Organizational structure of MSBR. Hierarchy of military formations

For many civilians such words as department, platoon, company, regiment and others are known. However, most of them never thought about the difference, for example, between a squad and a regiment, and a platoon from a company. In fact, the structure of military units is formed based on the number of military personnel. In this article, we will look at the size of each military unit and deal with the structure of military formations in detail.

Brief description of units and number of troops

In order to clearly control the personnel of military personnel, military units have a certain structure, each link of which has its own commander or chief. Each unit has a different number of military personnel, and is part of a larger unit (a squad is part of a platoon, a platoon is part of a company, etc.). The smallest unit is the department, it includes from four to ten people, and the largest formation is the front (district), the number of which is difficult to name, since it depends on a number of factors. To have a clearer idea of the size of a military unit, it is necessary to consider each of them, which we will do next.

What is a branch and how many people are in it

As noted above, the smallest military unit is the squad, which is directly part of the platoon. The squad leader is the direct head of the squad's personnel. In military jargon, it is abbreviated as "Chest of drawers". Most often, the squad leader has the rank of junior sergeant or sergeant, and the squad itself may consist of ordinary soldiers and corporals. Depending on the type of troops, a different number of people can be in the department. Interestingly, the equivalent of a squad in tank divisions is the tank crew, and in artillery divisions - crew. The picture below shows a few examples of the differences between squad, crew and calculation

The picture shows a motorized rifle squad, but in fact there are various squads in the battalions, for example: the control squad of the battalion commander (4 people), the reconnaissance squad of the control platoon (4 people), the weapons repair squad of the repair platoon (3 people), the communications squad (8 people) and others.

What is a platoon and how many people are in it

The next largest number of personnel is a platoon. Most often it includes from three to six departments, respectively, its number varies from fifteen to sixty people. As a rule, a platoon is commanded by a junior officer - a junior lieutenant, lieutenant or senior lieutenant.
On the infographic you can see examples of motorized rifle and tank platoons, as well as a firing platoon of a mortar battery

Thus, we see that a motorized rifle platoon consists of a platoon control (platoon commander and deputy) and 3 squads (we considered the composition of the squads above in the picture). That is, only 29 people.
A tank platoon consists of 3 tank crews. It is important that the commander of a tank platoon is also the commander of the first tank, so there are only 9 people in a tank platoon.
A fire platoon consists of 3-4 crews, each squad consists of 7 people, so the number of platoons is 21-28 people.

Also, in addition to the units presented in the example, there are many more different platoons in various brigades and regiments. Here are just a few of them as an example:

Control Platoon
communications platoon
Reconnaissance Platoon
Engineer Platoon
grenade launcher platoon
logistics platoon
medical platoon
Anti-aircraft missile platoon
Repair platoon, etc.

Company and the number of people in it

The third largest military formation is the company. Depending on the type of troops, the size of a company can be from 30 to 150 soldiers, who are part of 2-4 platoons. Thus, the strength of a tank company is 31-40 people, and the number of servicemen of a motorized rifle company ranges from 150 people. A company is also a formation of tactical importance, which means that the military personnel who are part of the company, in the event of combat operations, can perform tactical tasks on their own, without being part of the battalion. Often a company is commanded by an officer with the rank of captain, and only in some units this position is occupied by a major. Also, depending on the type of troops, the company may have a different name. For example, an artillery company is called a battery, an aviation company is called an aviation unit, and there was also a cavalry company, which was called a squadron.

In the example, we have a tank and motorized rifle company, as well as a mortar battery

Battalion and the number of soldiers in it

As in other military units, the size of the battalion depends on the type of troops. The battalion consists of 2 - 4 companies, and has from 250 to 1000 people. As you can see, this military unit already has a fairly impressive number, and therefore it is considered the main tactical formation capable of acting independently.

Many have heard the song of the Lyube group called "Combat", but not everyone knows what it means. So, the battalion is commanded by the battalion commander, which is abbreviated as "battalion commander", in whose honor this composition of the same name was written. The battalion commander is the position of a lieutenant colonel, but most often the battalion commanders are captains and majors, who have the opportunity to curry favor in their rank and receive the stars of a lieutenant colonel.

The activities of the battalion are coordinated at the battalion headquarters. Just like a company, a battalion, depending on the type of troops, may be called differently. For example, in the artillery and anti-aircraft missile forces they are called divisions (artillery division, air defense division).

In battalions and divisions, there are many more specific units that were mentioned above. Therefore, we will present the structure in the form of separate infographics

The regiment and its composition

The regiment consists of three to six battalions. The number of the regiment does not exceed two thousand people. By itself, the regiment is directly a key tactical formation, which is completely autonomous. To command such a formation, one must have the rank of colonel, but in practice lieutenant colonels are more often placed as regimental commanders. A regiment may contain several different units. For example, if there are three tank battalions and one motorized rifle battalion in the regiment, then the regiment will have the name tank. Also, depending on the type of troops, the regiment can perform different tasks: combined arms, anti-aircraft, rear.

There are also more numerous units that were heard by civilians much less often than the above formations. We will try to briefly talk about them in the next part of the article.

Brigade, division, corps, army, front

After the regiment, the brigade is next in size, which usually has from two to eight thousand military personnel. The brigade includes several battalions (divisions), several auxiliary companies, and sometimes two or even three regiments. The brigade commander (abbreviated as brigade commander) is an officer with the rank of colonel.

The main operational-tactical formation is a division. It includes several regiments, as well as many auxiliary units of various types of troops. The command of the division is allowed to the highest officers with the rank of major general and above, since the number of the division is an impressive 12-24 thousand people.

Another military formation is the army corps. It is formed from several divisions, which can reach one hundred thousand people. There is no predominance of any kind of military service in the creation of an army corps, since it is a combined arms formation. A corps commander may be a senior military officer - a major general and above.

The army as a military unit consists of several corps. The exact number of military personnel can range from two hundred thousand to a million, depending on the structure. The army is commanded by a major general or a lieutenant general.

front, and in Peaceful time The military district is the largest unit of all existing in the armed forces. It is very difficult to name its number, since it can vary depending on the political situation, military doctrine, region, etc. The position of front commander can be occupied by a lieutenant general or an army general.

General principles for the formation of the number of units

From the above, you can build a kind of chain that will help to finally clarify general principles formation of the number of units:

5 - 10 people form a department;
3 - 6 squads form a platoon;
3 - 6 platoons create a company;
3 - 4 companies form a battalion;
3 - 6 battalions create a regiment;
2 - 3 battalions form a brigade;
several brigades and support units form a division;
3 - 4 divisions create an army corps;
2 – 10 divisions are capable of forming an army

You also need to remember that the number of military units may depend directly on the type of troops. For example, tank units are always significantly inferior in number to motorized rifle units.

Other tactical terms

In addition to the above terms of the number of military units, the following concepts can also be distinguished:

Subdivision - all military formations that are part of the unit. In other words, such military terms as squad, platoon, company, etc., can be expressed by the word "unit".
The military unit is the main independent unit of the Armed Forces. Most often, the unit is a regiment or brigade. Also separate companies and battalions can be military units. The main features of the part are:

availability of open and closed combined arms numbers;
military economy;
bank account;
postal and telegraphic address;
own office work;
official seal of the part;
the right of the commander to issue written orders.

All these signs indicate that the part has the autonomy it needs.

Compound. In fact, this term can only describe a division. The very word "connection" implies the union of several parts. If the composition of the brigade is formed from separate battalions and companies that have the status of units, then in this case the brigade can also be called a formation.
An association. It unites such units as a corps, army, front or district.

After analyzing all the above concepts, one can understand on what principles the numerical class of military units is built. Now, when watching military-themed films, or talking to a soldier, having heard most of the military terms, you will have a clear idea about them. It should be noted that this article does not pay due attention to the structure of aviation and naval formations, since they do not differ significantly from military ones.

Now consider the question what changes took place in the Russian army during the two years of the Serdyukov reform?
For some reason, the main visible manifestation of this military reform was not social transformations, not measures to improve the situation in the troops, but the organizational “shrinking” of the Armed Forces to a three-stage structure: battalion - brigade - operational command, in which the brigade became the main operational-tactical unit. Such traditional levels as regiments, divisions, corps and armies were completely eliminated.

To date Ground forces consolidated into 85 brigades:
- 39 combined arms brigades,
- 21 brigade of rocket troops and artillery,
- 7 army air defense brigades,
- 12 communication brigades,
- 2 electronic warfare brigades,
- 4 air assault brigades.

To manage them in each district, from one to three operational commands have been formed.
This breakdown was presented to the Russian public as an “optimization” of a chaotic military structure, the legacy of Russia since the Soviet era. As confirmation, the figure of 1890 military units listed as part of the Armed Forces in 2008 was cited. After the "optimization" there should have been 172 of them. At the same time, it was emphasized that all of them would be 100 percent equipped with people and weapons and fully combat-ready. That brigades will become universal combat units from Kamchatka to Pskov.

But the plans in life, beautiful on staff papers, turned out to be very far from their real implementation. Least one third of the brigades as a result, it turned out to be formed according to some “light” states. According to one of them, the number of motorized rifle brigades - the main operational-tactical unit of the ground forces - is 3,500 people. But there are "brigades" totaling 2,200 people, although it was originally stated that all brigades would have a strength of 4,600 people.

Further more. The presence or absence of weapons and geographical features forced the "reformers" to change the already existing states in relation to a specific region and the basic set of weapons. As a result, today there are already at least SIX approved brigade states. But in reality, taking into account various "amendments" to the states, in today's Armed Forces You can't even find two identical teams.
That is there is no talk of any "unification", which the "reformers" were so striving for and how they argued for the rejection of the divisional structure. The resulting brigades are extremely heterogeneous in terms of numbers, organization and weapons. At the same time, no one remembers the promised equipping of them with new weapons. "New" now means just workable. Have achieved this in a simple way- all serviceable kits were removed from the storage bases and reserve warehouses and sent to staff these brigades.

On the one hand, of course, it’s wonderful that now the “new look” brigades have only serviceable and serviceable weapons and equipment, but on the other hand, what will happen to this equipment after its resource ends and it suffers the fate of those kits that were in service before? If the Ministry of Defense does not have money to restore the equipment that was in the regiments and divisions of the "old look", then where will they come from to repair the new one?
And would it not be more reasonable in this case to repair that “old” one? After all, the current "rearmament" is not a transition to qualitatively new weapons and equipment, but only the "eating up" of the mobilization reserve, without which not a single more or less large-scale war Russia simply cannot win.

As an example, take Far Eastern theater of operations(TVD). In 1986-1997 the number of divisions in the Far Eastern theater of operations has decreased from 57 to 23, tanks - from 14,900 to 10,068, surface-to-surface missiles - from 363 to 102, combat helicopters - from 1,000 to 310, combat aircraft - from 1,125 to 500. Process cuts continued after 1997, albeit at a slightly slower pace.
As a result, before the start of the Serdyukov reform, 23 divisions were located here, but more than half of these formations were “framed” - that is, reduced in strength, and the total grouping of the Ground Forces consisted of about 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

In the Shenyang and Beijing military districts of the PLA that oppose us, directly bordering Russia in the Far East and Transbaikalia, 22 divisions are concentrated (4 tank, 6 mechanized, 6 motorized infantry, 3 airborne, 3 artillery) and 38 brigades (6 tank, 12 motorized infantry, 1 infantry, 7 artillery, 1 anti-tank, 11 air defense). In reserve - 7 infantry divisions and 3 air defense divisions, total over 500,000 soldiers and officers, 3,000 tanks and over 1,000 aircraft and helicopters.

For the transfer of reinforcements from the west, here we have one and only communication - Transsib. Its length (from the Yaroslavsky railway station in Moscow to the railway station in Vladivostok) is 9288 km. Wherein more than 1500 kilometers of this railway they go in close proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border, sometimes approaching it at a distance of direct visibility. Therefore, in Soviet time the high military command never counted on it as a way to bring up reserves in the event of an aggravation of the situation in this region.

The bet was made on something else - in case of war, the Far Eastern group included in its warehouses and storage bases equipment, weapons, ammunition and ammunition for almost a million military group. Under a military threat, the ground military group deployed here could be brought up to almost 500 thousand in thirty days, and up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers in forty-five days, which already qualitatively changed the balance of forces in the region, given the continued technical superiority, and most importantly - superiority in command and control at the operational-strategic level. Given the strategic superiority of the USSR in nuclear weapons, covering the main economic centers with fortified areas, this made the war against the USSR a senseless adventure.

After Serdyukov's "optimization", the number of deployed troops in this region even increased by about 20 thousand people. It would seem that one can only rejoice, but at the same time, the entire mobilization part of our military group. All "framed" regiments and divisions have been reduced and disbanded. According to the plans of Makarov - Serdyukov, only a few can be deployed here in the event of war separate brigades. At the same time, after the agreements signed by Putin with China on a hundred-kilometer demilitarized zone along the border and territorial concessions to China all our fortified areas were disarmed and blown up.

In the event of a hypothetical war with China, the half-million Chinese grouping will be opposed by a thin defensive chain of three dozen brigades numbering just over 100 thousand people. In addition, stretched for more than 1,500 kilometers along the Chinese border, without reserves and without any hope of strengthening. Since the transfer of one brigade from the European part of Russia here will take no less than a month, unless, of course, the Chinese cut the Trans-Siberian earlier.

The point of permanent deployment of the northernmost MSBR in Primorye is determined in Sibirtsevo, and the southernmost MSBR of the Khabarovsk Territory in Bikin. Between them there are more than 400 km of the border strip, guarded by an electronic surveillance system of border departments with 15% staffing and abandoned military towns: Salskoye, Grafskoye, Vedenka, Dalnerechensk, Lazo, Filino, Koltsevoe, Panteleimonovka, Lesozavodsk, Sungach, Knoring, Spassk, Chernigovka.
At the same time, perfectly understanding the state of our Far Eastern grouping, the current Chief of the General Staff, General Makarov, cheerfully hypnotizes the public:

« Now the new brigades are ready not only for the immediate use of force, but are also capable of holding back any enemy for 45 days. This time is quite enough to mobilize and reinforce them with additional forces if necessary ...«

I remember that in our history there were already military leaders who promised Comrade Stalin to defeat any enemy with one powerful blow swiftly and on foreign territory. And then there was the forty-first year ...
I'm afraid that General Makarov remembers very poorly military history his army and the fate of these "optimists" in generals' stripes.
How sadly Far Eastern officers joke today: after the Serdyukov-Makarov "optimization" for Chinese army won't be a hard problem to smash Russian army. Finding it will be a problem...

branch

In the Russian army, a branch is the smallest military formation with a full-time commander. The squad is commanded by a junior sergeant or sergeant. Usually in a motorized rifle department there are 9-13 people. In the departments of other branches of the armed forces, the number of personnel of the department is from 3 to 15 people. In some military branches, the branch is called differently.
In artillery - calculation, in tank troops- crew. Typically, a squad is part of a platoon.

Platoon

Several squads make up a platoon. Usually there are 2 to 4 squads in a platoon, but more are possible. The platoon is led by a commander with an officer's rank. In the Russian army, this is a junior lieutenant, lieutenant or senior lieutenant. On average, the number of personnel in a platoon ranges from 9 to 45 people. Usually in all branches of the military the name is the same - a platoon. As a rule, a platoon is part of a company, but can also exist independently.

Company

Several platoons make up a company. Usually a company consists of 2-4 platoons, sometimes more platoons. A company is the smallest formation of tactical value*, i.e. a formation capable of independently performing small tactical tasks on the battlefield. The company commander is a captain. On average, the size of a company can be from 18 to 200 people. Motorized rifle companies are usually about 130-150 people, tank companies 30-35 people. Usually the company is part of the battalion, but often the existence of companies as independent formations. In artillery, this type of formation is called a battery.

Battalion

It consists of several companies (usually 2-4) and several platoons that are not included in any of the companies. The battalion is one of the main tactical formations*. A battalion, like a company, platoon, squad, is named according to its type of troops (tank, motorized rifle, engineer-sapper, communications). But the battalion already includes formations of other types of weapons. For example, in a motorized rifle battalion, in addition to motorized rifle companies, there is a mortar battery, a material support platoon, and a communications platoon. Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel. The battalion already has its headquarters. Usually, on average, a battalion, depending on the type of troops, can number from 250 to 950 people. However, there are battalions of about 100 people. In artillery, this type of formation is called a division.

Regiment

In the Russian army, this is the main tactical formation * and a completely autonomous formation in the economic sense. The regiment is commanded by a colonel. Although the regiments are named according to the branches of the military (tank, motorized rifle, communications, pontoon-bridge, etc.), but in fact this is a formation consisting of units of many branches of the military, and the name is given according to the predominant branch of the military. For example, in a motorized rifle regiment, two or three motorized rifle battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion, one anti-aircraft missile battalion, reconnaissance company, engineer company, communications company, anti-tank battery, chemical protection platoon, repair company, material support company, orchestra, medical center. The number of personnel of the regiment is from 900 to 2000 people.

brigade

As well as the regiment is the main tactical formation*. Actually, the brigade occupies an intermediate position between the regiment and the division. The structure of the brigade is most often the same as that of the regiment, however, there are much more battalions and other units in the brigade. So in a motorized rifle brigade there are one and a half to two times more motorized rifle and tank battalions than in a regiment. A brigade may also consist of two regiments, plus auxiliary battalions and companies. On average, there are from 2,000 to 8,000 people in a brigade. The brigade commander is a colonel.

Division

The main operational-tactical formation *. As well as the regiment is named after the type of troops prevailing in it. However, the predominance of one or another type of troops is much less than in the regiment. A motorized rifle division and a tank division are identical in structure, with the only difference being that in a motorized rifle division there are two or three motorized rifle regiments and one tank regiment, while in a tank division, on the contrary, there are two or three tank regiments, and one motorized rifle regiment. In addition to these main regiments in the division, one or two artillery regiment, one anti-aircraft missile regiment, a jet battalion, a missile battalion, a helicopter squadron, an engineer battalion, a communications battalion, an automobile battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, an electronic warfare battalion, a material support battalion. a repair and restoration battalion, a medical battalion, a chemical protection company, and several different support companies and platoons. In the modern Russian Army, there are or may be tank, motorized rifle, artillery, airborne, missile and aviation divisions. In other military branches, as a rule, the highest formation is a regiment or brigade. On average, there are 12-24 thousand people in a division. Division Commander Major General. At present, after the reorganization of the Russian army, divisions are being reduced and formed on their basis - the so-called reinforced brigades of a new look.

Army

The army is a large military formation of operational purpose*. The army includes divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops. Usually, armies are no longer subdivided according to the types of troops, although there may be tank armies, where tank divisions predominate. An army may also include one or more corps. It is impossible to talk about the structure and size of the army, because how many armies exist or have existed, so many structures existed. The soldier at the head of the army is no longer called "commander", but "army commander". Usually the staff rank of the army commander is Colonel General.

county

This is the highest military formation of the strategic type*. Larger formations do not exist. On the basis of the district in wartime, a front is formed. The district includes several armies, corps, divisions, regiments, battalions of all types of troops. The composition and size of the district may be different. The districts are never subdivided according to the types of troops (i.e. there cannot be a tank district, an artillery district, etc.). At the head of the district is the commander of the district with the rank of general of the army.

Above in the text there are the concepts of "tactical formation", "operational-tactical formation", "strategic ..", etc. These terms indicate the range of tasks solved by this formation in the light of military art. Military art is divided into three levels:

1. Tactics (the art of combat). Squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment solve tactical tasks, i.e. are fighting.
2. Operational art (the art of conducting battles, battles). Division, corps, army decide operational tasks, i.e. are fighting.
3. Strategy (the art of warfare in general). The front solves both operational and strategic tasks, i.e. fights major battles, as a result of which the strategic situation changes and the outcome of the war can be decided

Subdivision

This word denotes all the military formations that make up the unit. Squad, platoon, company, battalion - they are all combined in one word "unit". The word comes from the concept of division, divide. Those. part is divided into divisions.

Part

This is the main unit of the armed forces. The term "unit" most often refers to a regiment and a brigade. The external features of the unit are: the presence of its own office work, military economy, a bank account, a postal and telegraph address, its own stamp seal, the commander’s right to give written orders, open (44 training tank division) and closed (military unit 08728) combined arms numbers. That is, the part has sufficient autonomy. The presence of the Battle Banner for the part is optional. In addition to the regiment and brigade, division headquarters, corps headquarters, army headquarters, district headquarters, as well as other military organizations are also parts.
*terms military unit and the military unit do not mean exactly the same thing. The term "military unit" is used as a general designation, without specifics. If we are talking about a specific regiment, brigade, etc., then the term "military unit" is used. Usually, its number is also mentioned next: "military unit 74292" (but you can not use "military unit 74292") or in short - military unit 74292.

Weakness and failure of the brigade structure

Today, it is already quite obvious that the initiated organizational reform had no other content than a large-scale reduction in the officer corps and the maximum “compression” of the existing structure of the Armed Forces to a size that allows it to function more or less effectively within the allocated budget.

. Why in the Ground Forces, the divisions that existed before 2008 were reorganized into brigades, reducing all control as much as possible and dismantling the existing regiments to battalions and divisions, while at the same time reducing to complete zero the entire mobilization structure.

At the same time, the "reformers" did not even try to somehow experimentally work out their proposals. First, all the Armed Forces were thrown under the rink of total reform, which took tens of billions of dollars, and then, when old army was dismantled, new brigades were formed, the "reformers" finally set about studying the combat capabilities of what they had succeeded.
. And here they were waiting very much unpleasant discoveries. It turned out that the “optimized” brigades in terms of their combat effectiveness did not even reach the regiments of the old state. Covered with all sorts of weapons, advertised as "newest" and "unique", in the course of all past exercises, they sadly consistently show their unacceptably low combat capability. Not once in the course of past exercises did the higher headquarters and numerous advisers and inspectors manage to achieve coordinated, confident, energetic actions of a new-style motorized rifle brigade.

. If at the first stage extensions and deployments even if somehow it turns out to manage it, then as the tactical situation becomes more complicated and inputs arrive, the control of the brigade as a single combat mechanism is lost by the brigade command and a chaotic impulsive movement of troops begins.

As one of the generals of the headquarters of the Ground Forces sadly joked: actions at the exercises of new brigades are very good for studying the unsuccessful actions of Soviet mechanized corps in the academies in the first days of the war. A lot of chaotic movements, constant delay, loss of control and, as a result, the conduct of hostilities by hastily put together consolidated battle groups.

There are many reasons for this.

. Firstly, in brigades, in comparison with regiments, the number of officers has sharply decreased. If in a regiment for 2,000 soldiers there were 250 officers and 150 ensigns, then in a new brigade for 4,000 soldiers there were 327 officers.
. The number of officers decreased and, accordingly, management became weaker. Officers just don't get the job done. Especially at the brigade headquarters level. The combat command of the brigade is simply not capable of managing such a bloated structure. In addition, mass dismissals of officers with combat experience and length of service led to a sharp decrease in the already not very high level training of today's officers.

As confirmation, one can cite the words from the interview of the commander 693 motorized rifle regiment Andrey Kazachenko, who in August 2008 was the first to enter South Ossetia:

“Reforms had to be carried out. I completely agree here. Another question is how to carry them out? For example, I will speak from my point of view, from the side of the commander. What difference does it make who you command - a regiment or a brigade. On the contrary, a regiment is not as cumbersome an organization as a brigade is. Here in my regiment there were 48 officers and ensigns of the regiment's management. This is for 2200 people. And now there are 33 people in the brigade, where there are 3500-4000 people. What optimization are we talking about? Have we changed officers, or have they become gold with us? Or did they all immediately become professionals? As it was, so it remains .... "

. Secondly, the brigades turned out to be “blind” - the reconnaissance units that are part of the brigade do not provide full-fledged reconnaissance in its zone of operations. their strength and technical means absolutely not enough. Battalion reconnaissance platoons are not capable of providing full-fledged reconnaissance in the battalion's zone of operations, and the brigade's scant "reconnaissance battalion" is not capable of not only providing them with effective assistance, but simply conducting reconnaissance to the depth necessary in the interests of the brigade.

And even the information received cannot be processed in a timely manner and brought to the brigade command, since the brigade management does not provide for any reconnaissance and information structure: neither a department, nor even a department that could analyze the incoming information, check it, systematize and bring it to the commander .
. All intelligence in the combat command of the brigade is represented only by the head of intelligence, an instructor-foreman and a civilian translator. Everything!

All this does not allow the command of the brigade, even during exercises, to receive enough information to correctly assess the enemy, and as a result, it does not allow him to correctly assess him and, accordingly, develop the right decision for battle.
. And this is when conducting military operations against a potential enemy, technologically equal to the level of our army. What can we say about the conduct of combat against similar units of technologically advanced armies? The capabilities of their reconnaissance, target designation and combat use exceed the meager capabilities of the “brigades of a new look” by an order of magnitude!

To understand the weakness and inconsistency of the resulting structure, you just need to put a similar US or NATO brigade side by side, which, in fact, should be “balanced” by our brigades, and compare their capabilities. But not by the number of barrels or heads, which for a long time no longer reflects the real combat capability of modern troops, but by combat capabilities:
- depth and density of exploration,
— information support,
- speed and accuracy of target designation,
- reaction time,
- communications and combat control.

In addition to problems with the combat capability of the new brigades, the another no less acute group of problems — "weight" of logistics. Having copied the brigade principle from the US Army, the "reformers" for some reason forgot to copy and American system rear support. Namely, it makes the “brigade” organization in the US Army work. According to her logistic support brigades are carried out by the divisions in which these brigades are organizationally included. The brigades themselves are structures that are focused only on the conduct of hostilities.

In our country, with the liquidation of divisions, all the rears were hung on the same brigades. As a result, as the chairman of the board of military experts, Major General Vladimirov, aptly described the resulting monster, instead of combat brigades, we got "ugly swollen regiments". Which completely lost the mobility and unitarity of the regiments, but did not reach the power of the division.

One of the arguments in favor of the transition from divisional to brigade structure was the experience of advanced countries. However, here too the reformers got it wrong. In the US armed forces, as there were divisions (mechanized, armored, infantry, etc.), they remained. The divisional structure also forms the backbone of the ground forces of the People's Liberation Army of China.

If we recall that war presupposes an armed clash with the enemy, then the combat potentials of the opposing military formations must be mutually comparable. In other words, the brigade is at war with the brigade of the opposing side, and not with its division or army. But this just doesn't work. For some reason, the normative zone of defense (offensive) of our "compact" land brigade turned out to be equal to the zone of application of the "non-compact" mechanized division - 20 km along the front.

In the event of a military conflict with an enemy whose armed forces structure coincides with the American one, converge in this band:
from the Russian side:
- two motorized rifle battalions

- two tank battalions

Tank battalion of the mechanized brigade of Russia

(perspective structure)

Two artillery battalions
- one reactive battery

from the side of the enemy:
- two heavy brigades
- two brigade groups
- one army aviation brigade
- one artillery brigade.

TOTAL:
- against 170 enemy tanks, we will put up 84 tanks;
- against 394 of his infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers - 263 of his own;
- 16 thousand soldiers and officers of a mechanized division will meet on the battlefield with 4.5 thousand soldiers and officers of a motorized rifle brigade of the Russian Ground Forces.

And to the above, we add that against 118 helicopters of army aviation, regularly located in the division american army(including 24 drummers), we will not post anything due to their categorical absence in the staff of the new look brigade. Let's add to this the little things:
- threefold superiority of the alleged enemy in artillery pieces and mortars;
- sixfold superiority in multiple launch rocket systems, etc.

/ V. Shurygin "GREAT REFORM OR BIG LIE?", zavtra.ru /

Rearmament, which will not be

Night launch of missiles by anti-aircraft missile systems S-400 "Triumph".

What actually will not allow to modernize the Russian army on time

Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis, doubts that the Russian army's rearmament program will be completed on time. And the main obstacle here is not corruption, but the substitution of military science for propaganda.

Quantity government programs weapons accepted in post-Soviet Russia are now even difficult to identify. At the same time, without exception, all programs, both in the "dashing 90s" and in the "blessed 2000s", suffered the same fate. Not only were they not fulfilled, but they were all abandoned in the middle of the term - precisely because of the obvious failure. And in return, new programs were adopted with new deadlines and ideas. After that, everything repeated. In particular, this happened with the 2007-2015 program. Until quite recently, all state media widely advertised it as "a new stage in the development of the armed forces of the Russian Federation", but now no one remembers it. According to the established tradition, this unfulfilled program "hit the ground" and turned into another new state armaments program (SAP) for 2011-2020.

20 trillion rubles - a minimum for the rearmament of the army

It is planned to allocate approximately 20 trillion rubles for the new program. As expected, the liberal public raised a loud cry about "exorbitant military spending" and "militarization of the country" on this occasion. This cry, to put it mildly, is not the case.

But the fact is that the armed forces have practically exhausted the Soviet resource, and they need a total rearmament. So total that in fact these 20 trillion will obviously not be enough. This is the minimum minimum, and not "exorbitant costs." Without total rearmament, we simply will not have an army. The international situation, as it is easy to see, does not stimulate disarmament in any way.

PAK FA fighter during takeoff at the opening ceremony of the international aviation holiday in Zhukovsky. Photo: Marina Lystseva / ITAR-TASS

In this regard, it should be noted that the "compact professional army" is another liberal myth, to say the least - amateurish nonsense. This is irrefutably evidenced by the experience of European armies. Their long-term permanent reductions are beautifully called optimization, but in reality it is just a loss of combat capability. In particular, the production of equipment and weapons in microscopic batches is completely pointless. Firstly, it is extremely unprofitable economically: the smaller the series, the more expensive each sample. Secondly, it is extremely irrational from a military point of view. If there is very little equipment, then it is almost impossible to use it in battle, both because of the lack of quantity itself and because of the inadmissibility of losses: it will simply run out. Moreover, now the Europeans began to lack not only equipment, but also ammunition, which also became very complex and expensive, so very few of them are purchased. Finally, experience shows recent years, almost all European armies are losing the opportunity to fight not only independently, but even collectively.

Europe is saved by the fact that there is no one to attack her, and intervention is a voluntary thing. The ironclad NATO discipline exists only in the imagination of Kremlin propagandists. Russia has a fundamentally different geopolitical position, it needs a large army with a lot of equipment. It is obvious that humanity is very quickly slipping into the chaos of the "new Middle Ages", which will certainly be accompanied by many wars between the old and new "centers of power" for a complete redistribution of the world. It is strange to assume that this process will bypass the country with the largest territory in the world and huge amount natural resources with a small population. Therefore, either complete amateurs or people fulfilling someone's order can talk about a "compact professional army".

Industry is not ready

GPV-2020 faces a host of serious challenges. The first of them is the state of the military-industrial complex, which should produce these same weapons. During the post-Soviet period, he lost many of the most important technologies, and he never had any at all. In addition, production capacities and personnel have been catastrophically lost. During the post-Soviet period, many enterprises of the military-industrial complex ceased to exist, and the surviving ones, as a rule, had a very worn-out machine park. There is nothing to say about the loss of personnel. As a result, a situation is now beginning to emerge where the industry, even with normal financing, is physically unable to fulfill domestic orders and, moreover, export orders. First, she often fails to master production for real. modern technology, because of which it is necessary to return to modernized Soviet models (Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, Mi-35 helicopters, frigates, project 11356, submarines, project 636). Yes, and how new technology it often turns out, on closer examination, again a slightly improved Soviet one (for example, the S-400 today, in fact, is a kind of S-300PM +, since the “long-range” 40N6 missile system has never been adopted for it).

Anti-aircraft missile system S-400 at a military parade on Red Square. Photo: Alexandra Mudrats / ITAR-TASS

Secondly, for the production of equipment in adequate quantities, there is not enough production capacity. Now plants are being built in an emergency order in Nizhny Novgorod and Kirov for the production of components anti-aircraft missile systems S-400. True, it is not very clear where the personnel for these factories will come from. Such problems are experienced by all branches of the military-industrial complex without exception. Consequently, building and equipping new enterprises and training for them can take a lot of time and money. Financing for the construction and modernization of factories may require no less than the rearmament program itself.

On the other hand, military-industrial complex enterprises raise exorbitant prices for their products, and the pricing scheme is not always clear. Because of such prices, the Ministry of Defense acquires such a small amount of equipment that it would be better not to buy it at all. Moreover, the increase in price is by no means accompanied by an increase in quality, more often it is the other way around. And, of course, a powerful corruption factor is superimposed on all this, both on the part of the Armed Forces and on the part of the military-industrial complex.

However, defense enterprises are far from to blame for everything. Often the customer, represented by the Ministry of Defense, is simply not able to clearly formulate the tactical and technical specifications for the weapons and equipment he needs. In general, over the two post-Soviet decades, the military-political leadership of the country has not decided on external threats in a different time perspective. And without this, the military construction of the army in general and rearmament in particular become in fact impossible. Because of this, various "miracles" such as "Mistrals" arise: it is still unclear what their purchase is - outright madness or banal corruption. The extremely expensive program of the fifth generation fighter T-50 (or PAKFA) is being made from the only consideration - “to be like people”, that is, like the United States. At the same time, the American experience so far suggests that the entire concept of fifth-generation fighters may turn out to be a dead end branch of the development of combat aviation.

The reform was carried out without any scientific study

Also, following the US, Russia really wants to create a network-centric army, which in itself is reasonable. But since the essence of this concept is completely unaware of the state, the currently created automated systems management for different types armed forces and branches of the armed forces are incompatible with each other, respectively, the money spent on their creation is simply thrown to the wind. Due to a lack of understanding of what exactly the Armed Forces need, a completely paradoxical situation is emerging: the money has already been allocated, but what equipment and in what quantity they will buy has not yet been decided. Naturally, a fierce struggle is unfolding for this money using various lobbying and corruption schemes; as a rule, no one here remembers the interests of the army.

Such a sad state of affairs is largely due to the state of Russian military science, which today, with rare exceptions, is not only unable to create new concepts, but has practically lost the ability to even analyze foreign ones. Moreover, even the descriptive function of military science is almost no longer fulfilled, with the exception of certain questions of a technical nature. In fact, most of the work in the field of military science in Russia is not related to science at all, but is low-level propaganda.

A soldier with an AK-12 assault rifle. Photo: Pavel Lisitsyn / RIA Novosti

maybe someday it will

Accordingly, for military construction there is simply no scientific basis. A good example in this case is the military reform of ex-Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov. As a result of this reform, the armed forces underwent grandiose changes (mostly negative, although there were positive aspects), but neither its authors, nor its real goals, nor the criteria by which the transformations were carried out are still known. In fact, the then Chief of the General Staff, Makarov, frankly admitted that the reform was carried out without any scientific study.

Apparently, at Russian economy Today, significant problems begin that may affect the implementation of the SAP-2020 in the direction of reduction. But on this moment the main problem is not money, but the state of industry and science. Arms imports will definitely not save Russia, simply because modern weapons no one will sell it. Industry and technology can still be bought to a certain extent, although it is very expensive, it is already much more difficult to raise personnel for it. But the hardest part is science. Today it is in it our bottleneck. You can't buy fundamental science. Moreover, without such science, even stealing or buying foreign technologies would be pointless, they still cannot be mastered. You can donate nuclear weapons to Paraguay or Mauritania, but they will not become nuclear powers because they can't reproduce it. In the 40s, the USSR, in fact, "borrowed" nuclear weapons from the United States, but this only happened because Soviet science instantly "mastered" this technology.

In this regard, the situation has drastically worsened compared to the Soviet period. The point is not only and not so much in the destruction of schools and the loss of developments, but in the anti-scientific social atmosphere. The current forced clericalization of society is exceptionally dangerous, primarily because it destroys the scientific worldview; against the backdrop of a rapid decline in the average and higher education agitprop does not in any way contribute to the emergence and, moreover, to the retention of scientific personnel. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for us to fulfill SAP-2020. Most likely, in a couple of years it will magically transform into some kind of SAP-2025.

The three-tiered structure of the Russian Armed Forces

Now consider the question what changes took place in the Russian army during the two years of the Serdyukov reform?
. For some reason, the main visible manifestation of this military reform was not social transformations, not measures to improve the situation in the troops, but the organizational “shrinking” of the Armed Forces to a three-stage structure: battalion - brigade - operational command, in which the brigade became the main operational-tactical unit. Such traditional levels as regiments, divisions, corps and armies were completely eliminated.

To manage them in each district, from one to three operational commands have been formed.
This breakdown was presented to the Russian public as an “optimization” of the chaotic military structure that Russia had inherited from Soviet times. As confirmation, the figure of 1890 military units listed as part of the Armed Forces in 2008 was cited. After the "optimization" there should have been 172 of them. At the same time, it was emphasized that all of them would be 100 percent equipped with people and weapons and fully combat-ready. That brigades will become universal combat units from Kamchatka to Pskov.

Further more. The presence or absence of weapons and geographical features forced the "reformers" to change the already existing states in relation to a specific region and the basic set of weapons. As a result, today there are already at least SIX approved brigade states. But in reality, taking into account the various "amendments" to the states, in today's Armed Forces you cannot even find two identical brigades.
. That is there is no talk of any "unification", which the "reformers" were so striving for and how they argued for the rejection of the divisional structure. The resulting brigades are extremely heterogeneous in terms of numbers, organization and weapons. At the same time, no one remembers the promised equipping of them with new weapons. "New" now means just workable. We achieved this in the simplest way - all serviceable kits were removed from the storage bases and reserve warehouses and sent to staff these brigades.

On the one hand, of course, it’s wonderful that now the “new look” brigades have only serviceable and serviceable weapons and equipment, but on the other hand, what will happen to this equipment after its resource ends and it suffers the fate of those kits that were in service before? If the Ministry of Defense does not have money to restore the equipment that was in the regiments and divisions of the "old look", then where will they come from to repair the new one?
. And would it not be more reasonable in this case to repair that “old” one? After all, the current “re-armament” is not a transition to qualitatively new weapons and equipment, but only the “eating up” of the mobilization reserve, without which Russia simply cannot win a single more or less large-scale war.

As an example, take Far Eastern theater of operations(TVD).

In 1986-1997 the number of divisions in the Far Eastern theater of operations decreased from 57 to 23, tanks from 14,900 to 10,068, surface-to-surface missiles from 363 to 102, combat helicopters from 1,000 to 310, combat aircraft from 1,125 to 500. Process cuts continued after 1997, albeit at a slightly slower pace.
. As a result, before the start of the Serdyukov reform, 23 divisions were located here, but more than half of these formations were "framed" - that is, reduced in strength, and the total grouping of the Ground Forces consisted of about 100 thousand soldiers and officers.

Chinese helicopter pilots

For the transfer of reinforcements from the west, here we have one and only communication - Transsib. Its length (from the Yaroslavsky railway station in Moscow to the railway station in Vladivostok) is 9288 km. Wherein more than 1500 kilometers of this railway they go in close proximity to the Soviet-Chinese border, sometimes approaching it at a distance of direct visibility. Therefore, in Soviet times, the high military command never counted on it as a way to bring up reserves in the event of an aggravation of the situation in this region.

The bet was made on something else - in case of war, the Far Eastern group included in its warehouses and storage bases equipment, weapons, ammunition and ammunition for almost a million military group. Under a military threat, the ground military group deployed here could be brought up to almost 500 thousand in thirty days, and up to 700 thousand soldiers and officers in forty-five days, which already qualitatively changed the balance of forces in the region, given the continued technical superiority, and most importantly superiority in command and control at the operational-strategic level. Taking into account the strategic superiority of the USSR in nuclear weapons, covering the main economic centers with fortified areas, this made the war against the USSR a senseless adventure.

After Serdyukov's "optimization", the number of deployed troops in this region even increased by about 20 thousand people. It would seem that one can only rejoice, but at the same time, the entire mobilization part of our military group has been virtually completely eliminated. All "framed" regiments and divisions have been reduced and disbanded. According to the plans of Makarov-Serdyukov, only a few separate brigades can be deployed here in the event of war. At the same time, after the agreements signed by Putin with China on a hundred-kilometer demilitarized zone along the border and territorial concessions to China all our fortified areas were disarmed and blown up.

The point of permanent deployment of the northernmost MSBR in Primorye is determined in Sibirtsevo, and the southernmost MSBR of the Khabarovsk Territory in Bikin. Between them there are more than 400 km of the border strip, guarded by an electronic surveillance system of border departments with 15% staffing and abandoned military towns: Salskoye, Grafskoye, Vedenka, Dalnerechensk, Lazo, Filino, Koltsevoe, Panteleimonovka, Lesozavodsk, Sungach, Knoring, Spassk, Chernigovka.
. At the same time, perfectly understanding the state of our Far Eastern grouping, the current Chief of the General Staff, General Makarov, cheerfully hypnotizes the public:

« Now the new brigades are ready not only for the immediate use of force, but are also capable of holding back any enemy for 45 days. This time is quite enough to mobilize and reinforce them with additional forces if necessary ...«

I remember that in our history there were already military leaders who promised Comrade Stalin to defeat any enemy with one powerful blow swiftly and on foreign territory. And then there was the forty-first year ...
. I'm afraid that General Makarov remembers very little the military history of his army and the fate of these "optimists" in generals' stripes.
. How sadly Far Eastern officers joke today: after the Serdyukov-Makarov "optimization" for the Chinese army, it will not be a difficult problem to defeat the Russian army. Finding it will be a problem...

How many people are in different army units? Not everyone will be able to immediately answer such a question. However, each tactical unit in has a well-defined number, and this is worth bearing in mind.

When going to serve, a young man must study in advance, at least in passing. After all, then it will be much easier for him in the service. And such basic things as the number of people included in a platoon, for example, or in a squad, are just included in the list of necessary knowledge.

Basic order: how many people are in the basic units of the army?

Even an ordinary private must understand and understand how many people are in army units up to about a regiment. Larger-scale concepts, such as a brigade, for example, or a division, have to be manipulated much less frequently. But still, it is not superfluous to understand what the corps, the army, and even the military district are also. However, let's start with the basics.

So how many people are department- everyone should know this. After all, the department consists of 5-10 people. It is under the command of a sergeant as the squad leader. A junior sergeant can also lead him.

Further - platoon, which can combine 3-6 divisions. By total number in its composition there are from 15 to 60 fighters. The commander usually becomes a lieutenant or captain, that is, such a unit is already headed by officers.

Company It has 3-6 platoons, with a strength of 45-360 military personnel. The commander is a major. In practice, a captain or even a starley who has successfully started a military career usually becomes a company commander. And 3 or 4 companies are already battalion. Also included are:

Headquarters;
A certain list of specialists - signalmen, for example, and so on;
Sometimes - mortars, air defense.

In total, the number of this unit can be 145-500 people. The battalion commander should be a colonel, but in practice the position is sometimes transferred to majors, captains.

Regiment- these are 3-6 battalions, that is, from 500 to 2500 or more people. After all, here in the state there is also artillery, air defense, PTB. Colonels and lieutenant colonels are considered as command.

Largest units

The brigade consists of 1-4 thousand personnel, representing a number of battalions, sometimes 2 or 3 regiments. She is also under the command of a colonel.

Several regiments can be combined into division, which also often includes artillery, air defense, aviation, rear services. The command of a division may fall on the shoulders of a colonel or a major general. The number is about 4500-22000 people.

Several divisions form frame with up to 100,000 members. The corps is under the command of a major general.

Further - army, which includes 2-10 divisions belonging to different branches of the military. Its size varies greatly, from 200,000 to 1 million people or more. It is under the command of the general staff, representing an object high degree responsibility.

Front- this is the concept of wartime, in peacetime it is called the district. Here the numbers can be even more vague. Much depends on the specific situation, the specifics of the region, and so on. If we talk about the front, here the concept includes our own schools, warehouses, reserves, and so on. The command of such units is the task of lieutenant generals or generals of the army.

As a rule, one front has control and 1-2 missile armies, as well as 5-6 armies, 1-2 tank armies. Maybe an air defense army, 1-2 air armies, special types of troops, rear formations and institutions. There is a possibility of strengthening the front according to the situation - various parts Sun, the reserve that it has Supreme High Command.

Other tactical terms used in the professional military environment

There are other terms that imply a certain number of military personnel. Yes, there is a concept subdivision, which includes various formations that are part of the military unit. So, a platoon or company, as well as a squad or battalion, are all subdivisions. That is, the part is divided into similar elements, hence the term arose.

As for the parts- This unit can be considered the most popular. As a rule, this concept means a brigade or regiment that has its own:

military economy;
Construction part;
address;
Settlement account;
Seal and number, both open and closed;
The right of command to issue written orders.

Thus, a part is a fairly autonomous entity, which is based on a certain territory.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that a military unit and a military unit are somewhat different things.

So, a military unit is not a specific, general designation. However, if we talk about a particular brigade, for example, it is necessary to use the term military unit. The same applies to the situation when the number is indicated - in this case, the military unit is also indicated. In addition, there is a written designation of the military unit, which is used as an official abbreviation.

Next is the term compound. It can only denote a division, because it involves the unification of parts. At the same time, the divisional headquarters is, according to the status, a part. He has subordinate regiments - other units. Together they form a division. However, sometimes a brigade also becomes a unit - if it contains separate companies or battalions that have the status of separate units.

Another important term is an association. Here everything can be considered as in the previous case, only on a larger scale. The association will already include armies, corps, districts. There is also a headquarters in the form of a part and a number of other formations that form general composition.

Instead of a conclusion

It is worth pointing out right away that there are no other official concepts in this category. These tactical units are generally accepted, and they are relevant for the Ground Forces. At the same time, it should be noted that the fleet and aviation have certain differences in this regard. They have their own hierarchy and there are other tactical units that are relevant in connection with the conditions that are present in these areas. Here there is the concept of a link and some others that allow you to streamline the actions of the commanders of individual crews, for example.

In general, the hierarchy and strict order of tactical units are necessary to maintain the combat capability of the army. Indeed, the basis of the success of its actions is always discipline and order, subordination. Without these key foundations, its very existence would be impossible.

It should be borne in mind that the number of different tactical units can vary greatly in peacetime and wartime. So, in a calm period, these units can represent a kind of backbone, staffed to a minimum. However, at the moment of need, with the activation of the activities of the military commissariat and in the conditions of a mass conscription of people from the reserve, they can grow significantly, reaching their maximum indicator in terms of strength. This property allows you to maintain defenses and quickly respond to any threat from the outside, increasing the number if necessary in a matter of days.