Relapses of the Cold War at the present time. Gorbachev condemns relapses of the Cold War

This article was prepared as part of the work under the grant of the Russian Humanitarian Foundation "Socio-cultural aspects of national security Russian Federation».

Contradictions of interests, sometimes reaching rivalry on the brink of war - natural state interstate relations. But the qualitative difference of the Cold War was that beyond this very line there was a threat not only of mutually assured destruction, but of the destruction of the entire world civilization.

The recently published book in Russia by Oliver Stone and Peter Kuzik, The Untold History of the United States, quotes the famous American historian Arthur Schlesinger, who suggested that in a hundred years people will find the Cold War strange and incomprehensible ... Our descendants will most likely be amazed at the inconsistency between the causes of the Cold war and the related readiness of the two great powers for mutually assured destruction. And if today we are talking about the Cold War again, this is only evidence that the lessons of history do not teach anyone.

The arms race and its rules

After the end of World War II, there were no disagreements between the USSR and the United States that provoke readiness for mutual destruction, just as there are none now between the Russian Federation and the United States. But the Cold War happened. Why? There were three main factors.

The first. Collapsing perspective military industry caused fear in the United States of the return of the Great Depression. To maintain military production, an external enemy was needed.

Second. The nuclear bomb gave rise to a belief in overwhelming military superiority over the entire world and motivated politics from a position of strength.

Third. President Truman, not being sure of himself, made concessions to the anti-Soviet forces and the military, who considered possible not only open nuclear blackmail, but also nuclear bombing.

These factors were enough to develop anti-communist and militaristic hysteria in a couple of years. Attempts by the United States to limit the zone of Soviet influence, contrary to the agreements reached on the post-war order of the world, forced Moscow to take retaliatory steps. The United States made full use of nuclear blackmail, and after the creation of missile nuclear weapons in the USSR, the Cold War was entrenched on a solid foundation of mutually assured destruction.

The most dangerous was initial period. The military, on the one hand, and on the other hand, considered nuclear weapons as conventional, but very powerful. Therefore, despite the horrific consequences of the bombing of Japan, its use was provided for in strategic planning. The United States then had an overwhelming advantage both in the number of nuclear warheads and in their means of delivery. Beginning with the Berlin crisis, American generals were not only ready for a nuclear strike, but also put some pressure on the country's leadership. General MacArthur, who commanded the American troops on the Korean Peninsula, proposed to strike either at the cities North Korea or the Kremlin. He outlined a new approach - the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an unsuccessful conduct of hostilities, which was put by the North Atlantic Alliance as the basis of nuclear planning. In particular, Washington has relied on tactical nuclear weapons.

Doctrinal provisions suggested its use in Europe only as a last resort, when defeat became inevitable. But a deeper analysis showed that such an approach is unrealistic. In the event of a military conflict, tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably have been used at the very beginning of the conflict, which with a high probability entailed the full-scale use of strategic nuclear weapons.

Understanding dangerous consequences The inequality of potentials of the opposing factions eventually led to the development of the Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). However, it was signed when it had already begun to lose relevance, and since the mid-1990s. the document was used for political pressure on Russia, which led to Moscow's refusal of the treaty.

The desire for superiority not only of conventional armed forces, but of nuclear weapons in the European theater of operations (theater of operations) led the USSR to deploy a significant number of mobile missile systems medium range. However, the United States found a simple and effective answer - they deployed a small number of Pershing-2 missiles in Europe, which had high accuracy and a short flight time to Moscow. There was a real possibility of delivering a decapitating blow. This was enough to force the Soviet leadership to sign an agreement under which medium-range missiles were destroyed not only in the European part, but throughout the country as a whole, as a class of missiles. The USSR had to eliminate three times more missiles than the United States. Huge amounts of money were wasted.

With regard to strategic nuclear weapons, the approach of US President Eisenhower had a significant impact on the arms race. Being a sober politician who knew the reality of war and had experience of allied interaction with the Soviet troops, he believed that the main thing was to ensure quantitative and qualitative superiority over the enemy. Appearance missile weapons, originally medium-range, due to deployment in Europe and Turkey, made it possible to significantly supplement the capabilities of aviation to deliver a nuclear strike. In fact, the foundation of the Cuban Missile Crisis was laid during the Eisenhower presidency.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis came an understanding of the danger of a policy of nuclear deterrence, corresponding to the methods of street hooligans - "to take on a fright." During this period, there were no technical capabilities to prevent unauthorized missile launches. “Fear” could manifest itself at the level of a junior officer who has the technical ability to independently use the nuclear weapons entrusted to him. It is noteworthy that in the Caribbean crisis, the nuclear deterrence factor turned out to be effective, despite the fact that the US potential was 10 times higher than the Soviet one. And this is also a lesson that should not be forgotten. The criterion of unacceptable damage, justified by McNamara, was intended for other states. For itself, apparently, the United States has defined unacceptable damage at the level of preventing a single nuclear explosion on its territory.

It is important not to forget one more instructive moment. Moscow, in addition to medium-range missiles, secretly deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba. But secrecy prevented the use of its deterrent potential. As a result, both President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara managed with great difficulty to contain those military and politicians who demanded an immediate strike and invasion of Cuba. If information about tactical nuclear weapons were known to the Americans, no invasion could even be discussed. It is not in their tradition to bear such human losses. Hence the conclusion - in order to achieve the goal of deterrence, it is necessary to maintain a balance of secrecy and demonstrative openness when measures are taken to change the combat readiness of nuclear weapons.

It was during the Caribbean crisis that the practice of direct contacts between politicians began to develop, and specific organizational and technical measures were taken to prevent a nuclear war. The fact that Robert McNamara was the US Secretary of Defense played a huge role in further building relations between the two nuclear powers. A sober-minded and highly educated manager, McNamara formulated the criteria for the necessary number of nuclear weapons, strategic stability and the relationship between the levels of development of strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

No less important was the fact that John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, despite the pressure of overly zealous politicians and the military, resolutely and clearly outlined the desire for a reliable peace. It was largely due to their personal efforts that the first agreement on nuclear arms control, the Ban Treaty, was born. nuclear testing in three environments.

The Caribbean crisis gave impetus in another direction. Both powers developed certain rules behavior that allowed the creation of a nuclear arms control system. Initially, it was possible to limit the growth of strategic nuclear weapons and missile defense systems, and then proceed to reduce them. This process continues despite the current problems.

Why did we return to the past

However, today both countries have reached such a level of relations that they are talking about the Cold War again. The West demonstrates strength (exercises near Russian borders, the transfer of additional heavy equipment to the exercise area, etc.), including those with signs of nuclear blackmail (relocation of strategic bombers to Europe for the period of the exercise, statements about the possibility of deploying American medium-range missiles in European countries under the pretext of Russia's alleged violation of the INF Treaty, etc.). Moscow is also acting quite in the spirit of the Cold War, and some manifestations make one recall its initial, that is, still poorly controlled phase.

What pushed us to the dangerous edge again? Without pretending to be a complete answer, we can only make a number of assumptions. Several factors are at work.

The first factor is external. After the collapse of the USSR, the United States continued to struggle for spheres of influence. And this despite the fact that all the presidents of Russia indicated their readiness to move towards rapprochement with the West to a level that did not exclude even the discussion of the issue of joining NATO. However, no one was going to talk about a real strategic partnership, partly because, in the wake of euphoria after the “victory” in the Cold War, the West did not consider it necessary to take Russia seriously, not believing in the prospects for restoring its potential. At the same time, however, they openly encouraged the former allies of Moscow, who did not get tired of talking about the presence of military threats from her side. The United States sought to consistently expand its influence throughout the post-Soviet space, on the assumption that the traditional Russian presence there can be ignored.

The above does not negate the gross mistakes made by Russia in relations with neighboring countries, and, unfortunately, the most disastrous course was in the Ukrainian direction, which became the detonator of the current deep crisis between Moscow and the West. Russia has been unable to find the right policy instruments in neighboring states, nor to strike a balance between its natural historical responsibility to the peoples and compatriots associated with it, on the one hand, and the need to maintain stability among its neighbors, on the other. And the consequences of these miscalculations will long influence the already complex process of the formation of a new sense of self in Russia.

Yet the policy of the United States towards the Russian Federation Russian society a significant potential for anti-American sentiment, including among the younger generation, who are not familiar with the atmosphere of the real Cold War. And this potential is becoming demanded by the Russian authorities in the interests of domestic policy.

The second factor is internal. Taken in the 1990s. an attempt to immediately step into democracy and a market economy led to a dangerous edge, beyond which the collapse of the state loomed. Crime has poured into power not only locally, but also at the federal level. The moment has come when the transition to authoritarian methods of management has become logically justified. Statehood was stabilized, but the strengthening of the state, in which corruption has taken strong roots, at the same time raised its level. The “protection” of business passed from the hands of criminals to the hands of security structures. "Manual control" came into conflict with the process of formation of a market economy. The accumulation of internal tension created certain threats to authoritarian power. In fact, by crushing the opposition, the authorities destroyed the potential for political development, giving the West a reason to worry about the revival of authoritarianism in Russia. Russian ruling class, in turn, used the accumulated anti-American sentiment, stimulating a patriotic upsurge on the verge of nationalism and the perception of the surrounding world as hostile. Russia's move to retake Crimea, in response to an active Western policy of encouraging regime change in Kyiv, has raised the level of support for the authorities to such an extent that the West has begun to fear a resurgence of full-fledged totalitarianism in Russia. There was a vicious circle.

The third factor is also internal. Both in the US after World War II and in Russia today, this factor is associated with the defense industry. The problems are, in fact, diametrically opposed. In the United States, the challenge was to limit the potential of the defense industry, but in a way that did not stall development. And in Russia, the goal is to increase the potential of the defense industry for the development of the country. In the 1990s there was no conversion of defense enterprises in Russia. Some of them took a wait-and-see position, getting out different ways, but losing qualified personnel, and the other part survived on technology Soviet period supplying weapons and military equipment to other countries. At the same time, the Armed Forces experienced a crisis due to the fact that obsolete weapons and military equipment were 80% or more. It was no longer possible to pull further with the beginning of rearmament. The critical situation is long overdue, and the decision was made during the global economic crisis and on the eve of the fall in oil prices. As a result, the task of rearmament has to be solved with an excess of the permissible share of defense spending (in European NATO countries, less than 2% of GDP). As you know, budgets developed countries the share of spending on defense is less than the share of spending on education and health care. We are forced to rob the social sphere in the interests of defense. Under these conditions, an external enemy is not at all superfluous for domestic policy. Anti-Americanism has become in demand, and patriotism has become easily transformed into a love of power.

In addition to the task of rearmament, the state probably tried to solve another problem. Privatized enterprises, having fallen into private hands, became the subject of real estate auctions, and not producers of goods and services. The state failed to solve the problem of stimulating production in small, medium, or large businesses, and hence the deepening of the technological gap. This is where the hope arose that new technologies could appear in the defense sector.

The resultant of these three factors has led to a situation where the Cold War is being talked about again. It is important, however, that two of these factors have internal causes. There is only one external factor - rivalry in the post-Soviet space. Therefore, there is every reason to talk about the complete inconsistency of the problems in Russian-American relations with the state of mutually assured destruction characteristic of the Cold War.

How to manage risk

The world has changed, and the main threats are now common. The aggravation of relations between Russia and the United States weakens their ability to counter real, not imaginary threats. However, unfortunately, experience shows that in practice rational decisions rarely prevail in big politics.

But if we proceed from the worst-case scenario for the development of Russian-American relations, it is worth paying attention to two components that took shape and were maintained during the Cold War.

Firstly, the tolerant attitude of the leadership towards representatives of the intellectual class, who (at least ideally) do not adapt to the political situation, are not subject to propaganda pressure and are able to critically evaluate the actions of the authorities.

Secondly, preservation and enhancement of joint experience and potential in the field of arms control, which is aimed at neutralizing the main danger - readiness for immediate mutually assured destruction.

Obviously, contacts between officials today are much more intense than before, thanks in part to modern means connections. Perhaps it was because of this that the impression appeared that the leaders of the highest echelon no longer needed contacts and discussion of problems with prominent scientists and politicians, and in general their role had diminished. But this is the wrong way. In difficult times for Soviet-American relations, the practice of Dartmouth meetings and other forms of contacts began. They supplemented the official interaction of the intellectual component with new ideas and non-standard solutions.

In addition, it is necessary to take into account the dependence of political leaders on the systems formed by them in many respects. During a period of growing tension, they find themselves under the pressure of public opinion, the previously created atmosphere of perception of the enemy and the patriotic mood for a decisive rebuff, the military, thinking in terms of readiness for an armed conflict, political forces that are not responsible for the situation, but demonstrating their determination, etc. All this pushes for decisions that have only a tragic outcome. Leaders like Kennedy and Khrushchev are far from always being able to stop the tragic chain of events. At the same time, representatives scientific world, not subject to political conjuncture, act actively in such situations and are able to stop the risky drift.

Secondly, the topic of arms control, primarily nuclear, is relevant in any development of events. The experience of the Cold War has shown that as long as one side has an advantage that theoretically allows one to count on military victory, there are always groups that try to direct the policy of the state to the use of force, including nuclear weapons.

The potential capabilities of non-nuclear means of fire and electronic destruction, cyberattacks are capable of creating conditions during a military conflict that motivate the use of nuclear weapons first. It is hard to imagine that any political leader would consciously make such a decision. However, Russia and the United States have in their strategic nuclear arsenals missile systems ready for immediate use, but vulnerable to the enemy's first strike. First of all, it is about ground complexes ICBM. In a critical situation, the leader may be faced with a choice - either to use nuclear weapons immediately, or to lose them and suffer inevitable defeat.

It is no coincidence that some experts started talking about the need to develop measures to prevent the country's leader from making such a responsible decision on the signals of the missile attack warning system (EWS) in a short time interval (5-10 minutes). In fact, we are talking about reducing the risk of using nuclear weapons. However, the decision under discussion is questionable. For example, it is proposed to reduce the readiness of those missile systems that are vulnerable to a first strike, so that there is no situation provoking their use after receiving information from early warning systems. But at the same time, long-range non-nuclear high-precision means are being developed.

At this stage, when Russia and the United States are bringing their strategic nuclear weapons into line with the START-3 treaty, it is unlikely that negotiations will begin on further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, especially since Russia is talking about the need to switch to a multilateral reduction format, which in the near future will also unlikely. The unresolved problem of missile defense also has an effect. It goes beyond the framework of Russian-American relations and affects the interests of China, i.e. has a negative impact on the possibility of transition to a multilateral format of nuclear arms reduction.

At the same time, the task of reducing the risks of using nuclear weapons is relevant for all nuclear states and allows for a multilateral discussion format. The first steps can be simple and effective, followed by Russia and the United States, and quite acceptable to the rest of the nuclear states. This is a separate topic, but the approach to it can be identified.

There is every reason to believe that in Peaceful time making a conscious decision to use nuclear weapons is impossible. This was ruled out even at the height of the Cold War. If, in the absence of an armed conflict, the early warning system gives a signal of a missile attack, then this can only be unreliable information. It can be caused by hardware failures, deliberate interference, changes in the state of the Earth's magnetosphere due to disturbances on the Sun, untimely receipt of notifications about planned rocket launches, etc. At the same time, in accordance with the accepted procedures of this kind, information must be brought to the attention of the highest official who has the right to make a decision on the use of nuclear weapons. With the continuing state of mutual nuclear deterrence, the deployment of the missiles of the other side at distances with a short flight time, the decision to respond to information about a missile attack must be made under time pressure.

In peacetime, when a surprise nuclear strike is ruled out, it is necessary to rid the top leadership of the alarming early warning information. But for this, it is necessary to create such conditions for the personnel servicing the warning systems that would allow either to foresee the appearance of false signals, or to determine the cause of this as quickly as possible.

An attempt to organize such work by early warning systems operators was made in 2000, when Russia and the United States signed a Memorandum on the opening in Moscow of a Data Exchange Center (DPC) from missile attack warning systems. The Center provided for the joint work of American and Russian personnel using national hardware, and subsequently a variant of their electrical interface. Even at the initial stage of organizing the work of the DPC, it could really free top management from considering deliberately unreliable information that could lead to inadequate decisions and the use of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to return to the ideas of 15 years ago, but not dwell on them. Both countries are building nuclear weapons control systems using space assets, which simultaneously perform the functions of the first echelon of the missile attack warning system and the means of transmitting command information. Safety essentially depends on the reliability of space systems for various purposes. Therefore, joint monitoring of the situation in space becomes an objective necessity. In addition, from the very beginning it would be expedient to involve representatives of other states, such as China, in the work of the Center. And this is already an element of a multilateral regime for the control and prevention of the use of nuclear weapons. From the idea of ​​creating a Data Exchange Center, it is necessary to move on to creating a joint Center for the Prevention of Nuclear War. And if we talk about lowering the combat readiness of nuclear weapons in peacetime, then, first of all, in the interests of using the process of restoring combat readiness to strengthen the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in a period of military confrontation.

After the outbreak of a military conflict, other factors come into play that affect the possibility of using nuclear weapons. At this time, additional measures will be taken to increase the combat readiness of nuclear weapons, the survivability of both it and the control system. It is important to consider a set of recovery and readiness measures that could be used to contain the further escalation of the conflict. To do this, such measures must be demonstrative, that is, sufficiently open.

Thus, the creation of a joint international center for the prevention of nuclear war would lay a fundamentally new element in the multilateral nuclear arms control regime. The potential deterrent role of nuclear weapons is increasing, while the risk of their use is decreasing.

On the whole, there are still no grounds in Russian-American relations for the resuscitation of the Cold War, balancing on the brink of mutually assured destruction. Geopolitical interests in the presence of common threats have clear boundaries of influence on the process of deterioration of the bilateral atmosphere. Nevertheless, the emerging trends do not allow us to hope for a speedy recovery. Therefore, the positive experience accumulated over the decades of the Cold War should not be forgotten.

Main events international politics in the second half of the 20th century, the cold war between the two superpowers - the USSR and the USA determined.

Its consequences are felt to this day, and moments of crisis in relations between Russia and the West are often called the echoes of the Cold War.

What started the cold war

The term "cold war" belongs to the pen of the prose writer and publicist George Orwell, who used this phrase in 1945. However, the beginning of the conflict is associated with the speech of the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, delivered by him in 1946 in the presence of American President Harry Truman.

Churchill declared that an "Iron Curtain" would be erected in the middle of Europe, to the east of which there was no democracy.

Churchill's speech had the following premises:

• the establishment of communist governments in the states liberated by the Red Army from fascism;
• the activation of the left underground in Greece (which led to civil war);
• the strengthening of the communists in such Western European countries as Italy and France.

Soviet diplomacy also took advantage of this, laying claims to the Turkish straits and Libya.

The main signs of the beginning of the cold war

In the first months after the victorious May 1945, in the wake of sympathy for the eastern ally in the anti-Hitler coalition, Europe freely showed Soviet movies, and the attitude of the press towards the USSR was neutral or benevolent. In the Soviet Union, for a while, they forgot about the stamps that represented the West as the kingdom of the bourgeoisie.

With the onset of the Cold War, cultural contacts were curtailed, and the rhetoric of confrontation prevailed in diplomacy and the media. Briefly and clearly, the peoples were told who their enemy was.

All over the world there were bloody skirmishes of the allies of one side or another, and the Cold War participants themselves unleashed an arms race. This is the name given to the build-up in the arsenals of Soviet and American military weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons.

Military spending drained state budgets and slowed down post-war economic recovery.

Causes of the Cold War - briefly and point by point

There were several reasons for this conflict:

1. Ideological - the insolubility of contradictions between societies built on different political foundations.
2. Geopolitical - the parties feared each other's dominance.
3. Economic - the desire of the West and the Communists to use the economic resources of the opposite side.

Stages of the Cold War

The chronology of events is divided into 5 main periods

The first stage - 1946-1955

During the first 9 years, a compromise was still possible between the victors of fascism, which both sides were looking for.

The United States strengthened its position in Europe thanks to the Marshall Plan economic assistance program. Western countries united in NATO in 1949, and the Soviet Union successfully tested nuclear weapons.

In 1950, the war broke out in Korea, where both the USSR and the USA participated to varying degrees. Stalin dies, but the Kremlin's diplomatic position does not change significantly.

The second stage - 1955-1962

Communists face opposition from the populations of Hungary, Poland and the GDR. In 1955, an alternative to the Western Alliance appeared - the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The arms race is moving to the stage of creating intercontinental missiles. A side effect of military developments was space exploration, the launch of the first satellite and the first cosmonaut of the USSR. The Soviet bloc is strengthened at the expense of Cuba, where Fidel Castro comes to power.

Third stage - 1962-1979

After the Caribbean crisis, the parties are trying to curb the military race. In 1963, an agreement was signed to ban atomic tests in air, space and under water. In 1964, the conflict in Vietnam begins, provoked by the desire of the West to defend this country from leftist rebels.

In the early 1970s, the world entered the era of "détente". Its main characteristic is the desire for peaceful coexistence. The parties limit strategic offensive weapons and prohibit biological and chemical weapons.

The peaceful diplomacy of Leonid Brezhnev in 1975 was crowned with the signing by 33 countries in Helsinki final act Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe. At the same time, the Soyuz-Apollo joint program was launched with the participation of Soviet cosmonauts and American astronauts.

Fourth stage - 1979-1987

In 1979, the Soviet Union sent an army to Afghanistan to install a puppet government. In the wake of aggravated contradictions, the United States refused to ratify the SALT-2 treaty, signed earlier by Brezhnev and Carter. The West is boycotting the Olympics in Moscow.

President Ronald Reagan showed himself as a tough anti-Soviet politician by launching the SDI program - strategic defense initiatives. American missiles are deployed in close proximity to the territory of the Soviet Union.

Fifth period - 1987-1991

This stage was given the definition of "new political thinking".

The transfer of power to Mikhail Gorbachev and the beginning of perestroika in the USSR meant the renewal of contacts with the West and the gradual abandonment of ideological intransigence.

Crises of the Cold War

The crises of the Cold War in history are called several periods of the greatest aggravation of relations between rival parties. Two of them - the Berlin crises of 1948-1949 and 1961 - associated with the processes of formation on the site of the former Reich of three political entities- East Germany, West Germany and West Berlin.

In 1962, the USSR deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening the security of the United States - these events were called the Caribbean Crisis. Subsequently, Khrushchev dismantled the missiles in exchange for the Americans withdrawing the missiles from Turkey.

When and how did the Cold War end?

In 1989, the Americans and Russians announced the end of the Cold War. In fact, this meant the dismantling of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, right up to Moscow itself. Germany united, the Department of Internal Affairs collapsed, and then the USSR itself.

Who won the cold war

In January 1992, George W. Bush declared: "With the help of the Lord God, America won the Cold War!" His jubilation at the end of the confrontation was not shared by many residents of the countries former USSR where the time of economic upheaval and criminal chaos began.

In 2007, a bill was submitted to the US Congress establishing a medal for participation in the Cold War. For the American establishment, the theme of the victory over communism remains an important element of political propaganda.

Results

Why the socialist camp turned out to be weaker than the capitalist one and what was its significance for humanity are the main final questions of the Cold War. The consequences of these events are being felt even in the 21st century. The collapse of the left forces led to economic growth, democratic reforms, a surge of nationalism and religious intolerance in the world.

Along with this, the armaments accumulated during these years are preserved, and the governments of Russia and Western countries act largely on the basis of the concepts and stereotypes learned during the armed confrontation.

The Cold War, which lasted 45 years, is for historians the most important process of the second half of the twentieth century, which determined the outlines of the modern world.

Recently, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili called the presence of two military bases on Georgian territory "a relapse of the Cold War." What did he mean? It is worth remembering that the adaptation of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 brought an end to almost thirty years of negotiations known in history as the disarmament talks. The doctrine developed at the time by American specialists provided for a reduction in the number of offensive weapons deployed in Europe (tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, combat helicopters and aircraft) of two European blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries - and its joint inspection. In 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Arms was signed, and it discussed the reduction of military equipment of both military blocs by a total of 43,000 units. But since the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after its signing, it became necessary to adapt this agreement to new realities, which happened at the Istanbul summit in 1999.

The Bitter Taste of Istanbul

I remember when the Georgian delegation returned from Istanbul, I could not even believe that Russia agreed to sign an agreement on the withdrawal of two military bases (Vazian and Gudauta) within a two-year period. After the disbandment and withdrawal of these units, the two remaining bases on the territory of Georgia were deprived of the main component - airfield services, without which military bases located on the territory of another country lose their combat effectiveness. The Russian authorities realized this mistake later, after the two military bases remaining on the territory of Georgia were actually under blockade - to transport military contingent, military cargo and fuel and lubricants railway didn't work at all. A year ago, after the expulsion of Aslan Abashidze, they lost the sea passage and the support of local authorities. Russian journalists visiting recent months The 12th Batumi and 62nd Akhalkalaki bases noted that the bases have long been living in withdrawal mode - buildings and structures are not being repaired, supplies have been reduced, military personnel work without much zeal in almost extreme conditions. Knowing all this, Russian experts no longer hide the fact that both of these bases - two remnants of the Cold War - are almost incapable of combat, and that their existence means anything to protect Russia's interests in the Caucasus is out of the question. Nevertheless, a certain risk still remains - it lies in the details. Sometimes, as you know, the devil hides there.

Factor of Russian military bases

As long as there are two groups of undetermined status on the territory of Georgia Russian troops, the Georgian authorities will always be tempted to try to reduce the existing military imbalance in this country, even if it takes some part of the state budget. Russia maintains significant combat forces on the territory of Georgia. According to the GRVZ data for 2004, Russia has two military bases on the territory of Georgia:

12th military base (in Batumi) - 2590 personnel, 70 tanks, 80 infantry fighting vehicles, 120 artillery installations,

62nd military base (in Akhalkalaki) - more than 2000 people, 40 tanks, 130 infantry fighting vehicles and up to 50 artillery installations.

It is significant that in terms of tanks and armored vehicles, Russian bases exceed the capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. And most importantly, these bases have been illegally on the territory of Georgia for 15 years already, in conditions when Georgia and Russia have not signed (through the fault of the latter) an agreement and have not discussed the principles of interstate relations. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Russian military contingent in Russia’s ally, Armenia, looks much more modest when it comes to the number of manpower and equipment: the 102nd military base located in Gyumri has 2990 military personnel, 74 tanks, 148 infantry fighting vehicles and 84 artillery installations .

Given that the Russian military bases in Georgia and its GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) played a fatal role in unleashing all our conflicts and overthrowing Zviad Gamsakhurdia, official Tbilisi has more than enough reason to close the gap and increase the combat capability of its own built forces with more modern military equipment, while these bases are on our territory. As the military says, reduce the likelihood of risk.

What will happen after the withdrawal of Russian bases from Georgia?

As you know, in order to close two military bases and prepare the appropriate infrastructure for them on Russian territory (although more often they talk about the South Caucasus), Russia demands four years from the Georgian authorities. But Russia sets one more condition for Georgia - troops of other countries and NATO should not be stationed on the territory of Georgia. Such a demand, on the one hand, is undiplomatic, and on the other, it looks infantile. It's like asking a neighboring country to remain neutral, not to establish diplomatic relations with some country, not to adopt a law that for some reason you don't like, and so on. But Tbilisi's response to this message is no less infantile: the Georgian authorities say that after the Russian bases leave its territory, the troops of other countries will not be stationed here. This is a disingenuous statement. After all, Georgia, aspiring to NATO, will never be able to refuse Washington - the main locomotive of this aspiration - the status of a base for any military unit. Moreover, there is already an agreement with the organization of the North Atlantic bloc, which grants the NATO military command the right to use Georgia's air, land and sea communications for the transfer of military cargo to Afghanistan. It is hard to believe that a country that has already sent more than 800 troops to Iraq, a country where American and Turkish military instructors have been training elite units for four years now, would refuse to give its territories to the military forces of its strategic partners just to not irritate Russia. If at one time even the government of Uzbekistan, hostile to democracy, did not do this, without giving up pragmatic considerations (fearing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism), why should Georgia become an exception - the danger of terrorism is less here, perhaps, or its budget will be damaged by an extra mass of greenbacks?

Of course, if the Russian bases are withdrawn, Georgia will provide its territory to some NATO member country at the first opportunity. And he will do it just as defiantly - against the background of banners, music and sensitive songs, just as two weeks ago the President of the United States George W. Bush was received in Tbilisi.

NATO Supreme High Command Europe announced in advance that it plans to carry out flights of the E-3 Sentry aircraft between February 23 and 25, 2004 to test the interoperability of the relevant NATO structures with the BALTNET airspace surveillance system. Despite the warning, Moscow reacted very nervously to the flights of NATO airborne warning and control aircraft along its western borders. Both the RF Air Force command and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern, and the official application for the participation of a Russian observer in these flights was filed in advance. In response to Moscow's application, it was said that the participation of a Russian observer in flights was impossible.

The development of international relations during the years of the Cold War was determined mainly by relations between the superpowers. Their rivalry was of a military-political nature, but at the same time, both sides sought to avoid an open military conflict, being uncertain of its possible outcome. This predetermined the cyclical nature of post-war world politics. The Cold War was a series of aggravations and softenings of international life. Relations between the superpowers escalated as they competed, but to a certain limit, approaching which both sides began to feel the fear of being drawn into a global war. Then they, as a rule, looked for ways to ease tensions and made compromises. However, as soon as a sense of security returned, the rivalry resumed with the same strength, and the course of events was repeated. warming and cooling diagram stages of the Cold War "thaw" "WARMING" AND "COOLING" Many American leaders have repeatedly declared the great importance of Soviet-American relations for peace. "American-Soviet friendship," Eisenhower noted, "is one of the cornerstones on which the edifice of peace must be built." The Soviet side has repeatedly stated that the USSR attaches great importance to the improvement of relations between the two powers. great importance. At the beginning of 1959, an extraordinary XXI Congress The CPSU stated: “In the matter of defusing international tension, especially importance has improved relations between the US and the Soviet Union.” At the same time, while recognizing the improvement in Soviet-American relations, the US ruling circles turned out in practice to be unprepared to abandon the decrepit dogmas of the Cold War. The powerful inertia of the anti-Soviet foreign policy pursued throughout the entire post-war period. The leaders of American foreign policy still had illusions about the possibility of a forceful solution to the problems of Soviet-American relations. However, these illusions gradually weakened as the correlation of forces between the USSR and the USA changed and military-strategic parity was formed. In August 1959, a message was published on an agreement on an exchange of visits by the heads of government of the USSR and the USA. In pursuance of this agreement, in September 1959, official visit in the USA, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. S. Khrushchev. This trip aroused great interest among the American public. The communique of views on the results of the talks noted that the parties exchanged views on a wide range of international issues requiring urgent solutions, including general disarmament and the elimination of the consequences of the Second World War. Questions of trade and expansion of contacts between the USSR and the USA were also touched upon. Later, in December 1959, through diplomatic channels, an agreement was reached on convening in Paris in mid-May 1960 a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France. However, the emerging trend was fragile and short-lived. Cold War inertia”, relapses of “power politics” soon made themselves felt. May 1, 1960 in violation of all norms international law An American U-2 spy plane violated Soviet airspace and was shot down near Sverdlovsk. The US government not only did not apologize for this provocative act, but also stated that such flights would continue. As a result, the summit meeting in Paris was disrupted. The agreement on Eisenhower's responsible visit to the USSR was not implemented either. Again came the so-called "cooling" in foreign affairs between the USSR and the USA.

DIAGRAM - PERIODS OF CONFRONTATION AND WARMING STAGE I. The downward wave of the first stage - the period from 1947-1953. The upward wave of the first stage - the period from 1953-1960. II STAGE. Downward wave of the second stage - the period from 1960-1969. The upward wave of the second stage - the period from 1969-1979. SH STAGE. The downward wave of the third stage - the period from 1979-1985. The upward wave of the third stage - the period from 1985-1991. Attention! This graph depicts three stages of the Cold War, by clicking on one of these stages on the graph, you will get information about this stage. STAGES OF THE "COLD WAR" The first stage of the "cold war" - the end of the 40s-60s. -- the extreme sharpness of the confrontation: Stalin's claims to revise the borders in Europe and Asia and the regime of the Black Sea straits, change the regime of management of the former Italian colonies in Africa; W. Churchill's speech in Fulton in March 1946 with a call to protect the Western world by all possible means from "the spread of the influence of the USSR"; "The Truman Doctrine" (February 1947). Measures to "save Europe from Soviet expansion" (including the creation of a network of military bases near Soviet borders). The main doctrines are those of "containment" and "rejection" of communism; the creation by the Soviet Union (based on local communist parties and Soviet military bases) of a pro-Soviet bloc of Eastern European countries, the reproduction of the Soviet model of development in these countries; "Iron Curtain", Stalin's dictate in the domestic and foreign policy of the countries of the socialist camp, the policy of purges, repressions, executions. The apogee of the Cold War - 1949-1950s: the creation of NATO, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The confrontation between the two military-political blocs and the buildup of weapons, including nuclear missiles; Berlin Crisis creation of the FRG and the GDR; conflicts and wars in Southeast Asia (Korea, Vietnam), in the Middle East, in which the US and the USSR directly or indirectly participated. Caribbean crisis of 1962 (the world is on the verge of a new world war); entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968. The second stage of the Cold War - the 1970s. -- détente of international tension: treaties between the FRG and the USSR, Poland, the GDR. Czechoslovakia; the West Berlin agreement, Soviet-American arms limitation treaties (ABM and SALT); 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (attempts at peaceful coexistence of the two systems, its complexity and contradictions); military-political parity between the USSR and the USA. The third stage - the end of the 1970s - the middle of the 1980s. : the end of detente, a new aggravation of the international confrontation between the two systems; deterioration of Soviet-American relations, new round arms race, American program SDI; the growth of US interference in the politics of the countries of the Middle East and Latin America; input Soviet troops to Afghanistan; "Brezhnev's doctrine" - limiting the sovereignty of the countries of the socialist camp, increasing friction within it; attempts to continue the policy of the "cold war" in the conditions of the crisis of the world socialist system. 1990s: Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia. BN Yeltsin is the first President of the Russian Federation. Sovereign Russia on the way liberal reforms. The August putsch of 1991 and the collapse of perestroika as an attempt at socialist reformism. Termination of the activities of the CPSU. The course towards the radicalization of reforms, the transition to market relations and a liberal political model. First steps to the market. "Shock therapy" and the aggravation of the situation in the country under the government of E. T. Gaidar. Contradictions and social consequences of privatization. Consequences of price liberalization for the population; depreciation of money savings, a 150-fold increase in prices, deterioration in the quality of food and the system of treatment. The decline in industrial production, the reduction in the number of workers, the crisis of the collective farm system, rising inflation. Strikes of workers, employees. Emigration of scientific personnel. The beginning of the stabilization of the economic situation in 1996-1997. End of decline in production. Entrepreneurship growth. Reducing inflation. Strengthening of the ruble exchange rate. The formation of the banking system. Growth in the number of joint-stock companies, private enterprises and banks. The beginning of the creation of a private capitalist structure. Dismantling the obsolete command and administrative system and the transition to economic methods of regulation. The growth of foreign trade and the integration of Russia into the world economy. The growth of the consumer market. Formation of the political system of the Russian Federation. Establishment of relations with the subjects of the Federation. The desire to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia. The fight against crime and terrorism. Development of glasnost, political pluralism, multi-party system. Creation of a new system of laws. Broad democratization of the entire life of society. "Thaw" In March 1953, Stalin died, and a leadership led by N. Khrushchev came to power in the Kremlin. It condemned Stalinism in all its bloody manifestations and went for a certain liberalization of the regime. Significant adjustments have also been made to foreign policy. Moscow immediately put an end to the war in Korea, withdrew troops from Austria, stopped bullying Tito and other obstinate communists, made concessions to Finland, and, most importantly, seriously decided to seek a general easing of tensions in relations with the West. The changes were not accidental, caused only by the emotions and desires of Khrushchev. They reflected major changes in the country - a backward and illiterate Russia turned into a society educated people, with a complex, modern economy. It became impossible to rule such a state by the methods of medieval despotism, suffocating every initiative and living thought. The ideological mood of society has also changed - the era of revolutionary fanaticism has irrevocably gone into the past, the Soviet people who survived the terrible war longed for a safe, peaceful life, normal relations with the outside world. All this was reflected in the approaches and behavior of the new Kremlin leaders. They were dominated by fairly responsible bureaucrats who, among other things, were aware that a completely new era of nuclear weapons had begun. At the same time, Khrushchev and his entourage believed that, cleansed of Stalinism, socialism could become the most just social system. The Kremlin aimed Soviet citizens at the earliest possible construction of the highest form of socialism - communism. The population supported such a course, especially since at first things were going well in the Soviet economy, social and other spheres - it is enough to recall the launch of the first artificial satellite land, the annual rapid growth of GNP. In the sphere of international relations, the Kremlin's faith in the rightness was also influenced by the very behavior of Moscow, which, as already noted, the justice of social ideas was actively noted, energetically established contacts in and sincere (in contrast to the cynical and pragmatic "third world". For Americans, recently Stalin ) support for the national liberation and survivors of rough submission by Moscow to its radical movements in the "third world". Moscow on self-control of Eastern Europe, then triumphantly rejected colonialism and indeed there were communists in China, a war in Korea, activity is convinced that the liberated countries should follow the Kremlin in the zone of underdeveloped, young states, along a non-capitalist path of development, and the duty of the USSR is indeed, it looked menacing. help these countries. In 1956, an uprising took place in Hungary, which tightened Soviet foreign policy and caused a similar reaction in the United States and, in general, in the West. Moscow has again demonstrated its readiness to take extreme measures in order not to lose control over Eastern Europe. Washington showed that it was not going to put up with it, established itself in the rejection of Soviet communism, suspicions about Moscow's true intentions. Nevertheless, the movement of the USSR and the USA towards easing tensions gradually made its way. The threat of a thermonuclear conflict loomed before the two powers, they were affected by fatigue from costly and psychologically exhausting confrontations, pushed to this by the allies, world public opinion. In 1959, the first visit of a top Soviet leader to the United States took place. It was successful, and it seemed that the long-awaited era of detente had arrived. The coming to power in the United States of the liberal and full of strength John F. Kennedy inspired additional optimism in the prospects for Soviet-American relations. However, in practice, the "detente" that was just beginning was thwarted by two dangerous crises - over Berlin and Cuba. In both cases, Khrushchev considered himself absolutely right - he defended the interests of the allies in the GDR and Cuba and sought equal security with the United States. The Soviet leader acted harshly in the mentioned crisis situations, trying to neutralize criticism from the "hawks" in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and communist China (which turned from a loyal ally into an ardent opponent of Khrushchev's "revisionism"). John F. Kennedy, in turn, had to dispel American doubts about the ability of the young liberal president to stand up for the interests of the United States. However, neither Moscow nor Washington wanted disaster and found the wisdom to reach a compromise. As for the reaction of the United States (and after them the entire West) to the changes in the USSR, it was not very positive. The prevailing opinion was that the smiles of the new communist leaders could not be trusted, that Moscow was only camouflaging its former policy of communizing humanity. From high today it can be argued that the underestimation of the changes in the Soviet Union was erroneous. However, this reaction stemmed from a number of circumstances. By the beginning of the 50s. the entire US strategy was based on the Cold War ideology. The Washington elite (White House, Capitol, Pentagon, bureaucracy, etc.) participated in the development and development of this ideology. The "Cold War" was its brainchild, which the elite could not refuse, and even immediately, in a short time. Moreover, just then the United States sought unity from the European allies, an increase in the contribution to the armed forces of NATO. A powerful force that interfered to the white house take an unbiased look at the evolution of Soviet communism, was military-industrial complex. Generals and arms manufacturers were vitally interested in maintaining the image of a formidable and insidious enemy. Their power, influence, scale of access to budget money, etc. depended on this. Moreover, which is also quite natural for military people, the American military-industrial complex sincerely distrusted an already familiar enemy.