Commission - S. B. Ivanov), coordinating the activities of federal executive bodies in the field of military technical policy, export and import of military and dual-use products, etc.

Lit .: Bystrova I. V. The military-industrial complex of the USSR during the Cold War. M., 2000; Domestic military-industrial complex and its historical development / Edited by O.D. Baklanov, O.K. Rogozin. M., 2005.