The power of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP: accident, restoration

Monuments have already appeared on most of the graves: someone is depicted in full growth against the backdrop of a hydroelectric power station, poems or simply the words are engraved somewhere: “Here lie a father and son, who came out for a minute, gone forever ...”.

Looking at this last refuge of first-class specialists, those who visit this churchyard for the first time usually feel uneasy from the realization that the date of death on all the tombstones located on the large “patch” at the entrance is the same - August 17, 2009.

Uyskoye cemetery in Khakassia - almost all those who died in the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station are buried here. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

"They're all down there"

Not all relatives and relatives of those 75 people who once left for work and never returned were able to survive the loss. Now, mothers, fathers, children, wives, husbands rest next to the graves of those whose lives were cut short at the hydroelectric power station. People come here every day, stand at the graves for a long time, then pray in the chapel built right there and silently leave.

One of those who forever connected his fate with a hydroelectric power plant - Alexander Bezrukov, professional electric and gas welder. Ironically, he participated in its construction several decades ago. “He helped her to be born, and she helped him to die,” is how his colleagues now say about him.

His wife - Nina Bezrukova, like dozens of widows, does not like to talk to journalists. He says that he does not want to reopen a wound that has not healed: “What happened from my memory will never go away. For two years after the hydroelectric accident, all I did was ask myself questions. Only recently it dawned on me: this happened, you need to live with it, you need to accept it, no matter how painful it is.

The widow of an employee of the HPP, Nina Bezrukova, after the tragedy, could not even leave the house for six months. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

She met her husband in the 70s at the construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. A graduate of the Sverdlovsk technical school came to Cheryomushki to visit her parents, and she, like many young people of that time, was drawn into the romance of the all-Union construction.

“After I visited the station, I realized that I didn’t want to leave here,” says Nina. - Soon I was hired as an assistant welder. I ended up in the same team where Sasha worked. I was 19, he was 21. Despite the fact that she was insanely shy, and he was intelligent, everything somehow gradually began to spin. They got married, had children, and waited for a grandson.

The inhabitants of Khakassia have always been told that the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is a reliable construction, nothing can ever happen to it, because it was built with high quality, conscientiously, as they said, “for centuries”. No one living in the village of Cheryomushki, from where one can hear how water beats against the crests of the dam every second, could even imagine that something could happen to this colossus.

“In March 2009, five months before the accident, Sasha retired,” the widow recalls. But he was in no hurry to say goodbye to work. I repeatedly told him: stop working, let's start living for ourselves. But he wanted to work hard for another year. He had many students, the authorities consulted with him, it was considered - still, such work experience at the station!

Now the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is almost restored, work is being carried out in several shifts. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

About three months before the accident, Nina began to be haunted by a premonition of misfortune that had come from nowhere. But then she did not attach any importance to this:

“Very often, while working around the house, I caught myself thinking that I was burying Sasha. Such "visions" were driven away from me, but they returned. I couldn't figure out why this came to my mind. Why did it happen? Often she woke up at night and the first thing she checked was whether her husband was alive. I look at him - he breathes, everything is in order, and then I fall asleep. I was constantly haunted by some kind of anxiety. No matter how hard I tried, I couldn't get rid of her."

last hours

An incredibly responsible person by nature, that morning, 55-year-old Alexander, perhaps for the first time in long years overslept.

“I heard through my sleep how he turned off the alarm. Despite the fact that she herself madly wanted to sleep, she understood that she needed to wake her up. Somehow at seven o'clock he got up and quickly got ready. Sasha kissed me, went out into the entrance and stopped. This has never happened. He turned and looked at me as if last time. I will never forget that dreary, parting look. He had such beautiful eyes: light, blue. Then I said: “Sasha, how beautiful you are with me.”

Closing the door behind her husband, the woman went to the kitchen to make coffee. Somewhere at 8:13, the light blinked, but she did not attach any serious importance to this fact. Soon her son called her and asked: “What happened at the hydroelectric power station?”. But Nina didn't know. She immediately looked out the window and saw dozens of citizens running somewhere.

Residents were sure: the hydroelectric power station is a reliable design. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

“I remember Sashino grabbed her driver’s license and ran out into the street. None of the people knew anything, everyone hurried up the mountain, towards the dachas. And then I meet my husband’s boss and ask: “What happened? Where is Sasha? And he answers me: “They are all down there.” I returned home, and what started here ... ".

A few months after the incident, Nina Bezrukova, as she now admits, was on sedatives. Months of life, although rather of existence. She, like dozens of widows, walked like a zombie, not noticing anything around.

“We were given some drugs. We drank them. For six months I did not leave the house, I roared like a beluga. A few months later, the children began to take me to psychologists. Here, in Cheryomushki, I went to courses, in Krasnoyarsk I was observed by a good specialist. I was offered to sell the apartment and leave Khakassia away. But I don't want to leave this village. This is my husband's grave. No, I'm not at all afraid to live next to a hydroelectric power station - what happens, happens. You can't escape fate. At first, when I left here somewhere far away, it was easier for me. But when I returned, I understood: this place for me is some kind of black hole. Everything that I struggled with somewhere far away, came back here. It was like that for two years. From constant tears it became hard to see. Now I have to wear glasses.

Only after two years, or maybe three, when exactly - she doesn’t remember exactly, did she realize that she needed to learn to live on. Psychologists advised to deal with relatives only when she has free time. And the woman listened. Now she spends a lot of time in the country, travels often, passed the exams in the traffic police, drives a car confidently.

“You can’t bring a person back, you need to live on. The dead are gone forever. But, they say, someday they will return. Many young women who lost their loved ones on Sayano-Shushenskaya started life from scratch. I am happy for them, besides, they need to get on their own feet, raise children. And life, no matter what, goes on.”

"There was silence in the village"

Valentina Gartseva - former kindergarten teacher She is now raising three grandchildren. Their mother- Inna Zholobova— died on the day of the accident. At the time when the second unit failed, she was in the engine room, working as a plasterer-painter.

Valentina Gartseva issued custody of three grandchildren: their mother died in the engine room of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

“I remember that day, my daughter went to work, I slept at home with the children, I heard screaming, noise on the street. She looked out the window, a man running past said: gather the kids and run to the sports complex, the hydroelectric power station broke through. Then my son came running, took us with the guys and took us to the dacha. I knew that my daughter was there, but I didn’t even have the thought that she might die, ”recalls Valentina Gartseva.

Information soon appeared: everything is in order with the hydroelectric dam. The family returned home. “I was busy with urgent matters, there was no time to go outside, listen to what they were saying. The son came, I ask why Inna does not call? She is always so worried about the children. He replied: Mom, Inna will never call again.

The son took Valentina Georgievna to another apartment so as not to frighten the children. Neighbors came running and tried to calm me down. There was no hope: Inna's body was found within the first hours after the accident.

Valentina Gartseva recalls that evening: she says that it was so quiet in the village, you can’t even hear the birds. No one really wanted to talk about what happened - this is now a topic that they are trying to bypass in everyday communication. The village is small, everyone knows each other, the families of the victims try not to disturb them once again.

In the village of Cheryomushki, they don’t like to talk about what happened in 2009. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

“Inna’s daughter immediately learned about the death of her mother. The middle one, Kirill, we tried to prepare - he was after a traumatic brain injury, we were afraid for the child. When Inna's body was at our house, he was taken to the neighbors - but he ran in and saw her, - recalls Valentina. We didn't tell the younger one. Only once at dinner, when he did not want to eat, I say: mommy is looking at you from heaven, and you are being capricious. He asked why is mom there? I replied that it did. The boy didn't say anything. But at night he began to cry and scream - so it was every day for the next six months. Now he is already big, he understands everything, he goes with us to the cemetery.”

Two sons of Valentina Gartseva still work at the hydroelectric power station. She says she never asked them to leave - work is work. “We are raising children together with my husband, gradually everything is getting better. The eldest, until the sixth grade, studied for fives, when Inna died, she moved out for only threes. Only now they started to catch up, they obey us well, - says Valentina. - We received compensation from the company, apartments too, they even helped with money for their repair. We were taken to the sanatorium recently.”

The construction of the onshore spillway at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station began even before the accident, but what happened in 2009 forced the power engineers to accelerate greatly. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

The trial of the accident continues, but the family of Inna Zholobova does not go there. “It’s hard for me, and I don’t understand anything about it,” Valentina Gartseva explains. - Of course, I would like the guilty to be punished. But I don’t know who is to blame, I didn’t work there, and I don’t want to judge just like that.”

On the anniversary of the accident, she does not come to the cemetery - she says the atmosphere is too heavy. He tries to visit often, but on other days.

The grandchildren of Valentina Georgievna will probably go to work for Sayano-Shushenskaya: the eldest is going to be a welder, the middle one plans to study hydropower engineering, the smallest one does not yet talk about her dreams.

“We heard the rumble, but we thought it was necessary”

HPS employee Egor Mikerov one of the survivors of the disaster. His office was above the machine room, completely flooded at the time of the accident.

Egor Mikerov is one of the employees who survived the accident. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

Early in the morning he came to work, removed the alarm from the office, booted up the computer. Suddenly I heard a strange rumble: at first small, then - increasingly intensifying. And cotton. “After the clap, the lights were turned off,” Yegor says. — I have an office on the basement floor and the closest to the machine room. A stream of water rushed into the corridor, a huge stream. I realized that I would not run to the emergency exit at the end of the corridor - I have cerebral palsy, I am a disabled child, - says Yegor. - I closed the door and climbed out through the window into the street, there streams were already whipping from two doors, the water was about knee-deep. A woman jumped out of a neighboring building, together with her we slowly went to the checkpoint, the water kept coming, but we managed to catch on to some kind of visor. Then the guys came running and pulled me out. They put me in a car and sent me home.”

Egor recalls: the worst thing is the funnels that formed above the open basements, office furniture, iron safes were pulled in there, and a person could easily be pulled in. A couple of times the craters were only a couple of meters from Yegor, but we were lucky, we managed to get around them.

Eyewitnesses recall that at first the noise did not cause concern. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

Almost no one understood what happened, there was a guess that the sixth unit had broken down, because it was going to be launched on that very day. Therefore, the resulting vibration did not surprise anyone. A hum at startup is normal. Only when the noise began to grow did they realize that something had gone wrong.

Yegor recalls: many employees arrived at the hydroelectric power station two hours after the accident: people were leaving their vacation, they were coming from other cities. Cellular communication stopped working in the first hour - it could not withstand the overload. No one was called - but everyone rushed to the hydroelectric power station.

“It was quite obvious that only the Ministry of Emergency Situations could not cope, it was impossible, no matter how many people they had, so everyone who could help,” says Yegor. - I miraculously managed to get through to my father and mother, I said: pack your things, I thought there would be an evacuation. In the morning there was a terrible fog, the body of the dam was almost invisible, there were fears that something had happened to it. Then I realized that it was intact - otherwise, stones and cobblestones would have begun to fall from the mountains.

Ambulances drove along the street every now and then. The village was empty - everyone went to the station. The search for victims began, which lasted more than a month. Yegor says he lost hope much earlier: “The relatives believed to the last, but I knew that if people were not found on the first day, it would be almost impossible to save them: more than 24 hours a person is unlikely to hold out in the water.”

Sayano-Shushinskaya HPP. Photo: AiF / Ludmila Alekseeva

Yegor does not like to overdramatize what happened: “Yes, 75 people died (we count among ourselves - 76, one girl was pregnant, she was about to go on maternity leave). All this incredible grief. But after all, how many people were still saved.

A month later, drying and repair began in the premises. The HPPs gradually began to be restored, people returned to their offices and began to fulfill their direct duties.

Yegor soon got married, his daughter was born: “I can’t say that at that moment I experienced some kind of colossal stress, I couldn’t recover for a long time, you see, I’m disabled, I’m used to stress from childhood, maybe that’s why I quickly came to myself, I'm not complaining about anything. The village is small, and we experience all these troubles together. But life goes on, the city lives its own life. We remember the dead."

The tragedy at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP occurred on August 17 at 08:13 local time (04:13 Moscow time).

Due to the destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2, water began to flow into the power plant room under high pressure. The load on the hydroelectric power station almost immediately dropped to zero, constantly arriving water in a short time flooded the entire hall and the technical rooms below it. All ten hydraulic units of the station were damaged, three of them were completely destroyed. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the HPP.

As a result of the disaster, 75 people died and 13 were injured. Up to 50 tons of turbine oil got into the Yenisei.

The accident at the hydroelectric power station has no analogues in the domestic and world hydropower industry.

About Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after P.S. Neporozhny (SSHGES) is the most powerful hydroelectric power station in Russia. Its installed capacity is 6400 MW, the annual output is about 24 billion kW/h. The HPP is located on the Yenisei River in Khakassia near the city of Sayanogorsk. Included in JSC "RusHydro" as a branch of the company.

Construction of the station began in 1968. The first of ten HPP hydroelectric units was launched in December 1978, the last - in December 1985. The station was put into commercial operation in 2000.

SSHHPP is a high-pressure hydroelectric power plant of the dam type. Its pressure front is formed by a concrete arch-gravity dam deeply cut into the rocky shores. Height hydraulic structure- 245 m, length along the crest - 1074.4 m, width at the base - 105.7 m and along the crest - 25 m. The reservoir area is 621 sq. km. There are 10 hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 MW each in the turbine hall of the station.

Continuation

Rescue operation

Emergency Minister Sergei Shoigu and Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko flew to the scene of a large-scale emergency. During the night of August 17-18, the number of people involved in the elimination of the consequences of the accident increased tenfold.

The flooded premises were examined by divers. The search and rescue operation was carried out mainly in the engine room of the hydroelectric station. "Divers work in difficult conditions: the water is muddy, mixed with engine oil, but all corners of the engine room are carefully examined," said Alexander Kresan, head of the Siberian search and rescue team.

On the day of the accident, two people were saved, but already on August 18, the probability of finding living people in the flood zone was assessed as insignificant.

If a person got into an air bubble, then there is hope for his salvation. If he ended up in water, given that its temperature does not exceed four degrees, then the chances of saving him are minimal.

Alexander Tolokonnikov

former general director of the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station

On August 20, the pumping of water from the premises of the turbine hall began, by this time the number of victims had reached 17 people.

RusHydro announced that it plans to pay more than 300 million rubles in support of the families of the dead and injured.

"youtube.com/tdudin80"

"The largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world"

The investigation into the causes of the disaster was carried out through several departments. Immediately after the accident, the Investigative Committee joined him as part of an initiated criminal case, and a commission of Rostekhnadzor was also created.

First versions

Initially as possible cause accident, a version of a water hammer was put forward, but it did not find support, as well as a version of a transformer explosion that caused the wall of the turbine hall to collapse. The Investigative Committee ruled out the possibility of a terrorist attack.

RusHydro specialists suggested that the accident occurred as a result of the destruction of the turbine due to a factory defect. However, the heads of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Ministry of Energy warned against hasty conclusions.

Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko called what happened at the largest Russian hydroelectric power station "the largest and most incomprehensible accident in the world."

Report of Rostekhnadzor

On October 3, 2009, Rostekhnadzor submitted a report on the investigation into the causes of the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The document ran to over 100 pages. It was prepared by a commission of 26 specialists under the leadership of the head Federal Service for Environmental, Technological and Nuclear Supervision by Nikolai Kutyin. In the act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident, it was noted that the accident occurred due to a combination of reasons, including negligence, technical and organizational miscalculations.

Rostekhnadzor, which once every three years came and checked the state of the station, should act as an "axe" that constantly hangs over the management of the station

Vladimir Pekhtin

co-chairman of the commission from the State Duma

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the last unit of which was put into operation in 1985, was officially put into operation only 15 years later, in 2000, without a state examination. The corresponding document was signed by Anatoly Chubais, who at that time headed RAO UES of Russia. The report also said that several dozen cases of turbine equipment failures occurred during the initial period of operation of the HPP.

The Rostekhnadzor Commission named six people involved in the accident at the hydroelectric power station. Among them are ex-head of RAO "UES of Russia" Anatoly Chubais, Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Sinyugin, General Director of TGC-1 Boris Vainzikher, Ambassador-at-Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation in 2001-2004 Igor Yusufov. The list of persons involved in the accident also includes Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Central Commission for Commissioning the Sayano-Shushensky Hydropower Complex in 2000 Anatoly Dyakov and Managing Director, Head of the Yug Division of the RusHydro Company, Chief Engineer of the SSHHPP in 1983- 2006 Valentin Stafievsky.

Report of Rostekhnadzor: six involved

As noted in the document, Vyacheslav Sinyugin made decisions on the withdrawal of maintenance personnel from staffing hydroelectric power plant, failing to ensure the inclusion in the repair and maintenance contracts of requirements for regular monitoring technical condition main equipment. He "did not create the conditions for a proper assessment of the real state of safety of the SSHHPP. He did not take effective measures to develop, finance and implement compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP, including not ensuring the implementation of the decision on the speedy construction of an additional spillway at the SSHHPP, did not take effective measures on the replacement of impellers on hydraulic units that reduce the impact of "non-recommended zones" of their operation, did not ensure the adoption of a program for the safe operation of hydraulic units involved in power control and, therefore, having increased wear.

Boris Vainzikher, according to the conclusions of the commission, was responsible for the introduction of RAO "UES" standards aimed at strengthening the safe operation of equipment and did not ensure the safe operation of the SShHPP at the proper level.

Anatoly Chubais, the document notes, "approved the Act of the Central Commission for the acceptance into operation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex. At the same time, a proper assessment was not given to the actual state of safety of the SSHHPP." In addition, timely compensatory measures for the safe operation of the SSH HPP were not developed and implemented, including the failure to implement the decision "in as soon as possible start work on the construction of an additional spillway at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP", impellers on hydroelectric units have not been replaced, a program of compensatory measures for the safe operation of hydroelectric units involved in power regulation and, therefore, having increased wear has not been developed."

Valentin Stafievsky, according to the conclusions of Rostekhnadzor, "knowing about the real state of the equipment operated at the SSHHPP, did not create conditions for RusHydro to take effective measures for the safe operation of the SSHHPP. Participated in the removal of maintenance personnel from the staff list, failing to ensure compliance with the requirements for regular monitoring of the technical condition of the main equipment SSHGES".

Anatoly Dyakov was the chairman of the Central Commission for the acceptance into operation of the Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex and signed the acceptance certificate with an assessment of "good". "The act of the commission did not fully reflect the actual state of the operating buildings, structures and equipment of the SSHHPP, which created the prerequisites for underestimating the real consequences of further operation," the Rostekhnadzor document says.

Igor Yusufov, "while serving as the Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, he did not create mechanisms for real state control and supervision over the safe operation of energy facilities, including those included in RAO UES of Russia," the act of Rostekhnadzor notes. Yusufov, the document says, "did not provide development and adoption of the foundations public policy in the field of safe operation of energy facilities, contributed to the transfer of control functions from the state to operating organizations without making decisions on increasing their responsibility for the energy security of the Russian Federation"

Continuation

Rostekhnadzor also reported that the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was related to the fire at the Bratsk HPP on 16 August. It was because of this that the load on the SSHHPP had to be increased and the second hydroelectric unit had to be put into operation. “It cannot be said that the Bratsk hydroelectric power station is to blame for the accident at Sayano-Shushenskaya, but the conditions were created just at the time of the fire at Bratskaya,” said Nikolai Kutyin, head of Rostekhnadzor.

Parliamentary Conclusions

In parallel with the commission of Rostekhnadzor, a parliamentary commission established in September 2009 conducted its own investigation. Members of the commission - deputies and senators - visited the accident site and enterprises that produced equipment for hydroelectric power plants.

The commission determined that more than 20 persons were involved in creating the conditions for the occurrence of the accident. Among them are the management of the station, including CEO and the chief engineer, technical services that were responsible for the repair work and the technical condition of the equipment, as well as organizations that supplied various equipment to the hydroelectric power station, including automation.

The commission turned to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation with a request to identify the persons involved in the accident and establish the degree of their guilt.

Immediate cause of the accident

During the investigation of the causes of the accident, the commission of Rostekhnadzor and the parliamentary commission named the direct cause of the destruction of hydroelectric unit No. 2 as the fatigue failure of the turbine cover fastening studs as a result of vibration.

Continuation

Sentence for seven defendants

More than 300 witnesses were interrogated in the case, 234 examinations were carried out, including forensic, genetic, technical, metallurgical, as well as explosive and seismological examinations.

"Due to the large volume of materials, and more than 850 material evidence was attached to the criminal case, the examinations lasted for a year, as a result of which a mathematical model development of the accident," said the representative of the UK Vladimir Markin.

accusation

Seven employees of the station were in the dock: director of the SSHHPP Nikolai Nevolko, chief engineer Andrey Mitrofanov and his deputies Yevgeny Shervarli, Gennady Nikitenko, as well as employees of the HPP equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach.

The families of the victims still cannot come to terms with the loss of loved ones. However, a month ago, information appeared that the perpetrators of the accident would allegedly go unpunished. The fact that the criminal case can be closed due to the limitation of time has outraged people

Nikolai Popov

They were charged with violating the rules of labor protection, which negligently caused the death of a person. The article provided for imprisonment for up to three years. But by the time the case was received by the prosecutor's office on December 8, 2011, amendments to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation came into force, and this article was classified as a minor gravity. The statute of limitations for it is 2 years and by that time had actually expired, in connection with which the prosecutor's office returned the criminal case for additional investigation.

Investigative actions in the case of the accident at the SSHHPP were completed in June 2012. Seven defendants were charged with new article- part 3 of Art. 216 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation - "Violation of safety rules in the course of work, resulting in the death of more than two persons and causing major damage." They face seven years in prison.

According to investigators, the defendants for a long time allowed the operation of the hydraulic unit No. 2 in an unsatisfactory vibration state. HPP employees were inactive and did not take measures to eliminate the malfunction, including during the scheduled repairs carried out in January-March 2009.

162 people were recognized as victims. On June 4, 2013, the criminal case was sent for consideration to the Sayanogorsk City Court of the Republic of Khakassia. On July 15, 2013, preliminary hearings were held in the court and on July 19, the trial began.

Sentence and amnesty

On December 24, 2014, the defendants in the criminal case on the accident at the hydroelectric power station were sentenced. The former director of the hydroelectric power plant, Nikolai Nevolko, was sentenced to 6 years in a penal colony, the same term was given to chief engineer Andrei Mitrofanov. His deputies Yevgeny Shervarli and Gennady Nikitenko were sentenced to 5.5 years and 5 years 9 months in a penal colony. Employees of the equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko, Vladimir Beloborodov and Alexander Klyukach were sentenced to 4.5 years in prison without the right to occupy leadership positions. Moreover, Vladimir Beloborodov was released under an amnesty.

19 complaints were filed against the decision of the Sayanogorsk city court by the victims, the defense and convicts. Three victims individuals, as well as a representative of the RusHydro company, which was also recognized as the injured party, asked to acquit the convicts. In turn, the state prosecution asked to leave the verdict unchanged.

26 of May Supreme Court Khakassia changed the sentence of two defendants in the case. Employees of the HPP equipment monitoring service Alexander Matvienko and Alexander Klyukach, previously sentenced to 4.5 years in prison, were amnestied on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic war. The rest of the defendants were left the sentence unchanged.

The statute of limitations for the criminal case on the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP expired on August 17, 2015. If the decision of the Sayanogorsk court had not entered into force before this date, all the convicts would have been released and the case closed.

Restoration work and modernization of the station

It took more than five years and 41 billion rubles to restore the HPP. The first work at the station began in August 2009. By October, the blockages in the engine room were dismantled, by November, the walls and roof of the hall were restored, which made it possible to create a thermal circuit and ensure work was carried out in the cold season.

At the first stage (2010-2011), hydroelectric units Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 least damaged in the accident were restored and a new hydroelectric unit No. 1 was put into operation (in December 2011). In October 2011, a new onshore bypass spillway of the HPP was put into permanent operation, allowing for additional water flow of up to 4 thousand cubic meters. m (the cost of construction is about 7 billion rubles) and meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters.

At the second stage (2012-2013), new hydraulic units No. 7, 8, 9 and 10 began to operate, and the previously restored units No. 5 and 6 were replaced with new ones.

At the final stage in 2014, the updated unit No. 4 was included in the network - on May 22, President Vladimir Putin gave the command to launch it during a video bridge - and the equipment at unit No. 3 was updated.

The production and installation of new hydroelectric units for the station was carried out by OJSC Power Machines (a contract worth 11.7 billion rubles was signed with OJSC RusHydro on November 30, 2009).

Work on the reconstruction of the station was completed in November 2014, the station has reached its design capacity (6400 megawatts).

Completion of the full modernization of the HPP is scheduled for 2015.

What has changed since the emergency

After a large-scale accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, it was decided to carry out a comprehensive reconstruction of the station and equip it with new and modern equipment with improved performance and meeting all reliability and safety requirements.

The service life of the new hydraulic units has been increased to 40 years. Open switchgear units will be replaced with closed type units to reduce wear and tear. The HPP will have a complex automated system control of the state of the dam. Commissioned in permanent operation in October 2011, the new onshore bypass spillway of the station meets modern international requirements for the passage of flood waters, it allows for additional water passage of up to 4000 cubic meters. m per second. Also in 2009, the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation instructed, during scheduled repairs, to replace all turbine cover fasteners and install registration devices ("black boxes") at all Russian hydroelectric power plants.

abstract

Completed by a student
9th grade
Babich Ludmila.

2010

accident on Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP- industrialtechnological disaster , which took place on August 17, 2009 . As a result of the accident, 75 people died, and serious damage was caused to the equipment and premises of the station. Production station operation electricity suspended. The consequences of the accident affected environmental conditions of the water area adjacent to the hydroelectric power station , on the social and economic spheres of the region. As a result of the investigation, the direct cause of the accident was namedfatigue failure studs turbine cover fasteners hydraulic unit , which led to its failure and flooding station engine room.
This accident is the largest hydroelectric disaster in history. Russia and one of the most significant in the history of the worldhydropower. Nevertheless, the assessment of the consequences of the disaster in the expert and political community is ambiguous. Some specialists and organizations compare the Sayano-Shushenskaya catastrophe in terms of its significance and impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia withaccident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Other experts believe that these catastrophes are incomparable in scale.President of Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev believes that one should not overdramatize the situation and do "apocalyptic» comments. The accident caused a great public outcry, becoming one of the most discussed inmeans mass media events of 2009.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

General plan of the station
Main article:Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station Yenisei river is the largest hydroelectric power plant Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in the world. It is located on the borderKrasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia . The construction of the hydroelectric power plant started in 1968 . The first hydroelectric unit was put into operation in 1978, the last - in 1985 . The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000 . Technically, the HPP consists of concrete arch gravity damheight of 245 m and the dam building of the HPP, which houses 10radial-axialhydroelectric units with a capacity of 640 MW. The installed capacity of HPPs is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 24.5 billion kWh. Dam HPP forms a largeSayano-Shushenskoye reservoirseasonal regulation. Downstream of the Yenisei iscounterregulatory Mainskaya HPP , constituting a single production complex with the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The HPP facilities were designed by the institute " Lengidroproekt, hydraulic power equipmentdelivered by factories LMZ" and "Elektrosila "(now part of the concern" Power Machines "). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is owned by OAO RusHydro".

Catastrophe

At the time of the accident, the load on the station was 4100 MW, out of 10 hydroelectric units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13local time August 17, 2009 there was a sudden destruction of the hydraulic unit No. 2 with the flow of the hydraulic unit through the shaft under a large pressure significant volumes of water. The power plant personnel, who were in the engine room, heard a loud bang in the area of ​​hydroelectric unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. Streams of water quickly flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the HPP were flooded, while on the working hydro generators there wereshort circuits(their flashes are clearly visible in the amateur video of the disaster), which disabled them. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a de-energization of the station itself. On the central control panel of the station, a light and sound signaling , after which the remote control was de-energized - operational communication was lost, power supply lighting , automation and alarm devices. Automatic systems, stopping the hydraulic units, worked only on the hydraulic unit No. 5,guide apparatuswhich was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and the water water conduits continued to flow to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (heavily damaged stators and crosses of generators ). Water flows and flying fragments of hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydraulic aggregates No. 2, 3, 4. Hydro units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with fragments of the turbine hall.Employees of the station, who had such an opportunity, promptly left the scene of the accident.
At the time of the accident, from the station management in their places were Chief Engineer HPP A. N. Mitrofanov, Acting Chief of Staff civil defense and emergency situations M. I. Chiglintsev, head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift supervisor M. G. Nefyodov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the territory of the station after the accident.
Due to the loss of power supply, the gates could only be closed manually, for which the personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 08:30, eight operational personnel reached the shutter room, after which they contacted the station shift supervisor by cell phone, who instructed the shutters to be lowered. Having broken the iron door, the station workers A. V. Kataytsev, E. V. Kondrattsev, I. M. Bagautdinov, P. A. Mayoroshin and N. N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates within an hour water intakes by stopping the flow of water into the engine room. The closure of water conduits led to the need to open gatesspillway damto avoid flooding the reservoir. By 11:32 the food was organized gantry crane dam crest from movablediesel generator, at 11:50 the operation to lift the shutters began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water flow began.

Rescue work

Search and rescue, repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees Siberian regional center Ministry of Emergency Situations . On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations flew to the accident area Sergei Shoigu , who led the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident, [the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to inspect the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in "air bags" and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, as early as August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as negligible. On August 20, pumping out of water from the premises of the engine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been found, 58 people were listed as missing. As the internal premises of the station were freed from water, the number of found bodies of the dead grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when work on pumping water entered the final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of a search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of facilities and equipment. On August 28, the regime was abolished in Khakassiaemergencyintroduced in connection with the accident. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the HPP) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5000 m? blockages, more than 277,000 m? water. To eliminate oil pollution water areas Yenisei was installed 9683 metersbooms and collected 324.2 tons oily emulsions.

Causes of the accident

The results of the investigation of the accident by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the website of the department in the form of a document under official name"The act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 in the branch of the Open Joint Stock Company"RusHydro" - "Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhny" ". The act contains general information about the hydroelectric power plant, listing the events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The direct cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows: Most of these causes are of a systemic multifactorial nature, including unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the plant management, as well as abuse of official position by the plant management.
The constant monitoring of the technical condition of the equipment by the operational and maintenance personnel was not properly organized (which should be provided for in the operating instructions for the hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, approved by the chief engineer of the SSHHPP dated May 18, 2009). The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly shut down the second hydroelectric unit and find out the causes of vibration. SShHPP with numerous human casualties was the result of a number of technical, organizational and regulatory reasons.

Prerequisites

Operating zones of hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Hydro unit No. 2 was launched November 5, 1979 , initially at reduced pressure and with temporary working wheel. November 7, 1986 the hydraulic unit was put into operation with a standard impeller. The standard service life of the hydroturbine was set by the manufacturer at 30 years. The design of hydraulic turbines RO230/833-B-677 is characterized by a number of disadvantages, one of which is the presence of an extensive zone of non-recommended operation; when the hydraulic unit is in this zone, the operation of the turbine is accompanied by strong hydraulic shocks in the flow path and significant noise. At the same time, the zone of non-recommended operation separates two zones in which the operation of the hydraulic unit is allowed; Thus, with a significant change in power, the hydraulic unit is forced to pass through the zone of non-recommended operation each time. In the act on the acceptance of the hydroelectric complex into operation, dated 2000 , the need to replace the impellers of hydraulic turbines was noted. According to the program of technical re-equipment and reconstruction of the station, the replacement of the impellers of the hydraulic units was planned from 2011; particularly in August 2009 a tender was announced for the supply of a new impeller for one of the HPP's hydroelectric units
Hydro unit No. 2 was undergoing the last overhaul in 2005 , its last medium repair was carried out between January 14 to March 16 2009. After the repair, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibration equipment, which nevertheless remained within the permissible values.During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration state gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it passed the permissible level. The deterioration continued in the future; so, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 micron at the maximum allowable 160 microns; at 8:13, just before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with normative documents was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the causes of increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed at hydroelectric unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and the plant management when making decisions. Effects

Social Consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the turbine hall of the station, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the hall floor (327 m mark) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor level (at elevations of 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were employees of the station, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work ( most of of them - employees of JSC Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the zone affected by the accident). The accident killed 75 people, injured 13 people] . The body of the last deceased was found 23 September . Complete list of the deadwith an indication of the places where the bodies were found was published in the act of the technical investigation of the commission of Rostekhnadzor. A large number of The death toll is explained by the presence of most people in the internal premises of the station below the floor level of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these premises.
From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who could be inside the water-flooded turbine hall were disappointing. In particular, board memberRusHydro company, the former general director of the HPP Alexander Toloshinov stated:
“The lack of official information about the accident and the state of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, subsequently, mistrust of the statements of local authorities based on experience, caused panic in the downstream settlements - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk
etc.................

Municipal scientific and practical Internet conference for schoolchildren

"My Research in Natural Science"

Accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP and its consequences

MOU-SOSH r. p.Sovetskoye

Supervisor:

geography and ecology teacher

MOU-SOSH r. p.Sovetskoye

Introduction 2

I. Creation history 2

II. Accident at Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP 5

1) Disaster 6

2) Causes of the accident 7

III. Consequences of the accident

1) social consequences 8

2) environmental impact 9

IV. Conclusion 10

References 11

Introduction

The Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station on the Yenisei River is the largest hydroelectric power station in Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power stations in the world. It is located on the border of the Krasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia. The construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1968, the first hydroelectric unit was launched in 1978, the last - in 1985. The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000. Technically, the HPP consists of a concrete arch-gravity dam 245 m high and a hydroelectric dam building, which houses 10 radial-axial hydroelectric units with a capacity of 640 MW each. The installed capacity of HPPs is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 24.5 billion kWh. The HPP dam forms a large seasonally regulated Sayano-Shushenskoye reservoir. Downstream of the Yenisei is the controlling Mainskaya HPP, which, with the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, forms a single production complex. The HPP facilities were designed by the Lenhydroproekt Institute, and the hydraulic power equipment was supplied by the LMZ and Elektrosila plants (now part of the Power Machines concern). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP belongs to.

I.History of creation

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was designed by the Lenhydroproekt Institute. On November 4, 1961, the first team of surveyors of the institute under the leadership arrived in the mining village of Maina in order to survey three competing sites for the construction of a hydroelectric power station. Surveyors, geologists, hydrologists worked in frost and bad weather, 12 drilling rigs in three shifts "probed" the bottom of the Yenisei from the ice.

In July 1962, the expert commission chose the final version - the Karlovsky alignment. 20 kilometers downstream, it was planned to build a satellite of the Sayano-Shushenskaya - the counter-regulating Mainskaya hydroelectric power station.

Initially, four variants of the dam design were considered: gravity, arch-gravity, arch and rockfill. At the stage of the technical design, a variant of an arch-buttress dam was considered.

The arch-gravitational one was chosen as the most appropriate for the topographic and engineering-geological conditions of the alignment.

The creation of a dam of this type in the conditions of the wide alignment of the Yenisei and the harsh climate of Siberia had no analogues in the world. The design task was developed under the guidance of the chief engineer of the project. After his approval, he was appointed head of department and chief engineer of projects (1965). The development of the technical project begun under him was continued and.

In 1967, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League declared the construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP an All-Union shock Komsomol construction project. On November 4, 1967, a symbolic slab was laid under the foundation of the first large-panel house, which laid the foundation for the city of Sayanogorsk. In the summer of 1979, student construction teams took part in the construction of the hydroelectric power station. total strength 1700 people, Komsomol youth teams were formed during the construction.

More than 200 organizations were involved in the construction, the largest of which was KrasnoyarskGESstroy of the USSR Ministry of Energy.

Especially for the hydroelectric station, the largest production associations USSR: "Leningrad Metal Works" (hydraulic turbines), Leningrad Industrial Electrotechnical Association "Elektrosila" (hydraulic generators), association "Zaporozhtransformator" (transformers). Turbine runners were delivered by a waterway almost 10,000 kilometers long - across the Arctic Ocean to the upper reaches of the Yenisei. Thanks to the original technical solution - the installation of temporary impellers on the first two turbines, capable of operating at intermediate water pressures, it became possible to begin operation of the first stage of the station before the completion of construction and installation works.

The first cubic meter of concrete was laid in the main structures of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP on October 17, 1970.

In April 1974, the Treaty of Twenty-Eight, or joint commitment, was signed to reduce construction time and improve the quality of work performed. The idea of ​​the agreement provided for the identification of the reserve capabilities of all participants in the construction and the constant coordination of their actions. From the very beginning, the Coordinating Council was headed by the director of "Lengidroproekt".

The first cubic meter of concrete was laid into the spillway of the dam on December 26, 1972. The channel of the Yenisei was blocked on October 11, 1975. The construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was carried out with a phased development.

Each of the ten HPP turbines, equipped with a stainless steel impeller 6.77 meters in diameter and weighing 156 tons, is capable of developing a kW power at a design head of 194 meters. The first two generators of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were put into operation with temporary hydraulic turbine runners capable of operating at low pressures. This made it possible to generate electricity even at partial pressure, starting from 60 meters.

To ensure the launch of the first hydraulic unit at the appointed time, the filling of the reservoir was hastily started. Only a sanitary pass was dropped into the lower pool. At the same time, the possibility of discharging water from the reservoir in case of any unforeseen circumstances was not provided.

The turbine hall of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was built on the basis of a spatial cross-rod structure, which was first used in the practice of building hydroelectric power plants. It consists of unified metal elements of the system of the Moscow Architectural Institute (MARCHI). The ceiling and walls of the hall serve as a barrier for equipment and people from external environment. The design did not take into account the loads associated with the action of hydraulic processes during the operation of spillways and units. Therefore, due to increased vibration, once every three years, after each idle spillway, it is necessary to examine thousands of structural units with the measurement of gaps in the docking units.

II. Accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is an industrial man-made disaster that occurred on August 17, 2009. As a result of the accident, 75 people died, and serious damage was caused to the equipment and premises of the station. The power generation station has been suspended. The consequences of the accident affected environmental situation water area adjacent to the hydroelectric power station, in the social and economic spheres of the region. This accident is the largest disaster in history at a hydropower facility in Russia and one of the most significant in the history of world hydropower. “The accident is unique,” ​​said, in particular, the Minister of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences natural Disasters S. K. Shoigu. “Nothing like this has ever been seen in world practice.” Nevertheless, the assessment of the consequences of the disaster in the expert and political community is ambiguous. The accident caused a great public outcry, becoming one of the most discussed events in the media in 2009.

1. Disaster

At the time of the accident, the load on the station was 4100 MW, out of 10 hydroelectric units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13 local time on August 17, 2009 there was a sudden destruction of the hydraulic unit No. 2 with the flow of significant volumes of water through the shaft of the hydraulic unit under high pressure. The power plant personnel, who were in the engine room, heard a loud bang in the area of ​​hydroelectric unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water.

Streams of water quickly flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the hydroelectric power station were flooded, while short circuits occurred on the working hydroelectric generators, which put them out of action. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a de-energization of the station itself. A light and sound alarm went off at the central control panel of the station, after which the control panel was de-energized - operational communication, power supply to lighting, automation and signaling devices were lost. The automatic systems that stop the hydraulic units worked only on the hydraulic unit No. 5, the guide vane of which was automatically closed. The gates at the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and water continued to flow through the water lines to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (the stators and crosses of the generators were badly damaged). Water flows and flying fragments of hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydraulic aggregates No. 2, 3, 4. Hydro units No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with fragments of the turbine hall. Employees of the station, who had such an opportunity, promptly left the scene of the accident.

2. Causes of the accident

The act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 in the branch of the Open Joint Stock Company RusHydro - Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after PS Neporozhny. The act provides general information about the hydroelectric power plant, lists the events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The immediate cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows:

Due to the repeated occurrence of additional loads of a variable nature on the hydraulic unit associated with crossings through a non-recommended zone, fatigue damage was formed and developed on the attachment points of the hydraulic unit, including the turbine cover. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the failure of the turbine cover and the depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit.

From the report of the parliamentary commission to investigate the circumstances associated with the emergence of a man-made emergency at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the causes of the accident are formulated as follows:

The accident at the SSHHPP with numerous human casualties was the result of a number of reasons of a technical, organizational and regulatory legal nature. Most of these reasons are systemic and multifactorial in nature, including the unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, the unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the plant management, and the abuse of power by the plant management.

The constant monitoring of the technical condition of the equipment by the operational and maintenance personnel was not properly organized. The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly shut down the second hydroelectric unit and find out the causes of vibration.

III. Effects

1. Social consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the turbine hall of the station, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the hall floor (327 m mark) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor level (at elevations of 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were employees of the station, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work (most of them were employees of Shushensky Hydroenergoremont). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the zone affected by the accident). As a result of the accident, 75 people died and 13 people were injured. The body of the last deceased was found on September 23 . A complete list of the dead, indicating the places where the bodies were found, is published in the act of the technical investigation of the Rostekhnadzor commission. A large number of deaths is explained by the fact that most people were in the interior of the station below the floor of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these rooms.

From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who could be inside the water-flooded turbine hall were disappointing.

The lack of official information about the accident and the state of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, later, distrust of the statements of local authorities, based on experience, caused panic in the settlements lying downstream of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk, Abakan, Minusinsk . Residents hurriedly left to stay with relatives, away from the dam, and to nearby higher ground, leading to numerous queues at gas stations, traffic jams, and car accidents.

2. Environmental impact

The accident rendered negative impact on the environment: oil from the lubrication baths of the thrust bearings of hydraulic units, from the destroyed control systems of the guide vanes and transformers got into the Yenisei, the resulting slick stretched for 130 km. The total volume of oil leaks from the station equipment amounted to 436.5 m 3 , of which approximately 45 m 3 of predominantly turbine oil entered the river. In order to prevent further dissemination oil booms were installed along the river; to facilitate the collection of oil, a special sorbent was used, but it was not possible to promptly stop the distribution of oil products; The spot was completely eliminated only on August 24, it is planned to complete the cleaning of the coastal strip by December 31, 2009. Water pollution with oil products has led to the death of about 400 tons of industrial trout in fish farms located downstream of the river; there were no facts of fish death in the Yenisei itself. The total amount of environmental damage is tentatively estimated at 63 million rubles.

In the village of Maina, due to the failure of the purification filters, water intake from the Yenisei was suspended, which caused a violation of the centralized water supply of the village. The local authorities organized the delivery of water by tank trucks according to the schedule; 40% of the population of the village of Maina temporarily used water from wells. For 1.8 thousand elderly and disabled people who could not bring water to their homes, bottled water was delivered by the local branch of the Red Cross with funding from the European Commission in the amount of 10.5 thousand euros.

IV. Conclusion

Maybe the Soviet energy system, once the best in the world, has exhausted itself, and the technical policy of the post-Soviet leadership of the industry turned out to be untenable?

What happened is a harbinger of what Russian leaders have long feared: the inexorable degradation of infrastructure Soviet era. Everything from power plants to ports, airports, pipelines and railways to the city's thermal power plant and the Moscow metro - almost everything needs urgent repairs.

…These tragic events should once again remind us of fairly simple things that we, unfortunately, often forget about - that security control systems, the infrastructure of Russian enterprises as a whole, require utmost attention at the moment. In a number of cases, this infrastructure is inefficient and needs to be urgently modernized, otherwise we will pay with the most difficult things.

List of used literature

1. Great Soviet Encyclopedia.

2. Geography of Russia. Atlas. Roskartografiya, 2008

3. Russia in numbers. M., 2006

4. Member countries of the CIS. Statistical Yearbook. 2002

5. Rustling placement of the electric power industry. M., 2005

6. Website "Wikipedia".

Hi all! Vladimir Raichev, the author of this modest blog, is with you. Friends, please tell me, have you ever been scared? But for those who saw how the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP took place, it was very scary, and now I will tell you how it was.

I remember being very frightened when my car spun on a winter road and was thrown off the track into high speed. It was scary not immediately, not when I tried to catch an uncontrollable car, convulsively turning the steering wheel from side to side, but when it was all over. By the way, just yesterday I gave several recommendations on how to prepare for the winter period for a motorist.

I often write about catastrophes and accidents, for example, the sinking of the Titanic or the Messinian earthquake, read it if you are interested. So, I write often, but I only thought about how terrible it was once, when and how it happened, I will tell at the end of the article.

And today, let me continue the story of the disaster at the hydroelectric power plant. When looking for information, I imagined how scared people were. It's really terrible. I will not torment you with expectations and proceed to the main topic.

On August 17, 2009, several dozen people watched in amazement as the cover was torn off the hydroelectric unit No. 2 of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. Eyewitnesses recall:

“The eyes did not believe it. A rotor flew out of the corrugated coating of the unit and took off about three meters. He was spinning! Flew pieces of concrete, metal, we tried to dodge them "

In order to understand what exactly the station personnel saw, we recall that the total weight of the rotor assembly is 1300 tons. It was he who flew into the air. Imagine the size of such a colossus.

So, flying out of its mount, the rotor lands back. The engine room flooded within minutes. 75 people died and 13 were injured. The HPP does not actually function, one way or another, all the main components of the station are damaged. The Yenisei wins a temporary victory over man. Scary?

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was built for a very long time, from 1968 to 2000. However, in fact, this only meant a phased launch of the station's capacities, it gave the first current already in 1978, and by 1985 all ten hydroelectric units were launched. The last fifteen years are just general improvements. This is the most powerful hydroelectric power station in Russia and 13 in the world (ironically).

The largest hydroelectric power station is located in China (Three Gorges) and is approximately 4 times larger than ours in terms of parameters (22500 MW versus 6400).

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is a unique facility. Belongs to RusHydro. Located in Khakassia on the Yenisei River.

Prehistory of the disaster

At the time of the accident, nine out of ten units were in operation, the sixth was under repair. The staff has long noticed that something is wrong with the second machine, one of the bearings is obviously worn out. Vibrations are above normal. They are trying to stop the turbine, but the management is against it, it is enough that another one is already being repaired.

On the night of August 16-17, the vibrations become simply terrifying. A reinforced team of repairmen arrives, the go-ahead for the stop is still given and they try to do it twice.

The unit is bursting at the seams, the strongest beats and a complete stop are not resolved. On the morning of August 17, the chief engineer arrives and gives the command to slow down the unit to the end. We all know the result: the studs that hold the turbine cover are torn off, and the rotor-cover assembly is thrown into the turbine hall. The diameter of one hairpin is about 15 centimeters, in fact it is a metal blank with a thread. But it doesn't save.

Tragedy

After the rise and fall of the rotor, the main catastrophe occurs. Water gushed out of the damaged hydraulic unit. She drowns the turbine hall, all the rooms under it and all other units. They have short circuits, very spectacular.

In such a situation, emergency protection should work, which stops the turbine and provides an emergency descent of water. Worked only on the fifth. The rest were spinning, short-circuited and without proper support systems. This led to the failure of almost all ten turbines, which were somehow damaged. In a matter of minutes, the entire energy system of Siberia simply sank.

Another problem was the complete de-energization of the station, including the desk on duty. The hydroelectric power station fed itself, centrally. There was no emergency independent power supply path, I could not imagine a situation when it could be needed worst dreams no constructor.

Of course, there was a diesel generator, but in a situation of a complete short circuit of all wiring, there is little sense from it.

So, water hits seven hydroelectric units and another one (the fifth one stopped normally, the sixth was initially standing). The waters of the Yenisei have two ways - through the station or through the dam for sanitary water passage.

The station is blocked and flooded. The dam is closed. In order to somehow release water, you need to open the dam and close the gates of the hydraulic units. And there is nothing to do this - everything is de-energized, regular systems are destroyed.

But on the crest of the dam there is a special room with the possibility of closing the gates manually. Eight brave employees climb there. They break the iron door and, once again contacting the chief engineer for mobile phone, overlap.

At the same time, a gantry crane was powered from the same diesel generator to lift the gates of the dam. Somehow, the dam is opened, and it begins to let water through. All. The station is de-energized, all in the water, which gradually leaves, 75 people remain in its depths. But the Yenisei flows on. Time is 13:07. Three and a half hours of water hell is over.

liquidation

The Ministry of Emergency Situations arrives at the scene promptly, together with the personnel participates in the operation to release water and organizes diving work in flooded premises, pumping out water. Mostly dead, but two hours after the accident - the first rescued, took refuge in an air pocket. After 15 hours - the second. There will be no more miracles, only the bodies of 75 people will be raised.

The Siberian regional center organizes the transfer of additional forces to Khakassia, the station is being dismantled by the whole world. A day later, Shoigu arrives at the scene of the accident.

In general, there are no complaints about the work of rescuers in this situation. Everything happened too fast and still saved who can be saved.

The reasons

The saddest thing in this story is that no one could name the causes of the accident. It is precisely established how the destruction of unit No. 2 took place, each detail is painted by the minute. But no one can answer a specific question about the root cause.

There were certain specific problems in the operation of the unit, however, none of them can be called critical, nothing like this has ever led to the rotor flying out of the socket. In the end, we decided so. Here is the official wording of the conclusions of Rostekhnadzor:

“Due to the repeated occurrence of additional loads of a variable nature on the hydraulic unit associated with crossings through a non-recommended zone, fatigue damage to the hydraulic unit attachment points, including the turbine cover, was formed and developed. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the failure of the turbine cover and the depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit.

To put it simply, the water does not flow evenly, it has jumps and falls. As a result, in the hydraulic unit, which was not designed for such a dynamic mode of operation, fatigue accumulated and it was torn apart. The Yenisei turned out to be stronger than the margin of safety that was originally laid in the station. Although there are several more theories, up to a terrorist attack, but this is more likely from the field of conspiracy theories.

Seven employees of the station, management and members of the monitoring service were involved on charges of negligence. The investigation lasted five years, in December 2014 everyone received terms from four to six years, but the first was amnestied in the courtroom, two more - in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Victory. There is information that all the convicts are already free.

For 2016, the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station has been completely restored and again provides electricity to Siberia. But power engineers look at the Yenisei with redoubled apprehension. And they do it right.

It’s just that some kind of mysticism turns out: it was not possible to establish the reason, in our 21st century. Can you imagine?

And now I’m telling you about the catastrophe that scared me. Of course, this is the crash of our plane in Egypt. After all, Yulia and I then had to fly to Egypt on vacation, the tours had already been ordered and paid for.

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