Reconnaissance firing line. "The contours of the war of the future": how the Russian army is preparing for a new generation of conflicts

MOSCOW, 12 Jan— RIA Novosti, Andrey Stanavov. A dense wall of powerful explosions rumbles up at the front line of the enemy and gradually moves into the depths of battle formations, sweeping away and grinding everything in its path. Large-caliber shells fall almost continuously. The fiery tsunami slowly rolls over neat grids of trenches and communication passages, dugouts, concrete defensive fortifications, guns and machine guns dug into the ground.

Behind is a burning field plowed with funnels, along which the tanks and motorized infantry of the advancing troops are already moving in a swift avalanche. They meet almost no resistance - the enemy is defeated and demoralized, and the bunkers are turned into piles of concrete and red-hot fittings. About the most formidable and proven tactics of artillerymen that leave no chance for the enemy - in the material of RIA Novosti.

fire dance

According to the official version, for the first time the Soviet command resorted to the tactics of the fire shaft in 1943 to support the breakthrough of the infantry and tanks of the 65th Army of the Don Front during the counteroffensive near Stalingrad. However, a number of sources indicate that this tactic has been used before. According to the author of an article published in February 1941 in the Smena magazine, it was thanks to the powerful artillery support of the Red Army that the Mannerheim Line was broken through during the Soviet-Finnish War.

© Infographic Tactics of the battle "Fire shaft"

© Infographic

"On Sunday, February 11, at 8:20 in the morning, the Russians began artillery preparation ... The power of the fire - about a hundred concentrated batteries - was so great that it can only be compared with the largest artillery battles of the world war ... In the most dangerous sector of Lyakhtee, the entire area, starting from the front line and two kilometers behind the baseline, was densely littered with shell craters," Finnish Colonel Yosse Hannula recalled that assault.

From a tactical point of view, the barrage method is a massive use of artillery against enemy positions, combined with the advance of mobile formations. They fire, as a rule, high-explosive fragmentation and smoke shells. Unlike the classical artillery preparation, which traditionally precedes each attack, in this case we are talking about the total "processing" of enemy battle formations from long-range guns, resembling a giant fiery skating rink. So that the stunned enemy does not have time to come to his senses and grab the machine guns, tanks and infantry are let in after the "skating rink". Moreover, they go almost close to the line of discontinuities. The scale and suddenness of such an assault demoralizes the enemy and makes it possible to "swoop" through defense lines in depth.

The most hard work while the gunners - they are required to conduct an avalanche of gaps synchronously with the advancing units. The intensity of fire and coverage areas are specified in real time. If the infantry gets stuck, the shaft is stopped, if it breaks through, they are moved further, into the depths of defense. In order not to cover their own, the firing lines are coordinated and discussed in advance. To concentrate fire, positions are usually chosen that are as saturated as possible with cannons, machine guns and mortars. The distance between the lines is 300-400 meters. Each battery is assigned its own section of the front. The barrage of fire, as a rule, is preceded by classical artillery preparation on reconnoitered targets, in the intervals between raids, "combing" fire is used to suppress point pockets of resistance that have withstood the first onslaught.

A scheme of false transfers of fire is also provided, when a flurry of explosions suddenly shifts deep into the battle formations. The defenders perceive this as a signal to attack, many lose their nerves - they begin to shoot feverishly. Prematurely opened return fire betrays camouflaged machine-gun and artillery positions. Spotters fix them and return the fire shaft to the front line. This procedure is repeated until all guns and machine guns are silenced.

Despite its high efficiency, the fire shaft method also has significant drawbacks. The main one is the need for concentration. huge amount artillery and ammunition in a relatively narrow breakthrough area. On average, about four artillery divisions were required per kilometer of the front, and this is more than 70 guns. Usually, such activity in war does not remain a secret for enemy reconnaissance and clearly indicates the area where the main attack is being prepared. In addition, shooting fast pace accompanied by a monstrous consumption of shells, which literally melt in arsenals.

I call on myself

The barrage in its classic form was taken out of service by Soviet gunners in the 1980s, replaced by a similar tactic, the so-called mobile fire zone method. This is about the same, only fragmentation shells are no longer exploding in front of their advancing troops, but ... right above their heads, in the air. Naturally, the line of attackers consists only of armored fighting vehicles - tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with infantry sheltered inside. A deadly hail of fragments and striking elements moves synchronously and, without harming the attackers, completely sweeps away anti-tank weapons and enemy manpower. On the front line, up to 95 percent of the defenders are affected, including those sitting in trenches.

“This is a very complex process,” Colonel Viktor Murakhovsky, editor-in-chief of the Arsenal of the Fatherland magazine, explains to RIA Novosti. “Before each such attack, a planned interaction table is drawn up, where all the elements for tasks, lines and artillery operation time are coordinated to within tens of seconds. The command to shift the fire of the first line is given by the commander of the advancing battalion, which is in a tank or infantry fighting vehicle.This requires a very high qualification of officers, a reliable system of combat control and high training of units.I want to note that the Soviet army has repeatedly managed to successfully implement such tactics in large-scale exercises . Even with units manned by conscripts."

According to him, the mobile firing zone method is a non-standard artillery tool. It is used in special cases when you need to quickly break through the enemy defenses in a strategic area without wasting time reconnaissance of firing points. To do this, the attacking unit is given several additional artillery divisions, which are removed from other sectors of the front. However, as the experience of modern conflicts shows, such emergency measures are now resorted to less and less. Artillery and rocket troops learned to work on goals more accurately, more economically and more efficiently.

Individual approach

“Today, artillerymen and tactical missilemen mainly operate as part of the so-called fire reconnaissance and strike circuits,” Murakhovsky says. “Roughly speaking, targets in the area of ​​responsibility of a unit or formation are hit as they are identified – online. This work is carried out continuously and pointwise, without the accumulation of artillery and shells. Such tactics are spelled out in most modern combat regulations. "

It is noteworthy that the introduction of automated combat control loops makes this process intelligent - after detecting and identifying a target, the system itself determines how to suppress it: for example, "put" a pair of 152-mm howitzer shells next to it or cover it with a salvo of the Smerch multiple launch rocket system . This takes into account many parameters, including the degree of combat readiness of the installation, the distance to it and the type of loaded ammunition - anti-tank, high-explosive fragmentation or cluster.

Although, Murakhovsky notes, in case of urgent need, Russian artillerymen can even now arrange a barrage of fire without any problems. Moreover, due to the introduction of automated systems, it is much easier to control the fire rink. Today they are in service and tested the latest artillery and operational-tactical missile systems, which hit faster, more accurately and farther.

Thus, the promising self-propelled 152-mm howitzer "Coalition-SV" can send a projectile to 70 kilometers, remaining inaccessible to enemy artillery. One self-propelled gun is capable of hitting a target simultaneously with several projectiles fired along different trajectories. "The sweat of the artillery saves the blood of the infantry" - apparently, this old soldier's saying will not soon lose its relevance.

MILITARY THOUGHT No. 11/2006

Chief of Staff of the MFA of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Major General S.V. BOGATINOV

Colonel I.B. SHEREMET

ANALYSIS of the nature of military conflicts of recent decades with the participation of armies economically developed countries shows that in armed struggle there is a transition from the traditional methods of conducting military (combat) operations with the confrontation of troops on the line of contact, in which leading role ground (land) groupings of troops play, to the so-called non-contact forms. They are based on wide application technical means reconnaissance and high-precision, effective means of defeating the enemy throughout the territory occupied (controlled) by him (to the entire depth of the operational formation of troops).

According to many foreign and domestic experts, future combined arms operations may be characterized by the following main features: fewer forces in a larger space, or, to be more precise, limited forces in an unlimited space; information warfare will play an increasingly important role, and therefore only those who win time will create information superiority, will be able to unexpectedly hit the enemy in the centers of deployment of his forces and achieve the initiative; the outcome of the battle can be decided at the last stage and become favorable only when the enemy is deprived of the opportunity to enter this stage in a state of high combat readiness. In this regard, the main tasks of the missile troops and artillery (RV&A) of the modern Ground Forces are: effective and reliable reconnaissance throughout the entire depth of the enemy’s defense around the clock and at any weather conditions; contribution to the assessment of the situation by the commander; mobile, flexible and accurate fire support; accurate and complete destruction of any targets throughout the entire depth of the enemy’s defense.

These tasks can be solved only with the interaction of command and control, reconnaissance and combat activity. That's why modern RV&A is a system consisting of command and control, reconnaissance and combat assets. It is part of the Ground Forces mission-oriented, mission-optimized, structured and organized system. From this follow the main reasons (processes, phenomena) that make it necessary to improve reconnaissance in the interests of fire damage (Fig. 1).

The joint use of formations (means) of reconnaissance and destruction in the form of a single continuous process aimed at destroying enemy targets with the required efficiency in the minimum time is the essence of reconnaissance and fire operations. These actions are based on the principle scouted - destroyed. He involves a transition from the large-scale use of area-based weapons to the concept of highly effective selective strikes against vulnerable key elements of the vital systems of the armed forces and the military-industrial infrastructure of the enemy. For its implementation it is necessary close integration of forces and means of reconnaissance, fire destruction and comprehensive support, which, in turn, is impossible without automating the basic processes of collecting and processing intelligence information, making a decision to engage open enemy targets and preparing artillery fire (missile strikes) at them.

The main differences in the organization of reconnaissance in reconnaissance and fire operations from the organization of reconnaissance in traditional forms fire destruction of the enemy MFA is using the following principles:

a rational combination of centralization and decentralization in the management of forces and means of reconnaissance and destruction, which consists in the widespread use of such methods of using RV&A as the integration of forces and means of reconnaissance with weapons and actions against maneuver-fire scheme;

usage zone-object method planning for reconnaissance and fire engagement of the enemy, which consists in assigning for each instance a zone of responsibility for reconnaissance and engagement of the specified types of enemy targets;

the shortest possible time for bringing information about uncovered objects to the authorities concerned (authorities that make a decision to kill, forces and means that carry out fire damage), which makes it possible to implement the basic principle of using MFA - scouted- struck;

balance of the reconnaissance-fire system (ROS), which consists in the correspondence of the capabilities of reconnaissance forces and means to the capabilities of fire weapons;

Availability single information space in the ROS of a combined-arms formation, which involves the organization of authorized access to intelligence information in real time for all interested consumers, both in higher and lower levels of command and control.

Rice. 1. Reasons for the need to improve reconnaissance in the interests of fire damage

At present, the main directions in the development of the RV&A weapon system, which determine the prospective image of the reconnaissance means (material base) subsystem, are the creation of high-precision weapons (HTO), the formation of interspecific temporary reconnaissance and fire (strike) circuits (VRO (U) K), as well as in the integration of reconnaissance, destruction and support means on the basis of an automated command and control system of the armed forces. In accordance with these areas, the following requirements are being developed for the reconnaissance subsystem, which determine its appearance:

ensuring the use of the HTO (the possibility of opening the composition of the objects being struck, determining the most important and vulnerable elements in accordance with the accepted hypothesis of destruction, taking into account the state of the environment and other conditions in the area of ​​the target being struck);

compliance in the informational, technical and technological aspects with the degree of automation of reconnaissance and other processes that ensure the functioning of interspecific air defense systems (U)K (making a decision to kill, preparing for launch and firing, monitoring the results of using weapons of destruction);

timely communication to command and control agencies of intelligence information sufficient to make a decision to engage enemy targets that have been opened.

Despite the similarity of the above requirements, each of them carries its own semantic load. Thus, an analysis of the state and prospects for the development of the WTO shows that the functioning of modern and promising systems, WTO complexes, as well as precision-guided munitions are based on various information (energy, tactical, polarization and other) signs of the target. Therefore, whenever possible, one should strive to ensure that reconnaissance means have the ability not only to use, but also to evaluate the information signs of the target and, therefore, ensure the correct decision-making on the use of various types of WTO.

It is known that one of the main properties (advantages) of the WTO is the ability to selectively hit objects (targets). Therefore, the requirement for the completeness of intelligence information when ensuring the application of the WTO will, of course, differ from the corresponding requirement in the classical (existing) sense. At present, the completeness of reconnaissance information is understood as the determination of the minimum necessary list of the following characteristics of an enemy object, which allows it to inflict fire damage on it: the name (type, class) of the enemy object; its coordinates and dimensions (for a group object); the nature of the actions and the degree of concealment.

In order to realize the main advantage of the WTO, which is selective destruction, it is necessary that reconnaissance means be able to obtain not only the listed information, but also data about the composition of the object and the position of its most important (vulnerable) elements according to accepted hypotheses. Such information can be obtained by using reconnaissance tools that have a high resolution and a probability of recognition (selection) of true objects. Such means include mainly optical (opto-electronic) and radar reconnaissance means.

The main advantage of optical reconnaissance means in comparison with radar ones is a higher possibility of monitoring the results of the use of the HTO (assessment of the damage caused). Therefore, the directions of development of optical and radar means of reconnaissance should be considered a priority for ensuring the use of the WTO. At the same time, other means of reconnaissance (radio engineering, sound-measuring, seismic, etc.) can be used in the interests of the use of HTO, for example, as means of preliminary target designation. However, their application does not allow to control the results of the application of the WTO.

Automation of the functioning of reconnaissance assets is an urgent task for almost all of its types. Currently, the process of functioning (detection, recognition and selection of targets, determination of their coordinates and other characteristics of the object) is automated only for some reconnaissance assets. In addition, with the existing problem statement, the final decision to open an object (detection, recognition, determination of coordinates), as a rule, is made by the commander of the reconnaissance complex (means). At the same time, it uses a limited number of recognition features and manual or automated methods for determining coordinates. At the same time, it is known that decision-making on the basis of a set of intelligence features and the use of automatic algorithms for determining the location of a target can significantly increase the reliability of intelligence information. This is achieved by transferring and complex processing of intelligence information coming from various (dissimilar) reconnaissance means to a single data processing point (for example, a command post artillery reconnaissance). Accordingly, it becomes possible to form single information field in the zone of combined arms formation, which will improve the quality of the assessment of the situation and the validity of the decisions made by the command. Therefore, in the first place, it is expedient to automate the processes of functioning and transmission of intelligence information in complexes and reconnaissance assets that are connected to a single data processing point (artillery reconnaissance control point).

Based on the above priority areas development of the MFA weapons system and the requirements for the reconnaissance subsystem, the following main areas for improving artillery reconnaissance means in the interests of providing reconnaissance and fire actions of the MFA can be distinguished: improvement of the element base, methods of digital processing of intelligence information; introduction of new information technologies; creation of reconnaissance means using several detection channels; increasing the secrecy of reconnaissance. For all means of ground artillery reconnaissance topical issues are the automation of the processes of conducting reconnaissance and the transmission of intelligence information, as well as reducing the weight and size characteristics.

A promising direction for improving reconnaissance equipment is the placement of reconnaissance equipment on air carriers, such as artillery reconnaissance complexes with a guided projectile(KARUS), air reconnaissance systems with unmanned aerial vehicles(KVR with UAV), balloons(tethered helicopter platforms), which will lead to a significant increase in the reconnaissance range, the area being viewed and the weakening of the influence of the terrain on the technical capabilities of reconnaissance equipment. At the same time, almost all reconnaissance objects in the tactical level will be in the line of sight. The creation of KARUS and KVR with UAVs will make it possible in real time to solve the tasks of reconnaissance (additional reconnaissance) of enemy targets and maintenance of artillery fire, as well as provide consumers with video information about enemy targets for a real assessment of the results of the use of weapons of missile and military equipment, which is currently not carried out.

Availability of powerful computer technology, geographic information systems, appropriate software make the possibilities of control bodies practically limitless, including in solving problems in the interests of intelligence support for the MFA (Fig. 2).

Rice. 2. Tasks solved with the help of geoinformation technologies in the interests of intelligence support of the MFA

The implementation of these capabilities is necessary not only in the combined arms headquarters of the formation (connection), but also in the headquarters of the MFA (artillery) when planning the use of various (optical, radar, sound-measuring) reconnaissance equipment (complexes). In addition, with the introduction of geoinformation technologies, artillery reconnaissance planning by a higher headquarters (for example, a division artillery headquarters) can be carried out up to a specific reconnaissance means (complex), which will allow lower commanders (headquarters) to concentrate their efforts to a greater extent on preparing for the use of forces and means. intelligence. In fact, it is on the transfer of a number of functions in planning intelligence from lower authorities to higher ones, from the command and control bodies of the military branches (when forming temporary reconnaissance and strike contours) to combined arms bodies. Of course, this issue requires in-depth research, substantiation and elaboration.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the implementation of the proposed areas for improving reconnaissance will, in our opinion, make it possible to create means (complexes) that meet modern requirements, the use of which will ensure the effective conduct of reconnaissance and fire operations of the MFA in an operation (combat).

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The development of the Russian Armed Forces takes place taking into account the growing scale of the use of high-precision weapons and robotic means. This was stated by the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov. Technological weapons are actively used in new generation wars, which aim to undermine the state and the economy. The prototype of future conflicts is the Syrian campaign, where the West is actively using special forces, aviation and recruiting militants. What Moscow is doing to counter new challenges, RT figured out.

• Ministry of Defense of Russia

Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, said that the modernization of the Russian army is aimed at preventing new generation wars in strategic areas near Russian borders. Moscow is increasing the mobility of units and creating interservice groupings of troops capable of conducting combat operations in conditions of hybrid conflicts, Gerasimov said on March 24 in a report at a meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences.

“In order to ensure the efficiency and continuity of the fire impact on the enemy, reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire contours are being created. The requirements for the mobility of troops are being tightened. A transition is being made to a comprehensive defeat of the enemy based on the integration of the efforts of all strike and fire weapons into a single system, ”Krasnaya Zvezda quotes Gerasimov.

Accuracy and speed

Under the wars of the new generation, Gerasimov means conflicts using economic, political, diplomatic and military measures. An act of aggression is committed against an objectionable state “under the slogan of defending democracy”. According to him, the creator of this approach is the United States, whose policy is aimed at maintaining global leadership.

“Today, some military experts interpret the military conflict in Syria as a prototype of a new generation of war. Its main feature lies in the fact that the states that are opponents of Syria are conducting covert, clueless actions against it, without being drawn into a direct military conflict, ”Gerasimov noted.

• Military engineers of the combined detachment of the International Mine Action Center of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria
• RIA News

The Chief of the General Staff recalled that no state has declared war on the Syrian government. The intervention in the Arab Republic was carried out by using the protest potential of the population and the transfer of individual units. In particular, the West has created, subordinating them to its geopolitical interests.

In addition, the United States and its allies used a wide arsenal of high-tech weapons in the SAR - aircraft, drones, satellites, and various robotic means. According to Gerasimov, Western intervention in the situation in Syria "is only the contours of the most likely war of the future."

As the Chief of the General Staff emphasized, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must be ready for any negative scenario. Countries are the most vulnerable former USSR. That is why Moscow is strengthening the groupings of troops in strategic directions. First of all, the Ministry of Defense uses the potential.

“With this in mind, the development of the Airborne Forces is carried out as the basis of the rapid reaction forces. To increase their combat capabilities and ensure independence of action in air assault formations, tank subunits have been formed. EW units and unmanned aerial vehicles are being created as part of all formations. aircraft", - said Gerasimov.

Russia is also expanding the geography of basing aviation and navy forces, paying special attention to infrastructure in the Arctic. At the same time, when re-equipping the army, emphasis is placed on high-precision weapons, electronic warfare (EW), automated command and control systems, drones and other types of robotic equipment.

The main goal of changes in the Russian army is to prepare for counteraction the latest weapons, communications, reconnaissance and navigation systems of the enemy. In order to be proactive, the Ministry of Defense is improving the structures of command and control bodies and introducing modern software and hardware systems into the troops. Gerasimov noted that last years these measures made it possible to reduce the time of preparation for the combat use of high-precision weapons by 1.5 times.

• Start cruise missiles"Caliber"
• RIA News

“Work is underway to create an interspecific automated reconnaissance and strike system. Their result should be a 2-2.5-fold reduction in the time parameters for the cycle of solving a fire mission - from reconnaissance to hitting a target. At the same time, the accuracy of the defeat will increase by 1.5-2 times, the possibilities for targeting high-precision weapons will expand, ”the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces emphasized.

"The value of science"

Valery Gerasimov is considered a supporter of the introduction scientific achievements into the armed forces. Western media call the head of the Russian General Staff the main theorist hybrid war. Such a judgment is based on the report "The Value of Science in Foresight", which Gerasimov presented at the Academy of Military Sciences in 2013.

In particular, the Chief of the General Staff stated that Russian army should make a technological breakthrough by adopting robotic systems and intensifying research in the field of artificial intelligence. Gerasimov also urged "not to copy someone else's experience and catch up with the leading countries, but to work ahead of the curve."

PIR Center expert, military analyst Vadim Kozyulin believes that Gerasimov's current report is a logical continuation of the 2013 speech that made a splash in Russia and the West. The Chief of the General Staff summed up the results of military construction in Russia in 2017 and set new tasks.

“As far as I understand, in general, Gerasimov is satisfied with the current development of the army. in Syria with better side strength showed itself special operations, electronic warfare equipment, aviation. Russia managed to achieve major military and diplomatic successes. At the same time, the conflict revealed a number of shortcomings that helped determine the future vector of development armed forces our country," Kozyulin said in an interview with RT.

As the expert explained, today Russia is faced with the need to increase the pace of implementation of information technologies that are used in the course of combat operations. In the coming years, a system should be introduced in the Russian Federation that allows transmitting data on the enemy and the movement of troops to all levels - from the commander of headquarters to the infantryman.

• Russian drone "Orion"
• Company "Kronshtadt"

Unmanned aircraft expert Denis Fedutinov believes that Gerasimov paid significant attention in his report to unmanned systems. The appearance of heavy drones in the troops (projects "Orion", "Hunter", "Altair") will significantly strengthen the reconnaissance strike capabilities of the Russian army, including the group stationed in Syria.

"Plans to increase the use unmanned systems aimed at achieving several goals. Firstly, this is a reduction in losses among pilots, and secondly, a reduction in the time to detect and defeat enemy targets, as well as an increase in the accuracy of strikes, ”Fedutinov said in an interview with RT.

According to Kozyulin, speaking of new generation wars, Gerasimov meant Russia's need for strategic drones - they will not only provide target designation, strike, but also disable enemy communications.

“This is the most important link, which is so lacking in our troops. The speech of the Chief of the General Staff inspires confidence in the imminent appearance of this type in the army. military equipment", - the expert emphasized.

Currently, in NATO countries, precision weapons include:

guided missiles for various purposes;

guided and corrected bombs and projectiles;

reconnaissance-strike (RUK) and reconnaissance-fire (ROK) complexes.

Precision weapons - this is a guided weapon capable of hitting targets with the first launch (shot) with a probability of at least 0.5 at any range within its reach.

It follows from this that the WTO is designed to effectively and quickly, in comparison with conventional weapons, hit a target using a smaller amount of ammunition.

The most effective types of WTO ground forces in modern conditions reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes are becoming: in them, high-precision reconnaissance means and means of destruction are combined by an automated control system, which makes it possible to use reconnaissance data on a time scale close to real, and to hit objects in a matter of minutes after they are detected and an appropriate decision is made. What is the difference between RUK and ROK? If the striking element destroys the target by firing (for example, a barrel or rocket artillery), the complex is called reconnaissance-fire (ROK), but if it strikes (tactical, army aviation, launchers of tactical and operational-tactical missiles) - reconnaissance-strike (RUK). Therefore, reconnaissance-fire complexes are to a greater extent the means of tactical command, while reconnaissance-strike systems are the means of operational command.

All types of HANDs that differ in the class of targets for which they are intended have the same construction scheme, which includes:

means of reconnaissance (mostly airborne) and guidance;

control and data processing center;

means of destruction with automatic radio command guidance on the flight path to the target.

All elements of RUK are spatially separated and located on their own territory. A characteristic feature is the use of one coordinate reporting system, in which both reconnaissance and weapon guidance are carried out, which eliminates the inevitable output of target designation errors between means with autonomous, unrelated systems for measuring the location of targets and their coordinates.

At present, the US has developed and is operating reconnaissance-strike complexes "PLSS", "Dzhisak"; intelligence systems SOTAS and REMBASS. Let's take a closer look at American intelligence systems.

Helicopter tactical reconnaissance and target designation system "SOTAS" is designed to conduct reconnaissance to detect and determine the coordinates of moving ground targets, low-flying helicopters and tactical aircraft with subsequent transmission of these data to fire weapons located in the divisional area on a time scale close to real.

The advantages of this system of American military experts include:

the ability to conduct reconnaissance over a large area and beyond the line-of-sight range, as well as in any meteorological conditions day and night;

the ability to track the movement of enemy troops;

high efficiency in obtaining intelligence information.

The system includes:

four reconnaissance helicopters EN-60V (for round-the-clock reconnaissance) with an onboard radar station and equipment for transmitting data to ground reception points;

up to six information display points (displays) located at the command post of the division, brigades, command post of the artillery headquarters;

means for determining the current coordinates of EN-60V helicopters leading to this moment intelligence.

The system allows reconnaissance to a depth of up to 60 km in the division's zone when the helicopter is over its territory at a distance of up to 30 km from the line of contact between troops. Information about the enemy is transmitted at a distance of up to 75 km.

The EN-60V reconnaissance helicopter is a modified version of the UN-60A multi-purpose helicopter, equipped with radar and data transmission equipment. It has a maximum speed of about 300 km/h, a flight range of 600 km and a practical ceiling of 5800 m.

Target data received by the radar is processed by the onboard computer and converted into the form necessary for convenient and fast processing and display at ground stations. With the help of transmission equipment, the selected data is transmitted via radio channels to ground processing and display points.

Ground data processing and display can be of two types and differ from each other only in the amount of equipment. Both points are placed in standard C-280 containers on 5-ton trucks, while the main point is deployed on two vehicles, and the auxiliary one on one.

Information arriving at a ground point from the helicopter's radar is processed by a computer and recorded in a storage device, from where it is displayed at the operator's request on a tactical situation indicator.

The indicator provides the ability to perform the following functions:

selection of terrain areas with identified targets;

determination of coordinates;

introduction of operational information in a sign or symbolic form;

drawing routes and speed of movement of targets.

The helicopter flies over its territory at an altitude of up to 1500m. In combat conditions, 1-2 helicopters are on duty around the clock in the air. The main method of reconnaissance is in the hover mode of a helicopter. The radar station scans enemy territory to a depth of 50 km. Having identified moving targets in a certain area, the operator, using the onboard computer, determines their speeds, directions of movement and coordinates of the targets. The second method of reconnaissance is the movement of a helicopter parallel to the front line. It allows you to increase the destructive ability of the radar and increase the accuracy of target detection due to this.

Reconnaissance system "REMBASS" is designed to detect, locate and classify moving vehicles and enemy personnel in the entire zone of its operation, as well as transmit the collected intelligence data in real time to the combined arms commander.

The combat use of the "REMBASS" system can allow the solution of the following tasks:

observation of a certain area, an area of ​​several square kilometers, in which the movement of enemy troops is expected;

reconnaissance of possible routes of movement of enemy troops with the determination of the intensity and direction of his movement;

protection of minefields and areas not occupied by friendly troops;

monitoring approaches to protected objects (bridges, warehouses, etc.);

reconnaissance of targets and obtaining target designation data with an accuracy that ensures their fire destruction.

The "REMBASS" system includes:

reconnaissance and signaling devices (RSP);

radio means of relaying signals;

system control device and reflection of intelligence data.

Reconnaissance and signaling devices (RSD) are characterized by different ranges, the ability to classify targets and the ability to determine the speed of their movement. longest range actions are possessed by seismic RSP sensors. So, delivered by a 155-mm artillery projectile RSP type DT570, detects personnel at a distance of up to 50 m from the installation site, and vehicles - up to 500 m. The frequency of the target data transmitted by them is 10 seconds. With the help of sensors of magnetic and infrared types, targets can be detected and classified according to their speed of movement. The range of these RSPs when detecting personnel is 5 and 20 m, respectively, and military equipment - 25-50 m. The frequency of delivered or data is 2-10 seconds. The practical range of data transmission directly from the SRS to the system control device does not exceed 10-20 km. To increase it, and consequently, to expand the coverage area of ​​the system, repeaters are used in it.

Repeaters are installed manually or from aircraft and operate automatically. Their range is up to 15 km. In the case of lifting them to a hill or using them on board aircraft, the communication range increases to 60-100 km. The repeater antenna can be a standard whip antenna up to 30 cm long, or a spring self-deploying one, in which case its height can reach 3 meters. The total weight of the repeater is 15-23 kg. The built-in batteries of electric power supply ensure their automatic operation up to 30 days. The transmissions of each RSP are carried out on one frequency allocated for it. The radio transmitters of repeaters of all types are single-channel, therefore, when using one repeater to transmit data from several RPNs, a memory device is installed in it, which fixes them, and then transfers them one by one to the system control device.

The device for controlling the system and displaying intelligence data is usually used as part of up to four sets, which are placed on the vehicles of the combat operations control center of units and subunits serviced by the REMBASS system. Each device can receive data from 60 RPNs, however, only two devices arriving at the same time are displayed. These data are either displayed on an electronic scoreboard or printed on a paper tape. Headphones included with the control unit allow the operator to listen to the analog signals of the RSP, which allows him to more accurately classify targets.

The installation of the RSP in the depth of the enemy's position can be carried out manually by reconnaissance units and automatically when they are delivered to the required area by aircraft and artillery shells. The design of automatically installed RSPs provides for measures to disguise them as the surrounding area, and the directional antennas available for the devices orient themselves in the right direction.

Targets are detected by a sensor that perceives various signals (acoustic, seismic, magnetic, infrared, etc.) arising from the movement of enemy personnel and military equipment. Characteristics spectrum of signals are analyzed by a logic device built into the RSP, which determines the type of reconnoitered target (personnel, vehicles, armored vehicles. If signals from a vehicle are intercepted, then the logic device additionally determines whether it is wheeled or tracked. Then the coordinates of the target and its classification data are transmitted by the RSP transmitter to the device for controlling the system and displaying the received intelligence data located in the command and control center.

Modern concepts of warfare are based on the realization of the fact of the constant increase in the role of the information component of armed struggle, the rapid development of which in the near future will lead to a revolutionary change in all military affairs and, especially, the forms and methods of waging this struggle. One of the harbingers of the beginning of such revolutionary changes in the art of war is the announcement of the prospect of a transition to the so-called network-centric actions of troops at all levels of their application.

The essence of the concept lies in the conquest of global information dominance, depriving the enemy of the possibility of organizing countermeasures through the complete disorganization of state and military control systems, as well as the "one-time" incapacitation of the most important defensive systems and life support systems of the state.

All network-centric concepts of leading foreign countries are based on the possibility of organizing interaction and combining all disparate combat elements into subsystems, and then all formed subsystems into a single structure through the deployment of a "system of networks". Such an organization of interaction implies not only the unification of platforms, nodes, means, communication lines in the technical sense, but also the organization of cognitive interaction between personnel and controls.

According to military experts, the success of modern and future operations will depend primarily on the degree to which the participants in the operation (combat operations) are united by promising digital networks into a single information and communication space that provides effective management subordinate troops and forces. In this regard, the role of electronic warfare and disinformation as the main measures of organizing countermeasures is significantly increasing. The organization of effective countermeasures requires knowledge of the structure of the control bodies and the architecture of the deployed enemy communications system in order to identify their vulnerable elements, as well as an understanding of how the enemy uses these network resources.

The main form of integration of forces and means involved in defeating the enemy, which is most appropriate for the nature of current and future operations, is the combined-arms reconnaissance-assault system (RPS). It implies the coordinated use of reconnaissance and fire systems (combat systems), or "platforms", which are based on missile forces, artillery, air defense, and aviation, acting in the interests of a combined arms formation. In its turn, main task reconnaissance and fire systems should be deep highly effective fire destruction of enemy objects and systems, their electronic suppression by conducting systematic fire actions, delivering massive, electronic and fire strikes in the designated areas of responsibility for reconnaissance and engagement to the depth of reach of fire weapons on a time scale close to real.

The main tasks solved by the reconnaissance and fire system are:

• - maintaining the attracted forces and means at a level that ensures their timely readiness for the qualitative solution of tasks in combined arms combat;
• - effective defeat of the enemy in the designated areas of responsibility for reconnaissance and engagement (zonal-object planning principle);
• - generalization and analysis of situational data;
• - distribution of the range of objects (targets) of the enemy among the means of destruction in the areas of responsibility;
• - preparation and delivery of massed and concentrated strikes against enemy groupings, while determining the objects and targets to be struck, the forces and means involved for this, the time required to prepare friendly troops, the planned consumption of missiles and ammunition.
• - preparation of a proposal on the sequence of destruction of objects (targets) in case of insufficient number of forces and means of destruction;
• - preparation and transfer of commands to destroy enemy objects (targets) to units (fire weapons) involved in their destruction;
• - generalization and analysis of the results of the defeat inflicted on the enemy, presentation of data to the commander;
• - when fulfilling the tasks set by the senior chief, submitting reports to him on the results of the tasks.

The presence of a reconnaissance and fire system should allow the commander (commander) to exercise unmediated operational control of all disparate forces and means, regardless of their affiliation, operating in the zone of responsibility for reconnaissance and engagement of their formation. As a result, he can confidently and effectively:

• - manage groupings of troops and influence the combat operations of all combat systems to ensure success in an operation (combat);
• - personally delve into the issues of organizing interaction with the bodies that are entrusted with the tasks of combat support for the actions of this combined arms formation;
• - directly determine the procedure for their functioning in relation to the upcoming tasks of a combined-arms operation (combat);
• - personally supervise, when performing tasks of fire and other types of destruction, the actions of reconnaissance and fire systems in their area of ​​​​responsibility to defeat the most important (critical) objects (targets) of the enemy, on which the course and outcome of the operation as a whole depend;
• - periodically analyze the actions of subordinate troops (reconnaissance and striking systems of the lower level), immediately take measures to provide them with fire support in their area of ​​​​responsibility, hitting targets of a lower level;
• - supervise the actions of the second echelons and reserves.

At the control post of the reconnaissance and striking system of a combined arms formation, electronic monitors (scoreboards) should display in real time the position and condition of their troops with detail one step higher and two steps lower. It displays the combat mission of the formation in accordance with the developed operation (battle) plan, the combat positions of the attached forces and means and their combat resource, the main interacting bodies, the reach range of strike and fire weapons, the positions of the main reconnaissance systems and complexes with their range of action, areas where unauthorized fire is prohibited. It is important to display information about the enemy groupings being created and the intentions of his actions, as well as the nature of the planned and delivered missile and fire strikes against them (without detailing to the object or target). The scoreboard should display sequentially made decisions and the tasks of the operation (combat) performed in accordance with them.

The commander can request on his screen proposals on the situation or on the actions of the troops from any official directly from your workplace on the basis of Skype or touch (interactive) screens. In the course of combat operations, data on reconnoitred targets in the form of a formalized electronic document (target form) are received with their index on the central display with a display of their importance. For example, targets subject to priority destruction (PU, strike systems, artillery, etc.) are displayed as a set character on the display. Targets detected by reconnaissance and fire systems, within which reconnaissance and fire contours are created, are subject to immediate engagement with a simultaneous or sequential report for information to the established authority to exclude repeated fire exposure by other means. If the target index does not belong to this functional circuit, data about it are transmitted to the destination for defeat by its designated defeat subsystem. Data (target form) from the intelligence and information support system top level arrive on the display with their indices and electronic signature from the relevant intelligence agency. This confirms the accuracy and reliability of information about the target, the automated control system determines by the index for which consumer the target is intended, checks the possibility of hitting it in range, whether it is hit at that moment and whether it is in prohibited areas for fire impact, and using the touch screen discarded to the consumer. It is possible to distribute targets in automatic mode.

A variant of the functioning of the automated control system "on demand" is possible, which is a combination of equal in value, but heterogeneous forces. A feature of this architecture is that it consists of tools that have a narrow specialization (reconnaissance tool, control tool, fire weapon, etc.), but high quality for performing a specific type of task.

The military intelligence data of both its own and the upper level of command are sent to the intelligence control point (CRP). Here, information is divided into objective (target) information used in the event of a defeat, and information relating to the assessment of the enemy's active grouping. Reliable coordinates of targets in accordance with the catalog with their indices are sent to the center or group of coordination of fire damage for distribution according to the already disclosed scenario.