Rapallo Treaty signed by the RSFSR. Genoa Conference

In 1921, the Entente countries offered Russia to participate in an international conference, the purpose of which was to settle contentious issues regarding the economic claims of Western countries to Russian state. If these claims are accepted European countries officially accept Soviet Russia. The conference was opened in Genoa in early April. Twenty-nine countries took part in the event. Among them were England, Russia, Germany, France and other states.

The joint demands of the Western powers to Russia consisted in compensation for the debts of the Provisional and Tsarist governments (eighteen billion rubles in gold), the return of the property of the western region of the former Russian Empire. In addition, the countries of the West demanded the abolition of the monopoly on foreign trade, the opening of the way for foreign capital, and the cessation of revolutionary propaganda in their states.

In response, the Soviet government demanded compensation for the damage caused foreign intervention during the period civil war(thirty-nine billion rubles), ensuring broad economic cooperation on the basis of long-term loans from the West. Among the conditions put forward was the adoption Soviet program on the general reduction in armaments and the prohibition of the most barbaric methods of military action.

Thus, due to the mutual unwillingness to make a political compromise, the negotiations stalled. At the same time, there was a certain split among the powers of the West during the conference. The irritation of the Entente states at the lack of results at the meetings was exacerbated by the success of the tactics used by the Bolsheviks of "playing on the contradictions between the imperialists."

In between the plenary sessions of the conference, on April 14, 1922, on the outskirts of Genoa, the German Foreign Minister Rathenau and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia Chicherin signed a bilateral treaty (the Rapallo Treaty) on the mutual termination of claims. The renunciation of claims included the renunciation of reparation claims as well as the restoration of diplomatic relations. By signing the Treaty of Rapallo, Soviet Russia was recognized by Germany de jure (legally).

Due to its difficult economic and political situation, Germany was forced to cooperate with Russia. In addition, the Treaty of Rapallo carried out the task set by Lenin to split the ranks of the capitalist countries.

Later, in 1924, England, which was extremely interested in trade relations with Russia, was the first to officially recognize the existence of the Soviet state. Her example was later followed by France, Italy and other world powers.

Undoubtedly, the Treaty of Rapallo was a successful diplomatic step for Soviet Russia. As a result of the signing of a waiver by Germany, Western countries could not form a unified position on the issue of returning nationalized property to Russia. At the same time, the refusal of the Moscow government from Germany's supposed reparation share undermined the position of the French government, which continued to demand reparation payments from Berlin.

At the same time, the Rapallo treaty also had important negative consequences. With its signing, interaction between Russia and Germany began on an anti-Versailles basis. Military-technical, economic, cultural ties between the two countries began to develop rapidly. In addition, joint Russian-German training of military specialists began. Between Germany and Russia, despite the prohibitions of Versailles, a secret cooperation was established, which continued until the very advent of Nazism.

The Rapallo Treaty of 1922 gave France grounds to fear Russian-German relations.

Preventive war against Russia - suicide for fear of death

Otto von Bismarck

The Rapallo Treaty with Germany was signed by representatives of the Soviet delegation on April 16, 1922 during an emergency conference in the city of Genoa. This was an important step for both countries as it allowed them to emerge from the economic blockade.

Prerequisites for signing the contract

Despite the fact that in modern history textbooks, especially in Western ones, the significance of the signed documents in Rapallo is very great, and they had a huge impact on the whole political world of that era. In fact, we are talking about an agreement between two states that found themselves in world isolation on long years:

• Germany, due to the fact that they signed the Treaty of Versailles, which was extremely unfavorable for themselves, during which they actually lost their independence and were economically dependent on other world superpowers.
• Russia, which was represented at the international conference by the delegates of the RSFSR, headed personally by V.I. Lenin, from the moment they came to power, unsuccessfully tried to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the Western powers.

As a result, a rather paradoxical situation has developed, which no one even could have thought of a few years ago. The Rapallo Treaty with Germany and the USSR was signed major countries Europe under fear and strong pressure…

Talking about it historical event, many historians attribute it to a momentary impulse, which was poorly considered by the parties. This is not true. After all, negotiations began even before the start of the summit itself. As early as January 1922, the Soviet side was in Germany, where it held a corresponding round of negotiations.

Consequences of the signed agreement

The ongoing conference did not produce any positive results for either side. This was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks came to defend the interests of their homeland, while the Western states wanted only one thing - 18.5 billion gold rubles, which Russia allegedly owed for the supply of weapons.

However, on the night of April 16, 1922, the Rapallo treaty was concluded with Germany, which became known the very next day. The significance of this event could not be overestimated. In fact, this meant the lifting of the economic blockade of the RSFSR and the recognition of the independence of this country. Indeed, among the conditions of the agreement itself appeared:

1. dense economic cooperation, including trade
2. Establishment of diplomatic relations.
3. Renunciation of any economic claims to each other.
4. Recognition of the nationalization of enterprises on the territory of the USSR, including German ones.
5. Military cooperation as such was not supposed, although later the principles of mutual assistance in training and cooperation between armies were announced.

Parties that concluded an agreement in Rapallo

The Treaty of Rapallo with Germany was signed from the Soviet side by Georgy Chicherin (top picture), and German Walter Rathenau (pictured left). A small caveat should be made. In the document itself, Rathenau names the Weimar Republic as his country.

We see that the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany did not contain any significant restrictions that could affect other countries. It was a simple document between two parties. However, the reaction of the West was simply stunning. All as one, both politicians and the press began to talk about betrayal and literally force the Germans to break the agreement. It is even known for certain that Rathenau personally visited the Soviet diplomatic mission on April 17 with the sole purpose of persuading them to plunder the papers. But this was not carried out.

The significance of the Rapallo treaty with Germany for the young Soviet republic is extremely high, since it allowed them to obtain a document that actually recognized the USSR from Germany, which in turn had agreements with other countries. This meant the end of the international isolation of the USSR.

On April 16, 1922, in Rapallo, in the same Palazzo Imperiale hotel where the Soviet delegation lived, Chicherin on behalf of the Soviet government and Rathenau on behalf of the German government signed an agreement that became "one of the largest acts of international politics."

Both of its participants, as equal parties, mutually renounced all claims, public and private. Diplomatic relations were restored between Soviet Russia and Germany, and both states granted each other the most favored nation treatment.

The news of the signing of the Soviet-German treaty was an unheard-of sensation. "Bomb explosion", "thunderbolt", "mine planted under the conference" - these are the characteristic expressions of journalists who described the impression of what happened in Rapallo.

Georgy Vasilyevich rightly called the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo "the loudest event of the period of the Genoa Conference."

Despite all the unexpectedness and sensationalism for the Western powers, the conclusion of the treaty was the result of lengthy and difficult Soviet-German negotiations, which began as early as 1920.

Despite their interest in a treaty with Soviet Russia, the leading circles of Germany for a long time they did not dare to take a step independent from the Entente and did not go to an agreement with the Soviet government. Shortly before the Genoa Conference, G. V. Chicherin emphasized in one of his letters: “Rathenau, with its reparation policy and orientation towards France, prevents Germany from economic rapprochement with us and wants to subordinate it to the interests of France for the joint exploitation of Russia ...”

The question of the Soviet-German treaty G. V. Chicherin and his deputy M. M. Litvinov discussed with Reich Chancellor Wirth and Foreign Minister Rathenau during their brief stay in Berlin on their way to Genoa in early April 1922. Although there was almost completely the text of the Soviet-German treaty was agreed upon, the Germans nevertheless evaded signing and postponed negotiations until Genoa, hoping to secure more favorable conditions for themselves.

Already the first days of the work of the Genoa Conference deceived the hopes of the German delegates. They saw that main theme conference became the "Russian question". The Entente countries did not even want to hear about the softening of the Treaty of Versailles in relation to Germany and did not hide the fact that they would not agree to reduce reparations.

Informal meetings of the leaders of the conference with representatives of Soviet Russia at the residence of Lloyd George at Villa Albertis, where the Germans were not even admitted, finally convinced them that Germany was being kept aloof from solving world problems.

The Soviet delegation, headed by GV Chicherin, took into account these sentiments of the German delegates and skillfully used them.

Entering into negotiations with the representatives of Germany, our delegates carried out the task set before them by Lenin—to split the united anti-Soviet front, "to divide the bourgeois countries united in Genoa against us among themselves."

Fearing a possible agreement between the Entente and Soviet Russia without Germany, the German delegation was seriously alarmed. When on the night of April 15, on behalf of G. V. Chicherin, the expert of the delegation, A. V. Sabanin, conveyed an invitation to Virtu to continue negotiations on the treaty the next day, the Germans immediately arranged a meeting that lasted all night and received the name “pajama meeting” in the history of diplomacy. It was decided to accept the Soviet proposal.

On April 16, Chicherin and Rathenau, with the participation of experts from both sides, had a last stubborn discussion about the text of the treaty.

At 18.30 they signed it.

Georgy Vasilyevich later said: “Rathenau fled to Rapallo and hurried to sign an agreement, because he was afraid that England would agree with us and would no longer need Germany for operations against us. Last days before the Treaty of Rapallo, Rathenau continually asked us about our negotiations with Lloyd George, and we told him ... Then he ran to us in Rapallo, fearing to miss the time ... Wirth was a completely different matter, a healthy and deep instinct suggested to him the enormous importance of the line on us. When the three of us were walking in the park of the Eden Hotel, it happened that Rathenau ran off to put on another coat and grab an umbrella, and in these few minutes Wirth quickly whispered to me, which he could not say under the anglophile Rathenau, that he would draw a line against us even in spite of pressure England".

Huge historical meaning Everyone understood the Rapallo Treaty from the very first day.

Chicherin considered him a model for establishing satisfactory relations between two states with different economic systems.

Rapallo was a major victory for Soviet diplomacy and a great success for G. V. Chicherin as a diplomat. Commenting on this event, Keynes, a correspondent for the English newspaper Manchester Guardian, specifically noted that Lloyd George should not have forgotten the following: "Chicherin is one of the most brilliant diplomats in Europe." The Soviet-German agreement aroused the fury of the ruling circles of the imperialist powers. A variety of means were used to influence Germany, including threats, to force her to withdraw from the treaty.

On April 20, M. M. Litvinov reported to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs: the signing of the treaty with Germany caused a whole storm. The French delegation had been packing their things all these days. Lloyd George expressed even greater indignation, frightened the Germans and demanded that they renounce the treaty. There was a really tense atmosphere.

The American monopolists did not like the agreement either. As is known, the United States was not a participant in the conference, but it kept a keen eye on the progress of its work and was aware of everything that was going on in Genoa. The American ambassador to Italy, Childe, was present at the San Giorgio Palace as an observer. Having learned about the conclusion of the agreement, which he qualified as "the strongest blow to the conference", he launched an active behind-the-scenes activity, seeking to disrupt the conference. “I made it clear to Schanzer,” Child admitted in his diary published in 1925, “that the punishment against Germany for signing a treaty with Russia ... is just as deserved by the Russians and should be applied to them.”

The attempts of the imperialist circles to disrupt the agreement between Soviet Russia and Germany led to nothing.

Subsequently, G. V. Chicherin, in a statement to representatives Soviet press in connection with the two-year anniversary of the Rapallo Treaty noted: “The Rapallo Treaty was the end of the first post-war period triumph of the winners. Without the knowledge of the latter and against their will, this so important treaty between defeated Germany and the international pariah, Soviet Russia, came into being. Chicherin predicted that the principle of peaceful coexistence, which in the Treaty of Rapallo was given an "official form", was destined to play a "major role."

V. I. Lenin gave a high assessment to the Rapallo treaty. “The real equality of the two systems of property,” he noted, “at least as a temporary state, until the whole world has moved away from private property and the economic chaos and wars it generates to a higher system of property, is given only in the Treaty of Rapallo ...” 1

The subsequent period of the conference, after the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo, was full of stubborn struggle between the representatives of Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries.

Describing this struggle, Lloyd George in the preface to the book of the English historian Saxon Mills "The Genoa Conference" wrote: "Like the great dramas of the past, Genoa displayed the clash of two mighty forces, two passions, two opposing views, I can almost say, two worlds - the old and the new ".

In Genoa, the Soviet delegation worked very hard and intensely. Chicherin negotiated with the largest statesmen who arrived at the conference - prime ministers and foreign ministers: Lloyd George, Barthou, Fact, Wirth, Schanzer, Rathenau and others. Krasin and Litvinov met with big businessmen, bankers, representatives of oil trusts. Through V.V. Vorovsky, who was general secretary delegations, there were, as Georgy Vasilyevich said, "all sorts of negotiations ... the creation of new contacts."

prisoners different countries in the XX century, have become objects of close study of politicians and historians in the last two decades. Many of them have long lost their meaning and legal force. Of particular interest is the Soviet-German pact of 1939 concerning the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe. But one more important document is somehow forgotten - the Rapallo Treaty. It did not have a statute of limitations and is still formally valid.

Aliens in Genoa

In 1922 Soviet diplomacy made major breakthroughs in the field international relations. The world's first proletarian state was in isolation, the government of the recently formed USSR did not want to recognize the countries of Europe, Britain, the USA and many other states. The Soviet delegation arrived in Genoa in order to establish cooperation, mainly trade and economic, and to affirm a fait accompli in the world consciousness. A new state arose on the ruins of the Russian Empire; here is his flag - red, and here is his anthem - "Internationale". Feel free to reckon.

Very little succeeded on the first try. The head of the delegation, People's Commissar G. V. Chicherin, understood that it was necessary to look for allies, and among opponents, because there was nowhere else. And he found.

Germany after the crushing defeat of 1918 was a pariah country on a global scale. It was with this state that the mutually beneficial Rapallo Treaty was concluded a little later.

German affairs

Woe to the vanquished, this has been known since ancient times. Reparation payments imposed by the Entente countries on Germany crushed the country's economy, which itself suffered huge losses, human and material, for four years big war. In fact, state independence was trampled on, the size of the army, trade activities, foreign policy, the composition of the fleet and other issues usually resolved sovereign entities independently came under foreign control. An avalanche-like inflation raged in the country, there was no work, the banking system was ruined, in general, residents of post-Soviet countries who remember the early nineties, such a sad picture in in general terms familiar. In the early twenties, Germany needed an external partner, reliable and strong, just like Soviet Russia. The interest was mutual, the Germans needed raw materials and markets. The USSR was in dire need of technology, equipment and specialists, that is, everything that the countries of the industrialized West denied. The Treaty of Rapallo with Germany became a means of overcoming this foreign policy frustration. It was signed by Georgy Chicherin and Walter Rathenau at the Imperial Hotel.

Renunciation of mutual claims

In the Italian city of Rapallo in 1922, on April 16, an event took place that was important not only for Soviet Russia, but also for Germany. This was understood by both parties, who found themselves outside the economic and political world processes. The fact is that the Rapallo Peace Treaty was the first post-war international agreement concluded by Germany on equal terms. The parties made mutual concessions unprecedented in history. The Germans recognized as fair the alienation of the property of their fellow citizens (called nationalization), and the USSR abandoned claims for damage caused by the aggressor during the hostilities. In fact, the compromise was forced. Both parties understood the impossibility of collecting any damages, and preferred to come to terms with the real state of affairs.

Realism and pragmatic considerations formed the basis on which the Rapallo treaty with Germany was based. The date of April 16, 1922 marked only the beginning of the joint activities of the two countries that found themselves in international isolation. The main work was ahead.

Economic aspect

Germany before the First World War was considered the most industrialized country in Europe. It was here, in the place of the greatest concentration of the working class, according to Karl Marx, that the first proletarian revolution was to be born and take place. The defeat and the shameful conditions of the world seemed to put a fat cross on the industrial development of this state. Nevertheless, German firms, experiencing a serious shortage of raw materials and marketing and sales problems, continued to fight for existence. The significance of the Rapallo Treaty is eloquently indicated by the contracts that followed it. Already in 1923, Junkers undertook to build two aircraft factories on the territory of the USSR and sell a batch of finished aircraft, representatives of chemical concerns expressed a desire to jointly produce certain products (more on that later) on a joint basis, and also in the Soviet Union. The Reichswehr (which later became the Wehrmacht) made a major engineering order (more on that later). German engineers were invited to the USSR for work and consultations, and Soviet specialists went to Germany for training. The Treaty of Rapallo led to the conclusion of many other mutually beneficial agreements.

Military cooperation

Soviet Russia was not bound by the terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty, she did not sign it. Nevertheless, the young proletarian state could not openly ignore it - this would cause unnecessary complications on the diplomatic fronts, where the position of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was not yet very strong. Germany - under the terms of Versailles - was limited in the number of Reichswehr, did not have the right to create air Force and a full-fledged Navy. The conclusion of the Rapallo Treaty made it possible, in secrecy, to train German pilots in Soviet flying schools located deep in Russia. Officers for other military branches were trained on the same basis.

Treaty of Rapallo and defense industry

Industrial cooperation also covered the joint production of weapons.

The Rapallo treaty with Germany, in addition to the officially published text, had a number of secret applications. In addition, it has been updated several times.

The order for 400,000 3-inch artillery shells was fulfilled by the Soviet side. The planned construction of a joint venture producing OM (mustard gas) was not implemented due to the backwardness of German technology in this area. The Germans sold the cargo-passenger "Junkers", but when organizing a licensed assembly, the representatives of the company tried to cheat, supplying all the technically complex components already in ready-made. This did not suit the Soviet side, which was striving for the most complete development of advanced technologies. Further aviation technology in the USSR developed mainly on the domestic industrial base.

Result

The Rapallo treaty did not solve all the diplomatic problems facing the communist government of Soviet Russia, but it created a precedent for mutually beneficial trade and cooperation between countries with different political and economic systems. The ice broke, the process began, the issue of recognizing the new state as a subject of international law was resolved de facto for the first time. Already in 1924, diplomatic relations were established with Britain, Norway, Italy, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, France, China and several other countries. The results of the Treaty of Rapallo marked the path along which our country had to go through almost the entire remaining 20th century.

Significant events in the history of international relations and world diplomacy in the first quarter of the 20th century are the Genoa Conference of 1922 and the Rapallo Treaty between the RSFSR and Germany, signed during this international forum.

It should be noted that after the end of the First World War, financial obligations between the allies and reparation payments imposed on Germany in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles became serious European economic problems. Twenty-eight states were directly involved in these problems. The United States was the main creditor. The main recipients of funds - about 10 billion dollars - Great Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, who owe them. The amount of reparations imposed on defeated Germany exceeded 132 billion gold marks (33 billion dollars).

The Allies accused the United States, which insisted on the return of debts, of deepening the crisis in Europe and offered to partially write off (or completely cancel) the debt, pointing out that the provision of loans was the American contribution to the victory over Germany.

The problems of payments were repeatedly discussed at meetings in London, starting in May 1921. There was no unity among the Allied states in their approach to the issues of connection between the payment of inter-allied debts and the collection of reparations from Germany. While France intended to pay the debts of the United States and Great Britain from funds collected from Germany, Washington and London considered that German reparations were a separate issue. The British proceeded from the fact that the ruin of Germany impedes the restoration of the European economy, weakens trade and threatens British national interests.

After the First World War, the European economy was in deep crisis. To overcome it as soon as possible economic problems should be brought up for international discussion. To this end, on January 6, 1922, a session of the Supreme Council of the Entente opened in Cannes (France), the main issue of which was the convening of an international economic conference in Genoa (Italy) in March 1922 with an invitation to the delegations of Soviet Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

In order to consolidate the participants of the future conference, the resolution of the forum noted that “nations cannot arrogate to themselves the right to dictate to others the principles on the basis of which they wish to organize their internal economic life and their form of government. Each country in this respect has the right to choose for itself the system it prefers.” [Stein, B. E Genoa Conference. - M.: Glavn. Ex.State. Publishing house, 1922. p. 26]

Genoese international Conference on economic and financial issues was held in Genoa (Italy) from April 10 to May 19, 1922 with the participation of representatives of 29 states - Austria, Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, the RSFSR, France, Switzerland, Japan, etc., as well as 5 British dominions - Australia, India, Canada, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa.

The United States, which refused to participate in the work of the conference (note by Secretary of State C. Hughes of March 8, 1922), was represented by an observer, the American ambassador to Italy, R. Child.

The purpose of the conference was to find ways to the economic recovery of Central and of Eastern Europe. Russia was interested in achieving this goal as soon as possible. During this period, the Soviet economy was in dire need of foreign investment for its recovery, and the conference became of great importance for the country. [Mukhin I.V. Economic security of Russia and financial integration // Bulletin of the Moscow Humanitarian and Economic Institute. 2014. No. 1 (2), p. 69-74]

The head of the delegation of the RSFSR was V.I. Lenin, deputy head of the delegation - G.V. Chicherin, who in Genoa, where Lenin did not go, enjoyed all the rights of a leader. The delegation also included L. B. Krasin, M. M. Litvinov, V. V. Borovsky and others.

Before the start of the conference, the Russian delegation proposed to invite representatives of Turkey and Montenegro to it. The refusal to invite the delegations of these countries was justified by the fact that Montenegro had already participated in the elections to the Yugoslav Assembly and the delegates of Yugoslavia represent its interests. With regard to Turkey, it was noted that the conference is European, and Turkey is a country of Asia Minor.

Four commissions were formed for the work of the conference: political, financial, economic and transport.

The conference adopted the principle of representation, according to which all commissions included delegates from each of the five countries - the initiators of the Genoa Conference, as well as Russia and Germany. As for the remaining 21 states, several delegates were elected together from them to each commission.

One of the reports of the experts of the economic commission at the conference was devoted to the RSFSR. Some of the articles in the first chapter of the report contained the following basic requirements:

The Soviet government must assume all the financial obligations of its predecessors, i.e. tsarist and provisional government.

The Soviet government recognizes the financial obligations of all the authorities that have hitherto been in Russia, both regional and local.

All balances of amounts credited to one of the former Russian governments in a bank located in any country whose government gave loans to Russia are credited to the account of this government. [Genoa Conference 1922. Materials of the Genoeseconferences (Preparation, reports of meetings, work of commissions, diplomatic correspondence, etc.), M., 1922; The documents foreign policy USSR, vol. 5, p. 127-129. - M., 1961]

In addition to the recognition of all debts and the return (restitution) of nationalized enterprises, the report of experts in additional articles demanded the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade and the establishment of foreign nationals in Soviet republics a regime similar to the regime of capitulations in the countries of the East.

Thus, Russia was required to pay 18 billion rubles. According to the Russian side, the actual amount of debts of the tsarist and Provisional governments did not exceed 12 and a quarter billion.

How stringent the requirements were, can be judged at least by the fact that on the eve of the war the tsarist government paid almost 13% of the state budget, or 3.3% of the annual national income, on its debts; if the new government agreed to pay these debts in full, then it would have to pay a fifth of the annual national income and about 80% of the entire state budget of Russia at that time.

The proposal to introduce a debt commission and arbitration courts into the RSFSR was perceived by the country's leadership as an attack on its sovereignty. At the same time, the amount of interest that the country would have to pay was equal to the entire amount of Russia's pre-war exports - almost 1.5 billion rubles. gold.

In response to Western demands, the Russian delegation announced a counterclaim from the Soviet government in the amount of 30 billion gold rubles.

In this situation, the head of the British delegation, Lloyd George, made proposals prepared by the allies, one of which read:

“It must finally be established that no exceptions can be made for the Soviet government regarding:

a) debts and financial obligations assumed in relation to citizens of other nationalities;

b) the rights of these citizens to the restoration of their property rights or to compensation for the damage and losses incurred.

“The Russian delegation responded with a proposal to completely cancel military debts on the basis that the Russian people sacrificed more lives to the all-Union military interests than all the other allies together, they suffered huge property damage and as a result of the war lost large and important territories for their state development. And after the rest of the allies received huge increments of territories, large indemnities under peace treaties, they want to recover from the Russian people the costs of the operation that brought such rich fruits to other powers. [Genoa Conference 1922. Materials of the Genoa Conference (Preparation, reports of meetings, work of commissions, diplomatic correspondence, etc.), M, 1922; Documents of foreign policy of the USSR, vol. 5, p. 135. - M., 1961]

To prevent accusations of disrupting the conference, the Soviet delegation made a concession. She sent a letter to Lloyd George in response to the Allied proposals put forward at the Albertis Villa (Genoa, Italy), where representatives of the delegations of Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Soviet Russia met.

The Russian delegation reported that the current economic situation Russia and the circumstances that led to it, give Russia the right to completely release her from all obligations by accepting her counterclaims. But the Soviet delegation is ready to take another step towards resolving the dispute: it would agree to accept Articles 1, 2 and For of the above proposal, provided that, firstly, war debts and all interest on them are canceled and, secondly, that Russia sufficient financial assistance will be provided. The letter went on to say:

The Russian delegation also wishes to make it clear, although it goes without saying, that the Russian government will not be able to assume any obligations in respect of the debts of its predecessors until it is officially recognized de jure by the Powers concerned. [Genoa Conference 1922. Materials of the Genoa Conference (Preparation, reports of meetings, work of commissions, diplomatic correspondence, etc.), M., 1922; Documents of foreign policy of the USSR, vol. 5, p. 167. - M., 1961.)]

During the conference, on April 16, a bilateral treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Germany, which received the name Rapalsky at the place of its signing.

On the part of Russia (RSFSR), the agreement was signed by GV Chicherin. From Germany (Weimar Republic) - Walter Rathenau. The contract was signed without a time limit. The terms of the treaty took effect immediately. Only paragraph "b" of Article 1 on the settlement of public and private law relations and Art. 4 on the most favored nation came into force from the moment of ratification.

Under the treaty, both governments mutually refused to reimburse military expenses and military, as well as non-military, losses caused to them and their citizens during the war. Germany and Russia mutually stopped payments for the maintenance of prisoners of war.

Diplomatic and consular relations between Germany and Soviet Russia were immediately resumed. Both governments agreed to apply the principle of most favored nation in settling mutual trade and economic relations and favorably meet mutual economic needs. It was stipulated that the treaty does not affect the relations of the contracting parties with other states.

The first official assessment of the Treaty of Rapallo is contained in the communique of the German delegation, published in Genoa on April 17, 1922. It expressed the conviction of the German and Soviet governments that "by this treaty they had provided significant assistance to the main goal of the conference: the final restoration of European peace." [AVPRF, f.043z, op.11 "O", p. 109, d. 12, l.286\

The German delegation stressed the great importance of the Rapallo Treaty for Germany. In particular, it said: “The agreement with Russia was all the more important for Germany because in this case it was possible to come to a state of peace with one of the great nations that participated in the war, excluding the prospect of endless debt and allowing the restoration of normal relations, free from the burden of the past." [AVPRF, f.043z, op.11 "O", p. 109, d.12, l.287]

“The Rapallo Treaty was a bomb that exploded quite unexpectedly at the Genoa Conference. “This will shake the world! This is the strongest blow to the conference,” said the American ambassador to Italy, Childe, after learning about the Soviet-German agreement.

Two days after the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo, on April 18, 1922, the governments of the countries of the Entente, the Little Entente, as well as Poland and Portugal, addressed a note to Germany. In it, they accused Germany of disloyalty towards the allies, of violating the Cannes resolutions, that the German representatives "secretly concluded, behind the backs of their colleagues, an agreement with Russia." [Koblyakov, I.K. From Brest to Rapallo.Essays on the history of Soviet-German relations from 1918 to 1922 - Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1954. p. 123-125]

The main points in this treaty determined its political significance:

First, the mutual cancellation of all claims.

Secondly, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia.

Thirdly, the economic rapprochement between Russia and Germany, emerging from isolation thanks to the Rapallo Treaty.

Thus, Russia broke the ring of economic blockade, and Germany got the opportunity to expand its trade.

“The Treaty of Rapallo gave new grounds for Paris to fear the Soviet-German axis. The result was a new intensification of France's efforts to create an "irresistible wall" of anti-Russian and anti-German small states in the space between Germany and Russia. The attempt made in Genoa to bring a pan-European basis under the Versailles order was crossed out in Rapallo. [D.G. Najafov, sectionII, Ch. b Rapallo Treaty, with L 62 - in the book: System Historyinternational relations in four volumes, vols.I "Events 1918-1945"]

The text of the treaty does not contain secret military agreements, but Article 5 states that the German government declares its readiness to support the activities of private companies in the Soviet Union. This practice avoided compromising the German government, although the costs were covered directly by the War Office. Russia and Germany developed the Rapallo policy in the Berlin Treaty of April 24, 1926.

The agreement was also approved by German business circles. In this regard, the statement of the "German-East European economic union", which united several hundred entrepreneurs and traders. In its statement, this Union welcomed the Treaty of Rapallo, as it saw in it "the only way out of the current catastrophic state for a better future." [WUA RF, f. 048, op. 11 "o", p. 109, d. 12, l. 293]

Noting the importance of this treaty, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count W. von Brockdorff-Rantzau, wrote: "The Treaty of Rapallo opened a new era not only for the German and Russian peoples, and thus for Europe, but for the whole world." [WUA RF, f. 048z, op. "11", p. 109, d. 12, l. 294]

The Treaty of Rapallo was ratified by the government of the RSFSR on May 16, 1922, and by Germany on July 4, 1922. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Berlin on January 31, 1923. ["Collection of current treaties, agreements and conventions", vol. one-II, M.1928, p. 17),“International Policy of the RSFSR in 1922”, p.30]

HISTORICAL AND DOCUMENTARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY